

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_218893

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OUP--2272--19-11-79--10,000

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 394.0954

Accession No. 22315

Author V13H.

Title

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

REGIONAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES
(MAINLY INDIAN)

EDITED BY
N. A. THOOTHY, D. Phil. (Oxon)

HINDU SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
With reference to their Psychological Implications

“The dead, besides being infinitely more numerous than the living, are infinitely more powerful. They reign over the vast domain of the unconscious, that invisible domain which exerts its sway over all the manifestations of the intelligence and of character. A people is guided far more by its dead than by its living members. It is by its dead, and by its dead alone, that a race is founded. Century after century our departed ancestors have fashioned our ideas and sentiments and in consequence all the motives of our conduct. The generations that have passed away do not bequeath us their physical constitution merely; they also bequeath us their thoughts. The dead are the only undisputed masters of the living. We bear the burden of their mistakes, we reap the reward of their virtues”.

—Gustave LeBon : *The Psychology of Peoples*

(Quoted by H. P. Fairchild : *General Sociology*, P. 346)

HINDU SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

By

PANDHARINATH H. VALAVALKAR, PH. D., LL. B.

Khalsa College, Bombay

Sometime Lecturer in Sociology, University of Bombay

With a Foreword by

SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Kt., M. A., D. Litt., F. B. A.

Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford University

King George V. Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta University

धर्मो विश्वस्य जगतः प्रतिष्ठा लोके धर्मिष्ठं प्रजा उपसर्पन्ति

धर्मेण पापमपनुदन्ति धर्मे सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् तस्माद् धर्मं परमं वदन्ति ।

— महानारायणोपनिषद् २२. १.

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. LTD.

VULCAN HOUSE NICOL ROAD, BOMBAY

6 OLD COURT HOUSE STREET, CALCUTTA

36A, MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS

LONDON, NEW YORK AND TORONTO

1939

**PRINTED IN INDIA AT THE
BASEL MISSION PRESS (CANARAG LTD.), MANGALORE, S. K.**

All rights including those of translation, etc. reserved by the author.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

This series of monographs embodies the results of researches conducted by students working under my direction in the Bombay University School of Economics and Sociology, and by myself. The studies bear upon problems of human life in its various aspects—regional, economic, institutional, cultural and philosophical — with a view to advance constructive suggestions concerning the complicated problems that confront us at the present day.

Such an undertaking necessitates the treatment of facts and ideas in a scientific spirit and manner. Only patient investigation can yield results that prove valuable for the guidance of life. Every problem has its practical bearings. Hence, to understand a problem we must study it with reference to its past as well as its present, in order that we may be enabled to estimate its future. Vague and unscientific endeavours and conclusions are worse than useless ; for they not merely vitiate human efforts but frustrate purpose and aspiration, and paralyse our hope to shape the future.

And, in our own days, there is an urgent need for the kind of inquiries that the present series proposes to undertake and pursue. We are in the midst of an 'omnipresent anarchy of values' ; consequently, we are in a drift which bids fair to sweep the world to disaster. If equilibrium has to be regained and maintained, there must be a clear and adequate understanding of the fundamental facts, purposes, values and difficulties of human life. The humble aim of this series is to study and understand the various aspects of the human problem, and discover and formulate, or may be, rediscover and reformulate, a scheme of values that may become the basis of a more equitable and stable human order. One of our objects is to prevent loose thinking which is at the root of so much disharmony

VI GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

in the world of human relationships. It is the hope of Science that a disinterested pursuit of truth will rally human beings round the banner of its eternal values ; humanity might thus be brought together by recognising the common affinities and life-values underneath the seeming differences arising from regional and historical causes.

The problems of human life being various, the methods of approach are also many : philosophical, scientific and practical. In the series herewith presented, all these methods have been employed. There is a common purpose running through the labours of individual writers, however divided they may be on specific issues and details, however varied and even contradictory may be their conclusions. That purpose is to present the human problem in all its aspects carefully analysed and discussed.

Our ambition is to build up a body of systematic knowledge, at once scientific and of practical utility, which might help in the reconstruction of the future, and to organise a School of thought with an 'ethos' and a 'quest' uniquely its own. However partially the ambition and hope may be realised, we feel sure that what we are doing is worth doing, and that it is high time it should be undertaken by some of us in India.

The great dream of the Editor's teacher, Sir Patrick Geddes, was to build the City Beautiful, the New Jerusalem, as he called it. He is no more amongst us to dream, to survey, to build and to rebuild. But it is our hope and purpose that the master's wishes should be fulfilled, however fragmentarily and inadequately, by these humble efforts of those who have inherited a little the light of his spirit, and felt the urge of his indomitable will to strive, to labour, to plan and to achieve.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The present work was accepted as a thesis for the Ph. D. degree and is a result of Dr. Valavalkar's researches on Hindu Social Institutions, carried out under my guidance, during the years 1933-37, at the School of Economics and Sociology of this University.

Many books purporting to be studies of Hindu social thought and institutions suffer from three defects : (1) over-zealous and exaggerated statement on the part of votaries of orthodoxy ; (2) propagandist, and sometimes proselytising zeal of writers who are mostly ill-informed and who sometimes misrepresent Hindu positions for one reason or another ; (3) want of a comprehensive methodological treatment. The defects of the first two classes are obvious. A few words may be necessary about the third : we cannot correctly comprehend Hindu, or for that matter any social institutions, unless we bring to bear a synthetic grasp while studying them.

Social institutions of India are spread over vast areas of varied physical characteristics ; they embrace lives of diverse peoples and they have been affected by historical movements ; besides, all through the ages, they have followed the psychological inclinations of the peoples. In this multitude of matter one may easily succumb to the temptation of generalizing by examining a few particulars, with the result that one's conclusions go awry.

In a scientific work one cannot afford to miss the smallest relevant particular without mutilating one's conclusions. For diversities and deviations, particularly in institutional forms and functions, which appear to embarrass the social anatomist, can be shown to form part of the process of the growth of the social organism, and as such cannot be overlooked. It must be realised that the career and progress, whether of an individual or of an institution, to be empirically apprehended, must be accepted as

necessarily related to time and place ; and any claim to interpretation of any social or other phenomena without reference to these, or with inadequate or faulty reference to these, must not be accepted as sufficiently valid in science.

The last generation of teachers was confronted with the perplexing attitude of the Indian youth, Hindu and non-Hindu alike, either of indifference towards, or an out and out rejection of their own culture which their fathers had inherited as a sacred and holy trust from their ancestors ; and, this attitude was sought to be justified by an often over-zealous partiality for things Western. Some teachers who had made themselves familiar with Christian thought, teaching and endeavour began to examine Hinduism in the light of Christian criticism.

In spite of its many festering sores, the fundamental vitality of Hinduism was obvious to any impartial observer. We felt, then, that the validity of that vast system could not be so easily attacked and summarily disposed of as the youth and the 'progressives' were apt to imagine. Nevertheless it was evident that their own criticism was earnestly felt and expressed ; so we judged that the challenge was genuine and should be taken up and, if possible, answered. This set one to the task of enquiring if the old Indian values had at all any rational basis, in the light of Christian criticism, and particularly to attempt to state, examine and correlate Hindu theories, practices and beliefs which looked like forests of contradictions.

On investigation, the seemingly grosser elements revealed themselves to be strange garments of diverse hues, covering strong, healthy, living bodies or systems of thought and ways of human living. One realised, what indeed is now accepted as the correct scientific point of view and procedure, that in order to secure the proper perspective, Hindu scriptures must be examined in terms

of their psychological bearings and ramifications along the lines of native traditions of expository materials, and keys and outlooks made available in the commentaries of the great masters ; seeming contradictions dissolve themselves before such an unbiassed and systematic technique coupled with the disposition to look at facts, theories and institutions in their historical setting, as manifestations of the inner workings, needs, trials and judgments of the people and their thinkers.

Now, this position is of course not inconsistent with other attitudes and points of view ; in fact, an increasing understanding of the protean drama of human destiny must naturally unfold to our view the fruitful possibilities for a coordination of different dispositions, attitudes and approaches ; and, the more one tries this approach to the problem the more the conviction grows that though the human mind and understanding realise themselves in various patterns, on the whole, they tend to grow and evolve towards the self-same end, namely, of increasingly manifesting, realising and fulfilling the best and the noblest possible in human personality.

Perhaps the greatest single contribution of Hindu social thought to civilisation consists in the conscious recognition and acceptance of the fact that the highest individual development can and must be achieved in and through society, or to use the more comprehensive Hindu term through 'Samsāra'. Starting from this discovery, the Hindu seers proceeded from time to time to mould and perfect the appropriate social institutions.

There is this unique fact about institutions that they imply a way of collective life and are peculiar to human beings. Among animals we do not find institutions, though collective life among some animals is exhibited in a rudimentary form. Man accepts voluntary restraints ; while animals, as far as we know, accept none. In the case of man there is a recognition that the individual is but.

a part or limb of something larger, viz., the 'group' or 'society'; and he tries, as far as he can, to manage his interests with due regard to the interests of the group. Indeed, in a crisis the individual sacrifices his own interest for those of the group, and finds that the interests of both are inseparably commingled. The tenor of the entire life of civilised man is controlled by the group of which he forms a part. Group survival is the basis of institutional life and its end consists in the perfection of the individual.

Institutions are the crystallised expressions of the inner needs of the groups that invent them. In them their collective experience finds a safe anchorage in a cogent form. Institutions are sustained by past traditions, but at the same time they are also kept alive by present aspirations. In this sense they are dynamic bodies that generate energies which flow forward perennially. Their sources rest in the age-old springs, resources and possibilities of human nature, and their ends lie secure in the eternity of Becoming. In this way can social institutions be characterised as Eternal (Sanātana), not only co-eternal but co-efficient with the human spirit, blending temporal fruiting with spiritual flowering.

It is this subtle nature of social institutions that has given rise to the traditional error of treating them either as mere instruments on the one hand, or as mere ends on the other. The truth seems to us to lie in holding a balance between the extreme reaches of these positions. For our institutions do serve our initial and intermediate ends; but they cannot lead us to the ultimate. Between ourselves and our goal the institutions are only mediate; they serve as means. They are also the training ground, the fields of our self-discipline, without which, perhaps, our energies would be dissipated for lack of the power to concentrate. Viewed in this light, we may describe our institutions as ends; but in that case, they are only instrumental ends, if we may so express it in a paradox.

It is in this sense that the Hindus conceived of institutions as fields of the individual's self-discipline. Our institutions are not inherent within us but arise from the conditions of our existence. We may say that our institutions while arising from the necessities of our existence are sustained by our inner longings to manifest or unfold our inexhaustible powers.

The Hindus have fashioned their institutions in accordance with this standpoint. In this ocean of Samsāra, of birth, death and rebirth, the institutions are places of anchorage, where the soul may rest for a while, gather and replenish its energies, and re-survey its goal. Institutions, according to the Hindus, arise from Artha and Kama, and they are sustained and directed by Dharma towards Moksha. All the human factors and materials, human weaknesses and virtues are made use of in designing and executing the various schools and systems of human life. The concept and design of the four Āsramas, of the Varnas, and of the whole social organisation according to the Hindu scriptures reveal an acute perception of human psychology on the part of the Hindus and a masterly handling of human elements for constructing pathways towards the fulfilment and realisation of man's destiny.

While we accept that on the surface a study of Hindu Social Institutions reveals contradictions we insist that beneath the surface there are strong currents of principles working silently and invisibly towards harmony. The grosser elements or facts that are disclosed about Hindu Social Institutions are not peculiar to things Hindu ; the same is true of the social institutions of all mankind ; yet the truth is beyond denial that with all their contradictions and crudities, disharmonies and deficiencies, most social institutions have served man towards his betterment, and are groping their way towards the goal. They arise and are inspired by each people's vision of the same goal ;

the outer uncouthness, if there is any, belongs to the conditions or contexts of time and place. They largely embody our human aspirations; they help to make audible the subtle harmonies which the inner workings of man are articulating for ever.

Dr. Valavalkar has worked with me in class-room and seminars, and held personal discussions for over a period of six years; and he has endeavoured, in so far as he could accept it, to work along the lines of approach and attitude indicated above.

It is for the reader to judge the result of the adoption of this attitude. It is not claimed that the treatment of the subject is exhaustive. Many things may be found to have remained undiscussed, even to have been omitted; in some places the treatment may be found to be thin; in other places the discussion may seem abnormally detailed. But all these must be accepted as deliberate, as even necessary and unavoidable, because of the limited time at the disposal of Dr. Valavalkar, as also in view of the necessity for condensation and arrangement of the vast material at hand. It will be easily realised that each of the main problems raised in the book would require, for proper discussion, a volume of the size of the one now before the reader. But it is the hope of the Editor that the day is dawning when young enthusiasts like Dr. Valavalkar will undertake the difficult task of studying and exploring each of the problems, and will present the result of their investigations, fully documented and faithfully interpreted.

There are deeper problems than these that await treatment, study, elucidation and explanation—problems, for instance, connected with the contribution of the dwelling-place or theatre of each of the peoples with reference to the development of their psychology, *mores*, cultures, ideas, art and philosophy of life. It is difficult to believe that all things human and human values can

be independent of the subtle influences and varied relationships between man and his environment. These problems and considerations have not been reviewed by Dr. Valavalkar. But it may be that such a comprehensive survey must wait till the preliminary data have been correctly stated and discussed. It is sometimes urged that a statement of human motives and values must precede any attempt to set them up on the right stage, since, it is argued, human motives are and may arise, independent of, and even in spite of environmental necessities. Nevertheless it seems more in accordance with general biological, psychological and social possibilities that in the world of ordinary existence man's dreams, aspirations and idealogies are conditioned by the possibilities of his region, as also of course by the potentialities of man's own nature, capacities and experience ; in fact, not a few contradictions and peculiarities in our practices, beliefs, principles and theories of life become explicable in the light of the imperative mutualism between man and the region in which he dwells.

This way of study yields results in terms of a co-ordination of place, time, characteristics of heritage, and racial genius. Such a pragmatism dissolves disunity, not in the interest of a degrading compromise, but for achieving an enlightened harmony. Temporary limitations are accepted that we may live and outgrow them ; our limitations are horizons revealing tantalizing possibilities in the fields of space and time. The light of such a humanism has guided the path of many a toiler in the fields of scientific, social and philosophical work. Kindled by this conviction Dr. Valavalkar has approached the problems of Hindu Social Institutions for unravelling the psychological necessities that gave them birth. One must wish such a laudable endeavour all success.

FOREWORD

By

Professor S. Radhakrishnan

Dr. Valavalkar's book on *Hindu Social Institutions*, is, I believe, a serious and scientific account of Hindu social organisation. It deals with the many topics of education, marriage, family, the place of women in Hindu society, the system of caste, with accurate learning and great discrimination. To all those who are now engaged in the task of revitalising Hindu practices and renovating Hindu society, the book will be indispensable.

We are today in the midst of a Hindu renaissance, waiting for a new *Smriti*, which will emphasise the essentials of the Hindu spirit and effect changes in its forms so as to make them more relevant to the changing conditions of India and the world. Forms which begin by being useful are soon diverted from their objects to which they owe their existence to new ones where they are no longer of any use, where they even become dangerous. The task of the wise reformer is to note the essential spirit of the institutions and reorient them so as to embody it better. For such a task a true understanding of Hindu social psychology and institutions is essential and this book provides us with a key to it.

PREFACE

The following studies in Hindu Social Institutions represent the research work carried out by me in the Sociology Department of the University of Bombay during 1933-37, under the supervision of Dr. N. A. Thoothi, and submitted for the Ph. D. Degree in March 1937. I had, however, attended Dr. Thoothi's Lectures in Sociology for two years before 1933, during which period I was mainly studying Law, including the Hindu Law. In these studies I discovered, and became more and more conscious of, the importance of the Hindu *Dharma-Śāstras* which have in their bosom infinite treasures of wisdom to make a contribution to modern social thought, if interpreted in terms of science. After completing my Law studies, therefore, I sought the advice of Dr. Thoothi regarding the proposition ; and his assurance emboldened me to undertake the present studies. They are now published substantially in the same form as they were submitted for the Degree, with a few alterations and additions of a minor nature. Though some time has elapsed between the award of the Degree and the publication of the work, it has not become possible to revise and enlarge it in spite of the author's earnest desire to do so, due to difficulties which may not be mentioned here.

The problem and purpose of these studies is explained in the Prologue. In short, it is an institutional approach to the basic social psychology of the Hindus. A work of this kind is beset with numerous difficulties peculiar to it. The task of separating and sifting the wheat from the chaff in the numerous Sanskrit texts, the difficulties in the way of correctly grasping the sense of ancient writers and in-

interpreting the same in terms of contemporary expression without prejudice to the original import, and the proper assimilation and arrangement of the scattered and diffused material, are both time-consuming and labour-exacting. The author is quite conscious of the shortcomings in this work due to such difficulties. He is also conscious of the other shortcomings in this work which may be due to omission of certain aspects or points of view, other than those from which he has proceeded here, from which the Hindu Social Institutions may also be considered in order to make a comprehensive treatise. However, he has tried to make the best of the time and the resources at his disposal, and ventures to publish what may be regarded as the nucleus around which a whole Theory of Social Organisation as conceived by the Hindu may be developed and built up in time to come. A separate Source Book of Hindu Social Institutions is under preparation by the author.

In the present work, my teacher Dr. Thoothi has insisted on free English translations of Sanskrit terms and phrases, so as to bring out their proper implications with reference to the context. I have often bracketed the original Sanskrit word or expression along with my translation of the same, so that the reader may judge for himself the correctness or relevance of my interpretation. Also, in a few cases, when correct translation was not possible, I have retained original Sanskrit terms, e. g., *dharma*, *karma*, &c. Though I have sometimes used available English translations of Sanskrit texts, I have generally sought to give my own translations, in the making of which Dr. Thoothi has helped me generously. And, all verse renderings other than those acknowledged by me in the foot-notes are entirely from his pen. So also I am considerably indebted to him in regard to correctness of language and style.

I have tried to avoid repetitions as best as I could ; however, in a work connected with complex interpretations like the present one, some repetitions become unavoidable, for the same material or statement may lend itself to be viewed from different points of view in different connections.

It is a matter of great delight for me to acknowledge my intellectual and spiritual indebtedness to my teachers, two of whom I would specially like to mention here. One of these, Mr. K. S. Parulekar, not only took personal interest in the progress of my studies, but has also always favoured me with his encouragement and counsel. It has always proved instructive and delightful for me to discuss with him various issues of human interest. And I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Dr. N. A. Thoothi, under whose inspiring guidance the present research was carried out. But for his personal care, encouragement, assurance and advice, I might not have succeeded in my quest for understanding and interpreting Hindu wisdom. I have learnt a great deal from the many illuminating discussions which I had with him during my post-graduate career in the University. His insistence on *dharma* as the fundamental key to the solution of social problems as also his entire thought and interpretative talents have proved particularly helpful to me.

My indebtedness to scriptural texts and other writings is indicated specifically in the footnotes throughout the body of the work ; this and the bibliography at the end of the work will indicate the extent to which I have consulted original authorities and other books. As for the views and opinions expressed in the following pages, the responsibility is entirely mine.

I am deeply grateful to Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan for blessing this work with a Foreword, in the midst of and in spite of great pressure of work.

Finally, the author acknowledges his indebtedness to the University of Bombay for the substantial financial help it has granted towards the cost of the publication of this work.

School of Economics and Sociology,
University of Bombay,
September, 1939.

P. H. VALAVALKAR

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES ...	v
	EDITOR'S NOTE	vii
	FOREWORD By PROFESSOR S. RADHAKRISHNAN	xv
	PREFACE	xvii
	CONTENTS	xxi
	PROLOGUE	i-xvii
I.	THE BASIS OF HUMAN RELATIONS: THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ...	1
II	✓ THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SYSTEM OF THE FOUR <i>ĀśRAMAS</i>	61
III	THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION (<i>Brahmacharya 103-142</i>)	93
IV	MARRIAGE (<i>grihastha āshrama</i>)	143
V	THE HINDU FAMILY (<i>cf. p. 218-219.</i>) ...	201
VI	THE WOMAN IN HINDU SOCIETY ✓	257
VII	THE FOUR <i>VARṆAS</i>	279
	EPILOGUE	331
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	347
	INDEX	381

ERRATA

On p. 1, line 6, read *ya* for *yo*.

„ p. 9, l. 5 from bottom, read *gachchhati* for *gachhati*.

„ p. 19, foot-note 1, read *svārājya* for *sārājya*.

„ p. 42, l. 11 from bottom, read *nirmamah* for
nimamah.

PROLOGUE

PROLOGUE

The present study is an attempt towards constructing a picture of the Hindu Social Institutions and their Socio-psychological implications. It will be the effort of the writer to think out and follow as closely as possible along the lines of Hindu thought and tradition and to portray and interpret, so far as one can, both analytically and synthetically, the Hindu scriptures and theories in their proper and original perspective.

It may be objected that such a study, which more or less purports to unearth the past, would prove of no use for us of the present age of science and speed. Even if it is suspected that a study of the past institutions of India is not likely to be helpful towards the organization and control of our social life, it has to be studied, demonstrated and proved, before the utter uselessness and sure failure of the same can be taken for granted, in the spirit of true science, devoid of prejudice. We believe that such categorical assumptions on the part of social reformers are as much dogmatic as are the assumptions of the orthodox in regard to their faith in the infallibility of the *Śāstras*. For though it is quite likely that some of the problems that confront our present day society may not have been even thought of by our forefathers, it is probable that similar if not the same problems may have been faced by them, and the solutions to these, as formulated by them in the past, if not in themselves useful, may at least serve to suggest solutions towards the unravelling and management of the problems we have to face to-day. We may thus be led on to follow our ancestors in principles and spirit, if not in details, to our advantage, particularly if we discover that the spirit which goaded them to social action was inspired by proper and desirable motives and understanding. We

may, to say the least about it, learn not to commit the mistakes committed by our kith and kin during the past, if we come to know how and why they came to be committed. Thus, lessons from the past may serve as caution-signals for the future. This in itself would prove to be a sufficiently adequate reward yielded by the careful study of our past social institutions, brought into existence and nurtured by our forefathers to solve the problems of their own days. This would be, we admit, the negative result of our study. But there will be a positive side to it which cannot be gainsaid. It may, on the positive side, give us clues to future revision and reconstruction of a social order at times. For, the study of the past enables us to grasp the fundamental psychology behind the present problems and the attitudes that uphold or reject them due to which it has come to be what it is. We may thus be enabled to make out the causes and circumstances imbedded in the past, which led to the existence and conditions of things and events as they stand to-day. And, these valuable clues, conditions and causes are sure to prove themselves of great help to us in the making of our future.

We are sometimes given to regard with disdain and contempt the ideas and ideals of the ancients in the social and moral fields. We are apt to think that each new social problem must be tackled and solved afresh, and that the past is not going to be of the least assistance to us here. We may feel that the "new generation" has new problems to be faced quite unprecedented by anything to resemble it at any time before, and fresh solutions ought to be invented in order to deal with them. The enthusiastic social worker clamours for introduction of new ideas and ideals in the social and moral fields and insists on cutting off the old ideas and ideals to the root. In this, he is forgetting the one great lesson of social psychology, viz., that what has gained the very depths of the soul of a

people through ages past is well-nigh impossible to be uprooted at a short notice, sometimes even by efforts carried on for several generations. The people have to be educated, and their minds prepared, for discarding older ideas that are really harmful ; and they thus have to be led gradually and by degrees to favour new ideas. To be able to do this effectively, the social worker must be able to drive home to the people the actual and real harms and evils, if there are any, wrought by a persisting past. And, there is no better way of doing this than to lay bare before the people their past traditions, trace their roots and growth, and demonstrate their results.

But that is not all. There are reasons why the enthusiastic social reformer should not clamour for introduction of newer ideas and ideals in the moral and social fields every now and then. He could ill afford to forget the great lesson of social history that what has been able to stand the test of time for ages past and is yet alive and has been regulating the social order till this day may have at least some merit in it which is worthy of examination. We cannot resist here the temptation to quote at length a modern sociologist on the value and significance of the past. "The world has been a great experimental laboratory", says Professor Carver of Harvard University, "in the moral and social field. A great many 'new discoveries' are made in the field of morals ; most of them have no survival value and they perish, or the people who try them perish, which amounts to the same thing. Once in a great while a 'new discovery' is made which happens to work. A new system of morals or a new religion is born which fits its devotees for survival, and a new moral force is introduced into the world. That is, however, a poor argument in favour of adopting every new moral idea which is proclaimed. Most of them really are wrong in principle because they won't work. Only a few have shown any survival value. Most of the 'new' ones have

been tried and have been proved unworkable. If we knew as much as our great experimenters in physical science knew, we should learn not to repeat the same failures over and over again. That is one reason why persons with a historical perspective are generally conservative. At least they do not proclaim that they are willing to try anything once. A monkey is willing to do that. A real sociologist knows that many of these so called new schemes have already been tried many times and have always failed."

"It is chastening for any group of mortals to know the whole story," Professor Carver proceeds to observe, "because they know then that the way they behave in their land and in their generation is not the only possible way to squeeze satisfaction out of living or necessarily the best way. They acquire a healthy, eager, inquisitive, exploring attitude toward morality. They know that morals must change to keep pace with a changing world. And so they learn the value of moral inventiveness. But they learn, too, that they cannot look very far into the future to see the far flung consequences of change. And so they learn also, the value of standing pat by ancient wisdom in the matter of morals, of experimenting with care and circumspection. They know that 'whatever is', in the moral world is not necessarily right; but only possesses an actuarial probability of being right because of the fact that it has survived the best of time,—of moral selection. Yet moral innovations we must have if there is to be progress."¹ The main reasons in favour of moral innovations are two: First, the old *mores* may be altogether unsatisfactory and may have always been such in many particulars; or/and secondly, if the human environment changes in terms of culture-contacts, the *mores* need to be modified, altered or even changed for the proper

¹ T. N. Carver: "The Essential Factors of Social Evolution" pp. 254-256.

functioning of new life-values. Thus "group ways of behaving have to be altered in order to be continuously adapted to the changing life conditions a group must face."¹

Therefore, in the present essay, we shall first endeavour to visualize in details the basic conditioning factors that ruled the earlier phases of Indian culture and civilization; thereafter, as far as possible, these conditioning factors of the past will be compared with those that rule the life of our own days. This outlook and method may considerably save us from thoughtlessly rejecting the best of our past heritage; besides, if change is deemed necessary, we may, in the light of the insight thus acquired by us into the intricacies of our cultural fabric and psychology, be enabled to think out, devise, decide upon and adopt ways, conventions, ideas and ideals, new in themselves, yet in harmony with the spirit of the old; and even if a rejection of the old is found necessary, the synthetic attitude of detailed analysis and scrutiny which we adopt in our understanding of the old and the new will contribute a great deal towards an even and wise selection, adoption and assimilation of alien *mores* for the proper rejuvenation and nurture of the life of our people.

Moreover, a study of the social institutions of the Hindus as deduced from their scriptures will give us definite glimpses of what may be called the ideological and valuational bases of those social institutions. Thus the *Dharmaśāstra* and other scriptural literature of the Hindus seek to deal not only with what is, but also with what ought to be. Not only actual individuals and actual human groups living in a particular country and during a specific period in which they were written, but also ideal individuals and ideal human relationships conceived as true for any people, in any age and in any clime, form

¹ *ibid.* p. 256.

the subject matter of the Hindu Scriptures. In other words, the Hindu social thinkers have given us *theories* of social institutions, what they should be and ought to be. That is to say, they have thought out and portrayed social and individual ideals. And it is important for us to know this aspect of theorizing done by the Hindu Social Thinkers. For, it will be then that we shall be able to examine whether the present Hindu social institutions conform to or deviate from their spirit in the actual forms they have assumed to-day. And, in this manner we may be enabled to grasp the fundamental spirit, the fundamental ideology, in terms of which the Hindu's social institutions were conceived, and thus may be enabled even to mark off the distance and difference between this ideology and the actuality in which it has resulted.

Therefore, the present writer's aim, in the main, will be to describe ideas, ideals and aspirations so as to re-set and re-construct the several strata of the social structure that have been evolving in Hindu life and labour. Social institutions will thus reveal themselves as the scaffolding around which the actual modes of living of the Hindus are being built up and replenished from time to time. These social institutions have been the outcome of the necessities of life, and have had the advantage of social thinking behind them. In this sense, they have come into being neither haphazardly, anyhow, nor by themselves, that is to say, they are not evolved in the natural course of things. Further, it should not necessarily be assumed that these well thought-out institutions are against the requirements of the natural evolution of social life and institutions. Moreover, these institutions are so vitally related to each other, that each of them gathers its place and meaning in terms of specific inter-relational values between them. They are devised to enable man, so far as can be, to reduce definite ideas, ideals and purposes into concrete human conduct and affairs. As such, they serve as

PROLOGUE

tools for the best possible unfolding of human capacities, conduct and co-operation. In such series of infinite adjustments between the actual and the ideal, the wise men and the law-givers of the Hindus, whatever their failure or success, have been trying more and more to define life, its meaning and end, as also to give man new tools of life, more varied and efficient, in order that they may, by using them, live according to these ideals in actual conduct and affairs, personal and social. The problem of the basis and structure of social institutions is considered here, so that the comparative workability of these, their virtues or qualities, their shortcomings and also the causes of these may be located and defined.

Along with this, a general estimate of the social system of the Hindus and of the social institutions within it in terms of interrelations, will be made for the clear and definite apprehension of their life-designs. While attempting this, it was found necessary to distinguish the system or the principles governing Hindu Social Institutions and the ideas and ideals which gave rise to them in contrast with—not necessarily to seek or assert contradiction with—systems of ideas and ideals other than Hindu, especially the Western. This is done in view of the fact that India's Social heritage is being displaced by western cultural ideals and institutions ; besides, there is a complaint by contemporary leaders that such rejection of our own culture has been introducing and injecting into our lives, not the best of the culture of the west, but perhaps its worst. There is a great deal of truth in this complaint. But this should not mean that the Western thought, ideals, social structure and psychology are, in the opinion of the present writer, in themselves unworthy or at fault. It only demonstrates the difficulties of absorbing another intricate and historically evolved culture, life and ideas by a historic people through the media of its literature and books, rather than by living in close association and

comradeship with the peoples of that culture. Intellectual understanding and fascination of *mores* of other peoples are admirable in themselves ; but, by themselves, they prove invariably foreign to the genius of the people that seek to absorb them. This does not mean that there should be no cultural assimilation and contact between the peoples of the world. In fact, that is the ideal that has provoked the writer of this thesis to find out and study the best and the noblest of the Indian heritage in terms of the Indian Social Institutions and the psychology underlying it, in order that these may be conserved and preserved at their best, not merely to serve the needs of future Indian life, but also, to whatever extent, guide and direct the life of humanity at large, so that ultimately with goodwill and love the peoples of the world, East, West, North and South, may one day learn and adopt the best from wherever it comes and by whomsoever it is offered. It should be understood, therefore, that the present inquiry is more in the nature of self-search, self-chastisement and self-direction than of fault-finding with other cultures, systems, valuations and outlooks. Nor is there any presupposition that the culture contact and cultural give and take are in themselves unworthy of assimilation. On the other hand, this is an attempt at finding out, in the midst of an anarchy of life-values and medley of points of view which not only India but the whole world has been facing in our own days, what and how old India has thought out these issues in terms of a Social psychology, and the social institutions which served it.

On the other hand, let it be noted that the present writer believes in every people evolving a historical entity of its own, a personality, a genius, a psychology of its own, through which the nature and meaning and purpose of life unfolds itself into its own of the so many facets that go to make the jewel of human existence. It is therefore that the present writer does not see any

opposition or contradiction, in fact he does not believe that there need be any opposition or contradiction, between one theory of life and another, between one frame of mind and another, between one set of life-values and another,—not only within the orbit of the life of the same people but even between the orbits of the life of different peoples, not only in the same climates but even in different climatic conditions, not only in any single period of history but even in different periods or epochs in history, not only in the same level of culture but even between different levels of culture. In view of this, therefore, this thesis attempts to provide an analytical and synthetical study of one of these facets, as an humble contribution towards the making of a system of thought, outlook, life and understanding between the peoples of the world as children of One Father under the roof of His blue skies.

*

*

*

The sources of the understanding of Hindu social institutions that is attempted here are many and various. These include the Vedic literature, the Epics, the Purāṇic literature, the Sūtra literature, the drama, the poetry, and the vast storehouse of folk-tales. It may prove useful at this stage to speak a word about some at least of the sources which are being utilised in the pages that follow.

Two of the most important sources dealing with ideas of great sociological significance are the epics,—the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata,—and the Sūtras, viz. the Grihya-Sūtras and the Dharma-Sūtras. As for the Rāmāyaṇa which deals with the earlier epoch, we may say that the best and the noblest of the Hindu traditions and ideals of the times during, before and after it was written, are worked out in the personalities of Rāma, Sītā, Lakshmaṇa, Hanūmān and others ; in a sense, this epic is a Hindu Criticism of Life. It is difficult to say how far the original Rāmāyaṇa has been making and moulding Hindu life and mind through history ; but it is obvious

that the Hindi version of Tulsīdās has had and has been having a hold over millions of men and women in India ; Rāma is definitely worshipped as an *Avatāra* by them ; and his life is considered as mirroring the holy and the divine in human life, institutions and ideals.

The Mahābhārata is another work of immense sociological value. Though this epic describes the war fought about 1,000 B. C.,¹ and as such it is mainly concerned with the events connected with the two contending families of the Kuru dynasty, it gives minute details and principles concerning the laws, life and conditions which existed and controlled human conscience and destiny during a period much before the war was actually fought. According to some authorities, the epic in its present form was being knit up by several writers between about the 4th century B. C. and the 4th Century A. D., mainly in accordance with the traditions much older than when it was being written.² But the fact that it came to be written centuries after the events described therein took place, should justify the contention that at least a part of the background of the social traditions described therein must also belong to contemporary life and thought, that is, to the social conditions, beliefs and practices prevalent during the long period of about a thousand years during which the Epic formed itself. And since 400 A. D. to our own days, the Mahābhārata is regarded with high reverence by the Hindu as a great authority on religious and social matters.³ Indeed, orthodox Hindus have been regarding

¹ See Camb. Hist. Ind., Ed. by E. J. Rapson Vol. I, Ch. XIII p. 397.

² See "Camb. Hist. Ind." Vol. I, Ch. xi p. 258; cf. also, Dunbar: "A History of India" p. 32; Winternitz: "A History of Indian Literature", Vol. I, (Tr. by Mrs. S. Ketkar, Calcutta).

³ Says Winternitz: "The very fact that the Mahābhārata represents a *whole literature* rather than one single unified

it as the fifth Veda ; and, in view of this, the epic is put at least on the same level of authority as the Dharmaśāstras. In fact, inscriptional evidence proves that it was classed with the Dharmaśāstras as early as the fifth century A. D. ¹

The Grihyasūtras deal in the main with the domestic conduct and life of the Hindu. On the other hand, the Dharma-Sūtras, also known as the Smritis, treat mainly of the social conduct and life of the Hindu. Together, the two, mutually considered, prove to be rich sources of information for us with regard to almost every phase of the life of the Hindu in the domestic, social, political, economic, moral and religious spheres. Moreover, they deal with almost all the phases of Hindu life as conceived by them. Even the minutest aspects of a Hindu's daily life are described and defined by them to a degree that is astounding. Such a wealth of elaborate details is given in these scriptures that there is hardly any phase of human life, day in and day out, as the Hindu conceives it, that is left untouched by them. The *sūtra* period is placed between about 600 B. C. to 200 B. C.² But as with the Mahābhārata, so with the Sūtras : the social conditions described in these latter works also represent facts relating to a much earlier as well as of a much later period than that during which they were composed. Indeed, many of

work, and contains so many and so multifarious things, makes it more suited than any other book, to afford us an insight into the deepest depths of the soul of the Indian people". ("A Hist. of Ind. Lit., Tr. by Mrs. S. Ketkar, Vol. I, pp. 326-27).

And Macdonell remarks that the epic has become "so much over-grown with didactic matter that it could hardly be regarded as an epic at all, and has rather taken the place of a moral encyclopaedia in Indian literature ("India's Past", p. 88).

¹ Macdonell: *ibid.* p. 89.

² Dunbar: *ibid.* p. 33; "Camb. Hist. of Ind.", Vol. I.

the practices and injunctions regarding Hindu social life in the Sūtras have literally been functioning even in contemporary Hindu life. In fact the spirit of the *sūtras* may be said to be governing the general tone and tenor of the domestic and social behaviour of the Hindu, to a large extent, even to this day.

Now, the whole material and moral universe with which the individual has to deal in this world is divided by the Hindu into three big realms, viz. *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*; and the management and conduct of his social and individual life is conceived and formulated in terms of these three with reference to the ultimate end of life viz. *mokṣa*. We shall explain the meaning and implications of these terms in the next two chapters. In accordance with the division of the problems of life into *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, we have three groups of *śāstras* or scientific treatises, each dealing with one of these three life-purposes in the main, viz. the *Dharma-Śāstra*, the *Artha-Śāstra* and the *Kāma-Śāstra*; and the whole literature of the Hindu dealing with facts and theories of sociological value could broadly be classified under these three *śāstras*. Further, as has been opined by Manu, the just management and conduct of life should be conceived and formulated in terms of the harmonious co-ordination, or the proportionate aggregate, of these three (*trivarga*) life-purposes;¹ therefore, the three kinds of *śāstras* also have to be studied alongside with each other. They are not to be studied by the Hindu as separate and unconnected treatises, but as keys together to the problems of life. Moreover, the literature belonging to any one of these three *śāstras* does not entirely exclude all considerations regarding the other two, but only deals with them secondarily. Thus, though the *Dharmaśāstras* for instance, deal in the main with the ways and methods of

¹ Man. ii, 224.

Dharma, the other two sides of the problem of living concerning *Artha* and *Kāma* are also touched by them at many places. So it is with the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Kāmaśāstra*.

Of these three *śāstras*, or sciences of life, we have already referred to the *Dharmaśāstras* and their sociological importance. Among the second kind of these *śāstras*, viz. the *Arthaśāstras*, we may here refer to the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya as one of the important sources with reference to our problem. This *Arthaśāstra*, besides reasserting the earlier social codes and practices, provides new and important material for clues to understand the social changes that took place in later times. Another invaluable source of information concerning Hindu Social life, psychology and civic organization is the literature on sex and love by Sanskrit writers which is classed under the third kind of *śāstras*, viz. the *Kāmaśāstra*. Amongst the treatises on *Kāmaśāstra*, Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra* is perhaps the most authoritative and valuable for our purposes. This treatise attempts to give detailed information about the psychology of sex, and also such social themes as the life of a citizen (*nāgaraka*) and his duties, and the position of woman in the Hindu family and society.

In the pages that follow I have tried to understand and fathom the principles of life governing Hindu social mind and institutions based upon the above-named and other important sources in the Sanskrit literature. One very surprising fact in this connection is that these various sources so generally agree with each other on fundamental facts and issues. Differences between them, if and when any, are not only few, but they concern themselves only regarding points of minor details. And these minor differences can be usually traced to historical or regional causes.

*

*

*

In any discussion on the social institutions of a people with reference to their psychological implications, it would prove valuable to start with the most general of their ideas and views concerning existence itself. Thereafter we may profitably attempt to grasp the fundamental ideas and ideals which govern the life of the individual in a society. This may enable us to understand the fundamental or basic psychology behind its social institutions ; for, the social institutions are founded more or less on the framework of the solution to the problem of living. In view of this, we shall first deal generally with the Hindu view of life upon which the Hindu social institutions have been erected.

Thereafter, we shall consider the Hindu way of regarding the course of an individual's normal span of life with reference to the society. Here we find that the Hindu's life is conceived in terms of four specific stages, each of which is viewed as preparatory, not merely to the one that follows, but also to all the rest that follow it. So, the first stage has to be conceived as preparatory not only to the three stages that follow, nor also to the living and understanding and idealization of life as a whole, but also to the meaning, place and function of this life with reference to existence before and after death. These stages are known as *Āśramas*, the first being called the *Brahmacharyāśrama*. It is connected with the system of education. It is therefore proper that the institution of education should be taken next into account before considering other institutional tools of life. In view of this, Hindu educational practice and ideals and the psychology underlying them will be our next concern.

Following the lead of the *Āśrama* scheme as part of the Hindu view of life, we next propose to discuss the problem of marriage which lays the foundation of the *Grihasthāśrama*, or the life of a householder. And the normal consequences of marriage would be the formation

of family, the care of *Grihasthāśrama*, not merely as a biological necessity, but also as a well thought-out Social institution, shaped, arranged and idealized by human effort, ingenuity and wisdom for ages past ; so our discussion on marriage will be followed by the consideration of the institution of family. This will naturally bring us face to face with the problem of the attitude of the Hindu towards woman, which must be considered in the next chapter.

Along with this we shall discuss the views of Hindu social thinkers on the problem and the psychology of sex and love. Thereafter we deal with the much vexed problem of *varṇa*-organization, which has a special bearing on the Hindu social order. And, we shall conclude our survey with a few observations, in the light of the preceding discussion on the several aspects of Hindu Social Institutions.

CHAPTER I

THE BASIS OF HUMAN RELATIONS:
THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

*Yo devo'gnau Yo'psu Yo viśvam bhuvanamāvivēśa
Ya ośadhīshu Yo vanaspatishu tasmai devāya namo
namah*

—Śvetāśvataropaniṣad, II. 17.

To God
Who pervades Fire,
Who dwells in Water,
Who penetrates the Universe,
To Him
That lurks as medicine in herbs,
That permeates life into plants,
To that Shining One
I offer salutations,
I bow in reverence.

CHAPTER I

THE BASIS OF HUMAN RELATIONS: THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

It is generally asserted and assumed that the ancient Hindus so much lost themselves in speculating over the metaphysical problems of the ultimate nature of worldly things, that they never exerted any serious thinking in connection with the more practical and worldly problems, like those of social organization. During recent times, however, with the appearance of European, American and Indian studies in the Hindu lore of the bygone times, it is generally agreed that our ancients did carry on a great deal of systematized speculation, apart from the purely metaphysical one, in the realms of Mathematics, Astronomy, Astrology, Medicine, Grammar, Politics, Logic, Poetics, and the Science of Rhetoric. Yet, it is usually alleged, that amongst certain other intellectual pursuits, the science of Society as such did not attract the notice of the Hindu thinker. It is our purpose here to demonstrate that, in fact, they had given considerably serious attention to the problems connected with social organization, and had evolved out a system or scheme of social relations for securing the best possible organization of human life and conduct that they could think of.

Now, all forms of social organization, including the various social institutions, emerge out of human needs. The human needs define human interests, purposes and aspirations; and, the actual planning or devising of the different forms of social organization takes place in terms of the adjustments of human behaviour, individual and social, with these purposes and aspirations. The Hindu conception of life and its conduct, social as well individual,

is also organized in view of these considerations. And, the formulation of this organization is based upon an understanding of the meaning of human existence, its needs and interests, and a consequent scheme for conducting human life in accordance with that meaning. The fundamental meaning of life and existence as understood by the Hindu permeates through all the forms of social organization which are intended to regulate and direct the conduct of the individual's life. Therefore, our first task here will be to narrate and try to understand the Hindu's fundamental conceptions regarding human existence as a whole, and its purposes, its aspirations and its mission as defined in terms of these fundamental conceptions, in order that we may be able to visualize, against a proper background, the right perspective of the Hindu scheme of social organization as it has come to be formulated and as it is meant to function. We propose to state, in this chapter, this fundamental view of life as conceived by the Hindu, with reference to some of the treatises which have preserved his ancient lore and which are regarded by him as authoritative guides for the direction and management of human life and human affairs.

According to the Hindu, this life by itself alone would have no meaning ; it has meaning only as a link, even if the last, in a chain of links of births in the past ; it is a stage of transition from past births towards future birth or births, unless mokṣa or 'final liberation' is obtained within the span of this life. And, essentially, the birth of a human being is but an opportunity for him or her to free himself or herself from the bonds of this chain of births by living a life of *Dharma*,¹ as laid down by a succession of liberated ones (*muktas*) in the holy scriptures. The soul of a man is, for the Hindu, immortal ; the bodies in which

¹ The implications of this term will become clearer as the reader proceeds through this and the next chapter.

he lives during the stages of transition may change. This fundamental idea persists through the whole of the Hindu lore,—from the Vedas to the Samhitās, from the Samhitās to the Brāhmaṇas, from the Brāhmaṇas to the Āraṇyakas, the Upanishads, the Sūtras, the Smritis, the Epics, the Nītis, the Purāṇas, and even the drama, the poetry, the folk-lore, with slight modifications at times.

To start with, the Vedas give the first form to the idea that the soul of man is immortal, though the body may be burnt away after death. In Rigveda-IV. 35. 3, the Ribhus are described to have attained immortality (*amritattva*). At another place (RV. V. 4. 10) there is a prayer to Fire (*Agni*) for granting *amritattva*. In the tenth maṇḍala of the Rigveda, Agni is invoked (X. 16. 1-6) to take the deceased to the Fathers and the Gods. And, lastly, there is an interesting *mantra* in this maṇḍala (X. 58. 1-2) wherein the soul which has gone to the World of Death is recalled ; and it is asked to enter into another body once more. In Rigveda I. 164. 31, also, we have a mention of the notion that the soul of the dead returns frequently to this earth. In the Atharvaveda, this idea of the transmigration of the soul is given such a realistic expression that the deceased is said to meet, after death, his wives and children (AV. xii. 3. 17), and his friends and parents (ibid vi. 120. 3) who have died before him.¹ There is also a reference to personal immortality in the Vedas—a person who performs a sacrifice may be born in the next world with his entire body (*sarvatanuh*).²

The *Bhāhmaṇas* carry the idea further. A person who practises austerities (*tapas*) retains in heaven all his bodily functions, even those concerned with the sex life

¹ See also AV. vi, 120, 1 ; xii, 2, 45 ; xviii, 3, 71 ; xviii, 4, 9-10 ; and Vājasaneyā Samhitā, xviii, 51 ; for this idea of transmigration of the soul.

² RV. iv, 6, 1, 1 ; xi, 1, 8, 6 ; xii, 8, 3, 31 ; AV. xi, 3, 32 & 49.

(*maithuna*).¹ In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa we find a first clear statement of the theory of *Karma*, of retributive action; a sage called Bhrigu is shown over the tortures which wicked persons have to undergo in hell for their foul deeds on earth.² "Whatever food a man eats in this world, by that same again is he eaten in the next."³

Here is also the first statement that one who gains complete knowledge becomes one with Brahman and is thus liberated.⁴ Again, there is the story of Nachiketa who was shown over by Yama all the abodes where the dead reap the fruits of their deeds done in this world.⁵

3 - This germ of the idea of the immortality of the soul, coupled with the law of the deed and its retribution (*karmaphala*) is further developed in the Upanishads. Here there is a clear statement of the theory of the re-birth of a soul as a result of the fruition of his deeds (*karmaphala*). The story of Nachiketas, just referred to above, is also found in the Kathopanishad; here the idea that the soul of the dead takes up a new body is given a clear expression. "The mortal being decays like a corn; and like corn it is born again."⁶ The Brihadāranyakopanishad says that the soul, at death, moves out and is accompanied by the person's accumulations of all actions (*karmāśaya*) during his life-time; and this *karmāśaya* determines the form which the soul has to take in the next birth.⁷ Here, in this Upanishad, is given an account of the symposium of several philosophers on questions of metaphysical interests. For instance, when questioned as

¹ Sat. Br. x, 4, 4, 4.

² Sat. Br. xi, 6, 1.

³ Sat. Br. xii, 9, 1, 1.

⁴ Sat. Br. xi, 5, 6, 9; cf., *ibid* xi, 4, 4, 1; iii, 10, 9, 11.

⁵ Taitt Br. iii, 11, 8, 1, ff.

⁶ "Sasyamiva martyah pacyate sasyamiva jāyate punah"-
Kathop. i, 1, 5-6.

⁷ iii, 2, 13; and iv, 4, 2-6; also cf. *chhāndo*. iii, 14, 1.

to what happens to the soul after death, Yajnavalkya replies that man's future life is determined by his own actions (*karmas*) good actions bringing good results and bad ones, bad results.¹ "As a caterpillar leaves the end of one blade of grass only after it has secured its hold on another, so does this self (*ātmā*) leave the human body only after it has found out another tenement in another kind of existence ; and as a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, turns it into whatever newer and more beautiful shapes he pleases, so does this self create for itself a newer and more beautiful existence, be it the existence of the manes (*pitryam*), of the demi-gods (*Gāndharvam*), of the gods or of any beings that it pleases."² About rebirth according to one's own *karmas*, the *Bṛihadāraṇya-kopaniṣad* says : "As the soul moves out, life (*prāṇa*) moves out ; as the life moves out, all the vital airs (*prāṇa*) move out after it ;" his knowledge and actions and his consciousness of former births and deeds (*pūrvaprajñā*) follows him.³ And again, "As his conduct and behaviour, so does this self (*ātmā*) become. He whose works have been good becomes good ; he whose works have been evil becomes evil (*pāpo*). By holy works (*puṇyena karmanā*), he becomes holy (*puṇyah*) ; by sinful (*pāpena*) ones, sinful (*pāpah*). It is for this reason that they say that a person consists merely of desires (*kāma*) ; as his desire is so his will (*tatkratuḥ*) ; as his will so his work (*tatkarma*) ; as his work, so his evolution (*tadabhisampādyate*)."⁴ The remedy against the cycle of deeds and births lies in becoming completely free from desire :

¹ Bṛih. Up. iii, 2, 13: *puṇyo vai puṇyena Karmanā bhavati pāpah pāpena*.

² Bṛih. Up. iv, 4, 3-5 (Belvalkar and Ranade's Tr. "Hist. of Ind. Phil." p. 206).

³ Bṛih. Up. iv, 4, 2.

⁴ Bṛih. Up. iv, 4, 3-5; Ranade's Tr. "A constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy". p. 155.

“When a mortal man becomes free from all desires (*kāmāḥ*) that are after his heart, mortal as he is, he nevertheless becomes immortal (*amṛitah*) and achieves the Brahman.”¹ So long as the person is committed to *karmas*, he must be born again. Those of good conduct (*ramaṇīyacharaṇā*) will be born as Brāhmaṇas, Kshatriyas or Vaiśyas, while those of bad conduct (*kapūyacharaṇāḥ*) will be born as dogs, swines or chāṇḍālas.² The Kaushītaki Upanishad goes further, and states that a soul, according to his actions and knowledge (*yathākarma yathāvidyam*) will take on the body of a worm, a moth, a fish, a bird, a leopard, a lion, a serpent, or man, or of any creature for that matter.³ And the Kāthopanishad goes still further and declares that a soul may even take the form of inanimate things like plants or trees according to his works and knowledge (*yathākarma Yathāśrutam*⁴).

Thus the Vedas and the Āraṇyakas start with the idea of the immortality of the soul (*ātman*), though the body taken up by him is mortal and perishable. They also declare the view that the soul of a person suffers in the next birth or enjoys, according as his doings in this world are bad or good. The Upanishads, as we saw, go even further and say that after the death of one body, the soul takes another body according to his deeds ; he may even have to take to comparatively inanimate existence of trees and plants, if his deeds merit these ! Freedom from this tangle of birth and death, however, can be attained by a soul with the help of the performance of proper worship and sacrifices. Such worshipper attains the region of the deity whom he has worshipped, according to one

¹ Brih. Up. iv, 9-7, *ibid*, p. 136.

² Chhānd. Up. v, 10, 7: (*śvanyonim vā sūkarayonim vā chāṇḍālyonim vā*).

³ Kaushī. Up. i, 2; of also Chhānd. Up. vi, 9, 3.

⁴ Kāth. Up. ii, 5, 7.

Upanishad ;¹ while according to another, he achieves a complete likeness (*paramam sāmyam*) with God (*Īśam*),² he merges into the personality of the Divine and becomes one with it,³ just as a river flows into the sea, loses its name and form, and becomes one with the sea.⁴ To attain this end of entering the Universal Principle (*sarvam*) is possible for those who have renounced all passion (*vītarāgāh*), and who have attained peace of mind (*praśāntā*) and knowledge (*jñānatrīptāh*).⁵

Later literature, starting with these ideas, developed them into a whole philosophy of the *karma* theory. Let us now see how the development of the *karma* theory takes place, and what it implies for the Hindu.

Of the other works of sociological value,⁶ the Mahābhārata grapples with the problem of *karma* along similar lines. In the Vanaparva there is a long description of the blessings and enjoyments obtainable in Paradise (*svarga*), given by the messenger from Paradise (*devadūta*) who came down to take the sage Mudgala away to that region. "This earth," explains the messenger to the sage, "is meant for work (*karmabhūmiriyam*), while the next world is meant for enjoying its rewards (*phalabhūmīrasau*)". As soon as the rewards in proportion to the deeds (*karma*) are enjoyed, the individual falls from heaven. Moreover, beyond the next world of enjoyment, there is the eternal abode (*sanātānam padam*) known as *parabramha* from whence there is no return to this world ; but that could be attained only

¹ (Sa ya evametadrājanam devatāsu protam veda etāsāmccha devatānām salokatām sārshītām sāyujyam gachhati) —

Chhānd. Up. 11, 20, 2.

² Muṇḍ. Up. iii, 1, 3.

³ ibid. iii, 2, 7-8.

⁵ Muṇḍ. Up. iii, 2, 5.

⁴ Praśn. Up. vi, 5.

⁶ See Prologue, pp. xi ff.

by the unselfish (*nirmamāh*), the humble (*nirahankārāh*), those who have restrained their senses (*samyatendriyāh*) and attained complete knowledge.¹ "A creature is bound by deeds (*karmanā*); he is liberated by knowledge (*vidyayā*); by knowledge he becomes eternal, imperceptible and undecaying. Some men of little understanding eulogise works (*karma*); so they embrace with delight the entanglements of corporeal existence; but those who have achieved the highest intellectual perception (*buddhim*) and have achieved a perfect comprehension of *dharma* (*dharmanaiṣṇadarśinah*) do not commend karma, as a person drinking from a river thinks little of a well."² The soul (*ātman*) "is born again with its accumulated load of *karma*."³ And, it is in consequence of a life of *karma* that one obtains pleasure and pain (*sukha-duhkhe*), prosperity and adversity (*bhavābhavau*); by knowledge he reaches that condition in which there is no suffering, no death, no birth and no rebirth.⁴ "The acts done in the former births never leave any creature. In determining the various effects of *karma*, the Creator did see it. Man, being under the influence of *karma*, must always consider how he can atone for his *karma* and how he can extricate himself from an evil doom."⁵

The law of *Karma*, moreover, explains why sometimes evidently deserving persons get failures in life, while sometimes the undeserving seem to succeed. The most able, intelligent and diligent (*dakṣāścha matimantāścha*) man may get failures in spite of great exertions during this life, as a result of his past *karmas*, while the wicked during this life may seem to enjoy a happy life in this

¹ Mahā. Vanaparva. 260, 36. (Krishnāchārya's Ed.)

² Mahā. xii, 8810 ff. [—Muir: Ori. Sans. Texts].

³ Mahā. Vana. 208, 31.

⁴ Mahā. xii, 8810 ff. Muir. op. cit.

⁵ Mahā. Vana. 207, 19-20. (Dutt's Tr.)

world.¹ The sage Brihaspati explains to Yudishthira that after death, a man's virtuous and vicious *karmas* follow him and determine his fate in the next birth ; one should, therefore, try to acquire *dharma* which alone is one's true friend in the next world, and which determines his happiness and sorrow in the next birth.² Nay, it determines even the particular kind of existence which he has to take ; for the wicked may be born again as dogs, asses, worms and their like.³ Decrepitude and death are the devourers of all creatures,—the strong and the weak, the tall and the short, except those who escape re-birth. The soul only is eternal.⁴ Every person therefore should try to attain the liberation of his soul (*mokṣa*) ; for this world is full of difficulties and shortcomings.⁵ "Whatever one does (*yattena kinchiddhi kritam*), he is sure to reap the fruits of his own actions. The consequences of *karma* can never be erased (*nāsti kritasya nāśah*)...Men's actions follow them. It is due to the influence of these *karmas* that they are born again and again.⁶ Man's *karmas*, again, may be either good or evil (*śubham or aśubham*), and, he is sure to reap as he sows. The people who are ignorant of this law of *karma*, severely abuse the gods when they are unlucky ; for they do not know that their ill luck is the result of their own evil *karmas*.⁷ None can be the dispenser of his own destiny ; the *karmas* done in the former life are seen to produce fruits in this life (*iha siddhiḥ pradrīṣyate*).⁸ Liberation from this cycle of births and deaths, and its accompanying happiness and

¹ Mahā. Vana. 208, 9-12. (Dutt's Tr.).

² Mahā. Anu. 111, 11-18.

³ *ibid.* 43-130.

⁴ Mahā. Śānti. 320, 12-13.

⁵ Mahā. Śānti. 174, 5.

⁶ Mahā. Vana. 208, 27-28.

⁷ Mahā. Vana. 208, 5-7.

⁸ Mahā. Vana. 208, 22.

sorrow can be achieved when there is no more *karma*. And, to attain this end, all desire (*vāsanā*) must be killed.¹ Moreover, what is expected to give happiness may give you grief ; therefore one should try to be immune both to the joys and sorrows of this life.² "If objects of desire are renounced, they become sources of happiness ; the man who follows objects of desire is ruined in that pursuit."³ "Neither the happiness which is derived from a gratification of the senses, nor that great happiness which one may enjoy in heaven, comes up equal to even a sixteenth part of the happiness which originates from the destruction of all desire."⁴ The fulfilment of a desire leads to another desire ; and so, an unending series of desires and their consequent *karmas* is created. "Contentment does not come from an acquisition of the objects of desire. The thirst for acquisition is only further increased by each fresh acquisition, like fire with new fuels thrown into it."⁵ The most effective way to end the life of *karmas* is, therefore, to destroy all desire (*vāsanā*). Desire has its origin in the actual experience of the pleasures of the senses, touch, sight or hearing.⁶ One who has never actually experienced the enjoyment given by an object, never feels the desire for that object.⁷ "Therefore, to acquire happiness, a man should vow not to taste, not to touch, and not to see."⁸

Here, therefore, we have the idea of attaining liberation (*mokṣa*), from the otherwise un-ending cycle of birth or death, by cultivating a sense of complete detachment

¹ Mahā. Śānti. 174, 45, ff.

² *ibid.*

³ Mahā. Śānti. 174, 47.

⁴ Mahā. Śānti. 174, 48.

⁵ Mahā. Śānti. 180, 26.

⁶ *ibid.* 180, 30.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ Mahā. Śānti. 180, 33.

from wordly objects. But, the Mahābhārata also suggests another way of *mokṣā*; and that is by following the way of one's own appointed duties (*svādharma*). Says Bhīṣma : "The dharmas ordained with regard to every mode of life (meaning the different *āśramas*, about which we shall speak in the next chapter) are capable, if well performed, of leading one to heaven and to the highest (*mahat*) fruit of Truth (*satyaphalam*). *Dharma* has numerous ways of approach (*sarvadvārasya dharmasya*); and none of the practices (*kriyā*) enjoined by them fails (*viphalā*) to produce the desired effect."¹ The dialogue between the Virtuous Hunter (*Dharmavyādha*) and the Brāhmaṇa, is quite instructive in this respect.² The Brāhmaṇa had gone to this Dharmavyādha, who was a hunter by profession, to learn the ways of *Dharma*. The hunter explains how it is impossible for any person to live without doing any *karma*. Every one of us is doing something or other every moment of his life. Even the commandment of *Ahimsā*,— 'not to kill any creature'—is difficult to be obeyed fully. "Man kills innumerable (tiny and imperceptible) animals that live on the ground (for instance) by trampling over them by their feet. Even wise and learned men kill many animals in various ways, when sleeping or resting. The earth and the sky are full of animal organisms which are unconsciously killed by man due to ignorance. "Do not kill" (*ahimseti yaduktam hi*) — This commandment was ordained in the days of Yore by men who did not know the real facts of life... There can be said many things as regards the *dharma* and *adharma* of our actions (*karmasu*). But he who adheres to the *Dharma* of his own order (*svadharmanirato*) acquires great fame."³ Therefore, doing one's own duty (*niyata karma*) properly, in accord-

¹ Mahā. Sānti. 353, 2.

² In Vanaparva, Adhy. 207.

³ Mahā. Vana. 207, 30-39.

ance with one's *Dharma*, even if it happens to be that of killing, is also an effective way, according to the *Mahābhārata*, of attaining salvation (*mokṣa*). The soul of a man, says the Virtuous Hunter to the Brāhmaṇa, is born again and again with its accumulated load of karma—the virtuous ones (*śubhakṛt*) in virtuous existences (*śubhayonishu*) and the sinful ones (*pāpakṛt*) in sinful existences (*pāpayonishu*).¹ Destiny (meaning the effect of his past *karmas* here) is all powerful (*vidhistu balavān*), and it is difficult (*dustaram*) to overcome the consequences of our past actions (*purā kṛitam*). His birth in the profession of a hunter, says the Dharmavyādha, was the fault of his *karma* (*karmadosho*) due to the sins committed in a former life.² But he would not therefore abandon the *karmas* which were proper to his profession. To abandon one's own duties (*svadharmam*) here in this world (*iha*) is considered to be sinful ; to stick to one's own karmas (*svakarmanirato*) is certainly in keeping with the *dharma*.³ And *karma* carried out in this manner, i.e. in accordance with one's *dharma*, does not touch or pollute the individual, even though the *karma* happens to be that of killing an animal as the case was with the *Dharmavyādha*. For, as the Brāhmaṇa said to him : “These wicked deeds being the duties of your profession, the stain of evil *karma* (*karmadōśah*) will not attach to you.”⁴ Men of little understanding (*alpabuddhayah*) are overpowered with grief at heart on the occurrence of something which may not be agreeable to them or at the non-occurrence of something which may be much desired by them.⁵ However, nothing could be achieved by merely grieving over such things ; on the contrary, it makes one all the more

¹ *ibid.* Vana. 208, 31.

² *ibid.* Vana. 207, 2.

³ *ibid.* Vana. 207, 18.

⁴ *ibid.* 215, 11-12.

⁵ *ibid.* 215, 18.

miserable.¹ Those wise men (*manīṣiṇāḥ*) whose knowledge has made them happy and contented (*jñānatīptāḥ*) and who are indifferent both to happiness and to misery (*parityajyanti ye duḥkham sukham vāpyubhayaṃ narāḥ*) are only really happy (*sukhamedhāntē*); the foolish (*mūḍhāḥ*) are always discontented (*asamtoshaparā*), the wise (*paṇḍitāḥ*) are always contented (*santosham yānti*).² There is no end to discontent; contentment (*tushtistu*), on the other hand, is the highest happiness (*paramaṃ sukham*).³ The man who becomes overpowered with dejection (*vishādo*) and whose energies abandon him when an occasion for displaying vigour presents itself, has no manliness in him (*purushārtho*).⁴ The effect (*phalam*) of our actions performed by us (*kriyamāṇasya karmaṇo*) must necessarily (*avaśyam*) manifest itself; however, no good is accomplished by giving oneself up to self-disparagement (*nirvedamāgamya*).⁵ Instead of grumbling (*aśochan*), one should try to find out the means (*upāyam*) by which one can be freed (*parimokśaṇe*) from all misery (*duḥkhasya*).⁶ The means to do this, as the Dharmavyādha himself has pointed out above, is to follow *svadharma* during life.

And here we embark upon another important issue, viz. how far life is governed by fate or destiny (*daiva*) and/or how far by one's own effort or exertion (*purushakāra*). Yuthisṭhira desired to know which of the two —*daiva* or *purushakāra*—was more powerful (*śreṣṭhataram*), and for an adequate answer to this problem, he turned to the most learned (*mahāprājña*) Bhīṣmapitāmaha who was

¹ ibid. 215, 21.

² ibid. 215, 21-22.

³ ibid. 215, 23.

⁴ ibid. 215, 25.

⁵ ibid. 215, 26.

⁶ ibid. 215, 27.

well-versed in all the scriptures (*sarvaśāstraviśāradaḥ*).¹ In answer to the query, Bhīṣma narrates the discourse between God Brahman and Vasishṭha on the same topic.² One's own efforts or strivings or exertions (*purushakāra*), says Brahman, are like the seed (*bījam*) while fate (*daiva*) is compared to the soil (*kṣetram*) and the harvest (*sasyam*) thrives from the union of the two (*kṣetrabījasamyogāt samriddhyate*).³ Just as without the seed, the soil though tilled does not yield any fruit, similarly without human effort, fate does not get fulfilled (*na siddhyati*).⁴ Nothing can ever be gained by depending upon fate only by a person who lacks efforts (*akritātmanā*); on the other hand everything (*sarvam*) can be attainable by effort or exertion (*karmaṇa*).⁵ Man's efforts when utilized (*kritah purushakāraṣtu*) only follow his fate (*daivamevānuvartate*); but fate alone by itself cannot produce any good for any one who lacks efforts (*na daivamakrite kinchit kasyachit dātumarhati*).⁶ Just as even a small fire becomes highly powerful (*mahān*) when fanned by wind, so does Fate become highly potent when aided by individual exertion (*karmasamāyuktam*).⁷ On the other hand, just as the light in a lamp diminishes by diminishing the supply of oil, so by the abatement of exertion or effort (*karmakṣayād*) the influence of Fate also diminishes.⁸ There is no inherent power in Fate itself (*nāsti daive prabhutvam*). Just as a pupil follows his preceptor (*gurum*), so does one's actions (*karma*) guided by Fate follow his personal exertions (*purushakārah*); where one's own exertion is displayed,

¹ Mahā. Anu. 6, 1-2.

² ibid. Anu. adhyāya 6. (The whole adhyāya).

³ ibid. 6, 8.

⁴ ibid. 6, 7.

⁵ ibid. 6, 7.

⁶ ibid. 6, 22.

⁷ ibid. 6, 43.

⁸ ibid. 6, 44.

there only does destiny show its hand.¹ "By the influence (*abhyutthānena*) of Fate (*Daiva*) and by using personal exertion do men attain to heaven (*svarga*); the combined help of Fate and Exertion becomes fruitful."² This is the conclusion to which Brahman himself arrived after carefully weighing the claims Fate and personal exertion. ✓

The problem of *karma* has also received attention at the hands of the *Dharmaśāstras*, or what are generally known as the *smritis*, also. Manusmriti, for instance, devotes the greater part of one whole chapter (Ch. xii) to it. The discussion may be briefly summarised as follows : All action (*karma*), in the opinion of Manu, springs from mind, speech and body (*manovāgdehasambhavam*) and produces either good or bad results. These *karmas* are the cause of the various conditions of life (*karmajā gatayah*) of man.³ As a result of the mental sins, a person becomes a low-caste (*antyaajātitām yāti*) in the next birth; as a result of sins committed by speech, he may be born again as a bird or as a beast; while as a result of the sins of body, he becomes, in the next birth, an inanimate object (*sthāvaratām*).⁴ A person who has committed wicked deeds is tortured by the God of Death (*Yama*) after death; and, after atoning for those sins, such a person is born again.⁵ Every one, therefore, should understand these transitions of the soul (*jīvasya gatih*) according to his righteous or unrighteous conduct (*dharmato'dharmataścha*), and should always fix his mind on *dharma* (*dharme dadhyāt sadā manah*).⁶ "But with whatever disposition of mind (*bhāvena*) he performs any action, he reaps its result in a (future) body endowed with the same quality (*tādriśena*

¹ *ibid.* 6, 47.

² *ibid.* 6, 49.

³ Man. xii, 3. (Pandya's "Manusmritih").

⁴ Man. xii, 9; cf. Yāj. iii, 131; and 134-6.

⁵ Man. xii, 17-22.

⁶ Man. xii, 23.

śarīreṇa).¹ *Karma* is therefore essentially connected with rebirth. No act whatsoever can go without its effect (*phala*), to enjoy or suffer which, as the case may be, one must be born again.

Manu, however, suggests a remedy to go out of the cycle of births and deaths (*samsāra*). That remedy lies in the attainment of the knowledge of the self (*ātma-jñāna*). This knowledge is the most virtuous action among all the virtuous actions here below (*Śubhānām karmaṇām param smṛitam*).² Through this knowledge, immortality (*amritam*) and freedom from birth are gained.³ All *karmas* performed in accordance with the precepts of the Vedas (*Vaidikam karma*) are sure to bring happiness both in this world and in the next;⁴ for, it includes (*antarbhavati*) all other (*sarvāṇi*) meritorious acts (*dharma-karmāṇi*).⁵ Now this *vaidika karma* leads to two ways: One is that of *pravṛtta*, that is of increase of happiness and of a continuation of mundane existence; and the other of *nivṛtta*, that is, of the cessation of mundane existence and thus of the achievement of the supreme bliss (*naiḥśreyasikam*).⁶ Mere meritorious action will not lead to the attainment of the supreme bliss (which is *mokṣa*); it will lead, at best to happiness during the next birth. The state of supreme bliss from whence there is no return to this mundane existence can be obtained only by attaining knowledge of the self (*ātma-jñāna*). "He who sacrifices to the self (*ātmayāji*), equally recognising (*samam paśyan*) the self in all created beings, and all created beings in the self, becomes independent like an autocrat and self-luminous

¹ Man. xii, 81.

² Man. xii, 85.

³ Man. xii, 85.

⁴ Man. xii, 86.

⁵ Man. xii, 87.

⁶ Man. xii, 88.

(*svārājyamadhigachhati*).¹ The real fulfilment of the mission of one's life (*janmasāphalya*) is possible for him who exerts to the best of his abilities towards acquiring the knowledge of the self (*ātmajnāne*), towards extinguishing his passions (*śame*), and towards pursuing the study of the *Vedas*.² Steady application or discipline or austerities (*tapas*) and knowledge (*vidyā*) are the best means of obtaining supreme end of life (*niśśreyasakaram param*); disciplined activity (*tapas*) destroys one's blemish (*kilbisham*); and, knowledge³ (*vidyā*) secures cessation from births and deaths (*amritam*).⁴ To attain to this highest state (*param padam*) and so to be one with the *Brahman*, one must be able to recognise the self through the self (*atmānamātmanā paśyati*) in all created beings, and be just or equable in his behaviour towards all

¹ Man. xii, 91 (*svārājya*, from 'rāj' 'to rule', as well as 'to shine', as translated by G. Bühler, following Medhātithi).

² Man. xii, 92-93, cf. muṇḍ. Up. iii, 2, 5, quoted on pp. 25-26.

³ The word "knowledge" (*jñāna*, *vidyā*) used by the Hindu in connection with the attainment of *mokṣa*, requires some explanation. 'Knowledge' in such connection means knowledge of the Ultimate Reality,—*ātmajnāna*, or *brahma-jñāna*,—than which there could be no higher knowledge. In a sense, therefore, my knowledge of mathematics, or of chemistry or electricity, is no knowledge in the real sense of the term for the Hindu. But in another sense, this also could be called knowledge by him, provided it is understood in its widest implication, viz. that the real and most thorough knowledge of anything whatever, be it of small things or great, must lead to the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality; and therefore a full and complete knowledge of mathematics, or anything else, will include the knowledge of everything else! Technically, therefore, for the Hindu, 'knowledge' means knowledge of the Supreme. It is the inter-relation of the finite with infinite. The knowledge of the behaviour of finite things as such is ignorance (*avidyā*) in this sense.

Man. xii, 104, '*tapas = svadharmavrittivam*'—Kullūka.

(*sarvasamatā*).¹ This is the real *Dharma* of man as prescribed by Manu in the *mānava-dharmaśāstra* in his discussion on what is *Dharma* and what is *Adharma* (*dharmādharmau*).

Therefore, without causing pain to anybody, one should gradually accumulate (*samchinuyāt*) *dharma* for the sake of acquiring an aid in the next world (*paraloka-sahāyārtham*).² For in the next world, neither father, nor mother, nor sons, nor wife, nor relations stay to be his companions (*sahāyārtham*); *dharma* alone stays (*dharmastishṭhati kevalah*).³ Single is each being born; single it dies; single it enjoys the rewards of its good deeds (*sukrutam*); single it suffers for its bad deed (*dushkritam*). Leaving the dead body on the ground like a log of wood or a clod of earth, the relations depart with averted faces; but *dharma* alone follows him.⁴ During life, therefore, a person should always (*nityam*) gradually (*śanaih*) accumulate *dharma* (*samchinuyāt*) for his companionship (*sahāyārtham*); for with *dharma* as his companion he will traverse (*tarati*) a gloom (*taṃas*) which is difficult to traverse (*dustaram*).⁵ For *Dharma* speedily (*āśu*) conducts the man, who is devoted to it (*dharmapradhānam*) and eradicates his sins by a life of disciplined activities (*tapasā hatakilbīṣam*), to the next world (*paralokam*), radiant (*bhāsvantam*) and possessing an ethereal body (*khaśarīṇam*).⁶ *Dharma* when violated, destroys (*dharmā eva hato hanti*); *dharma* when preserved, protects (*dharmo rakṣati rakṣitah*); therefore, *dharma* must

¹ Man. xii, 125 (i.e. becomes *mukta*—'mukto bhavati'—Kullūka).

² Man. iv, 238.

³ *ibid.* iv, 239.

⁴ *ibid.* iv, 240.

⁵ *ibid.* iv, 241.

⁶ *ibid.* iv, 242.

⁷ *ibid.* iv, 243.

never be violated, lest violated *dharma* may destroy us.¹ For, Divine *Dharma* is like a '*vrisha*' (i. e. bull) and he who would have '*alam*' (= 'no-more') with it, i. e. would not follow it, would be considered by the gods to be a *vrishala* (= *vrisha*+*alam*) i. e. a low-born person; therefore one should never violate *dharma*.² The only friend (*suhrid*) who follows man even after death is *dharma*; for everything else is lost at the same time that the body perishes.³ A person should, therefore, never turn his mind to *adharma* even though he has to suffer due to following his *dharma*; for he would find that there is quick (*āśu*) destruction (*viparyayah*) awaiting those who do not follow *dharma* and are (therefore) sinful.⁴ *Adharma* practiced in this world (*loke*) may not produce its fruit (*na phalati*) immediately (*sadyah*), like seed sown in the earth, but it gradually accumulates (*śanairāvartamānastu*) and destroys the man who practised it to the root (*kartur-mūlāni krintati*).⁵ Once committed, *adharma* never fails to produce its effects upon him who did it; if the calamity does not fall upon himself, it falls upon his sons; and if not upon the sons then upon his grandsons.⁶ For the time being (*tāvat*) he may prosper through *adharma*; and, he may also achieve successes; and thereafter, he may even overpower his enemies; however, ultimately he is destroyed to the root (*samūlah*).⁷ He should therefore take delight (*āramet*) in the true *dharma* and conduct such as

¹ *ibid.* viii, 15.

² *Vrisho hi bhagavān dharmastasya yah kurute hyalam Vrishalam tam vidurdevāstasmāddharmam na lopayet—Mānu.* viii, 16. "*Kāmān varshati iti vrishah*"—i.e. '*vrisha*' '' means one who pours forth pleasures, says Kullūkabhaṭṭa—commenting on the word.

³ *ibid.* viii, 17.

⁴ *ibid.* iv, 171.

⁵ *ibid.* iv, 172.

⁶ *ibid.* iv, 173.

⁷ *ibid.* iv, 174.

would become an Ārya.¹ Let him therefore abandon even *Kāma* and *Artha* if and when and where these are opposed to *dharma* (*dharmavarjita*). And even *dharma* may be abandoned if and when it would cause pain in the future or is harsh or cruel to human beings (*lokanikriṣṭam*).² So that the ultimate test of true *dharma* is not a self-regarding one but other-regarding one.

Yājñavalkya agrees with this expression of the doctrine of *dharma* and *karma* as expounded by Manu. In the opening verse of his gloss on Yājñavalkyasmṛiti, the commentator Bālabhāṭṭa says that *Dharma* and *Adharma* are the seeds of the accumulation of *karma* (*karmāśaya*); and that from this *karmāśaya* grows the three-fold results viz : (1) *Jāti*, that is birth in the high or the low position, (2) *Āyu*, that is, the length of life, (3) *Bhoga*, that is, the enjoyment or suffering, for every human being. *Dharma* may be said to be the right *karma*. Yājñavalkya says that he has been only expounding the *dharma* of the different *varṇas*, of the different orders of life (*Āśramas*), and the other relevant topics (*itara*) in his Smṛiti.³ The *Mitākṣarā* of *Vijñāneśvara* further comments on this statement by saying that Yājñavalkya is considering six topics in connection with the question of *dharma* : (i) the *Varna-dharma*, referring to the duties of man in relation to the four groups of men, (ii) the *Āśramadharma* concerning the duties connected with the four stages of human life, (iii) the *Varnāśramadharma*, concerning the duties of man towards both the *varṇas* and the *āśramas* in their interrelation with each other,⁴ (iv) *Guṇadharma*, teaching the

¹ *ibid.* iv, 175.

² *ibid.* iv, 176.

³ cf. also Man. iv, 171-61, *anta*.

⁴ For example, the rule that a person belonging to the Brāhmaṇa *varṇa*, and desiring to enter the *āśrama* of studenthood (*brahmacharya*) should carry a stick of *Palāśa* tree, and so forth.

duties of persons with reference to the characteristic qualities (*guṇas*) which reside in them ;¹ (v) *Nimitta-dharma*, concerning the duties of man in connection with particular occasion (*nimitta*)² and (vi) *Sadhāranadharma*, embracing duties common to all men and women as human beings.³ These various *dharma*s describe and prescribe the right *karmas* for man. Of all *karmas*, including sacrifices (*ijyā*), rituals (*āchāra*), discipline or conduct (*dama*), harmlessness (*ahimsā*), liberality (*dāna*), or the study of the Vedas (*svādhyāya*), the highest *dharma* (*paramo dharma*) of man is self-realization (*ātma darśanam*).⁴ Here, again, we come to the oft-repeated method of attaining *ātma jñāna* for the salvation of the souls. And, it is the duty of the King to see that the various social institutions like the family (*kulāni*), the caste (*jātih*), the trade-guilds (*śreṇīścha*), the sects (*ganān*) and associations or unions like those of the artisans etc. (*jānapadānāpi*), who have deviated from their proper *dharma* (*svadharmāchchalitānjātān*) shall be properly disciplined (*vinīya*) and set in the right path.⁵

Here we may also refer to the similar observations made by the *Śukranīti*. This *Nīti* work, too, speaks of one's existence as being conditioned by his *karmas* in the previous births. "Everything in this life is founded on *daiva* (destiny, fate) and *karma*, the latter being divided into that done in previous birth or births (*prākkarma*), and that done in this one (*ihārjitam karma*).⁶ *Śukranīti* thus

¹ For example, the rule that the highest duty of a king,—i.e., a Kshatriya,—is to protect his subjects.

² For example, rules regarding observing penance for failure to carry out certain duties.

³ For example, harmlessness, and befriending all living creatures. cf. *Medhātithi* & *Kullūka*, commenting on *Manu.* ii, 25.

⁴ *Yāj.* i, 8.

⁵ *Yāj.* 361.

⁶ *Śukr. Nī.* i, 97-98 (Tr. by B. K. Sarkar).

admits *daiva* also as a factor conditioning the destiny of a person. But this is not to say that what man is and becomes has been already *in toto* decided for him by his fate, and that therefore he should not strive or make any effort but should lead an inactive life. For, it is the weak who lead an inactive life ; while those who have energy and strength can change their future destiny by work done in this birth (*ihārjita*). One's own actions (*karmas*) alone are thus, in the ultimate analysis, the cause of his good or bad luck (*daiva*).¹ Moreover, his *karmas* can determine not only his destiny (*daiva*) in the next birth, but also his intellectual disposition in the next birth. A man is inclined to virtues or vices according to the effects of his *karmas* in his former births.² Therefore, according to Śukra Nīti, though Fate (*daiva*) is a factor in determining the destiny of man, his own *karmas* themselves have a tremendous influence over his fate. Śukra Nīti is not quite free from ambiguity in this connection. It may be that it seeks to strike a mean between two extremes ; or it may be said to be stating the case of both the sides, leaving the student to judge and decide between the two. Anyway, we see that, on the one hand it praises the philosophy of action (*paurusha*) which is born of active efforts (*karma*) in this life,³ and denounces those who worship fate (*daiva*) ;⁴ and, on the other hand, it opines that everything is founded on both fate (*daiva*) as well as *karma*.⁵ At one place, it seems to give fate (*daiva*) a more exalted place than *karma* as the determining factor in human destiny. "The intellectual disposition is generated according as the fruits of work (*karmaphala*) make their appearance. The

¹ Śukr. Nī. i, 73.

² Śukr. Nī. i, 89-90.

³ Śukr. Nī. i, 105.

⁴ *ibid.* i, 96.

⁵ *ibid.* i, 97.

means and instrumentalities used also are such as are adopted to the predestined fate (*daiva*)."¹

This difficult problem has been more clearly answered in the Yājñavalkya's Smṛiti. He says :—"The fulfilment of an action (*Karmasiddhiḥ*) rests between destiny and human effort (*daive purushakāre cha vyavasthitā*). Of these two, the destiny is the manifestation (*abhivyaktam*) of the human effort (*pauruṣam*) of the past life (*paurva-dehikam*). Some hold that the fulfilment of an object is the result of destiny (*daivāt*) only ; some of accident (*svabhāvāt*), some of time (*kālāt*), some of human effort (*purushakārataḥ*) ; but some men of clear intellect (*kuśalabuddhayaḥ*) hold, however, that the fruit (*phalam*) is the result of the combination (*samyoge*) of these. As verily by one wheel alone there is no motion of the chariot, so without human effort, the destiny does not get fulfilment (*na siddhyati*)."² Yājñavalkya seems to hold, along with the *Mahābhārata*, that both *karma* as well as *daiva* are operative in the shaping of human destiny.

We shall next consider the views of the *Yoga-Sūtras* of Patanjali on the problems of existence, of *karma* and of *mukti*, without concerning ourselves with the purely metaphysical implications of this system of thought. Even though *Yoga* has come to be regarded as one of the six systems of Hindu Philosophy, we must not forget that the chief interest of the *Yoga-Sūtras* lies, not in building up a system of metaphysics, but in devising an outlook and practices in consequence of the same, by the aid of which one could liberate oneself from the bonds of *karma* (*karmabandha*) and thereafter attain liberation (*kaivalya*).³

¹ Śukra. Nī. i, 91-92.

² Yāj. i, 349-51.

³ cf. Radhakrishnan: "The main interest of Patanjali is not metaphysical theorising but the practical motive of indicating how salvation can be attained by disciplined activity"
"Indian Philosophy", vol. ii, (1927) p. 338.

In this sense, Yoga is more a practical philosophy of life than a purely metaphysical system; and therefore the system has a particular interest and value in connection with our present discussion. The word 'Yoga' is derived from 'Yuj', 'to join', in which case it would mean joining or union of finite soul with the infinite or supreme soul (*Īśvara*), i. e. God. It suggests that there is a disunion, or separation (*viyoga*) between God and man, and that *Yoga* is an effort towards dissolving that separation. Hence the term *Yoga* has also come to mean the efforts, or the method or system of efforts, by the help of which the union of God and man is effected. In fact the *Yoga-sūtras* use the word *Yoga* generally in this latter sense, as a method involving strenuous efforts or exertions towards attaining the liberation of the soul (*kaivalya*).¹ The word is also used as a synonym for the *samādhi*—the last stage, among several, that the *Yogī* attains — in which case the word would be derived from the root 'Yuj' as meaning 'to go into trance or to meditate'.² The word seems to have a particular fascination for the Hindu, since it has been used in combination with other words, by doing which the meanings of the latter are invested with a special import every time—as in expressions like *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga*, and *bhakti-yoga*.

To return to our discussion of the views of *yoga-sūtras*, according to Patanjali, nescience (*avidyā*) is the root cause of human suffering, including birth and death. All the 'afflictions' (*kleśāḥ*) of man arise out of the unreal cognition (*viparyayah*), or *avidyā* in the larger sense, which identifies *Purusha* with *Prakriti*, the ego with the body, the Mind with Matter. *Avidyā* is not absence of knowledge; it is rather false knowledge which is positively

¹ cf. *ibid.* p. 338.

² See Vasu's Intro. to "Yoga Sūtras of Patanjali," Tr. by Rama Prasad. Sacred Bks. of the Hindus. Allahabad p. i.

in antagonism to right knowledge (*vidyāviparitam jñānāntaramavidyā*).¹ It gives rise to five kinds of 'afflictions' (*kleśas*) as under :

(i) *Avidyā* which wrongly identifies the transient with the intransient principle, the ephemeral with the eternal, the effect with the cause, the ego with the *Purusha* i. e. the Primary Spirit from which everything has originated. This *avidyā* is the principle *kleśa* of human beings ; and in the larger sense, it underlies all the other *kleśas*.

(ii) *Asmitā*, meaning the mistaken identification of the body, through which the self functions, for the self itself.

(iii) *Rāga*, which defines the inclination towards, and seeking after, things that give pleasure.

(iv) *Dveśa* which refers to the hatred of and consequent avoidance of things that cause pain.

(v) *Abhiniveśa* which relates to the love of life and fear of death.²

The last four are only modifications of *avidyā* (*avidyā-bhedāḥ*) and as such arise out of it. All the *kleśas*, therefore, would be removed³ as soon as *avidyā* itself is removed. Now, the removal of *avidyā* could be achieved by right knowledge (*prajñā*) with the aid of Yoga. Further, *avidyā* is the cause of all *karmas* of man on account of the *kleśas* described above. The *kleśas* are, so to say, the immediate cause of all our *karmas*—the good ones (*puṇya-karmas*) as well as the evil ones (*pāpa-karmas*).⁴ And the operations of these *karmas* are felt both in this life as well as after it is over.⁵ They are the cause of birth (*jāti*), life-span (*āyuh*) and life-experiences (*bhogāḥ*).⁶ Patanjali speaks of *karmas* in terms of 'white' (*śukla*) and

¹ Das Gupta: "The Study of Patanjali", p. 99.

² Pat. Yog. Sut. ii, 3. (Rama Prasad's Ed.)

³ See Vāchaspati on Pat. ii, 3; and Vyāsa on Pat. ii, 4.

⁴ See Vyāsa on Pat. ii, 12.

⁵ *Drishṭādrishṭajananavedantīyah*—Pat. ii, 12.

⁶ Pat. ii, 13; cf. *supra*, p. 22, Bālabhaṭṭa on Yāj. i, 1.

'black' (*krishṇa*). The *karmas* of ordinary man are either 'white', or 'black', or 'white-black' (*śuklakrishṇa*). The *suklakarmas* are due to mental states only (*manasyāyattatvād*), and are not dependent upon external means (*bahih sādhanānadhināh*); these are study (*svādhyāya*) and meditation (*dhyāna*); these acts are free from injury (*piḍā*) to others,—the really harmless acts. The *krishṇa-karmas* are the wicked deeds. And, the *śukla-krishṇa-karmas* partake of the character of both; these are brought about by external means, by acting kindly to some and causing pain to some others; indeed, in all cases where kindness is shown to some by the help of external means, injury is sure to be caused to some others.¹ Even in such apparently innocent actions as preparing barley for food to be given to another, it is possible that ants and other tiny or imperceptible living beings may be injured at the time of pounding the barley.²

Now, the three kinds of *karmas* described above are the *karmas* of ordinary man. But the *karmas* of a *Yogin* belong to none of these three kinds.³ They are not white because the *yogin* gives up the fruit of actions (*phalasamnyāsād*);⁴ he dedicates it to *Īśvara*⁵; the *Yogī* is a '*karmasamnyāsi*'—by which term is meant, not one who has renounced doing anything, but one who has renounced the fruit of his actions, (*phalasamnyāsa*). The *Yogī's karmas* are merely atonements of past debts; they do not create future debts, because they are not *karmas* in the usual sense of the word; therefore, they are neither 'white' nor 'black'. This, of course, does not involve any

¹ "Yadyāvat bahih sādhanasādhyam tatah sarvatrāsti kasya-chit piḍā"—Vāchaspati on Pat. iv, 7.

² See Pat. iv, 7, and Vyāsa and Vāchaspati on it.

³ "Karmāśuklākrishṇam yogināstrividhamitaresām" — Pat. iv, 7.

⁴ Vyāsa on Pat. iv, 7.

⁵ Vyāsa and Vāchaspati on Pat. iv, 7.

absence of *karma*, or inertia, as may be thought by some ; in fact the actions of a *Yogī* are *karmas*, performed on the attainment of discriminating knowledge (*vivekakhyātiḥ*) which fathoms the distinction between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti* ; besides, the fruits of these *karmas* are dedicated to *Īśvara*, and they are performed in His name. The *Yogī* does these *karmas* with the full knowledge that His (*Īśvara's*) "will be done, on earth as in heaven", and indeed throughout the whole universe. The "fire of knowledge" (*jñānāgni*) burns down to ashes all *avidyā* ; and with the destruction of *avidyā*, all *kleśas* are removed right to the root ; thence also are the good and bad accumulations of *karmas* (*karmāśayah*) utterly destroyed.

And, as the *kleśas* and *karmas* are thus completely destroyed, the wise man (*vidvān*) becomes liberated and free even while alive (*jīvanmuktah*). The cause of all existence is rooted in unreal cognition (*viparyayah*) ; one who is free from the affliction of unreal cognition (*kṣīṇakleśaviparyayah*) will not be born (*jātaḥ*) again.*

Thus, in the opinion of Patanjali, knowledge (*jñāna*) is the only means of bringing to an end the otherwise endless cycle of *karmas* (in the ordinary sense of a force that causes re-birth), and birth, each causing the other in succession, one after the other. The *karmas* do not cease with the attainment of *jñāna* ; but they lose their previous import. With the attainment of *jñāna*, the *Yogī* becomes a *Dharma-Megha* (cloud of *dharma*) which showers down blessings upon humanity. The word 'cloud' (*Megha*) probably signifies that he becomes immune, as it were, to the 'touch' of the *karmas* or their effect. That wise man (*kuśalah*) in whom the light of knowledge has dawned (*pratyuditakhyātiḥ*) and whose desires have been destroy-

¹ "Samūlaghātam hatāḥ bhavanti"—Vyāsa on Pat. iv, 30.

² *ibid.*

ed (*kṣīṇatrishṇah*) is not born again.¹ All others have to be born again.

So, for the *Yogasūtras* of Patanjali, the end of human existence lies in the final emancipation (*kaivalya*) of the *Purusha* from the bondage of *Prakriti*.² But this is not the same as physical death. It consists of the destruction of *avidyā* brought about by the knowledge (*jñāna*) that *Purusha* is entirely distinct from *Prakriti*. It accrues, moreover, out of the death of the human weakness in each of us, and the realization that all our *karmas* have reference to the *Purusha*. That highest state of *Samādhi*, say the *Yoga-sūtras*, wherein this realization dawns upon the *Yogī*, is called the *Dharma-megha-samādhi*³—wherein the *Yogī* becomes a veritable mass of all that is holy and saintly. For whatever he does then is prompted and performed by the *Purusha* — the Holy Principle in him which is now fully liberated from the evil influence of *Prakriti*. The *Purushas* are striving, through time and space, to attain to that Holiest Principle, God, or *Īśvara*, which is a distinguished (*viśeṣah*) *Purusha*⁴ and therefore distinct from other *Purushas*. He is distinguished from the other *Purushas* by the fact that He is untouched by any of the *kleśas*, *karmas*, and their effects,⁵ to which the other *Purushas* might be subjected owing to their bondage to *Prakriti*. For Patanjali, the *Purushas*, even after they have attained *kaivalya* (absolute freedom from the bondage to *Prakriti*), are to be distinguished from *Īśvara*. For *Īśvara* never had, nor will ever have, any relation to these bondages⁶; in fact *Īśvara* is ever free.⁷

¹ Vyāsa on Pat. iv, 33.

² See Pat. iv.

³ Pat. iv, 29.

⁴ “*Purushaviśeṣa Īśvarah*”—Pat. i, 24.

⁵ “*Kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmrishṭah*”.

⁶ “*Īśvarasya cha tatsambandho na bhūto na bhāvi*”.

⁷ “*Sa tu sadaiva muktah sadaiva Īśvarah*”.

On the other hand, in the case of a *purusha* which is emancipated, the former bondage is known,¹ and even a future bondage is possible.²

By far the most popular and influential treatise on the problem of human existence in the Sanskrit Literature is perhaps the *Bhagwad-Gītā*—the Song of the Lord. This treatise has secured the highest place in the heart of the masses as well as the classes of India not only in matters of religious behaviour but also on social and moral issues. Therefore the *Gītā* must be considered by us an authority of primary importance for our purpose here. It answers the problem of *karma* more clearly than any other treatise has done so far. Like others dealing with the same problem, the starting point of the *Gītā* too is the theory of *karma* and rebirth. The present stage of life is a period of transition, with past births and their *karman*s and the future lives. The soul (*ātmā*) itself as such never dies nor is it born again (*na jāyate na mriyate*); even when the body dies, the soul is not dead.³ Just as man discards worn out clothes and puts on new ones, so the soul discards old bodies (*śarīrāṇi*) and takes up new ones.⁴ One who is born is sure to die some day; and one who is dead is sure to take birth again⁵—unless, of course, he obtains salvation (*mukti*); but, then, such a person who has attained salvation is not said to die; he is, as the word *mukti* implies, “freed” from birth and death. Otherwise, no one can live even for a moment (*kṣaṇamapi*) without doing any kind of *karma*⁶; again, the accumulation of *karma* is sure to cause another birth.

¹ “*Pūrvabandhakoṭiḥ prajāyate*”.

² “*Uttarā bandhakoṭiḥ sambhāvya*” Vāchaspati on Pat. i, 24.

³ Gi. ii, 20.

⁴ Gi. ii, 22.

⁵ Gi. ii, 27.

⁶ Gi. iii, 5.

Now if *karma* is the cause of the bondage of the individual into the chain of births and deaths (*samsāra*), it may be suggested that the best remedy against this *samsāra* and its concomittant entanglements which will continue *ad infinitum* would be to cease doing any *karmas* at all. This is the natural conclusion to which a partial or incomplete view of the *karma* theory would lead. And, in fact, some scholars have been led to find this meaning in the *karma* theory. They have contended that the theory of *karma*, in solving the problem of existence, leads to inaction or fatality, if *mukti* has to be the end of human life. Thus, Macdonell has said : "A result of the combined doctrine of transmigration and *karma* is, it is true, to reconcile men to their fate as the just retribution for deeds done in a previous life, but on the other hand, it paralyzes action, drives to asceticism, and makes action self-regarding, since it becomes the aim of every man to win salvation for himself individually, by acquiring the right knowledge. There is consequently little scope for the development of other-regarding virtues, as each individual is intent on gaining his own salvation".¹ It is our purpose here to show that such a conclusion cannot be drawn on a complete view of the implications and meaning of the *karma* theory ; and though our previous discussion would have partially answered such criticisms of the *karma* theory, our best authority on this point would be no other than the *Bhagwad-Gītā* itself, as could be seen from what follows.

Now, the very beginning of this great treatise is worth a careful notice in this connection. Arjuna is about to resign his duty of fighting like a true soldier on the battlefield. The Lord Krishna, however, persuades him to take

¹ Macdonell : "Lectures on comparative Religion". 1925, p. 67. Similarly also, Keith : "Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishads" vol. ii, p. 596, calls *Karma* theory "essentially fatalistic."

up his weapons and do his duty as a soldier on the battlefield ; and the whole of the *Gītā* is primarily a discourse directed to press home to Arjuna this point of doing one's duties, whatever may befall one. This means that the central theme round which the *Gītā* is woven is : "do thy duty, follow thy *svadharma*". The *Bhagwad-Gītā* advocates a life of action and deprecates that of inaction ; for, "action is certainly far better than inaction".¹ The great king Janaka and others attained their salvation by following the path of action (*karma-yoga*) ; and, indeed, Janaka did not cease doing his *karmas* even after attaining *mukti*.² So also, there was nothing left in this world for the Great Lord Kriṣṇa Himself to achieve (*kartavyam*) ; nor was there anything for him to gain that He had not already gained ; and yet He followed the path of action (*karmayoga*), because great people do set an example to the mankind.³

Now the *Gītā* ideal of activity is a qualified one. It does not advocate that any kind of action is preferable to inaction. Further, in carrying out the desirable actions, the *Gītā* wants that they should be carried out in a particular discipline and with reference to a specific purpose. Thus, there are two kinds of checks on the path of action in the *Gītā*. The first is the internal one, a kind of psychological discipline, in that *karmas* are to be carried out without any attachment (*asaktah*) to them,⁴ without any *vāsanā*, or motive and without any idea of "mine" and "thine" and of the self (*mamatva*). The blessed is the man who keeps his senses under control (*indriyāṇi manasā niyamya*) and does his *karmas* without attachment to them (*asaktah*).⁵ It is impossible for any man to be without

¹ Gī. iii, 8. "*Karma Jyāyo*"—*hyakarmaṇah*".

² Gī. iii, 20.

³ Gī. iii, 21-22.

⁴ Gī. iii, 19.

⁵ Gī. iii, 7.

karma (*akarmakrit*) even for a moment.¹ Absolute cessation from activity is death. And besides, so long as a man lives, he cannot help doing *karma*; for the *karmas* that have been already credited to his account will force him into more *karmas*.² Those who are ignorant (*avidvānso*) follow their *karmas* with attachment (*saktah*) to them. However, the man who knows (*vidvān*) should follow his *karmas* with a spirit of detachment (*asaktah*) and for the benefit of the people (*lokasamgraham*).³

And here comes now the second important check on man's actions, ~~the external check~~. In doing his *karmas*, man is to follow his duty (*dharma*). He should not be led by his senses (*indriya*); rather, he should carry out the duties which are his *dharma*, and which he is born to do. It is better to die while following one's own *dharma* (*svadharma*), however worthless or bad (*viguṇah*) it may appear; but it is dangerous to follow that of another (*paradharmo*).⁴ Those who follow the duties laid down for their particular order (*sve sve karmanyabhiratah*) shall attain the goal of existence (*samsiddhim*).⁵ There is no sin (*kilbisham*) in doing that to do which one is born (*svabhāvanīyatam karma*).⁶ Even though such *karma* is fraught with faults, shortcomings or blemishes (*sadosh-amapi*), one should not abandon it (*na tyajet*);⁷ for, all *karmas* are accompanied by faults in them, just as fire is accompanied by smoke.⁸ The Gītā explicitly declares that doing one's own *karmas* (*karmayogah*) in accordance with

¹ Gī. iii, 5.

² Gī. xviii, 60.

³ Gī. iii, 25.

⁴ Gī. iii, 35.

⁵ Gī. xviii, 45.

⁶ Gī. xviii, 47.

⁷ Gī. xviii, 48.

⁸ Gī. xviii, 48.

dharma is far better than abandoning *karmas*¹ altogether (*karma-samnyāsāt*).

In the last *Adhyāya* of the *Gītā*, Śrī Krishṇa gives a more precise definition of the terms *karmasamnyāsa* and *karmatyāga* used in this connection. By *karmasamnyāsa* is to be understood not the abandonment of all *karmas*, but the abandonment of the desire for their fruit. "By *samnyāsa*, learned men understand the renunciation of actions done with the desire for fruit (*kāmyānām karma-ṇām nyāsam*); and by *tyāga*, wise men understand the renunciation of the fruit of all actions (*sarvakarmaphala-tyāgam*)," ² not of actions themselves. On the other hand, "indeed, the giving up of the *karmas* prescribed by the *Sāstras* (*niyatasya karmaṇo*) is not proper" ³. In the same strain, the Lord again declares: "Your duty is to perform *karmas* only, (*karmānyevādhikāraste*), unmindful of the fruit or result (*phala*); in doing *karma*, you ought not to possess the motive of fruit (*karmaphalahetuh*); nor should you be inclined to inactivity (*mā te sangostvakarmaṇi*). ⁴ The renunciation of *karmas* through delusion (*mohāt*) is said to belong to the *tāmasa* nature; their abandonment through fear of physical suffering belongs to the *rājasa* kind; but when they are performed without attachment (*samgam*) and also without the desire for fruit (*phalam*), then such a *tyāga* is *sāttvika tyāga*; ⁵ and, of course, it is the most desirable of *tyāgas*. "It is not possible for those who have taken the bodily apparatus (*dehabhritāḥ*) to renounce *karmas* completely (*aśeshataḥ*); but he who renounces the fruit of *karma* (*karmaphalatyaṅgi*) is verily

¹ Gī. v, 2.

² Gī. xviii, 2.

³ Gī. xviii, 7.

⁴ Gī. ii, 47.

⁵ Gī. xviii, 7-9.

to be called the (real) *tyāgi*.¹ And those who renounce the desire for fruit (*phalam*) of their *karma* become free from the bondage of birth (*janmabandha*) and attain that supreme goal, i. e. *mukti*.²

Now the *karma* theory so far described implies that man is born due to his past *karmas*, and that all that he has to do and has not to do, that he will do and he will not do, will react again on his past *karma* and may create new *karmas*. The whole theory is based on the principle that every action is followed by a reaction. Nothing that is thought or spoken or done by an individual can escape being credited to his account. One can never disown one's own actions. The theory further implies that so long as man continues *karmas*, he is going to be born again and again to atone for them and even to create new ones. Moreover, freedom from the round of births and deaths cannot be obtained until freedom from *karma* is obtained. And, with all this, it does not at all imply that,—as could be seen from our discussion,—this freedom has to be acquired by resorting to asceticism, or by leading a life of inactivity, or a life of not doing any *karma*. It is, on the contrary, fully recognized that a life of absolute inactivity is never possible for any one, so that the question of its desirability has no place at all. What the theory of *karma*, properly interpreted, implies is that only the right *karmas* should be performed, recognizing fully, that the particular position in which any individual has come to be—the birth in a particular *varṇa* or family (*kula*), the worldly happiness

¹ Gī. xviii, 11. The late Dr. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar has pointed out that the insistence on *karmas* being done without any regard for the fruit is not new. The *Īśopaniṣad* says in the 2nd verse that “a man should desire to live a hundred years doing actions resolutely, and in that way and in no other, will action not contaminate him”. cf. also Chhānd. Up. iv, 14, 3; Brih. Up. iv, 4, 23; Maitr. Up. vi, 20. See Bhandarkar; “Vaishnavism, Śaivism, and other minor cults”. p. 27.

² Gī. ii, 51.

which surround him, and so on—is the result of his past *karmas* and not a mere accident or chance or luck. The individual has to know this fact and fully understand its implications. He has to atone for, or enjoy the fruits of, his past *karmas*; but, while doing this, he should follow the path of right *karmas*; that is to say, he should follow his *svadharma*, so as to control his future *karma*. The *Bhagavadgītā* has pointed out that only thus can one counteract one's own past *karma* and safeguard himself from the future effects of *karma*.¹ The *Mahābhārata* and *Smritis*, too, agree with this attitude.² Yājñavalkya, for instance, has said that the *dharma* or *adharma* which an individual follows form the seeds of the store of his *karma*;³ therefore he says, he has tried to lay down the proper *dharma* which, if followed by a man, would secure salvation (*mokṣa*) for him.

Therefore, each one of us is born to do his or her part in whatever position we find ourselves, to undo the effects of past *karmas*, and so to behave through life that we may get *mokṣa*. This means that the individual is born not fully to use all his faculties, not fully to take from the world of the physical, the biological, the economical and the social existence around him, as best as he can, as much as he can,—of course consistent with such full opportunities to other individuals, which latter is also the aim of all Western thought; with the Hindu, on the other hand, it is a question, not of using to the utmost, but using the just and the correct quantity and quality, for undoing the effects of past *karma* and for not creating a new world of *karmas* which may react either in this life or in lives to come. The *karmas* are expected to be so manipulated as not to disturb the equilibrium or the balance of the

¹ See pp. 34 ff.

² See pp. 12 ff., and pp. 20 ff.

³ Yāj. i, 1. See pp. 22 ff.

Universe. One must take out, from the world outside, only so much as is just enough for one, not more, not even less. Anything more or less might disturb the equilibrium of the system of *jagat*, and thus might entangle one into the medley of *karmas*. To be able to achieve this, we must follow our *svadharma* which defines our limitations and our specific duties with reference to definite, as also indefinite and probable, situations. It is so devised as to enable one to acquit oneself just equitably. For, as the *Gītā* has said, even a little of this *dharma* will be able to protect us from great dangers.¹ /

So far about what is usually termed as the *karma-mārga*, the 'way of action', as a method of solving the problem of existence. But there are two other 'ways' (*mārgāh*) discussed in the *Gītā* itself for the solution of that problem, viz. the *Jñāna-mārga* and the *Bhakti-mārga*. The followers of the *Jñāna-mārga* would maintain that it is knowledge² (*Jñāna*) that leads to the goal of existence; while the followers of the *Bhakti-mārga* maintain that it is devotion (*bhakti*) to God and self-surrender to Him that leads one to that goal (i.e. *mukti*). The *Gītā* has attempted to bring the three *mārgas* into harmony with each other. But before taking over this point, we shall do well to grasp the *Gītā* interpretation of *Jñāna* and of *bhakti* as leading to *mukti*.

We take up the *Jñāna-mārga* first. The *Jñāna-mārga* is discussed in the fourth *Ādhyāya* and also in the seventh *Ādhyāya* of the *Gītā*. The Lord says: "Actions pollute (*limpanti*) Me not; nor have I any desire for their fruit (*karmaphale sprihā*); he who knows (*abhi-jānāti*) Me to

¹ "Svalpamapyasya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt" *Gītā*, ii, 40.

² See note 3 on p. 19, for the connotation of the word "knowledge" in this connection.

be such, shall never be tied down (*badhyate*) by *karmas*. It was with this knowledge (*jñātvā*) that, in ancient times, those who were desirous of attaining salvation (*mumukṣu*) performed actions ; you also (O Arjuna), therefore perform actions as men of old did in olden times.”¹ Here knowledge is said to be the essential means towards the salvation of man, not as excluding the *karmas* but as giving the *karmas* their due value. Knowledge is essential as an auxiliary to the proper valuation of *karmas*. “Even the wise man is puzzled as to what should be done and what should not be done (*kim karma kimakarmeti*)”.² Therefore it is essential to acquire the knowledge of the real nature of actions (*karma*), forbidden action (*vikarma*) and inaction (*akarma*).³ “That man whose *karmas* are burnt away and are therefore purified by the fire of knowledge (*jñānāgnidagdhakarmāṇam*), and, moreover, whose *karmas* are free from any motive or deliberate expectations of particular results thereof (*kāmasamkalpavarjitah*) is called a *pañḍita*.⁴ And, the entire (*samagram*) *karma* of such a man, whose attachments are dead, and whose mind is fixed on knowledge (*jñānā’vasthitachetasah*), and who performs actions in the spirit of a sacrifice (*yajñāyācharatah karma*), is completely destroyed.”⁵

Now, here we enter upon another important conception fundamental to life and existence propounded by the *Bhagawadgītā*. Man is to perform actions in a spirit of sacrifice, in a spirit of self-surrender. Actions performed without this spirit of sacrifice (*yajñārthāt anyatra*) would bind one to *karma* (*karmabandhanah*) ; therefore they are to be performed with that purpose, casting off all thoughts

¹ Gī. iv, 14-15.

² Gī. iv, 16.

³ Gī. iv, 17.

⁴ Gī. iv, 19.

⁵ Gī. iv, 23.

of one's own self (*muktasangah*).¹ "From food all creatures are born ; from rain is food produced ; rain is produced by sacrifices (*yajñāt*) ; and sacrifice is the result of action (*karma*). Know that all action has its source in the Vedas, and the Vedas are originated from the One (i. e. God) Who knows no decay (*akśara*) ; therefore, the all-pervading Vedas are ever present in a *yajña*.² He who does not help the wheel (*chakram*) of life thus revolving here below, lives in vain, passing his life in sin and by the gratification of the senses (*indriyārāmah*).³ Later, in the same *Adhyāya*, the meaning of *yajña* is more amplified. The wise man (*vidvān*), says the Lord, should behave completely unattached (*asaktah*), ever with the good of the people at heart (*lokasamgraham*), just as the ignorant act with self-attachment (*saktāh*) to action. The self-surrender must be thorough—"Dedicating all actions to Me, with a mind fixed upon the Supreme (*adhyāt-machetasā*), engage yourself in battle (*O Arjuna*) without desire, without any notion of "mine", and [thus] without any mental grief [or anxiety] (*vigatajvarah*)".⁴ Indeed, in the next *Adhyāya*, a very wide meaning is given to this spirit of dedication, of self surrender, of *yajña*. All our actions are to be in dedication to the Universal Spirit—"Brahman is the dedication (*Brahmārpaṇam*) and Brahman is the offering (*Brahmahavir*) ; Brahman is the fire (*Brahmāgnir*), Brahman the sacrificer (*Brahmaṇā hutam*) ; and Brahman is the destination to which he attains who meditates on Brahman (*Brahmakarma-samādhinā*)".⁵ Therefore, "whatsoever you do, whatsoever you eat, whatsoever austerities you perform, do them

¹ Gī. iii, 9.

² Gī. iii, 14-15.

³ Gī. iii, 16.

^{3a} Gī iii, 25.

⁴ Gī. iii, 30.

⁵ Gī. iv, 24.

as offerings unto Me (*madarṣaṇam*)”.¹ For, says the Lord, “by managing all your conduct in this manner, you will be free (*mokṣyase*) from the bonds of *karma* resulting in good or evil fruits (*śubhāśubhaphalair*); and thus attaining that state of mind which renounces [the fruit of actions] (*samnyāsayoga-yuktātmā*), you will reach *mukti* and come to Me.”²

In this universal meaning given to *Yajna*, all *karmas* are the *yajnas* performed by man, all knowledge is also *yajna* performed by him. Life itself is conceived as a perpetual *yajna*, a perpetual dedication to God, or to the Universal Being, and consequently the *karma-mārga* or the *jnāna-mārga*, as means of attaining the end of life are conceived as *karma-yajna* and *jnāna-yajna* respectively dedicated to the *Brahman*, the Universal Being. The *Yajna* thus loses the original merely ritualistic meaning, and comes to attain a more human and deeper significance.³

To return to our discussion of the *jnāna-mārga* as the means of solving the problem of life in the *Gītā*, the Lord, at one place, says that of all the *Yajnas*, *jnāna-yajna* is far superior (*śreyān*) to that which consists of action (i. e. the *karma-yajna*); for *karma* is entirely comprehended in knowledge (*jnāne parisamāpyate*).⁴ Even the sinner amongst the sinners (*pāpebhyah pāpakrittamah*) shall be able to cross [the ocean of *samsāra*] by the aid of this boat of knowledge (*jnānaplava*).⁵ The fire of knowledge (*jnānāgnih*) reduces all *karmas* to ashes.⁶ Indeed, there

¹ Gī. ix, 27; also cf. Bhāgawata Purāṇa XI. iii, 38; and XI. xix, 9.

² Gī. ix, 28.

³ We shall have occasion to speak more about this later in this chapter.

⁴ Gī. iv, 33.

⁵ Gī. iv, 36.

⁶ Gī. iv, 37.

is nothing so sanctifying and ennobling in this world as knowledge.¹ To those who have their ignorance (*ajñānam*) destroyed by the knowledge of the self (*ātmanah jñānena*), such knowledge, like the sun, throws light on our understanding of (*prakāśayati*, i. e. reveals) that Supreme (*tat param*).² And those whose minds are (fixed) on That, who have their souls identified with That (*tadātmanās*), who have dedicated their all to That (*tannishṭhās*), and who consider That as their final goal (*tatparāyanāh*), depart never to return, their sins being destroyed by knowledge.³

This 'way of knowledge' so far described may, however, be found difficult of accomplishment by the ordinary man. To attempt to know the nature of the *Brahman* is much difficult (*kleśo' dhikataras*), because the unperceived (*avyakta*) goal is difficult to attain for the embodied (*dehavadbhih*),⁴ i. e. for the human being. Therefore another comparatively easier way is suggested by the Lord for the attainment of salvation. And that is the *Bhakti-mārga*. Those who dedicate their actions to *Śrī Kṛṣṇa*, and, holding Him as the highest goal, worship Him and meditate upon Him with their minds fixed upon none but Him (*ananyenaiva*)—of such men He becomes, without delay, the deliverer from the ocean of mortal world.⁵ "That devotee (*bhaktah*) who hates no being, who is friendly and compassionate, who is free from attachment (*nīṣamah*) and egoism (*nirahamkārah*), who is equally balanced in times of happiness and misery (*sama-duhkhasukhah*), who is forgiving, contented, always engaged in *Yoga*, self-controlled, firm of mind, and who has his mind and intellect fixed on me (*maiyyarpita-*

¹ "Na hi jñānena sadriśam pavitramiha vidyate"—Gī. iv, 38.

² Gī. v, 16.

³ Gī. v, 17.

⁴ Gī. xii, 5.

⁵ Gī. xii, 6-7.

manobuddhih) is dear (*priyah*) to Me''.¹ In the opinion of *Śrī Krishṇa*, those who ever fix (*nityayuktāh*) their mind on Him and worship Him with the highest faith (*śraddhayā parayā*), are the greatest of Yogis.²

In combination with this *Bhakti-mārga* is also found, again, the doctrine of dedication of actions to which we have already referred before. "He who does actions for My sake (*matkarmakrit*), whose highest ideal is Myself (*matparamah*), who is devoted to Me (*madhaktah*), and who is free from attachment and enmity to any creature, comes to Me, O Pāṇḍava".³ A spirit of complete dedication and self-surrender to God is the main characteristic of a *bhakta*. All possessions, spiritual or material, are to be deemed not as man's belongings but as God's; and they are to be used for Him, to serve His purpose. That man is fit to attain salvation who worships (*sevate*) Him with unswerving devotion (*avyabhichāreṇa bhaktiyogena*).⁴

Again, in combination with *bhakti*, we also find the eulogy of *jnāna* in the '*Gītā*'. By devoted love (*bhaktyā*) to God, the devotee is able to attain the knowledge of God,—what His extent is and what He is in truth (*tatvatah*); and by knowing the true nature of God, the devotee enters into Him.⁵ Towards the close of the *Gītā*, the Lord says: "He who will study this Holy Dialogue between us, will have offered unto Me the sacrifice of knowledge (*jnāna-yajna*); this is My opinion."⁶

In a previous *Adyāya*, four kinds of devotees (*bhaktāh*)

¹ Gī. xii, 14; also cf. *ibid*.

² Gī. xii, 2; cf. also iv, 47; "Amongst all the *Yogis*, he who dwells in Me and worships Me with full faith in Me (*śraddhāvān bhajate*), is considered by Me the highest Yogi (*yuktatamo*).

³ Gī. xi, 55.

⁴ Gī. xiv, 26.

⁵ Gī. xviii, 55.

⁶ Gī. xviii, 70.

are described. "Of men of virtuous actions who worship Me, there are four types : the afflicted (*ārto*), the seeker after learning (*jñnāsuh*), the man who desires wealth or worldly happiness (*arthārthi*), and the man who knows (*jñānī*), Oh mighty among the *Bharatas* ! Of these, the knower (*jñānī*) who is ever possessed of steady application (*nityayuktah*) and whose worship is addressed to the One Being (*ekabhaktir*) is most excellent (*viśishyate*) ; for I am exceedingly dear to the Jñānī, and he is so dear (*priyah*) to Me. All these are noble (*udārāh*) ; but the Jñānī I deem to be My very self (*ātmaiva*) ; for he, with steady application (*yuktāmā*) resorts to Me as the goal (*gatim*), than which there is nothing higher (*anut-tamām*)".¹ This passage fairly summarizes the main attitude of the *Gitā* towards the "way" of *karma*, *jñāna* and *bhakti*. There is a clear indication here that the three "ways" are to be regarded as complementary to each other, in as much as a man of good actions (*sukrutin*) who has attained knowledge (*jñānī*) and is ever devoted to One God alone (*ekabhakti*) will find out his salvation without delay. Thus a real synthesis of *karma*, *jñāna* and *bhakti* is made out here. *Jñāna* is the psychological foundation, the intellectual training, upon which the edifices of *karma* on the one hand, and of *bhakti* on the other, have been erected. The life of full devotion was conceived as hemmed in by a life of activity (*karma*) and a life of reflection (*jñāna*).

Thus, *bhakti* as a means of attaining the end, is conceived as based on an intellectual foundation and not on mere emotional or sentimental one. It has been defined in the *Śāṇḍilya Bhakti-Sūtras* as "affection (*anurakti*) fixed upon the Lord".² And, the *Bhakti-Sūtras* of Nārada say that it is in the form of the highest devotion or affection

¹ Gī. vii, 16-18.

² Śāṇḍilya Bh. Sū. i, 2.

towards some one.¹ It is not, however, a mere sentimental attachment to God;² it is, rather, the result of a rational conviction that *Īśvara* is the goal of human existence. Even for *Rāmānujāchārya*, who was one of the foremost among the *bhakti-mārgīs*, *bhakti* is no mere sentimental attachment to *Īśvara*. It is attained by the devotee after passing through a long course of elaborate mental training. Its requirements are the possession of the capacity of the discrimination of good (*viveka*), freedom from attachment (*vimoka*), constant meditation of God (*abhyāsa*), doing good to others (*kriyā*), wishing well to all (*kalyāṇa*), speaking the truth (*satyam*), sympathy (*dayā*), non-violence (*ahimsā*), and charity (*dāna*).³ And in his *Bhāshya* on the *Gītā*, he has pointed out that the way to *bhakti* is achieved by knowledge and action (*jñānakarmānugrihitam bhaktiyogam*).⁴

The germs and roots of the idea underlying *bhakti* could be traced back to the very ancient sources in Indian Literature, the *Vedas*. The *mantras*, the prayers, the rituals, the different invocations of Gods, with which the *karmakāṇḍa*⁵ was practised in the Vedic days are some of

¹ Nār. Bh. Sū. 2—"sā kasmai paramapremarūpā".

² Which seems to be the later interpretation of *bhakti*.

³ "Sarva-Darśana-Samgraha", IV — from Radhākriṣṇan: Indian Philosophy, vol. ii, pp. 704-5.

⁴ Radhākriṣṇan: *ibid.* The same authority has drawn our attention to Svapneśvara's commentary on the word "anurakti", which is used to denote *bhakti*. 'Anu' means 'after', and 'rakti', means 'attachment'; 'Anurakti' therefore means, according to Svapneśvara, attachment which comes after the knowledge of God.

⁵ *Karmakāṇḍa* is the ritualism which was taught by the *Vedas*; while the later Upanishads are said to deal with what is known as *jñāna-kāṇḍa*—see e.g., *Śiva-Samhitā*, i, 20-22. Mr. N. K. Venkatesan, however, in an article on "the Upanishads of the Atharva-Veda" in the 'Quarterly Journal of the Mythical Society' (New Series, vol; XXVI, No. 1, July-October, 1936), points out that of the 108 Upanishads

the sources whence the later *bhakti* conception was developed. We have in the *Rigveda*, for instance, this prayer to *Agni*; "Oh *Agni*, be easy of access to us, as a father is to his son".¹ Here the prayer to God proceeds upon the assumption of love or affection of God to men which is as natural as a father's love for his offspring. In a later work, viz. the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, the very word *bhakti* is introduced, now for the first time. It tells us that unless the student has absolute faith or devotion (*parā bhaktih*) in God as well as in the teacher (*gurau*), he shall not be taught the sacred knowledge.²

It was, however, the *Bhagwadgītā*, which first gave a strong impetus to the *bhakti* cult. It was made more popular later on by the *Paurāṇic* tradition, especially the *Bhāgawata Purāṇa*, the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, the *Bhakti-Sūtras* of *Nārada* and *Śāṇḍilya*, by *Rāmānujāchārya* and other *Vaiṣṇavite* leaders, and the *Vishṇu-prabandha*, a work in four thousand verses by the twelve *Ālvārs* or saints. *Rāmānujāchārya*, in the 11th century invested the *bhakti* cult with fresh force. The spiritual monism preached by *Śankarāchārya* who flourished from about 800 A. D. onwards,³ was considered by the *Vaiṣṇavites* as opposed to their *bhakti* cult; and so, a reaction was aroused. *Rāmānuja* (who flourished between 1175-1250 A. D.)⁴ tried to harmonize the *bhakti* principle with the belief in One Supreme Deity. Then came *Madhva*, *Nimbārka*, *Rāmānanda*, *Kabīr*, *Vallabha*, *Chaitanya* and

belonging to the four Vedas, 39 belong to the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, 62 belong to the *Karma-kāṇḍa*, and 7 deal with miscellaneous topics connected with the *karma-kāṇḍa*. This means that the number of Upanishads dealing with the daily practices and rituals of the Hindus is larger than those which deal with their philosophical meditations.

¹ i, 1.

² Śvet. Up. vi, 22-23.

³ See Macdonell: "India's Past" p. 148.

⁴ ibid. p. 149.

many other teachers of religion. Madhva (1197-1276)¹ enjoined the *bhakti* of God *Vishṇu*. Nimbārka (about the 13th century) enjoined the worship of *Krishṇa* and his beloved *Rādhā*. Rāmānanda (14th century) preached the *bhakti* of *Rāma* as the Supreme Deity. Vallabha (16th century) enjoined the worship of *Bāla-Krishṇa*, the boy *Krishṇa*; and, his contemporary Chaitanya preached the worship of the boy *Krishṇa* and *Rādhā*.² In Mahārāshṭra, the *bhakti* cult was prominently propounded by Marāṭha saints like Jnānadeva (born about 1271 and died 1293 A. D.) Nāmdeo (about the end of the 14th century), Eknāth (16th century) and Tukārām (first half of the 17th century) in the form of the worship of Viṭhoba of Paṇḍharpur.⁴

Most important among the causes for the *bhakti* cult being so popular, was that *bhakti* as a means of salvation was open to all alike—to women, to the *Vaiśyas*, and to the *Sūdras*,—nay, even to the persons of the most sinful birth (*pāpāyonayah*).³ There was no distinction of race, caste, creed or sex in the way of *bhakti*. Indeed, one of the greatest saints and leaders of the *bhakti-mārga*, Kabir, was a Moslem by birth. The *jñāna-mārga* of the Upanishads was too restricted a path of salvation, being open to the male sex, and that too of the first Varṇa viz., the *Brahmins*, who only could give their full life to it. *Bhakti* therefore soon gained immense popularity owing to its universal appeal.

¹ *ibid.* p. 150.

² Bhandarkar R. G.: "Vaishṇavism, Śaivism & other cults" p. 62 ff.

³ *ibid.*; and Thoothi: "Vaishṇavas of Gujarat" p. 88 ff.

⁴ Bhandarkar; *op. cit.*; and Ranade: "Mysticism in Mahārāshṭra".

⁵ Gi. ix, 32; cf. the Bhāgawata Purāṇa IX, xiv, 21. "Bhaktiḥ punāti mannishṭhān śvapākānapi sambhavāt".

⁶ Of the 16th century.

To return to the discussion of three well-known 'means' of solving the problem of existence, a study of *Gītā* reveals to us the important fact that each of these three *mārgas* has a psychological foundation. Thus, the *karma-mārgī*, who believes in 'action' as the chief *mārga* of salvation, has to acquire certain kind of mental discipline in order to do *karmas* which are to serve the end of his existence. He has to abandon all attachment (*asakta*, or *asamga*), to give up all ideas of 'mine' and 'thine' (*mamatva*) and egoism (*ahamkāra*), and to perform *karmas* in a spirit of dedication to God, knowing full well that whatever he does is for the fulfilment of God's purpose and not his own, without any expectation of a return of the fruit or result of that action (*karmaphalāsā*). The psychological implications of *jñāna-mārga* and *bhakti-mārga* are not dissimilar to these, though in its later developments, *bhakti-mārga* lost much of this psychological implication of mental training and discipline. The later *bhakti-mārga* degenerated even to the extent of finding erotic meaning in *bhakti*, and wavered between divine love and erotic sentiments finding expressions in the various narrations about the episode of love between *Krishna* and the *Gopīs* and *Rādhā*.

Our foregoing analysis of the several views on the solution of the problem of existence and the meaning and end of human life,—whether it is called *mokṣa*, *mukti* or *kaivalya*,—will be enough to enlighten us regarding the controversies which have been raging on the supremacy of one or the other of the three *mārgas*—the *karma-mārga*, the *jñāna-mārga* or the *bhakti-mārga*—as the most effective pathway towards *mokṣa*. It has to be remembered that these three *mārgas* by no means stand in antagonism to each other. On the contrary, they are usually supposed to be working in co-operation with each other. The difference of opinion among the philosophers lies mainly in the assertion that one of these should be

taken as of the primary importance (*śreshṭha*), while the other two have to be regarded as subsidiary or auxiliary to it. In this way have arisen the *jñāna-mārga* school of thought, the *karma-mārga* school of thought and the *bhakti-mārga* school of thought. Even the *jñāna-mārga* should not be supposed to be opposed to the *karma-mārga*. It should be obvious from our preceding survey that what the *jñāna-mārga* asserts is, not that the *karmas* should be absolutely abandoned, but only that they should be executed with the fullest knowledge about the nature of existence, and therefore the fullest understanding of the nature and purpose of *karmas* themselves. A close perusal of the citations from different authorities given in the preceding pages, will clearly show that none of these have advocated a complete abandonment of action at all, but that all of these have declared that the *karmas* which are 'natural to one's station in life',—to use Bradley's expression,—which one is born to carry out, (*svabhāvanīyatam karma, sahaṇam karma etc.*), should be carried out in accordance with one's own *dharma*.¹ And *Dharma* is defined for the individual by the *Vedas* (*śrutih*), the *smritis* (sacred tradition), the conduct of good men (*sadāchārah*) and the ultimate satisfaction of one's own conscience (*svasya cha priyamātmanah*).²

Early Hinduism which was concerned with actions centred round the *yajna*, was, in a sense, an activistic religion in contrast with later Hinduism which was concerned with reflection and meditation, as in the Upanishads. The Vedic tradition said that man can return

¹ Also, see e.g., in Ch. VII on "Varṇas", pp. 303 ff. the story of the butcher who adhered to his *dharma*.

² Man. ii, 12; also cf. ii, 6. These are according to Manu the fourfold means of defining *dharma*; Yājñavalkya, who repeats all these four as the roots of *dharma* (*dharma-mūlam*), adds one more—"the desire which springs from a good resolution" (*Samyak samkalpajo kāmo*)—Yāj. i, 7.

to the source of his origin by doing all the *Vedic karmas*, by doing the duties as laid down in the *Vedas*, the sacrifices, the *varṇa-dharma* and the *āśramadharmas* etc., whereby salvation was promised — a sort of mechanical *karmayoga*, by *doing*, not by *thinking* or meditating; *jñāna* and *bhakti*, knowledge and faith, were secondary. All the *Yajnas*, the prayers, the offerings of all the nice things of life—all this was done primarily as items of *karma*. In the *Jaiminīya sūtras*, for instance, for all practical purposes, *Jñāna* has no place. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* refuses to give any position to the *jñāni*. All *karmas*, in its opinion, would lead to *mukti*. He who desires to reach heaven will perform sacrifices;¹ for sacrifices confer immortality, in the opinion of Jaiminī.² Indeed, by the performance of the 'Āśvamedha' sacrifice, one is able to conquer the world, death, sins, even the sin of murdering a Brāhmaṇa.³

In the Upanishadic teachings however, *Yajna* came to be considerably looked down upon. This was the starting point of the quarrel between the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* and the *Uttara-Mīmāṃsā* schools. The *Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa* which belonged to the latter school and which were popularly known as the Vedānta philosophy, taught, in one sense, an anti-vedic *mārga*. For them, *Yajna* by itself had little meaning. The difference between the old Hinduism and the new Hinduism was the difference between a life around *Yajna* and a life without *Yajna*. The old Hinduism is a life of optimism in a sense. It was concerned with attempts at earning power. The particular institution of monasticism, of self-suffering is absent in old Hinduism. Life was

¹ "Yajate svargakāmah".

² "Yajaterjātamapūrvam" and "Apāma somamamrito babbhūma"; etc.

³ "Sarvānlokanjayati, mrityum tarati, pāpmānam tarati, brahmahatīyām tarati, Yo'śvamedham yajate"; etc.

regarded as a striving of purposes through several elements which were to be won over with the help of *Yajnas*. In a sense, therefore, it is the *Upāsana*, the control of a deity with a kind of magical charms by which it was propitiated and subdued, that the old Hinduism concerned itself with. In fact, old Hinduism was an activist type of religion and not a reflective one. Even when reflection was attended to, it was carried in terms of, and to promote, action. The magico-religious rites of the *Vedic Aryans* following in what they called the *karma-kāṇḍa* centred round the *Yajna-kunḍa* or the *Agni-kunḍa*, that is the Fire-worship. Fire was the medium, a kind of agent,—between man and God. It was through *agni* that man performed a *yajna* offering the best things that he could afford for the Gods—milk, ghee, grain and cattle.¹ All life was thus resolving round the *Yajna-Kunḍa*. The life of activity was conceived as lying in and through sacrifice and giving away what was very dear to man, his necessities of life. The life of the individual, of the family (*kula*), of the village (*grāma*), of the community, was centred round the sacrificial fire.

However, this early phase of Hinduism, known as the *karma-kāṇḍa*, was so much overdone, that the *karmas* grew into mere ritualism. This ritualism was soon looked down with contempt by the time the Upanishads appear. The ritualism of the Vedic period was assaulted and corrected by later meditative and reflective life. The contempt of *yajna* ritualism, e.g., is thus expressed : “These boats in the form of *yajna* are weak (*adriḍhā*) ; those fools who regard these, performed by the eighteen persons (the host, the hostess and sixteen priests) as yielding blessings are certain to attain old age and death.”² And, again, “these boats of *yajna* are fragile—think not over the many

¹ cf. Thoothi : “Vaishṇavas of Gujarat”. p. 32.

² Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 7.

words of the scriptures, for they will bring you fatigue. What shall I do with these? For they cannot secure immortality for me. Grant me, O Lord, that knowledge which has secured immortality for thee.”¹ Therefore the Upanishadic seers set themselves to the task of discovering a new method of reaching salvation. This was done not by completely discarding the *yajna*, but by giving a new interpretation to it. *Yajna* had now to be in terms of the inner life, not in terms of the outer ritual observances. Contemplation of the nature of the ultimate reality, *Brahman*, was a way to realizing *mokṣa*; and so *Yajna* was reinterpreted in terms of *jñāna*. Thus the *Yajna-paramparā*, the tradition of the *yajna*, was kept alive, though in a different garb now.² This meaning of *yajna*, in terms of the spiritual and reflective life was elaborated by the Upanishads and was given a fresh impetus by *Śankarāchārya* and the teachers of his school who came after him. They interpreted, accordingly, the Vedas, the Upanishads, the *Gītā* and the *Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras* in the light of the *jñāna-mārga*. In the period of early Hinduism, *yajna* had been a means to an end superior to itself; and there were attempts to rationalize a life of *Yajna* in terms of superior purposes, aims, and destiny of life. All this living spiritualism of early Hinduism is missing in the later period starting from the Upanishads in which philosophical reflections were carried out. *Śankarāchārya* and his followers merely meditated upon and discussed philosophical problems, which is a characteristic also of Buddhism and Jainism. On the meditative side, the Upanishadic teachings were considerably supported by the Buddhistic and the Jaina schools of thought. *Śankarāchārya* takes up the Vedic tradition, the Upanishadic

¹ See Thoothi: “The Vaishṇavas of Gujarāt” p. 34.

² There are instructions regarding this *jñāna-yajna* in the Upanishads, e.g., in *Chhând. Up.* iii, 17, 1-14; and in *Taitt. Āraṇ.* x, 48; 49; 64; *Sat. Br.* xi, iii, 1, 1 seq.

tradition, and the Bauddha and Jaina traditions and tries to harmonize all of these and secure a balance between the Vedas and the Upanishads, the Gītā, and the Bādarāyaṇa-Sūtras (i. e., the *prasthāna-trayī*). It may be remembered that Śankarāchārya was popularly known as *Prachchhanna-Bauddha* in view of the fact that for him, as in Buddhism, both the world (*jagat*) as well as worldliness (*samsāra*) were illusion (*mithyā*). On the other hand, in spite of the injunctions of their founders, both the Buddhistic and the Jaina traditions set up by their followers take up practically to the *karma* doctrine. In Jainism, for instance, meditation itself resolved into a matter of ritualistic observance ; thus, a Jain is expected, for instance, to read or recite a particular *grantha* (religious book) for a particular number of times every day.

Now, the re-interpretation of *yajna* in terms of *jnāna*, as propounded by the Upanishads, Śankarāchārya, and others, was again carried to such an extreme extent that it became almost incompatible with the every-day life of an average man. The extreme form to which *jnāna-yajna* philosophy led was of asceticism and renunciation of a life of activity (*karmasamnyāsa*). The eulogy of *jnāna* at its extreme tended to result in a wholesale condemnation of *karma*. In order to raise the one to its highest and to indicate its distinctive merit, the other was placed at the lowest in estimation. Also, like *karma* in the earlier days, *jnāna*, too, soon became formalistic and fossilized. The extreme ascetic implications of the *jnāna* cult must have caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the masses of India. It was too much to ask of the average man to believe that world and worldliness (*jagat* and *samsāra*) were all false (*mithyā*), because they were all born of appearance (*māyā*).

Therefore, Hinduism had to be re-interpreted to suit the needs of the average man in India. In the new re-interpretation, account had to be taken of the past heritage

(*paramparā*) of *India* ; that could not be discarded *in toto*. The mistakes of the past too, had to be avoided. Both the interpretations of the past,—the one in terms of the *karma-yajna* as well as the other in terms of *jñāna-yajna*—were, as we have seen, expressions of the human needs of their own times. Dissatisfied with the one as a solution of the problem of existence, the Hindu mind discovered the other ; but then this latter was soon found incompatible with the actual every-day life of the Hindu. Therefore, the new interpretation of Hinduism had to be such as to take into account the life that has to be lived by the common man, and yet possess the dignity and majesty of a philosophy in order to be able to replace the philosophy of *jñāna-mārgis*. The *karma-mārga* had taken into account the common man's life, but soon failed to satisfy the Hindu with loftier ideas and ideals, who must have felt that what the *karma-mārga* resulted into was too mundane and low an aim of life. The *jñāna-mārga*, on the other hand, proved rather too lofty and impracticable an ideal for the average individual to approach. Both these kinds of mistakes of the past had to be avoided now. And yet, the past tradition (*paramparā*) had to be kept alive as far as possible ; in fact, the new philosophy had to draw upon the past *paramparā* itself. All this was achieved by the introduction of the *bhakti* principle, especially by the thinkers of Vaishṇavite school mainly at the instance of the *Bhagavadgītā*. The *Gītā* accepted the heritage of the past in that *yajna*, *karma*, *jñāna*, *saṁnyāsa*, *dharma*, and even *bhakti* itself, were taken up by it ; but each of these was invested with a newer meaning, more compatible with every-day life that is lived, and therefore more human. *Yajna* was interpreted as a discipline in self-surrender to the will of God (*Īśvarārpaṇa* or *Brahmārpaṇa*) ; *karma* was placed in opposition to *akarma*, inactivity, and made acceptable in life so far as it happened to be in accordance with the *dharma* of a man. *Jñāna* was

explained as implemental to acquaint man with the greatness and the glory of God and Godliness ; this was effected in order to bring God in an estimation above all else in the eyes of man, and thus to impel man to cultivate a spirit of activity in His name and for His sake without desire or expectations of its result (i. e. to *karmasamnyāsa* in its true meaning of *karmaphalasamnyāsa*). And *bhakti* towards which all these converge, with unswerving faith (*śraddhā*) as its foundation, is the very pinnacle of the philosophy of life expounded by the *Gītā*. It lifts up and carries forward the old *Yajna* tradition (*Yajna-paramparā*) towards a living and ever-new interpretation. Life itself was conceived as a perpetual *yajna*, a perpetual surrender to God's purpose, not in terms of the libations of ghee, milk, butter, cattle, or grain (i. e. *vaidikam karma*), nor in terms of mental contemplation (*jnāna*), but in terms of giving up the entire self of man,—body, mind, heart and possessions. True and fullest living means the surrender of body, mind and belongings (*sarvārpaṇa*) ;—that is the *yajna*, the full *yajna*. And considerably along with this line of thought, the Hindu did, and does to-day, think of life as a *yajna* to be performed in terms of *bhakti*, of course in spite of and in the midst of human frailties.

Therefore it is the *yajna-paramparā* that is sought to be interpreted by all Vedic writers, Upanishadic writers, the Bhagawadgītā and the Bhāṣhyakāra Āchāryas. The *Yajna-paramparā* is at the root of all Hindu scriptures and of the Hindu social psychology too. Even to this day, it finds expression in the very common term “*Yajamāna*” used to denote the householder (*grihastha*). This is how the magico-religious heritage of the Vedic India has persisted in the cultural consciousness of the Hindu even to this day.

The magico-religious heritage of the Vedic times persists in the Hindu mind in yet another direction. The government of the supernatural power or powers over

human environment is also governing the Hindu social psychology. The various *vratas* (penances), the *samskāras*, etc. have this presupposition of divine government of human affairs. At every stage during the course of each *vrata* or *samskāra*, the presence of the family-god (*kula-devatā*), the village-god (*grāma-devatā*), and such other deities is invoked to be appeased. We shall have occasion to speak of the *samskāras* and their part in the individual's life in the chapter on family.

Now, a close scrutiny of all the several philosophies of life presented hitherto, will disclose to us more of the psychological unity behind them in spite of the historical differences of opinion incidental in the course of their development. All these views are based on a certain psychology, an attitude of mind, which is fundamental in the midst of all the divergencies. Let us attempt to understand this attitude of the Hindu mind.

In the first place, in considering the problem of existence, of life, we must distinguish between the 'means' and the 'end'. The 'end' has been variously named as '*mukti*', '*mokṣa*' or '*kaivalya*', though in fundamentals, the general meaning of all these terms is the same. We shall see, as we proceed, how it is the same in all cases. The 'means' have also been variously conceived as *jñāna*, *karma* and *bhakti*. And here again, we have seen that though these differ from each other, none of them is exclusive or even independent of the other two. The important point is that these 'means' have to be made use of in accordance with *dharma*. So that, in one word, *dharma-samchaya* (accumulation of *dharma*) would be the means to attain the meaning and the end of human existence, viz. *mokṣa*.

And here we come to the main point of our inquiry, the psychology behind the 'end' and the 'means' :

The first issue to be raised here is, what is the end? Through one birth or several, whatever you have come to be has an origin. Why should you be born at all? Now, the Hindu believes that man is born and exists in accordance with the wish of God (*Īśvara*), of the Infinity, of the Primal Cause; and that he is to that extent separated, as it were, from it. And from birth to birth, all the struggles that he goes through and the means that he employs, are the means to go back to the source of his existence. We are all born to fulfil the will of God. All sparks that radiate from him must desire to return to the original source. The whole problem seems to be reduced to this, that the whole universe is a process, first of evolution, of the Many being evolved out of the One, and then of involution,—the Many trying their best to go back to the origin from which they came. From the point of view of this life, of *samsāra*, there is involution; from the point of view of the One, the *Īśvara*, there is evolution. From Infinity, thus, finite souls appear and strive, with struggles and efforts, ultimately with a view to reach the Infinity;—this is the end of existence. For, the birth of the sort that we get, in the view of the Hindu, is bound to keep us as finite and away from the infinite. It is therefore that we seek to be free from birth. However, we also get in Hindu Philosophy the theory that births are opportunities to serve the Infinite,¹ that births themselves are thus means towards the end, that dealings with space and time are necessary implemental factors which we should welcome, in so far as they give us opportunities to be one with the Infinite!

But, it may be asked: Why should it be said that freedom from birth is life found, is salvation? The Western mind misinterprets this theory in terms of not

¹ As with the Vaishṇavites, esp. Vallabhāchārya (see Dr. Thoothi: "Vaishṇavas of Gujarāt" p. 93 et. seq.)

only death of this life, but of any existence. The Hindu's answer to this lies in another theory altogether. The Hindu feels that the things of life and world and worldly relations are fetters in the way of his freedom. And therefore, the fact of the birth which brings him in contact with these is, for him, the main cause of this difficulty, fundamentally because he feels a sense of separation (*viraha* or *viyoga*) from the One, the Universal Principle, while he really wants to merge into the One. Therefore, he finds himself divided between this longing to merge in the Universal and the problems of life, viz., world and worldliness (*jagat* and *samsāra*). In his best moments he compares these two attractions, these two desires, these two longings, and declares that if he wants to reach the one, he must abandon the other. This birth, then, is an opportunity to be one with, or to belong to, or to be united with, or to be about (according to the various philosophies) God. Otherwise, ordinarily he is satisfied with what he gets of the world and worldliness, or seeks more of it. Unless, therefore, that longing, that pang, that desire to go out of one's self to the source of his being is aroused, the problem of salvation has no place for an individual.

So then, the problem of life, the problem of existence, is, to return back, or to be alongside with, or to be one with the original source of existence. It is not to die, but to become deathless (*amara*) ; and, to be *amara* does not mean that one dies for ever, but one becomes free from births and deaths, that is to say, one becomes immortal. And, this sense of separation from the original source of life by the individual lies, thus, at the root of this search for salvation in terms of *mukti* as cessation of births and deaths, as cessation of relation between the individual (*jīva*) and worldliness (*samsāra*).

All the institutions, social or personal, are, in view of these considerations, further means of *dharma-samchaya*

and are calculated to secure this end of *mukti* for the individual. The four *āśramas*, the *varṇa*—organization, education, marriage, family, personal and social conduct—all these are means in this sense, to the one end, and must be followed in accordance with *dharma*. The finite personality itself is also a means towards the end. The finite personality is the object which is sought to be developed, birth by birth, *āśrama* by *āśrama*, stage by stage, day by day, throughout this life, throughout his connections with the various social institutions, throughout his private life, towards realising the one end, viz., *mokṣa* from whence there is no return to this worldly or any existence of a changing nature (*anitya*).

It is on these considerations that the various *dharma*s—the *varṇa-dharma*, the *āśrama-dharma*, the *kula-dharma*, etc. are founded. The basis of *āśrama-dharma* for instance, lies fundamentally in so helping the individual, each personally training himself up along such lines, that though he may have to live in, with and along with society, that is to say, world and worldliness (*jagat* and *samsāra*), he may so formulate and work out his career as to acquit himself equitably in the social universe,—which is only a part of the larger universe,—and in the world and worldliness, without being affected by these, so that when the time comes the individual may, out of this training and discipline, be enabled to cast away these social bonds, go into himself, and find himself out (*ātma-jñāna*), and thus secure the salvation to achieve which this birth is an opportunity and the things of life in it are so many instruments of salvation.

The whole system of *āśrama-dharma* has this note of direction ; the whole system of *varṇadharma* is based on such fundamental conception ; and all other qualitative *dharma*s, like *manushya-dharma*, *nitya-dharma*, *naimittika-dharma*, *kula-dharma*, *sādhāraṇa-dharma*, *āchāra-dharma*, *vyavahāra-dharma* and so forth, are within the

orbit of this fundamental chord of Hinduism, viz., that all *dharma*s and *karma*s have to be and can be so adjusted and manipulated, that ultimately they will enable the individual to be free from his *karma*s and bring him face to face with the ultimate *dharma*, to cultivate and practise which alone he took birth. In the following pages, we shall attempt to elucidate and explain this with reference to the different social institutions.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
SYSTEM OF THE FOUR *ĀŚRAMAS*

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SYSTEM OF THE FOUR *ĀśRAMAS*

The Hindu sages have taken into account man as a social being with reference to the different factors that influence his life and its conduct. Thus, man is considered in connection with (i) *Deśa*, which may be said to be the regional approach to the study of society ; (ii) *kāla*, which, we may say, constitutes the historical approach to that study ; (iii) *śrama* which takes into account man with reference to his nurture and development in the contemporary environment ; and (iv) *guna* which refers to the natural inherent individual equipment of man. The importance and significance of 'place' and 'time', or region and history, in the activities of man has been acutely recognized by the Hindu thinkers ; and *Rājarshi* Bhīṣma teaches us, indeed, that according to the conditions and demands of the time and place (*deśakāla*), what is *dharma* may become *adharma*, and what is *adharma* may become *dharma*.¹

In the present work, we have attempted to make an investigation into the Hindu social thought particularly under the last two headings, i. e. on man as a social being in connection with his nurtural developments, and in connection with his natural endowments. We may note here that in substance, all the Hindu sages agree that any scheme of social organization which aims at the best functioning of every human being as a social unit, must, in the first instance, take him into account from two aspects : First, it must consider man as a social being with reference to his training and development in the natural

and social environment in order to enable him to fulfil the final aim of his existence ; and secondly, this has to be co-ordinated with another scheme which studies man with reference to his natural endowments, attitudes and dispositions. The first of these is the problem undertaken in the scheme of the *āśramas* ; the second is thought out in the scheme of the *varṇas*.)

The two schemes of the *āśrama* and the *varṇa*, which we may shortly term as the considerations of the problems of the nurture and the nature of man, rightly serve as the corner-stones of the Hindu theory of social organization. And, we may also note here that the scheme of the *āśramas* as thought out and devised by the Hindu is a unique phenomena in the whole history of the social thought of the world, without even a parallel to it in any other thought-system. The same may be said to be true to a great extent of the *varṇa*-organization also.

Now, both the schemes of the *āśrama* as well as the *varṇa* presuppose, and are fundamentally based upon, a certain point of view in regard to the problem of life and its conduct, upon a certain *philosophy* of life ; this fundamental philosophy of life was the topic of our first chapter. There we have discussed the ways in which the problem of existence and human destiny was conceived by the Hindu, and how attempts were made to arrive at a basis for the solution of that problem. In this chapter and in those that follow, we shall attempt to find out how, on this basis, the whole superstructure of the Hindu social institutions has been erected so as to give effect to the principles enunciated in the first chapter, within the orbit of the practical day-to-day life of the Hindu. In other words, in the first chapter, we dealt with the *theory* of the problem of life and its solution, while in this chapter and in the chapters that follow, we are going to consider the *practices* based on that theory, by following which the ideals preached by the theory could be realized.

And here lies, broadly speaking, probably one of the distinctions between the Hindu way of understanding, tackling and solving social problems and the modern Western way. In the West, generally speaking, the social sciences as such of to-day are mainly built up in terms of the relations between man and man, and between man and his environment, and from thence, between man and God, and that too only if and when the latter has at all to be taken into consideration. While, on the whole, the Hindu starts with the problem of the relation between man and God or the Ultimate Principle; and upon that basis he seeks to define and formulate his relations with every other thing, person, event, and circumstance in the universe. Thus, for the Hindu, the individual's relation with God defines his relations with other men, with his family, with the group or society in which he lives or with which he comes in contact, with his village and his country—in fact, with humanity and with the world!

And this general statement of the case applies to the *Āśrama* theory which we are proposing to state and discuss in this chapter, reserving the discussion of the *varṇa* theory for a later chapter. The whole of the life of a human individual is, for the Hindu, a kind of schooling and self-discipline. Now, during the course of this schooling, he has to pass through four stages,—four grades of courses, as it were,—called the *āśramas*. And, in regard to the *āśramas* too, every item and stage and phase have to be defined in terms of the already defined relations between man and God. Here, therefore, practically we start with a supernatural basis; upon this, we erect the superstructure of the man's earthly career. The earthly existence has thus to be defined in terms of *dharma*; and *dharma* has to be interpreted in the concrete in terms of *karma*. The *āśrama* scheme therefore defines our *dharma* in and through a life of *samsāra*, before it, and beyond its

pale ; and in practice, it seeks to delineate the implications of *dharma* in terms of *karma*.

In order to understand the psycho-moral basis of the āśramas proper, it is advisable that we should take up the theory of the purushārthas which concern themselves with the understanding, justification, management and conduct of affairs of the individual's life in relation to the group, in and through āśramas. // We speak of the purushārthas as the 'psycho-moral' basis of the āśrama theory, because, on the one hand, the individual receives a psychological training through the āśramas in terms of lessons in the use and management of the *purushārthas* : while, on the other hand, in actual practice, he has to deal with the society in accordance with these lessons. It is in the light of the understanding of the meaning and place of the purushārthas in the āśrama scheme that we shall be able to comprehend the right method, way and outlook for the management of each of the āśramas. // The four *purushārthas* are *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. It is usual to translate these terms in English by such words as moral-ity, wealth, desire or passion, and salvation respectively. But these terms are potent with deeper meanings than these English words singly convey. // Thus, the word *dharma* is derived from the Sanskrit root '*dhri*', meaning 'to hold together, to preserve.'¹ The social implications and meaning of *dharma* as a principle for maintaining the stability of society is brought out by Vāsudeo Kṛṣṇa in three verses in the *Mahābhārata*. In advising Arjuna as to what is *dharma*, he touches, first, only a fringe of *dharma* when he says that "*dharma* is created for the well-being

¹ For the several stages of meaning through which the word has passed from the Rigvedic period onwards, see P. V. Kane: "History of the Dharmaśāstras," Section I, pp. 1-4.

of all creation”;¹ and further that “all that is free from doing harm to any created being is certainly *dharma*; for indeed *dharma* is created to keep all creation free from any harm.”² Kṛiṣṇa proceeds, next, to give a still more comprehensive view of *dharma*: “*Dharma* is so called because it protects (*dhāraṇāt*) all; *dharma* preserves all that is created. *Dharma*, then, is surely that principle which is capable of preserving the universe.”³ *Artha*, on the other hand, is to be understood as referring to all the means necessary for acquiring worldly prosperity, such as wealth or power//And *kāma* refers to all the desires in man for enjoyment, and satisfaction of the life of the senses, including the sex to which the word *kāma* more prominently refers.⁴

In a sense, then, *artha* and *kāma* may be said to refer to two aspects of man’s earthly belongings: *artha* referring to the material possessions, and *kāma* to the natural mental inclinations possessed by man. At its worst, *kāma* is said to be one of the six enemies of human being.⁵ But it is equally true that a human being cannot conduct his life without *artha* which constitutes the means of living, and *kāma* which helps the propagation of the species. Therefore, it is needed that the correct quality and quantity, the place, and the season of *artha* and *kāma*, have to be found

¹ Mahā. Kāṇ. 69, 57: “*prabhavārtham cha bhūtānām dharma-pravachanam kṛitam*”.

² *ibid.* 58: “*Yas syādahimsāsamyuktas sa dharma itī niśchayah/ahimsārtham cha bhūtānām dharma-pravachanam kṛitam*//.

³ *ibid.* 59: “*dhāraṇād dharma ityāhur dharmo dhārayate prajāh/yas syād dhāraṇasamyuktas sa dharma itī niśchayah*//.

⁴ Cf. the discussion on the *purushārthas* in Dr. Thoothis’ “The Vaishṇavas of Gujarat”. pp. 44-45.

⁵ *Kāma*, *Krodha*, *lobha*, *moha*, *mada* and *matsara*—passion or lust, temper, greed, weakness of will, conceit or pride, and jealousy,—are the six enemies (*śaḍrīpu*) of man.

out and fixed up by the wise. Now, this is done in terms of *dharma* which defines for man, the proper quality, quantity, place and season, for the right functioning of *artha* and *kāma*. By attending to his *dharma*, therefore, a person is entitled to live a proper life even though it may be lived in terms of *artha* and *kāma*. As Vidura says : "It is by the help of *dharma* that the sages have been able to cross the world. The stability of the universe depends upon *dharma* ; *artha* and *kāma* too, depend for their proper management upon *dharma*. *Dharma* is the foremost of all ; *artha* is said to be the middling ; and *kāma*, it is said by the wise, is the lowest of the three. Therefore, we should live with controlled soul, paying our best attention to *dharma*." In the opinion of *Manu*, the good of humanity lies in a harmonious management or co-ordination of the three (*trivarga*), viz., *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. Says he : "Some declare that the good of man consists in *dharma* and *artha* ; others opine that it is to be found in *kāma* and *artha* ; some say that *dharma* alone will give it ; while the rest assert that *artha* alone is the chief good of man here below (on earth). But the correct position is that the good of man consists in the harmony or the aggregate of the three."² Now this advice, as *Kullūka* explains, is meant for those who weigh the issue from the viewpoint of the immediate and worldly objectives of life. But, from the point of view of the final purpose and meaning of life,

1 Mahā. Śānti. 167, 6-9 :—"dharmeṇaivarshayastirṇā dharme lokāḥ pratishṭhitāḥ/dharmeṇa devā vavridhur dharme chārthah samāhitah ||7|| dharmo rājan guṇah śreṣṭho madhyamo hyartha uchyaite/kāmo yavīyān iti cha pravadanti manīṣiṇaḥ ||8|| tasmāddharmapradhānena bhavitavyam yatātmanā/".

² "dharmārthāvuchyate śreyah kāmārthau dharma eva cha / artha eveha vā śreyas trivarga iti tu sthitiḥ//Man. ii, 224. On 'trivarga' *Kullūka* comments : "dharmārthakāmātmakah parsparāviruddhastrivarga eva puruṣārthatayā śreya iti viniśchayah/".

mokṣa alone would prove to be the best guide.¹ With reference to the supreme end of *mokṣa*, therefore, the other three immediate objectives of life become but the means for the attainment of that end.

Now, as we shall see in our discussion of the *grihasthāśrama*, *artha* and *kāma* have to be practised by the individual with reference to one or more other individuals. So also, the practice of *dharma* cannot be possibly conceived as existing apart from the relation between the individual and the group, except when the *dharma* directed is mainly in the interest of the *mokṣa* of the individual ; for, then *artha* and *kāma* become transformed and get merged into *mokṣa*. Thus, on the whole, the *purushārthas* are concerned both with the individual as well as the group. They enunciate and justify the *certain* kinds of relation between the individual and the group ; they define the *just* relations between activities of the individual and those of the group ; they state and consider also the improper relations between the individual and the group. Thus, the *purushārthas* control both the individual and the group, and also their inter-relations. Here, it is to be remembered that when we refer to *artha* and *kāma* as *purushārtha*, we refer to them in their proper proportions, that is to say, only in the best sense of these words. *Artha* refers to the problem and activities connected with the finding, making, gathering, conserving and organizing of the fundamental necessities of life connected with nutrition and all that accompanies the same ; similarly, *kāma* refers to the sex and the reproductive aspect, its understanding, its right functions, its ob-functioning, its organization and management,— both with reference to the individual and the group. *Dharma* seems to be the arbiter, the conscience keeper, the director, the inter

pp. 60-cha *bubhukṣūn pratyupadeśo na mumukṣūn*,
Literature am tu *mokṣa eva śreya iti śhaśṭhe vakṣyate/.*

preter, of the proprieties that govern the right functioning and management of the relations between the inner man and the outer man, and between the individual and the group. *Dharma* is, therefore, the holder of the balance in terms of which *artha* and *kāma* have to be dealt with, weighed, practised and appropriated.¹ *Mokṣa*, on the other hand, seems to be concerned mainly with the individual. It refers, perhaps, to the appeal of the inner man to the individual, pure and unaffected by the group. It is perhaps too personal an outlook that defines the struggle and hope and justification within the individual for *Mokṣa*. But, from the Hindu's point of view, we must also remember, that the inner personality of the individual at its best, is identified by him with, not only the group, not only the society, not only the nation, not only the race, nor even with the human race, but also with the whole creation, animate and inanimate, seen and unseen, which includes all these and is still much more than all these! This will be amply evident from our discussion on the problem of *mokṣa* in the first chapter.

And now let us turn to the theory and practice of the *āśramas* proper. The word *āśrama* is originally derived from the sanskrit root '*śrama*' 'to exert oneself'; therefore it may mean, by derivation, (i) a place where exertions are performed, and (ii) the action of performing such exertions.² Literally, an *āśrama* is a 'halting or resting place'. The word therefore signifies a halt, a stoppage or a stage in the journey of life just for the sake of, in a sense, rest in order to prepare oneself for further journey. The *āśramas*, then, are to be regarded as resting places during one's journey on the way to final liberation

¹ For a discussion of the implications of the concept of *dharma* on similar lines, see also Thoothi: "The Vaishṇavas of Gujarāt", Ch. II.

² Hastings: "Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethic" on "*Āśrama*", by P. Deussen.

which is the final aim of life. The four stages of life, says Vyāsa in the Mahābhārata, form a ladder or flight of four steps. That flight attaches to Brahma. By ascending that flight one reaches the region of Brahma.¹ Whichever of the above be the original meaning of the word, the historical development of the āśrama scheme as an institution and the social implications within it include all the interpretations given above. Each of the āśramas is a stage of life in which the individual has to train himself for a certain period, and exert himself within the circuit of the same in order to qualify himself for the next. *

The āśramas are four in number : (1) the *brahmacharya*—that of a student, (2) the *grihastha*—that of a married man, the householder, (3) the *vānaprastha*—that of a retired life in the forest, after abandoning the home, preparatory to complete renouncement of worldly relations, and (4) the *śamnyāsa*—the life of complete renunciation of worldly relations and attachments. Attempts have been made to show that in the beginning there were only three āśramas, that originally the vānaprastha and the śamnyāsa āśramas, formed only one order, and that these came to be distinguished from one another in later times. ** Thus the Chhāndogya Upanishad mentions three orders of life according to *dharma* (*trayo dharmaskāṇa*) ; (1) the householder's order, where one is expected to perform sacrifices (*yajñah*), study (*adhyayanam*) and charity (*dānam*) ; (2) the order of the recluse wherein one is expected to perform penances (*tapas*) ;

¹ Mahā. Sānti. 242, 15 :

“*Chatushpadī hi niḥśreṇī brahmaṇyeshā pratishṭhitā/ etāmāruhya niḥśreṇām brahmaloke mahiyate* //.”

² See “Proc. and Trans. of the Seventh All-Ind. Ori. Con.” Baroda, Dec. 1933 (1935), pp. 315-16, Art. on “Development of the System of Āśramas” by Dr. P. M. Modi. See also “Vedic Index” by Macdonell and Keith, Vol. I, pp. 68-69; and C. V. Vaidya: “History of Sanskrit Literature”, Vol. I, Section ii, pp. 180 ff., Poona (1930).

and (3) the order of a perpetual or life-long (*atyantam*) student residing permanently in the house of a teacher (*āchāryakulavāsi*). All these three (*sarva etc.*) reach the worlds of bliss (*punya lokā*), after death ; but any of these three who is established in *Brahman* (*brahma-samsthō*)¹ attains immortality (*amritatvam*).² Dr. Modi also refers to two other passages from Manusmṛiti where reference to the scheme of āśramas as consisting of three āśramas is made.³

¹ "trayo dharmaskandhā, yajno'dhyayanam dānamiti prathamah, tapa eva dvitīyo, āchāryakulavāsi tritīyo, atyantamātmānamāchāryakule'vasādayan/sarva etc. punyalokā bhavanti brahmasamsthō' mritatvameti/—Chhāndo. Upa. ii, 23, 1.

² See Modi: Op. cit.

This passage, however, may be interpreted in a different manner. For, Dr. Modi has taken the word '*brahma-samsthah*' as an adjective qualifying the three orders mentioned previously in the passage. The word, on the other hand, may have been used independently to denote an order by itself. It is in this manner that Prof. Ranade has interpreted the last sentence from the passage quoted above—as referring to the *samnyāsa āśrama* as the fourth āśrama. "..... We are told", says he, "that he, alone who lives in *Brahman* (*brahma-samsthō*), referring primarily to the life of the *Samnyasin*, attains to immortality. We, if we re-arrange these orders," he further adds, "we find that the foundations of the future *Āśrama* system are already well founded firmly laid even in such an old Upanishad like the *Chhār dogya*."—'*A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*', Poona, 1926), pp. 60-61.

"ta eva hi trayo lokāsta eva traya āśramāh/ta eva hi trayo vedāsta evoktāstrayo'gnayah"—Man: ii, 230.

"There are three Worlds, three *Āśramas*, three *Vedas*, as also there are said to be three Fires."

And, "*Yasmātrtrayo'pyāśramaṇo jñānenānrena chānvalam/grihasthenaiva dhāryante tasmājjyeshthāśromo grihi*—Man. iii, 78.

Dr. Modi considers that in the latter verse, the force of '*api*' is intended to include all the *āśramas* in existence; and there-

Now even though in early literature, we find, as in the Chhândogya Upanishad quoted above, a mention of the three phases of life viz., the student, the householder, and the anchorite, yet there is no particular order laid down in the Upanishads for these phases to be followed. A man, it seems, could become a householder after he finished his student's life, or he could live the life both of a student and a householder, or he could turn to the anchorite's life after he finishes his student's career, without marrying.¹ This means that the *samnyāsi's* stage need not necessarily be preceded by the *grihastha* phase. The four stages come to us, in an ordered form, from later Upanishads like the Jābāla, according to which the order of the student must precede that of the householder, and that of the householder must be followed by the order of the anchorite (*vānaprastha*), while the order of the wandering or begging ascetic (*parivrājaka* or *bhikṣu*) must be preceded by those of the householder and the anchorite.²

If we try to identify the three *āśramas* mentioned in the Chhândogya Upanishad with the four traditional ones, we may say that a system of three *āśramas* rather than four could more stand the test of reason. There is a view according to which the *samnyāsa* state was not regarded as an *āśrama* proper; it was rather considered as

fore, for him, the passage means that all the three *āśramas* including the *grihasthāśrama* itself are dependent upon *grihasthāśrama*. The commentator Kullūka on Manu, however, has interpreted '*trayo' pyāśramaṇo*' as 'the three *āśramas* other than the *grihasthāśrama*'. (*grihasthavyatirik-tāstrayo'pyāśramaṇo*) depend upon *grihasthāśrama* for their support'.

¹ See Chhând. Up. ii, 23, 1 (already quoted above); v, 10; viii, 15; Br. Up. iii, 8, 10; iv, 2, 22; Taitt. Up. i, 11, 1. cf. Ranade: "A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy" pp. 60-61; Keith: "Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanishads", vol. ii, p. 587.

² Keith: Op. cit. pp. 587-8. See Jābāla Up. iv.

outside the meaning, and therefore beyond the limits, of an *āśrama*, as in the *Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* wherein the *śamnyāsi* is said to be above all the *āśramas* (*atyāśramin*)¹; as such, he is no longer a social personality; he is devoid of any family bond; he is a homeless wanderer, begging, without any belonging or property of his own; and such a one bears the name of *śamnyāsin*, that is, a person who has renounced everything.² And, we may also point out that even in the later development of the *āśramas* into a scheme of four stages, the personal identity of the man who ends with the *vānaprastha* stage and enters into the *śamnyāsa* stage ceases to exist altogether both for himself and for the rest of the world. In fact, such a person is actually supposed to have been dead, the usual death ceremonies (*antyeshti*) being actually performed by his kinsmen; and the *śamnyāsin* is said to have been born out of the ashes and the flames of the funeral pyre of the dead person. Such a person, in fact, even abandons his personal name and the family surname by which he has been known before he takes up *śamnyāsa*, and actually adopts a new name by which he comes to be known thereafter. And, since the man is supposed to be dead, and his body is taken to have been already burnt away and the death ceremonies performed, his actual death after the *śamnyāsa* is accepted by him has to be by the rites of what is known as *śamādhi*, and not by the *antyeshti* death-rites meant for the ordinary man.

Now, according to the *Hindu Dharmaśāstra*, each individual should normally pass through these four phases of life, one after another (*kramaśah*), and live in them according to the *śāstras* if he desires to obtain salvation (*mokśa*).³ After passing from *āśrama* to *āśrama*, and after

¹ Śvet. Upa. vi, 2.

² Keith: Op. cit. p. 589.

³ Man. VI, 88; also see Gau. iii, 1; Āpa. ii, 21, 2.

offering the sacrifices with senses subdued (*jīteन्द्रियah*), comprehending and realizing the limitations and futility of a life dependent upon alms and offerings (*bhikṣābali-pariśrāntah*) if one goes forth as a wandering mendicant (*parivrajan*) and dies thereafter, he becomes blessed ; that is, as explained by Kullūkabhaṭṭa, such a person attains *mokṣa*.¹ Now, before entering the last phase, viz., the *saṁnyāsa*, he has to pass through the three previous phases of life in their proper order ; besides, he has to satisfy himself that he has carried out the duties and obligations laid down for each of the *āśramas* ; and he has also to see that he has duly given his dues to the "debts" (*ṛiṇas*).² These three *ṛiṇas* are : (1) the debt to the *rishis* (*rishirīṇa*), (2) the debt to the ancestors (*pitṛirīṇa*), and (3) the debt to the Gods (*devarīṇa*).³ Now these three debts could be satisfied, respectively, (1) by studying the *Vedas* in accordance with the rules laid down for the study (*vidhivad*), that is to say, by passing through the *brahmacharyāśrama*, (2) by begetting sons in accordance with the *dharma* (*dharmatah*), i. e., by going through the *grihasthāśrama* and (3) by offering sacrifices according to one's capacity (*śāktito*), i. e., by performing the duties of the *vānaprasthāśrama*.⁴ After carrying out these, one should apply one's mind towards the attainment of *mokṣa*.⁵ It is opined that the man who fails to carry out any of these obligations due to him during the first three *āśramas* is not entitled even to try to attain *mokṣa* ; and, Manu says that he who seeks *mokṣa* without fulfilling his

¹ Man. vi, 34, and Kullūkabhaṭṭa's commentary on it : (*mokṣalābhādbrāhmabhūtaraddhyatiśayam prāpnoti*). cf. also Bau. ii, 17, 15-16.

² Man. vi, 35 ; cf. Yāj. iii, 57.

³ Man. iv, 257.

⁴ Man. vi, 36.

⁵ *ibid*.

duties in the first three *āśramas* will sink low to damnation (*vrajatyadhah*).¹

There are differences of opinion among different authorities concerned as regards the particular period of age at which one is expected to enter each of the *āśramas*. Thus, for instance, different ages at which a man is expected to enter the *grihasthāśrama* have been prescribed; and, moreover, for different *varṇas* again, different ages at which an individual may enter the *brahmacharya* stage are given.² After the prescribed course of education is completed, the young man enters the *grihasthāśrama*; this is bound to be obviously in the maturity of youth, when he is fit to marry. And, he is expected to retire from the *grihasthāśrama* after doing his part as a member of the *āśrama* in the proper manner (*vidhivat*);³ this happens when his skin gets wrinkled, when his hair turns white, and when he sees the sons of his sons; he has now to take to a life in the forest; he may leave his wife to the care of his sons, or he may take her away alongside with him (*sahaiva vā*).⁴ In the forest he has to live the simplest life: receiving alms, performing sacrifices, and studying the Vedas and the Upanishads.⁵ After having thus spent the third part of (a man's natural term of) life in the forest (*vane*), he may live as an ascetic during the fourth part of his existence abandoning all attachment to worldly objects and relations (*tyaktvā saṃgam*).⁶

¹ "Anadhītya dvījo vedānanutpādyā tathā sūtān/anisṭvā chaiva yajñaiścha mokṣamichchanvrajatyadhah" and also, "Riñāni trīṇyapākṛitya mano mokṣe nīveṣayet/anapākṛitya mokṣam tu sevamāno vrajatyadhah"—Man. vi, 35, and 37. cf. also Yāj. iii, 56; Bau. ii, 34; Āpa. ii, 24.

² See next chapter.

³ See chapters IV and V.

⁴ Man. vi, 1-3; also Mahā. Śānti. 244, 4.

⁵ Man. vi, 5 ff; Yāj. iii, 45; Vis. xciv. 1-3.

⁶ Man. vi, 33.

The *Kāmasūtras* of Vātsyāyana point out in this connection, that as the natural span of the life of a human being is supposed to be a hundred years (*śatāyurvai puruṣho*), one should divide this period into childhood (*bālya*), youth (*yauvana*) and old age (*sthāvira*). In childhood, the individual should acquire education (*vidyā-grahana*); in youth he should seek to satisfy his natural craving for enjoyment and pleasure (*kāmam*); while in his old age he should seek *dharma* and *mokṣa*.¹ But, Vātsyāyana adds, that owing to the uncertainty of life (*anityatvādāyusho*), one should follow these, viz. *vidyā*, *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa* as they come to him at any period of life (*yathopapādam seveta*);² that is to say, one has to pursue each of these, not to the exclusion of the rest, but whenever he gets opportunities to practise any of these, he should avail himself of the same. According to Vātsyāyana, in fact, one should pursue all the three puruṣārthas (trivarga) viz. *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*, together in proper adjustment with each other, without any one of these coming in the way of the other.³ This is also the tone in which Manu has advised that the real good of man consists in the harmony or aggregate of the three puruṣārthas (trivarga).⁴

Of the four *āśramas*, the first two will be treated here only in brief, as they will be described in details in the chapters that follow.⁽⁵⁾ On the other hand, we propose to discuss the *vānaprastha* and the *saṁnyāsa āśramas* sufficiently fully in this chapter, so as to give us an idea of the kind of discipline and training which the individual is expected to undergo in these *āśramas*.

¹ Kāma. i, ii, 1-6.

² *ibid.*

³ "Anyonyānubaddham paraśpaṛasyānupadyāttakam seveta".

⁴ Man. ii, 224.

⁽⁵⁾ For 'Brahmacharyāśrama', see Ch. III, *infra.*; and for 'grihasthāśrama', see Chs. IV and V *infra.*

The *upanayana* ceremony introduces the young boy into the *Brahmacharyāśrama*.¹ After the course of studies is over in accordance with the *dharma*s laid down for the *brahmachārī*, he takes a bath, symbolic of his completion of that *āśrama* course; so he now becomes a *snātaka* (one who has taken the bath).² He now becomes fit to enter the next *āśrama* viz., the *grihasthāśrama*. The ceremony of returning back home from the teacher is called *samāvartana*. In the *grihasthāśrama*, the individual has to fulfil his obligations to the members of his family, to his deceased ancestors, to strangers and to the gods, in order to become fit to enter the next *āśrama* of *vānaprastha*.

Now in the *vānaprasthāśrama*, as the name itself suggests, the individual has to leave the shelter not only of the family (*kula*) and of the home (*griha*), but of the village (*grāma*) too; he must go to the forest and live there, all the while striving to bring under control his senses of enjoyment (*niyatendriyah*)³ in the following manner: He has to eat vegetables and fruits only (*śākamūlaphala*);⁴ he is not to touch sweet things or meat (*madhu māmsam cha*)⁵ he must never accept fruits or roots grown in the village (*grāmajātāni*) even when he is extremely hungry (*ārto'pi*).⁶ For his clothing he has to use the deerskin (*charma*) or the bark of a tree (*chīram vā*).⁷ He should make no deliberate attempts to obtain comforts (*aprayatnah sukārtheshu*); and, has to lead a celibate life

¹ See Śān. Gr. Sū. II, 1 ff.; Gobh. Gr. Sū. II, 10 ff. Āp. Gr. Sū. IV, 10, 1. etc; Āśv. Gr. Sū. I, 20, 11 ff. etc.

² Śān. Gr. Sū. III, 1, ff.; Gobh. Gr. Sū. III, 4, 7 ff.; Āp. Gr. Sū. V, 12-13. Āśv. Gr. Sū. III, 8, 9. etc.

³ Man. vi, 4; also Yāj. iii, 45; Gau. iii. 27.

⁴ Man. vi, 5; also Yāj. iii, 46.

⁵ Man. vi, 14.

⁶ Man. vi, 16; cf. Yāj. iii, 46.

⁷ Man. vi, 6.

(*brahmachārī*), sleeping on the floor (*dharāśayah*), residing under a tree, without any attachment to where he happens to reside (*śaraṇeshvamamāśchaiva*).¹ Yet he has to continue the performance of the five great sacrifices (*mahāyajnān*) which he used to perform in the *grihasth-āśrama*, in the proper manner (*vidhipūrvakam*),² and has to offer to the fullest for sacrifices (*balim*); and he has to offer to the guests who may visit him out of whatever he collects for himself to eat according to his might (*śaktitah*).³ Besides, he should utilize his time in studying the *upanishads* and the *śrutis*, and practise penances (*tapas*) for the purging of his body (*śarīrasya cha śuddhaye*), as also in order to raise his soul up to higher and higher levels (*ātmasamsiddhaye*).⁴ Thus, he must devote himself heart and soul to his studies (*svādhyāye nityayuktah syāt*); at the same time, he has to lead a life of self-control (*dānto*) and friendliness (*maitrah*) and charity (*dātā*) to others — life wherein though he never accepts charity from others (*nityamanādātā*), he has a compassionate attitude towards all creatures *sarvabhūtānukampakah*).⁵ If the individual dies while he is pursuing his life in the *vānaprasthāśrama* in this manner, he is supposed to reach the region of *brahma*⁶—that is, he attains *mokṣa*, as the commentator *Kullūkabhaṭṭa*, on *Manusmṛiti*,⁷ explains.

But if he survives the *vānaprasthāśrama*,⁸ the individual has to enter the last *āśrama* of *saṁnyāsa*, casting off all

¹ Man. vi, 26; Yāj. iii, 51 and 54.

² Man. vi, 5.

³ Man. vi, 7.

⁴ Man. vi, 29-30.

⁵ Man. vi, 8, cf. Yāj. iii, 48.

⁶ Man. vi, 32.

⁷ On Man. vi, 32.—*Mokṣamāpnoti ityarthah*.

⁸ “*Yasya tu maraṇābhāvastasyāha*” says Kullūka, before starting commenting on the next section on *Samnyāsa*.

attachment (*saṃgam*) with the world.¹ Manu also permits the individual to enter this āśrama immediately after the grihasthāśrama.² Commenting on this śloka of Manu, Kullūkabhaṭṭa quotes from Jābālaśruti :/“One should complete *brahmacharya* and enter *grihastha*’s order, after that he should enter *vānaprastha*, and thence he should take to *saṃnyāsa*; or else, he may take to *saṃnyāsa* directly after *brahmacharya*, or after the *grihastha* stage is completed”³ Yājñavalkya, too, takes up the same view by allowing a person to take up the *saṃnyāsāśrama* either after the *vānaprasthāśrama*, or directly after he has done with the *grihasthāśrama*.⁴ The man who has entered the *sanyāsāśrama* should possess nothing; he must always move about, all alone (*eka eva charennityam*), without being dependent upon any one for help or support (*asahāyavān*);⁵ he could beg alms only once in a day; and he should not feel down-hearted when he fails to procure alms nor should he feel elated when he procures it.⁶ Indeed, he should care neither for living nor death (*nābhinandeta maraṇam nābhinandeta jīvitam*).⁷ By restraining his senses (*indriyāṇām nirodhena*), by casting away the love and hatred within himself (*rāgadveshaśayena cha*), and by living a life of harmlessness to living beings (*ahimsayā cha bhūtānām*), the *saṃnyāsī* becomes fit to achieve immortality—that is, as Kullūka explains,

¹ Man. vi, 33.

² “*Atmanyagmīn samāropya brāhmaṇaḥ pravrajedgrhāt*”.—Man. vi, 38.

³ *Yathā Jābālaśrutih*:—‘*brahmacharyam samāpya grihī bhaved, grihī bhūtvā vanī bhaved, vanī bhūtvā pravrajat; itarathā brahmacharyādeva pravrajat, grihādvā, vanādvā*’.

⁴ Yāj. iii, 56; also in Bau. ii, 17, 18-28; Vis. xcvi, 1-2; Vijnāneśvara’s comm. on Yāj. iii, 56, quotes the same passage from Jābālaśruti which is quoted above.

⁵ Man. vi, 57.

⁶ Man. vi, 57.

⁷ Man. vi, 45.

to attain *mokṣa*.¹ All the sins (*pāpmānam*) of the man who passes through the *samnyāsāśrama* in this manner come to be washed off and destroyed (*vidhūya*),² and thus he attains the ultimate end or goal of existence (*paramām gatim*), which end is again explained by Kullūka as the same as "*mokṣa*".³

The Mahābhārata describes the duties and obligations of the *āśramas* in almost similar terms.⁴ And Kauṭilya too, summarizes them in his Arthaśāstra in a like manner.⁵ Kauṭilya further adds that it is the duty of the King to see that his subjects abide by the rules made obligatory for persons following any one of the four *āśramas*. He asserts that the violation of the codes of behaviour for the *āśramas* as well as for the *varṇas* would lead to a confusion of the *varṇas* and *āśramas* and thence (to a chaotic state of the society (*samkara*))—such that the world (*lokaḥ*) would thereby come to an end (*uchchhidyeta*).⁶ On the other hand, he adds, if all people follow these regulations, the world would certainly progress.⁷ The *āśrama* and the *varṇa* schemes are thus conceived as means not merely towards furthering the best ends of

¹ Man. vi, 60; Kullūka's commentary is—"Mokṣayogo bhavati".

² Man. vi, 85.

³ Man. vi, 96; Kullūka's commentary is: "*paramām gatim mokṣulakṣaṇām prāpnoti*".

⁴ See Mahā: Sānti. Adhyāyas 61, (11 to 17 ślokaḥ); 191-192; 241-245; 268-275; 353-355; Anu. 141 (where the Great God Maheśvara is said to have explained to his wife Umā the duties of the four *āśramas*).

⁵ Artha. p. 7 (Śāmasāstry's Tr.).

⁶ "*Svadharmassvargāyānantyāya cha/tasyātikrame lokassamkarāduchchhidyeta/tasmātsvadharmam bhitānām rājā na vyabhichārayet/svadharmam samdadhāno hi pretya cheha cha nandati*/" Artha. I, iii, 8, 6-7; Śāmasāstry's Tr., op. cit. p. 7.

⁷ "*Vyavasthitāryamaryādah krita-varṇāśramasthitih/trayyā hi rakṣito lokah prasīdati na sīdati*/" ibid.

social organization, but also of social progress, stability and equipoise.

Apart from the special duties concerned with the life of the individual in each of the *āśramas*, there are certain obligations of a general or universal nature ; these are considered as part of the duties of every human being without reference to the *āśrama* to which he belongs. Thus, according to the Smritis, to whatever *āśrama* a man may belong, he should, with diligence and assiduity (*prayatnatah*), practise the following characteristics of a proper life of *dharma* (*daśalakṣaṇako dharmah*):¹ Steadiness, forgiveness, self-control, abstention from unrighteously appropriating anything, purity, control of the sense-organs, correct discernment, knowledge, truthfulness, and absence from anger.² Kauṭilya too has said that harmlessness, truthfulness, purity, absence of spite, abstinence from cruelty and forgiveness are the duties common to all human beings.³

Of all the *āśramas* however, the *grihasthāśrama* is given a very high place of honour. The *Mahābhārata* is quite emphatic in this connection. Thus we are told in the *Sāntiparva*, that once Yudhisṭhira became so disgusted with the ways and affairs of the world that he proposed to take to the *saṃnyāsi's* mode of life ; but eventually he was persuaded to remain in the *grihasthāśrama* by the wise counsels of his brothers, wife, and the *Dvaipāyana Vyāsa*

¹ Man. vi, 91.

² "Dhritih kṣamā damo'steyam śauchamindriyanigrahaḥ Dhīrvidyā satyamakrodho daśakam dharmalakṣaṇam". Similarly, Yāj. iii, 66:—

"Satyamasteyamakrodho rth śaucham dhīrdhritirdamah samyatendriyatā vidyā dharmah sarva udāhritah". cf. also. Vas. x, 30.

³ "Sarveśhāmahiṃsā satyam śauchamānasūyā'nriṣamsyam kṣamā cha/"—Artha. I, iii, 8, 4.

himself.¹ The story was narrated to him, of how "certain little-witted well-born Brāhmaṇa youths, without attaining manhood, forsaking their homes, came to the woods for leading a forest life."² Indra felt pity for them, and taught them that "Asceticism is attainable by leading the life of a householder (*kuṭumbavidhinā*) upon which the proper management of everything depends (*yasmin sarvam pratishṭhitam*)."³ In fact, says Indra "the life of a householder is very superior and sacred, and is called 'the field of success' ".⁴ We are told that hearing these beneficial words pregnant with dharma, those ascetics abandoned the idea of Renunciation, saying—This is not meant for us now,—and started living like householders.⁵ After all his relatives did their utmost to dissuade Yudhishṭhira from taking up *saṁnyāsa*, the Dvaipāyana Vyāsa himself advised him to follow the counsel of his brothers and wife of not abandoning his post as a member of the *grihasthāśrama*. For in the opinion of that sage, the highest dharma as sanctioned by the scriptures, consists in a training through the duties of a householder.⁶ The householder supports birds, animals and various other creatures;⁷ "he, therefore, who belongs to that mode of life, is superior to all."⁸ In this *āśrama*, moreover, can the three *purushārthas*, *dharma*, *artha* and

¹ Mahā. Sānti. Adhyāyas 11 ff. The explanatory title of adhyāya 11 is: "Yudhishṭhiram prati gārhaṣṭhyasya śreshṭhyopapādanam."

² Mahā. Sānti. 11, 2.

³ ibid. 11, 21.

⁴ ibid. 11, 15: *Siddhikṣetramidam puṇyam ayamevāśramo mahān/*

⁵ ibid. 11, 27: "Tataste tadvachah śrutvā dharmārthasahitam hitam/utsrujya 'nāsti iti' gatā gārhaṣṭhyam samupāśritāh//

⁶ Mahā. Sānti. 23, 2: "Śāstradrishṭah paro dharmah sthito gārhaṣṭhyamāśritah/"

⁷ ibid. 23, 5.

⁸ ibid. 23, 5: "Grihasthenaiva dhāryante tasmāchchhreshṭho grihāśrami"

kāma, exist together, towards the end of mokṣa.¹ In fact this mode of life is considered as the very root of all the others.² The other three āśramas "derive from this āśrama the means they live upon, the offerings they make to the departed manes and the gods, and, in short, their entire support."³ All the obligations of life, individual and social, all the three 'debts' (ṛiṇas)—the debt to the gods (devarīṇa) the debt to the manes or ancestors (pitirīṇa) and the debt to the sages (rishirīṇa)—could be satisfied by a person living a full life in the grihasth-āśrama.⁴ So also, the trust vested in us by the Creator could be executed in this āśrama by the proper begetting of offsprings in the family.⁵ /

And the Smritis, too, bestow the highest praise upon the grihasthāśrama. Just as all living creatures subsist by receiving support from air, so all the āśramas subsist by receiving support from the grihastha; and since men in the three other āśramas are daily supported by the householder, with sacred knowledge and food, the householder's is the chief state.⁶ As rivers, great and small, find a resting place in the ocean, even so men of all āśramas gather their stability and support at the hands of the householder.⁷ "And, in accordance with the precepts of

¹ Mahā. Śānti. 191, 10: "Dharmārthakāmāvāptirhyatra"

² ibid. 191, 10: "Taddhi sarvāśramāṇām mūlam udāharanti"

³ ibid. 191, 10: "Teshāmapyata eva bhikṣābalisambhāgah pravartante"

⁴ ibid. 191, 13: "Api chātra yajnakriyābhirdevatāḥ priyante, nivāpena pitaro, vidyābhyāsaśravaṇadhāraṇena rishayah, apatyotpādanena prajāpatiriti"

⁵ ibid.

⁶ Man. iii. : "Yathā vāyum samāśritya vartante sarvajantavah/ tathā grihasthamāśritya vartante sarva āśramāḥ// Yas-mātrayo'pyāśramiṇo jñānenānnena chānvaham/grihasthe-naiva dhāryante tasmājyeshthāśramo grihī//78//

cf. also Vis, lix, 27-28; Vas. viii, 14-16.

⁷ Man. vi, 90: "Yathā nadīnadah sarve sāgaram yāntisam-sthitim/tathāivāśramiṇah sarve grihasthe yānti samsthitim/"

the Veda and the Smṛiti, the householder is declared to be superior (*śreṣṭha*) to all of them ; for he supports the three".¹ He who desires imperishable bliss in heaven and permanent happiness here, must strive through this *Āśrama* with great care and effort ; for it is difficult to be practised by men with weak faculties.²

Now, we must not here misunderstand this special eulogy bestowed upon the *grihasthāśrama*, but must try to comprehend its meaning in its proper context. The *grihasthāśrama* is glorified, not in terms of absolute superiority of that *āśrama* over all the others, but from a particular angle of vision and with reference to the particular position which that *āśrama* occupies in the scheme of life. The *Śāstrakāra*'s praise for the *grihastha* as the best *āśrama* emanates, we must not fail to notice, from the point of view of the social values of the *āśramas*. Ordinarily, since each *āśrama* is in theory regarded as an essential stage for the development of the individual, it is the best in its own place, and any comparison of merits between them on absolute grounds would be surely beside the point. But, with reference to a particular aspect, viz. the aspect of social valuation, the *grihastha* is exalted on the merits of its lending support to the other three *āśramas*, as well as of its direct contact with the society and the consequent direct contributions made by it to the society // On the other hand, from the point of view of the acquisition of knowledge by the individual, the *brahmacharyāśrama* would evoke the highest praise ; while from the point of view of individual salvation, the *saṁnyās-āśrama* would evoke the highest praise.

¹ Man. vi, 89: "*Sarveshāmāpi chaiteśhām vedasmṛitividhān-atah/grihastha uchyate śreṣṭhah sa trīnetānbibharti hi* //" The above Tr. is Bühler's. cf. Gau. iii, 36; Vas. viii, 14.

² Man. iii, 79: "*Sa samdhāryah prayatnena svargamakṣ-avamichchhatā/sukham chehechchhatā nūtyam yo'dhāryo durbalendriyaih* //

However, such an interpretation as the above does not completely dissolve our difficulties ; for there are also one or two statements, noted above, which specifically compare the *grihasthāśrama* with the next two *āśramas* by asserting that in this *āśrama* could be achieved the merits that are achievable in the other two *āśramas* too. Thus, it is said that in the *grihasthāśrama* alone can the three *purushārthas* be practised together, and the three *rinās* could all be discharged satisfactorily. May we say that such a view of the *grihasthāśrama* was due to the fact that the Hindu *Śāstrakāras* perhaps found that it was practically not always possible, or exceedingly difficult, for every individual to follow the course of all the four *āśramas* one after the other, and that therefore they suggested that one can hope for salvation even if he continued in the *grihasthāśrama* till the end of his life, provided that he discharged the three *rinās* and practised the three *purushārthas* in the manner prescribed?

In the light of our description of the theory and practice of the *āśramas* given above, let us try to find out the significance and position of the *purushārthas* as envisaged in the *āśrama*-scheme. In the *Brahmacharyāśrama*, *dharma* is the predominating *purushārtha* ; *dharma* has to be learnt up and practised particularly as a check upon *kāma* and *artha* ; besides, the ultimate value of *mokṣā* has to be comprehended. In the *grihasthāśrama* both *artha* and *kāma* become the fields of the personality of the individual who has acquired a knowledge and practice of *dharma*, and who has realised the value and place of *mokṣā* for his own self-realisation. Here, let it be admitted that *kāma* and *artha* are part of the essential heritage of both the human individual and races. In this sense, *artha* and *kāma* form what may be called part of the natural psycho-physiological apparatus for the functioning of both the group and the individual. We must observe, however,

that this apparatus may be, and as a natural history of facts, has been and is being misused and misfunctioned by individuals and races. Now, instead of demanding a total repression of this apparatus by damning them as merely base and worthless, the Hindu seers have taught that *artha* and *kāma*, shall, on the one hand, be wisely directed into proper life-functions as prescribed by *dharma*, and shall, on the other hand, be controlled from misfunctioning or disfunctioning as prescribed also by *dharma*. In this way, *artha* and *kāma* have been so placed in the *āśrama* scheme, each in terms of *dharma*, that both of them may, by right functioning, contribute their necessary quota for the upkeep, growth and development of the human race consistent with the personality of each of the individuals whose conscious self-control and self-direction carry the seeds of the race and its cultural heritage, through history.¹ So also, in the *vānaprasth-āśrama*, *dharma* and *mokṣa* become the main concern of life, *dharma* occupying the primary position. And, in the *saṁnyāsāśrama*, *mokṣa* occupies the supreme position in the *saṁnyāsi's* mind; in fact, his *dharma* now becomes identified with *mokṣa*. Of course, throughout the *āśrama*-scheme and throughout life in every and any phase, *mokṣa* always lurks as the ultimate aim, permeating, sometimes visibly, sometimes invisibly, underneath and defining the course of, the three — viz. *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*.

Like the tradition of *dharma* (*dharma-paramparā*), the tradition of *yajna* (*yajna-paramparā*) also persists and permeates through the Hindu scheme of life¹ through the *āśramas*. In terms of *yajna*, all the four āśramas must be considered as four kinds of yajna. The nature, practices and the forms of the *yajna* in each of the *āśramas* are obvious. It is, in fact, a part of the theory of the *āśramas* ;

¹ See ch. I, pp. 39 et, seq. ; 54 et seq.

as such, *yajna* must of necessity be the spirit that hovers over every stage of the life of a person in any of the *āśramas*. Thus, in the *brahmacharyāśrama*, the individual has to surrender his life of senses (*indriyas*) mind (*mana*), and intellect (*buddhi*),—that is to say, all the intellectual and emotional apparatus, to the handling of the adept (*guru*). Therefore in this *āśrama* a sort of a *yajna* of the lower self has to be practised, on the one hand, in the sense that the student (*brahmachārī*) has to undergo all sorts of lessons in self-control imposed upon him by his preceptor (*guru*); and as he has as well to acquire knowledge from his *guru*, *jñāna-yajna* has also to be increasingly practised by him.

The *grihasthāśrama* proves another kind of field for a life of *yajna*. At its best, it is, in a sense, the fully dedicated life. Here it is one's duty to practise *artha* and *kāma* in terms of *karmas* consistent and in strict accordance with the *dharma*s, the meaning and value and the justification of which he has learnt in the first *āśrama*. The *grihastha*'s life is to be a continuous stream of giving (*dāna*)—a life of self-less service and dedication of his best and utmost for his elders, children, wife (who also is his sharer in his service to others) and other members of his family (*kula*), his dependents and strangers (*atithi*). Here in the home, he has to bear in mind and practise the parting advice given by his *guru* in the preceding *āśrama* that he has to give his dues to the mother, to the father, to the teacher and to the strangers (*mātridevo bhava*, *pitridevo bhava*, *āchāryadevo bhava*, *atithidevo bhava*). The devoted service of and for these, is considered the same as the service of God. Here, therefore, the *karma-yajna* consistent with and in accordance to *dharma* has to be practised as fully as possible by the individual.

In the third *āśrama*, the beginnings (*ārambha*) are made for the yielding of the self for the final *yajna* which is expected to be performed in the last *āśrama*. The indivi-

dual has now to give up his fields of *artha* and *kāma* by leaving his near and dear ones, his family (*kula*), his village (*grāma*), and by abandoning his belongings and possessions ; he has now to go out into the forest (*vana*, *araṇya*), where by meditation and service of others, he has to train himself up for the execution of the final *yajna* that awaits his soul-pouring in the *samnyāsāśrama*.

And, the last *āśrama* provides the fullest opportunities for the self-expression and self-expansion of the individual in terms of the final *yajna*. This consists of an *āhuti*, a complete offering, of the self, wherein the self, out of a will and purpose to be perfect, surrenders all that was nearest and dearest to his lower ego, in order that thereby and thereafter he may be enabled to be one with the real self, the *ātmā*. In both these last *āśramas* a kind of *bhakti-yajna* has to be practised in that the dedication to God is complete, the entire self of the individual having been now surrendered to God (*sarvārpaṇa*). Again, the individual becomes, in a sense, a *jñānī-bhakta* when he takes to *samnyāsa* ; for he has undergone the schooling and discipline from stage to stage, *āśrama* to *āśrama*, realizing more and more that he belonged not to this *samsāra* nor that this *samsāra* belonged him ; thus, fully realizing the place and meaning of the self in the midst of *samsāra*, he now brings himself face to face with the final aim of all existence, viz., *mokṣa*.

(The *āśramas*, then, as we have already said, are regarded as schools of life at several stages of human existence, devised and organized towards the best likelihood for the individual to attain the end of *mokṣa*, in accordance with the theory of the ultimate nature of things, or in accordance with the conception of existence and its relations to the Ultimate. During these different stages of life, the functions of the group and the individual are both different and definite with regard to each other. For example, during the first *āśrama* the function of the

group is to look after the individual. So far as the individual is concerned, on the other hand, this may be said to be a natural, neutral phase. In the second *āśrama* the individual has to look after the group ; he is the trustee and manager of the social estate, of the social *mores*, and of the three *rinās*. The group here is interested in giving and taking the fullest opportunities, social, economic and spiritual, so that the individual may and should best satisfy these obligations. The third *āśrama* is, once more, a designedly neutral phase from the point of view of the individual as well as of the group. Here, on the part of the individual, efforts have to be made to yield up his responsibilities in the midst of power and pelf, and thus, by and by, to take to a life in accordance with the best lessons acquired in the *brahmacharyāśrama*, viz., of going into one's self and finding the truth out for oneself. The feeling of separation from the Ultimate or God should really start at this stage. Even then the individual is pledged to the young and the junior that he shall serve them, the family and the group, as a guide occasionally advising them, rather than as a manager of their estate which position he had to undertake in the second *āśrama*. In this *āśrama* and in the fourth, the function of the individual is to deal with the supernatural, with the life within ; and the function of the group becomes by and by thinned out, till in the fourth it comes to almost nil. And in the last stage, the individual who is completely free from any social obligation, has to help himself in the search of the self (*ātmachintana*, *ātmajnāna*).

And the justification of such a scheme of the functions and independence of the group and the individual is to be taught during the first stage of life, the *brahmacharya* ; and the management of the whole scheme is to be organized, supported and established by the group as well as the individual in the second stage, the *grihasthāśrama*. In the first stage, the group rears, protects and gives the

best of his heritage to the individual. In the second stage, the individual yields his best and most for the efficient and harmonious functioning of group life, consistent with the dictates of his own conscience ; here, the individual seeks to make the group the chief medium and instrument for the upkeep and growth of his personality. In the third stage, the individual, giving up the close attention required of him to manage the affairs of group life, starts on a preliminary journey for self-search. While, in the fourth stage, the individual retires altogether from group activities and seeks to know and find and realize the self that hides within the core of his being.

CHAPTER III
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION

In the first chapter we attempted to study the fundamental attitude of the Hindu towards the problem of living which is at the basis of all Hindu social institutions. In the second chapter, we considered how the general framework of the social institutions was visualized in the theory and practice of the āśramas, which is a unique way of considering and solving social problems, without a parallel in the whole history of social thought of the world. In this chapter, we shall discuss the first of the four *Āśramas*, viz. the *brahmacharyāśrama* which concerns itself with education as a social institution. In this connection, we shall consider the institution of education as a social phenomena or fact, rather than discuss the purely psycho-physiological technique of education which is generally understood to be the subject-matter of modern "educational psychology"; we propose to undertake a study of the Hindu system of education with reference to its socio-psychological outlook, methods and implications.

It is well recognised that the outlook and methods of education prevalent in a society have a far-reaching significance and influence upon the other social institutions of a human group. It is also realized that this significance and influence is not merely one-sided but also of a mutual nature; that is to say, the system of education prevalent amongst a people influences as also is itself influenced by the society which it serves and by its *mores*. Education is the principle instrument, in the hands of a social group or an assemblage of social groups, by means of which it passes on and hands over to the individual (and thus to itself), the traditions, disciplines and culture it has

gathered through long and continual endeavours of the race towards making the best and most of the gift of human life ; thus it seeks to train the individual to adjust himself to the ideas and ideals which have gathered meaning and value, nay, even respect from the best and the noblest that have made the history of the race. It is evident, therefore, that amongst all the social institutions, the system and outlook of education is of primary significance. Our main concern here will therefore be, to study the social aspects and implications of the Hindu system of education and to discover the psychological reactions of the same on the individual and the society in relation to each other ;—how far, in what respects, and with what results does the Hindu educational system affect the relations of the individual with the society in which he “lives and moves and has his being”? ; what are the socio-psychological foundations of this influence of education upon the individual and upon the group? — these shall be some of the issues we shall have to raise, and into which we shall have to probe deep.) After stating the views of the Hindu sages on these points, we shall endeavour to evaluate the same.

Before starting to enquire about the problem of the Hindu educational system, it would be advantageous for us if we consider some of the general social principles which should generally underlie every educational system. By ‘education’, is meant here what Dewey has called “formal or institutional education”¹; this is a regular programme of training, as, for instance, carried out by schools and colleges to-day. For, in one sense, we are being educated every moment of our life, from birth till death. Consciously and unconsciously, we may be said to be learning every moment of our life. But it has been recognized that since the behaviour of an in-

¹ Dewey: “Democracy and Education” pp. 7-11.

dividual is likely to have vital reactions on the community of which he is a member, the individual should be given a regular training calculated to equip him to serve the community. Students of human nature of all times have urged that some sort of a deliberate training of the individual is absolutely essential in order to enable the individual to adjust himself to the complex social environment in which he finds himself. From Plato, Aristotle and Plutarch down to Pestalozzi, Rousseau, Herbart and Spencer, in the West, all have pointed out that nature unaided by training and discipline cannot accomplish all that is demanded of an individual in this direction.¹ If we bear these remarks in our mind, they will be sufficient to give us an idea of the social functions which an educational system is expected to, and actually, has to serve.

In this connection Dr. Nunn observes: "Every scheme of education being, at bottom, a practical philosophy, necessarily touches life at every point. Hence any educational aims which are concrete enough to give definite guidance are correlative to ideals of life and, as ideals of life are eternally at variance, their conflict will be reflected in educational theories."² And yet it seems that we can formulate certain social principles which are, or must be, common to all educational systems. For, the real conflict is reflected not so much in what the aim of education should be, but in the ways and means employed in education, and in emphasizing some aspect or other of education. It is therefore not so difficult to get at a general idea of the social functions of education.

The main social functions of education are, first, the carrying over "to the child and youth of the tools, technique and information necessary for his adjustment to the

¹ O'Shea: "Social Development and Education" pp. 248 ff.

² Nunn: "Education; Its Data and First Principles" p. 2.

world around him, and second, the carrying over of the social and moral codes of conduct which the group holds to be essential to its survival."¹ The chief aim of education is thus to furnish the individual with such necessary equipment for living that he may be enabled to reduce to a minimum the operation of those of his personal interests which conflict with the interests of the group or the society, so as to live in harmony with the group life and its ideals, and even to raise high and exalt the social and moral practices and codes which the group considers as conducive to the healthy and right growth of its members. Each one of us has innate tendencies and impulses, some of which, if given unrestrained freedom and expression, might come into clash with the best interests of the society ; therefore, one of the main purposes of education should be to train the individual in curbing these in the interests of the society. As Sumner has expressed it, education transfers the *mores* to the individual ; that is, "He learns what conduct is approved or disapproved ; what kind of man is admired most ; how he ought to behave in all kinds of cases ; and what he ought to believe or reject."² In this sense, education may be said to be the process *par excellence* to socialize the individual. Looked at from this point of view, the main problem of education would consist, in the words of O'Shea "either in repressing in some manner such of the child's native impulses as are out of alignment with contemporary social practices, or transferring these impulses into tendencies that will bring the individual into harmony with the customs, ideals and institutions of civilized society."³

Now, the problem of the socialization of the individual must be understood and evaluated in its proper perspec-

¹ Young : "Social Psychology" p. 293.

² Sumner : "Folkways". p. 638.

³ O'Shea : op. cit. p. 249.

tive. An individual may be said to have been socialized when, and to the extent to which, he has attained a harmony with the purposes, aims and ideals of the group of which he is a member as also of humanity at large. For, we must remember that from the larger view-point we cannot possibly think of a particular limited group or tribe or clan apart from or opposed to other human groups or mankind as a whole. Particularly, if we are in search of finding out the widest and most universal meaning of the aim of education as the theory, method and institution devised and planned for the proper socialisation of the individual, then, we must understand the term 'socialization' in this wider sense. Of course, there is a narrower sense in terms of which socialization would mean the 'making of a good citizen' or some such thing. But this cannot form the universal aim of education ; for, the ideals of citizenship may vary. And, here we come to the distinction between aims of education as they *should* be, and as they have been and *are* being actually conceived by the different systems of education. In many educational systems, the aims of education are formulated with reference to the satisfaction of certain ideals of a particular group at a definite period in its history. "There can be no universal aim of education if that aim is to include the assertion of any particular ideal of life ; for there are as many ideals as there are persons. Educational efforts must, it would seem, be limited to securing for every one the conditions under which individuality is most completely developed—that is, to enabling him to make his original contribution to the variegated whole of human life as full and as truly characteristic as his nature permits ; the form of contribution being left to the individual as something which each must, in living and by living forge out for himself."¹

¹ Nunn : op. cit. pp. 5-6.

This interpretation of the socialization of the individual by means of education suggests another very important function of education which may be called the *individual* function of education as distinguished from its *social* function. This individual function consists in the development of the personality of an individual. In this sense, education should provide the necessary machinery, training and opportunity to the individual in order that the potentialities within him may be nursed and developed, even to the extent that the group may thereby grow in the stature and breadth of its mind and vision. Much has been made, by most writers on the subject, of education as the chief instrument in the operation of the process of socialization as compared to its value in the development of personality. Thus, Professor Ellwood remarks that "the systems of education may work under the fiction that they exist for the training and development of the individuals as such, regardless of the social life ; but their real purpose must be to control the process by which individuals acquire habits ; so that as adults, they will be efficient in carrying on the social life, and will co-ordinate their activities harmoniously with the group."¹ "Systems of education", the same writer proceeds at another place, "have not been created for the training and development of the individuals as such, but rather to fit the individuals for membership in society, that is, to control the process by which they acquire habits, so that they shall advantageously co-ordinate their activities with those of the group."² In a similar strain, Dr. Williams opines that "Education must lead to the formation of convictions for civic and political action, to the end that every citizen may become, within the limits of his capacity, an effective

¹ Ellwood: "Introduction to Social Psychology" p. 110.

² Ellwood: "Sociology in its Psychological Aspects" p. 186.

agent for progress.”¹ It will be evident from this that there is a growing opinion of writers on this subject that the value of education lies in its ability to function the capacities and powers of the individual towards the proper functioning and stability of the social group to which he or she belongs.² It must be borne in mind, however, that education can be said to have an equally great value, if not greater, in as much as and to the extent to which it provides a means for the intellectual development of the *individual* as such. And this aspect of the value of education requires as much attention on the part of our educationalists as the other aspect of socialization has already received and has been receiving even to this day. True education helps the cultivation not only of character, habit and discipline of mind, but also of the intellect, the reason, and the critical and discriminating faculty. Without the development of the faculty of intelligent appreciation and judgement, man would be no more than a tool, a machine which acts, be it for the good of the society or otherwise, without understanding how his actions are good or bad, and in what respects they are going to affect the social order. A truly educated individual is not always expected to be led by the society ; in fact, he may(at times also lead the society. He must be able to weigh, to discriminate and to appreciate, and possess sufficient courage and personality to follow his own reason.

Any sound theory of education, we may therefore say, must not separate the intellectual faculties of the individual from his behaviour towards the society. The two react closely upon each other ; and education must try to lay the foundations of individual's social behaviour upon

¹ Williams: "The Foundations of Social Sciences" p. 115.

² See also Judd: "Psychology of Social Institutions" Ch. XVIII; Young: "Social Psychology" pp. 293 ff.
Williams: "Principles of Social Psychology", pp. 366 ff.

an appeal to his or her own powers of reasoning and intellect, and not upon the mere fact of social approval or disapproval. The appeal to the individual's reason or intellect, moreover, will receive welcome consideration or will fall short of it and be turned down under the pressure of a social bias, according as the individual's intellect has been allowed an independent development or not. It is the task of true education to help the growth of the individual's intellect by keeping it independent and uninfluenced by external prejudices and biases of any kind. Such a development of the individual on the intellectual side would enable him to judge every action or idea on his own, and, thus, free from any social or other bias. This is what is most likely to result in the development of the personality of the individual members of the group. The system of education which aims at development of the individual's personality endows him at the same time with the power of rational appreciation ; such a system abolishes that conservative and orthodox attitude of mind, which shuns the acceptance of any new ideas in the social and moral fields, and which pursues the traditional path merely because it offers the line of least or no resistance. For, such an education enables one to judge any idea or act on its own merits. Acts based on such educational equipment will be actions backed by intellect and reason, rather than mechanically followed by the individual.

Moreover, the development of the personality of individual members of the group will thus also help the growth of real social progress. Society will, under such conditions, refuse to remain satisfied by blindly following a social bias when it may be irrational to do so ; it would, in fact, incessantly endeavour to break away from old biases and thus lead itself onwards and upwards towards a life based and built on a will that conforms with reason. This aspect of education, viz., of

personality-development therefore, is as much important as the other aspect of social harmony which has been much stressed by writers on the subject. In fact, real education has value both in so far as it develops the personality as well also as it "socializes" the person and thus enables him to keep in harmony with the material and moral framework of the group to which he belongs. The proper ideal of education must envisage a co-ordination of these two aims. It is our contention that such should be the true socio-psychological basis of any educational theory.

After this introductory discussion on the problem and aims of education in general, we propose to study the socio-psychological basis of the Hindu Educational theory, and see how the Hindus have tried to solve the problem of Education.

* To start with, every male¹ child belonging to the Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya and Vaiśya *varṇas* started his educational career with the observation of certain rites and rituals grouped under the name of the *upanayana* ceremony.* The earliest reference to this *upanayana* ceremony seems to be in Atharva-Veda, where the sun is described as a Brāhmaṇa student approaching his *āchārya*² (teacher) with firewood (*samidh*) and alms.³ The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa describes a student named

¹ Female education will be dealt with later on in this chapter.

² *Āchārya* is the word most often used in the Grihya-Sūtras and other early literature (See e. g. Mān. G. S. I. 2, 10; Āśv. G. S. I. 19, 1 etc.). The Smritis have used both *āchārya* and *guru* to denote the teacher (see e. g. Man. ii,—69; 140; 145; 191-218; 225-26; etc. Yāj. i,—15; 26; 33; 51; etc.). In Man. ii, 191, for instance, we have both the words *āchārya* and *guru* used simultaneously to denote the same person. Other words denoting a teacher are *adhyāpaka*, *upādhyāya*.

³ A. V., xi, 5.

Uddālaka approaching his teacher with *samidhs*, and requesting him to be accepted as a *brahmachārin* for tutitions under him.¹ And the Brihadāraṇyakopanishad declares that such a request to the teacher by the student has to be preceded by the words '*Upaimyāham bhavantam*', i. e., 'I am approaching you, Sir.'² The teacher then inquires about the name, birth and family of the student, as Satyakāma Jābāla was asked when he approached Gautama Hāridrumata.³ All these formalities, and many others which we shall observe as we proceed, had to take place with the observance of due rites (*vidhivat*), as was done by Śaunaka when he approached Angiras, to learn.⁴ The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa describes some of the rites thus : 'The *āchārya* places his right hand upon the head of the pupil (*Śishyamastake*), thus symbolizing the imparting of the very core of his own personality to the pupil (*tena garbhī bhavati*) ; and on the third night, such personal inner splendour (*garbha*) of the teacher is supposed to enter the very core of the pupil's whole being ; thereafter the pupil becomes a true Brāhmaṇa, on being taught the *Śāvitṛi Mantra*.⁵ The Grihya-Sūtras and the Smritis have given elaborate descriptions of these and various other rites to be performed at the *Upanayana*.⁶ A girdle (*mekhalā*) has now to be

¹ Śat. Br. xi, 4, 1, 9.

² "*Upaimyāham bhavantam iti vāchāha smaiva pūrva upayanti*" Brih. Up. vi, 2, 7.

³ Chhānd. Up. iv, 4, 4.

⁴ Muṇḍ. Up. i, 1, 3.

⁵ Śat. Br. xi, 5, 4, 12 ; with Śat. Br. xi, 5, 4th Brāhmaṇa, which gives a description of the rites of accepting a pupil by a teacher, cf. Śān. Gr. S. ii, 1 ff. ; Āśv. G. S. i, 20 ff. ; Pār. G. S. ii, 2, 17 ff. ; etc.

⁶ See Āśv. G. S. I, 19 seq. ; Śān. G. S. II, 1 seq. ; III, 1 ; IV, 5, seq. ; Āpa. G. S. IV, 10, seq. ; etc. Man. ii ; Yāj. I, 14ff. etc. Some of these texts use the word '*upanāyana*' but as Vijnāneśvara on Yāj. i, 14 has explained, this word also means the same thing as '*upanayana*'.

tied round the waist of the young boy to be initiated. This girdle is to be made of *munja* grass in the case of a Brāhmaṇa, bow-string in the case of a Kshatriya and woollen thread in the case of a Vaiśya.¹ The boy is then to be given a staff (*daṇḍa*)—of *palāśa* or *bilva* wood for the Brāhmaṇa boy, of *nyagrodha* wood for the Kshatriya and of *udumbara* wood for the Vaiśya.² Or, in the alternative, it is also laid down that any sort of staff may be used by a boy of any *varṇa*.³ Thereafter, the sacrificial chord (*yajnopavīta*) is adjusted round his body.⁴ The *āchārya* then inquires after the name, family and other particulars of the boy, and asks him whether he is seriously desirous to undertake the vow of *brahmacharya* under his instructions.⁵ After the student asserts his willingness to observe the *brahmacharya*, the *āchārya*, “grasping down, with the span of his right hand, the student’s right shoulder, touches part of his chest behind which his heart lies with the words : ‘May I be dear to thy inviolate heart.’ ”⁶ He further adds : “Under my will I take thy heart ; my mind shalt thy mind follow ; in my word shalt thou rejoice with all thy heart ; may Brihaspati join thee to me.”⁷ Then, calling the boy by his personal name, the *āchārya* declares “Thou art the *brahmachārin* of *kāma*.”⁸ And then the *Sāvitrī* mantra is recited by the *āchārya* to the student. The *upanayana*

¹ Śān. G. S. : ii, 1, 14-17; Āśv. G. S. i, 19, 12; Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 21-23; also, Man. ii, 42.

² Śān. G. S. ii, 1, 18-20; Āśv. G. S. i, 19, 13; Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 25-27; Āp. G. S. v, ii, 16.

³ Śān. G. S. ii, 1, 24; Āśv. G. S. i, 20, 1; Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 28; Go. G. S. ii, 10, 14; Āp. G. S. v, ii, 17; etc.

⁴ Śān. G. S. ii, 2, 3; etc.

⁵ Śān. G. S. ii, 2, 4 ff; Pār. G. S. ii, 2, 17 ff.; etc.

⁶ Śān. G. S. ii, 3, 3; cf. Āśv. G. S. i, 20, 10.

⁷ Śān. G. S. ii, 4, 1; Āśv. G. S. i, 21, 7.

⁸ Śān. G. S. ii, 5, 1-3; Pār. G. S. ii, 2, 1-3; Āp. G. S. iv, 11, 8-10; etc.

sacrament (*samskāra*) is virtually regarded as the second birth of the young boy (*kumāra*).¹ Till the *upanayana* is not passed through, every child is considered nature-born and, as such, as good as a *Sūdra*; therefore any child that had not gone through the *upanayana* rite did not enjoy the full rights of an *Ārya*. [After *upanayana*, he becomes a *dvija*, a twice-born *Ārya*.

(These elaborate rituals and ceremonies centering round the *upanayana* have a great social significance which is worth noting in this connection. They create an atmosphere of dignity and seriousness about the particular occasion; therefore they serve to impress the minds of the persons taking part in the ceremonies with the high significance attached to the occasion. It has been pointed out that the savage tribes also had noted the social importance of ceremonials of which they took advantage when they initiated their young folk in the art of archery, or hunting.² These ceremonies arouse in the spectators as well as in the person undergoing the ceremonies, "states of feeling and emotion that are frequently of great social importance."³ Both of them feel the weight and importance of the particular duties and responsibilities entrusted to the initiated young; and interest shown by the spectators is an index of the social significance of the occasion.)

Regarding the age of the pupil at which he is to com-

¹ Āpa. i, 1, 1, 15; Gau. i, 8; Vis. xxviii, 37-40; Vas. ii, 3-5; Man. ii, 148; 68.

² Nunn: "Education; Its Data and First Principles" (1935). pp. 75-

³ Speer: "The elaborate ceremonials of this nature, serves:

of these consists not in themselves, but in what In brief, their biological utility lies in their in actors and spectators, as often as they of feeling and emotion that are frequently of importance". (Nunn: op. cit.).

mence his studies, there are differences of opinions among the Hindu Śāstrakāras. Some authorities, for instance, lay down that the Brāhmaṇa, the Kshatriya and the Vaiśya student should be initiated (*upanayet*) at the age of eighth, eleventh and twelfth year respectively.¹ Yājñavalkya adds that the Upanayana may also be carried out at any convenient time according to the family custom (*yathākulam*).² But it is advised by some of these that the students who desire to speed up their educational attainments should start their studies a little earlier : the Brāhmaṇa in the fifth year of his age, the Kshatriya in the sixth, and the Vaiśya in the eighth.³ The authorities concerned also declare that the *upanayana* may be performed at any time between the eighth and the sixteenth years of age for the Brāhmaṇa boy, between eleventh and twenty-second for the Kshatriya boy and between twelfth and twenty-fourth years for the Vaiśya.⁴ Those who do not get initiated within the age limits as mentioned above, become *patitasāvitrika*, i. e., lose their right of learning the *Sāvitri* verse ;⁵ they become *vrātyas*, by thus losing their right (*savitripatitā*) ; and they are despised by Āryas (*āryavigarhitāh*).⁶ The śūdras were not to go in for learning according to these authorities. From the difference in the respective ages prescribed for the three different *varṇas*, Dr. S. K. Das infers that "it

¹ Śān. Gr. Sū. ii, 1, 1-9; Āśv. Gr. Sū. i, 19, 1-7; Pār. Gr. Sū. ii, 5, 36-38; Go. ii, 10, 1-4; also in the Smritis: Man. ii, 36; Yāj. i, 14 etc.

² Yāj. i, 14; so also Pār. Gr. Sū. adds that *upanayana* may also be performed at any time according as it is considered auspicious by different families.—Pār. G. S. ii, 2, 1-4.

³ Man. ii, 37, cf. Ap. i, 1, 19-20; Gau. i, 6.

⁴ Śān. Gr. Sū. ii, 1, 1-9; Āśv. Gr. Sū. i, 19, 4-7; Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 37-38; Go. ii, 10, 3-4; etc. and, Man. ii, 38; etc.

⁵ Śān. Gr. Sū. ii, 1, 8; Āśv. G. S. i, 19, 8; Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 39; Go. G. S. ii, 10, 5.

⁶ Manu. ii, 39; Yāj. i, 38.

seems probable...that the difference in age was to emphasize the supposed intellectual superiority of the Brāhmaṇa who was thus ready to begin the study at a younger age than his non-Brāhmaṇa fellows."¹ But if we recall here an earlier remark, made at the beginning of this chapter, that an educational scheme touches life at every point and is a practical philosophy of life, we shall be able to see that the real explanation of this distinction should lie in another direction altogether. Of the three *varṇas*, the Brāhmaṇa's main duties centred round teaching and learning, according to the Hindu theory of *varṇas* of which we shall have to speak in more details in a later chapter.² The Brāhmaṇa boy was supposed to come of a family, the members of which adhered to their duties of teaching and learning ; and therefore, it would be quite natural to expect a hereditary predisposition for a Brāhmaṇa child to develop tendencies to learn earlier, owing to his family and social surroundings, than it could be for the Kshatriya and Vaiśya children. And, as to the Kshatriyas and the Vaiśyas, the age when each of these is allowed to start studies is very nearly the same, which fact also goes to support the above contention of ours. Moreover as the Brāhmaṇa's duties of life were centered round learning and teaching, the earlier he started to learn, the better it would help him to become a master of as much knowledge as possible.

✱ With the performance of the *upanayana* ceremony of the boy, his first lessons in simple living begin. In all humility and humbleness the initiated pupil had to start begging alms for his teacher. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa says of the student who is required to do this : "Having made himself humble, as it were, and having become devoid of shame he begs alms."³ The initiated pupil had

¹ Das : "Educational System of Ancient Hindus". p. 72.

² See Ch. VII.

³ Śat. Br. xi, 3, 3, 5. (Tr. by J. Eggeling).

to start begging food; he may beg from his mother, sister or other female relatives who are not likely to refuse. He has then to announce (*nivedya*) the same to the *guru*, and with his permission, should help himself with it.¹ The student is expressly forbidden from accepting from anybody anything but alms (*bhikṣā*).²

Next, there are rules about taking meals prescribed for the student. Manu says that he should take meals only twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening, and must abstain from taking a third meal between the two.³ He has to avoid over-eating (*atibhojanam*) because it causes ill-health (*anārogyam*), shortens the duration of life (*anāyushyam*), prevents acquisition of the spiritual merit (*apūṇyam*), will not lead to heaven (*asvargyam*) and is condemned by men.⁴ According to Hārīta also, over-eating as well as eating spoilt or stale food causes ill-health, is hostile to longevity and to the attainment of the celestial region and virtue; besides, it is condemned by the society and should therefore be avoided.⁵ The student should never eat flesh (*māmsam*) or honey (*madhu*).⁶ He is also advised not to eat stale sweet.⁷ He is ordered not to eat beetle leaf.⁸ Says the Mahābhārata: "Eating morning and evening is an ordinance of the Gods. It is ordained that no one should eat anything between these periods."⁹¹⁰

About the dress of the student, Manu has said that a Brāhmaṇa student shall wear a piece of hempen cloth,

¹ Man. ii, 50; also Śān. G. S. ii, 6, 4-6; Āśv. G. S. i, 22, 4-7.

² Śān. G. S. ii, 6, 7; Man. ii, 51; Yāj. i, 35.

³ Vyāsa, i, 32.

⁴ Man. ii, 56; cf. Bau. i, 8, 14.

⁵ Man. ii, 57.

⁶ Hār. i, 61 (Tr. by M. N. Dutt).

⁷ Man. ii, 177; Gaut. ii, 13; Āp. i, 2, 2, 23.

⁸ Man. ii, 177; Yāj. i, 32; Vis. xxviii, 11.

⁹ Parā. i, 50.

¹⁰ Śānti. 193, 10.

the Kshatriya student shall wear a piece of silken cloth, while the Vaiśya shall wear a piece of woollen cloth just enough to cover the body. So also each of these three have to put on upper garments (*uttariyas*) made of the skins of the antelope, of the *ruru* (a kind of deer), and of the goat respectively.¹ In the opinion of Vasishṭha, a Brāhmaṇa student should wear a piece of white and spotless cloth, the Kshatriya student should wear a piece of cloth dyed with madder, and the Vaiśya student should wear a piece of cloth dyed with turmeric or made of raw silk.² Another piece of thread or threads, considered sacred, (*yajñopavīta*) is also to be worn by the student ; it is suspended from the left shoulder and comes to the bottom of the right arm, and is made up of three strings of cotton for the Brāhmaṇa student, of hempen thread for the Kshatriya, and of woollen thread for the Vaiśya.³ We must note that the *higher* the *varṇa* to which the student belonged, the *less luxurious* piece of garment in regard to its quality is to be worn by him. The staff which the student is to hold, should be straight, unburnt, beautiful in appearance (*saumyadarśanah*), and not likely to create terror in any person (*anudvegakarah*) ;⁴ for it is intended merely as a security of the student's safety and not for deliberately offensive purposes. It is also required of the student that he should not indulge in such luxuries as anointing (*anjanam*) the eyes, using scents, and using umbrellas and shoes (*upānachchhatradhāranam*).⁵ He is not to embellish or adorn his body with ointments etc. (*abhyangam*) ; nor is he to enjoy dancing (*nartanam*), music (*gītavādanam*), or take part in gamb-

¹ Man. ii, 41.

² Vas. x.

³ Man. ii, 44 ; Vis. xxvii, 19.

⁴ Man. ii, 47.

⁵ Man. ii, 177-78 ; Yāj. i, 32 ; Gaut. ii.

ling (*dyūtam*), or useless discussions (*janavādam*).¹ He is to preserve his vow (*vrata*) of *brahmacharya*; he is not to talk with women more than is necessary.² He is to speak the truth, be modest and possessed of self-control, and keep free from lust (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*) and greed (*lobha*).³ He has also to behave without causing any harm (*himsanam*) to any being.⁴ In short, as Gautama puts it, he has to keep his tongue, his arms and his stomach under control and discipline.⁵)

Thus the Hindu student was being trained in the habits of simple life, no matter to what family he belonged. Williams has rightly observed that young children should be taught to think not what they *can have* but of what they can *do without*. "Then, as men and women", he proceeds, "will they be free to give themselves to high aims untempted by the material side of life."⁶ In India, whatever the social position or status of the students' families,—whether they came from rich or from poor families,—they had to take up the same mode of life. In the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, there are several instances showing how even princes had to undergo the same rigours of the student's life along with their poorest brother-students. The hero of the Rāmāyaṇa and his brothers,—all sons of King Daśaratha, had to undergo these hardships of the life of a student. And in the Śrīmadbhāgavata, we have, for instance, the story of princes Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa following the hard life of

¹ Man. ii, 177-9; Āp. i, 1, 1, 2-23 to 3-24; Gau. ii, 135, 16, 22; Yāj. i, 32.

² *ibid.*

³ *ibid.*

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Gau. ii, 22.

⁶ Williams: "Principles of Social Psychology". p. 378.

the student along with their poor fellow student Sudāmā at the *āśrama* (hermitage) of *guru* Sāndipani of Avanti.¹ So again, in 'Raghuwamśa', we have a description of the peaceful atmosphere and the simple mode of living at the *āśrama* of *kulapati* Vasishṭha ;² we are told that King Dilīpa, accompanied by the Queen Sudakshiṇā, went to the *āśrama* with a very small retinue of attendants, in order that there should be no disturbance to the quiet atmosphere of the *āśrama* (*āśramapīḍā*) ;³ and, on their arrival to the *āśrama*, these royal guests were provided with only the rural (*vanyām eva*) means of living for the night's stay—viz. a hut made of leaves (*parṇasālā*) and beds of *kuśa*-grass.⁴

✧ The student has to rise up early in the morning before the sunrise. "If the sun rises, seeing him asleep out of wilful laziness, let him mutter the *gāyatrī mantra* and fast for a whole day."⁵ He is not to sleep during day time at all.⁶ He should perform the *sandhyā* rite twice daily—early in the morning and in the evening.⁷ Says Bhīṣma in the Mahābhārata : "The Sun-God should always be adored. One should not sleep after sunrise. Morning and evening the prayers should be offered, sitting with face turned towards the East and towards the West respectively."⁸ The student should take his bath every day.⁹ The first duty (*ādītaḥ*) of the *guru*, on the completion of the preliminary rites of the *Upanayana* of the student (*śiṣyam*), was to instruct (*śikṣayet*) him in the

¹ See Bhāg. x, 80, 34 ff.

² See Raghuwamśa, Canto. i, 35-95.

³ *ibid.* i, 37.

⁴ *ibid.* i, 94-95.

⁵ Man. ii, 220.

⁶ Āp. i, 1, 2, 24.

⁷ Man. ii, 222; Yāj. i, 22; 25.

⁸ Śānti. 193, 8.

⁹ Man. ii, 176 etc.

rules of personal cleanliness (*śaucham*) and of good conduct (*āchāram*).¹ The *āchārya* says to the initiate : "You are a *brahmachārī* ; do the service ; do not sleep in day-time ; with devotion to the *āchārya*, study the Veda."

One unique thing to be noted about the student's life in Hindu India was that he had to live in the house or hermitage (*āśrama*) of the guru. The Chhāndogya Upanishad speaks of the student as residing with the family of, or in the neighbourhood of the *āchārya* (*āchāryakulavāsin, antevāsin*).² The term *antevāsin* with reference to the student is also mentioned in the Brihadāranyaka and the Taittirīya Upanishad.³ (The *Smritis* too prescribe rules for the student's residence at the guru's house.) We have already referred to the story of Balarāma and Krishṇa's education at the *āśrama* of guru Sāndipani, and Ramachandra's and his brother's education at Viśwāmitra's *āśrama*. And, there is something indeed that could be said (in favour of this system of the ancient Hindus giving the boy away to the absolute care of the teacher, during the period of his education.) In the family, the young boy is likely to come in close contact with persons who may be of a less moral calibre than his parents would desire for his company. It is also probable that the boy may come in contact with environment and surroundings which would not be conducive to his free and healthy moral and mental development. There are likely to be some family prejudices and beliefs whose impress upon a child at an early age may obstruct the proper development of his faculty of reason. Under the Hindu system, the raw material of the child

¹ Man. ii, 69; Yāj. i, 15.

² Āśv. G. S. i, 22, 2: "*Brahmachāryasyupo'shāna karma kuru divā mā svapsirāchāryādhīno vedamadhīshveti*".

Also, cf. Sat. Br. xi, 5, 4, 5; Sān. G. S. ii, 4, 5.

³ Chhānd. Up. ii, 23, 2; and iii, 11, 5;

⁴ e. g. Briha. Upa. vi, 3, 7; Taitt. Up. i, 11, 1.

was given over, for proper emotional and intellectual shaping, to the care of the expert who was particularly equipped for his special task, and whose main duty in life was to teach and train.) The young child was placed in the hands of the *guru* at an age when his attitude towards things and persons around him was not yet formed and fixed. At this age, his mind is so flexible and so much likely to be influenced by those who possess authority over him that it should be the duty of the parents to place him under the care of a tried person of a high moral character. Ross has observed : "The hackneyed metaphors, 'potter's clay', 'wax tablet', 'bent twig', 'tender osier', are so many ways of emphasizing the high suggestibility of the child. The mark of the young mind is an absence of fixed habits, of stubborn volitions, of persistent ways of acting. The staunch personality that can plough through counter-suggestions as tremorless as an iron-clad in a flight of arrows we look for only in the adult. The child gradually builds it as a worm builds its wormcast—out of material taken in from without. And this original dependence on surroundings holds true alike of the martyr and of the milk-sop, of moral hero and of weakling. They differ only in their power to form fixed habits."¹

Therefore, childhood is an age when utmost precaution has to be taken in selecting the environment in which the child is to be brought up, as well as in selecting the person under whose influence he is to be brought up. It is the formative period of life ; and the processes of suggestion as well as of imitation play greatest part during this period of one's life. The greater part of an individual's character is due to the various impressions his mind has received during childhood. We know how the modern psycho-analyst, for instance, often traces the cause of an

¹ Ross : "Social Control" p. 163.

adult's mental disorder to some event which has left its stamp upon his mind during his more tender years. (Under the Hindu system of education, the young boy had to live with his *guru*, often far away from his nearest relations, so that his absolute mentor and guide was the *guru* alone.)

This system, again, can claim another advantage to its credit. It avoided any occasion of conflict between the teacher and the family, such as are, for instance, met with in the modern school.¹ The school-child finds itself divided between two kinds of interests,—the one is the tendency to follow the family and other attitudes he has been acquiring during the time he is spending with his family, and the other is the tendency to develop the power of independent learning.² It was this conflict of the two interests which the Hindu system sought to avoid by leaving the child entirely in the custody of the *āchārya*.

Rightly, therefore, have the Hindu sages spoken of the *āchārya* as the "spiritual father" of the pupil.³ The *āchārya* in his turn was to regard the pupil with all the affection due to a son.⁴ Unless the *āchārya* took a real parental interest in the pupil, he would not be able to wield a moral influence upon him; and, therefore, to that extent he would also be unable to mould his character properly. The opening prayer which both the teacher and the pupil sing, according to the Taittiriya Upanishad, is this: Almighty! do protect us both, together; give food for both of us at the same time; may both of us apply our energies towards acquisition of knowledge in harmony and co-operation; may our studies be illustrious and

¹ See, e. g., Williams: "Principles of Social Psychology" pp. 367 ff.

² *ibid.*

³ Ath. Veda. xi, 5, 3; Ait. Br. i, 1; Man. ii, 170; Gaut. i, 1, 10; Vas. xxviii, 38-9; Mahā. Vana. 180, 34; etc.

⁴ Praśna Up. v, 8; Āp. i, 2.

brilliant ; may there never be hatred amongst us two !
Peace, Peace, Peace !!!¹

The teacher's duty towards his student was to impart to him "truth exactly as he knew it."² The function of the teacher was to lead the pupil from the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge.³ The teacher from whom the pupil receives the *upanayana* sacrament (*samskāra*) is called an *āchārya*.⁴ And Āpastamba explains the word thus : "He from whom the student gathers (*āchinoti*) his *dharma*s is the *āchārya*.⁵ The *āchārya* must never get wearied of instructing his pupil, and must also, as a teacher, try to maintain a high standard in respect of his own academic attainments.⁶ The Gopatha Brāhmaṇa narrates the story of a certain teacher named Maitreya who closed his seminar and dismissed his students as soon as he discovered that he was not conversant with a particular subject ; thereafter he started to acquire a knowledge of that subject.⁷ The *āchārya* must not only love his pupil like his own son, but must also give full individual attention to him while teaching ; and he must not withhold any part of the sacred knowledge from him : "Loving him like his own son, and full of attention, he (the teacher) shall teach him the *dharmaśāstra*, without keeping away anything from the whole *dharma*. And, he shall not use him for his own pur-

¹ Taitt. Up. ii, 1 : "Om! sahanāvavatu, sahanau bhunaktu, sahaṁvīryam karavāvahai/tejasvīnāvadhītāmastu mā vidvis-hāvahai/Om! śāntih! śāntih! śāntih! The same prayer is repeated in ibid. iii, 1.

² Muṇḍ. Up. i, 2-23; Praśna Up. vi, 1; Chhānd. Up. vii, 16, 7.

³ Āp. i, 10-11.

⁴ Gau. i, 9; Āpa. i, 1, 1, 13.

⁵ Āpa. i, 1, 1, 13.

⁶ Man. ii, 73; Śār. Gr. S. iv, 8, 12, 16-17.

⁷ Gop. Br. i, 1, 31. (—From Altekar: Edu. in Ancient Ind. p. 49).

poses to the detriment of his studies, except in times of distress.”¹ The Mahābhārata as well as the Rāmāyana give us numerous instances of teachers of very high moral character and learning, like Viśwāmitra, Vasishṭha, Sāṇḍipani, Droṇāchārya, Kripāchārya and others.

On the other hand, a very high degree of reverence to the teacher was expected of the student. Manu-smṛiti says that within the sight of his *guru*, the student shall not sit carelessly or at ease (*yatheshṭāsano*).² Again, in the presence of his teacher he was always to eat less, wear less valuable dress and ornaments, and rise earlier and go to bed later.³ Wherever people defame his teacher, justly or falsely (*parivādo nindā vāpi*), there the student must cover his ears, or depart from that place, rather than hear it.⁴ By censuring his teacher, though justly, he will become (in his next birth) an ass; by falsely defaming him he will become a dog.⁵ Now, these and such other rules were not intended to create a servile attitude in the pupil towards the teacher; they were meant only to cultivate an attitude of deep reverence for the teacher in the breasts of the students. Yājñavalkya explains such rules by saying that the student should “wait upon (*upāsita*) the *guru* for the sake of learning (*svādhyāyārtham*). He should be all attentive (*samāhitah*). He should always (*nityam*) promote his *guru*’s interest (*hitam*) by all acts of body, mind and speech” (*mano-vāk-kāya-karmabhih*).⁶ In Mahābhārata we have several instances of strict

¹ Āp. i, 2, 8, 25-26.

² Man. ii, 198; also Gaut. ii, 14-15; Āp. Gr. S. i, 2-21; Śār. Gr. Su. iv, 8-5-7-11.

³ Man. ii, 194; 198; also Gāu. ii, 21; Āp. Gr. S. i, 4, 22-28; Mahā. Ādi. 91.

⁴ Man. ii, 200.

⁵ Man. ii, 201.

⁶ Yāj. i, 26-27; cf. also Man. ii, 191—‘*Kuryādadhyayane yatnamāchāryasya hiteshu cha*’.

obedience of the teacher's word by the pupils. The Mahābhārata says : "The father and mother only create body. The life, on the other hand, which one acquires from the *guru* is divine....Preceptors always treat their disciples with great affection. The latter should, therefore, revere their preceptors duly....The preceptor deserves greater respect than either the father or the mother."¹ These and such other rules were intended to infuse a spirit of high reverence in the pupil's heart towards his teacher. The reason is obvious. Unless the teacher is regarded with deep reverence as well as deep affection by the pupil, he would not succeed in carrying the psychological influence over the pupil such as is necessary for the proper mentor and the guide. Childhood, as Ross puts it, "is the hey-day of personal influence",² and the Hindu child was therefore placed under the influence of a "picked person" and an expert intellectual leader of a high moral standard. Such great selfless intellectual leaders are a rarity at any time and in any country. At any rate it would be certainly impossible to find such an intellectual leader in every family. To the sole care of one of these few great men was every student in ancient India entrusted for his moral and intellectual training. The Mahābhārata points out that "if the *guru* happens to be unwise, the disciple cannot possibly behave towards him in a respectful or proper way ; if the preceptor is possessed of purity and good conduct, the disciple also succeeds in acquiring conduct of the same kind."³

The moral influence of the teacher upon his pupil must have acquired an added weight due to the fact that the

¹ Sānti. 108,-18, 21 and 24.

² Ross: op. cit. p. 164.

³ Mahā. Anu. 105, 3: "Na *gurāvakritaprajñe śakyam śishyeṇa vartitum/gurorhi dīrghadarśitvam yat tachchhishyasya Bhārata*||.

teacher charged nothing to the pupils or their parents for his labours.) Teaching for a stipulated fee (*bhṛitakādhyāpakah*), as well as being taught for a stipulated fee (*bhṛitakādhyāpitah*), have both been severely denounced.¹ After the young student has finished his course of studies, however, the student may offer a gift (*gurudakṣhiṇā*) to his *guru* according to his own means before he leaves the *guru's* house.² But such a gift, as the Vājasaneyā Samhitā points out, does in no way signify an adequate return in exchange of the knowledge received; it is only a mark of honour and respect to the teacher.³ There is an instance in the Mahābhārata, for example, of *guru* Droṇa being presented with gifts by Bhīṣma for accepting the tutorship of the Kaurava princes.⁴ But such gifts to the teacher were regarded as *honoraria* paid to the *guru*, as an expression of respect for one who was very often a penniless man. The poet Kālidāsa has given a pertinent instance in this connection: Varatantu, the *guru*, was asked by Kautsa, the *śishya*, to accept some fee (*gurudakṣhiṇā*) from him after his course of studies was over (*samāptavidyena*). Varatantu, however, refused to think of any payment in return for the knowledge he had imparted, for, indeed, he looked upon Kautsa's attention and devotion (*bhakti*) to him as the fee itself. But Kautsa's haughty insistence provoked him into anger, and he demanded "four and ten crores of money, according to the number of lores"—i. e. the fourteen lores (*vidyās*)—that were taught by the *guru*.⁵ This story clearly indicates that accepting fees for tuitions was regarded as immoral by the teachers of ancient India.

¹ Man. iii, 156; cf. Yāj. i, 220; Mahā. Śānti. 260.

² See Man. ii, 245; Yāj. i, 51; Āśv. Gr. S. iii, 9, 4; Gobh. Gr. S. iii, 4, 1-2 etc.

³ Vāj. Sam. xix, 30.

⁴ Mahā. Ādi. 141-44.

⁵ Raghuvamśa, Canto. v, 20-21.

Learning was thus never used in India as a means of acquiring material gains.

Free tuitions had another very important significance in the Hindu educational system. It meant that the education of the Hindu child never depended upon the financial position of the family into which he was born. The gates of the Temple of Learning were open to all, prince and pauper, alike. Nor did the quality of education suffer owing to lack of capacity to spend money over it.

Knowledge was not only never given with any material motive behind it, but it was also never acquired with such a motive. There were no prizes offered to pupils for excellence shown in their lessons except perhaps the expression of admiration by the teacher. There were no competitive examinations marking the gradations of the students' abilities. To acquire knowledge for its own sake was the sacred duty (*dharma*) of every one ; and no one went to learn with a view to furthering or increasing material prospects. Absence of any material motive in learning must have been a great psychological asset in keeping the Hindu educational system free from many of the evils that would otherwise have beset it. For, once the material motive is set on, it would not stop until it has created all the mischief it could, into the educational system including those that taught and learnt under it. On the side of the teachers, there would be created a rivalry and competition amongst them to obtain as large a number of students as possible, since that would pay them more, and the efficiency in imparting education would deteriorate to that degree. On the side of the students, there would be created a rivalry and a spirit of competition amongst them also to win prizes and other material awards ; and this spirit of rivalry amongst the students is most detrimental to the real cause of education. For then, learning will have value for the students only in so far as it is able to yield laurels and prizes, and will therefore be

pursued only with the material motive in view. The temptations of material profit would be too great and too enticing to keep the pure, disinterested intellectual joy in learning alive. "Spontaneous and disinterested desire for knowledge", says Russell, "is not uncommon in the young, and might be easily aroused in many in whom it remains latent. But it is remorselessly checked by teachers who think only of examinations, diplomas and degrees."¹ The Hindu system of education was never allowed to suffer from motives of any kind of material prospect or of a spirit of rivalry and competition; and utmost care was taken to keep alive lofty ideals in the breasts of the devotees of Learning. The pursuit of knowledge was carried on as one's part of the inherent, natural duties (*dharma*s) of man.

To learning (*vidyā*) is due all honour for the Hindu, more even than to achievements in wealth, (*vittam*) or to elderly relationship or to age.² Manu tells us the story of a young boy (*śiśu*) named Kavi who taught his elder relatives and used to call them "little sons" (*putrakā iti*), since he excelled them in knowledge. These relatives complained to the Gods of Kavi's audacity; but the Gods gave their decision in favour of young Kavi.³ For, a learned man, though young, has to be respected and honoured by virtue of his learning.⁴ Bhishma advises that before giving a maiden in marriage, inquiry must first be made as to the educational qualifications of the suitor.⁵ So again, a maiden coming from a family where the Vedas are not studied is regarded as unfit for marrying.⁶ Every twice-born person (*dvijanman*) is by sacred duty bound

¹ Russell: "Why Men Fight" p. 174.

² Man. ii, 136; Yāj. i, 116; Mahā. Vana. 133, 11-12.

³ Man. ii, 151-53; also in Baudh. i, 3, 47.

⁴ Man. ii, 156; Gaut. vi, 21-23; Yāj. i, 115.

⁵ Mahā. Anu. 44, 3.

⁶ Man. iii, 7; Yāj. i, 54. See Ch. on 'Marriage'.

to study the Vedas together with the *rahasyas*; at the same time such a person must undergo the disciplines and obey the rules (*vratāh*) laid down for a *brahmachārin*, (that is, for one belonging to the order of a student).¹ It was well recognized that education was the foundation upon which the whole edifice of the moral culture of the individual was to be built. A person belonging to the *dvija varṇas*, i. e. to any of the first three *varṇas*, who failed to do his duty of studying the Vedas would be degraded to the *Śūdra varṇa*.²

There were many other matters of discipline imposed upon the Hindu student. As soon as the initiation ceremony of the student was over, the first duty of the *guru* was to instruct his new pupil in the rules of personal cleanliness and of good conduct.³ The young boy must learn to befriend all living beings.⁴ A striking feature of the Hindu system of education was that the training in character-building proceeded side by side with the development of the intellect of the student. The moral culture of the student was not separated from his intellectual culture. "Grateful, non-hating, intelligent, pure, healthy, non-envious, honest, energetic,—such a student should be taught, according to *dharma*."⁵ Manu would say that one who completely governs himself (*śūyantritaḥ*), though he knows the *Sāvitṛi* only, is better than he who knows all the Vedas but who cannot control himself.⁶ No amount of knowledge can help one whose heart is contaminated with evil ideas (*vipraduṣṭabhā-*

¹ Man. ii, 165.

² Man. ii, 168; Vis. xxviii, 36; Vas. iii, 2.

³ Āśv. Gr. S. i, 22, 2. Man. ii, 69; Yāj. i, 15.

⁴ Man. ii, 87, Vas. xxvi, 11.

⁵ Yāj. i, 28: "Kṛitajno'drohi medhāvi śuchiḥ kulyo'anasū-yakah/adhyāpya sādhuśaktāptasvārthadā dharmatastvime//
Also cf. Man. ii, 109.

⁶ Man. ii, 118.

vasya).¹ On the other hand, he whose speech and thought are pure and ever perfectly guarded, gains the full benefit which is attainable by the study of the Vedas.² "The wise man," says Manu, "should strive towards restraining (*samyame*) his organs (*indriyānām*) which run wild among alluring sensual objects (*vishayeshu*), just as a charioteer restrains his horses."³ The organs are : the five organs of sense (*buddhīndriyāṇi*)—viz., the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose ; the five organs of action (*karmendriyāṇi*)—viz., the anus, the organ of generation, hands, feet and the organ of speech ; and the eleventh—the mind, which is both an organ of sense as well as of action. When the mind (*manas*) is controlled (*jite*), all other organs are controlled.⁴ For Manu, man incurs guilt undoubtedly (*asamśayam*) through the attachment of his organs to sensual pleasures. But he is sure to attain the aim of his life (*siddhim*) if he keeps these under complete control (*samyamya*).⁵ On the other hand, desire (*kāmah*) is never extinguished by the enjoyment of the desired object ; it grows only stronger like fire fed with clarified butter.⁶ One must, therefore,—and especially the student must, (because Manu is dealing with the life of a student (*brahmacharyāśrama*) in this section)—try his utmost to subdue the desire for sensual pleasures (*vishayeshu*). And, the best way to subdue and keep under control the organs which are attached to the sensual pleasure is, not by mere abstinence (*asevayā*) from them, but by constantly engaging oneself in the pursuit of studies (*jnānena*).⁷ Mere repression of desires is not

¹ Man. ii, 97.

² Man. ii, 160: "Yasya vāṅgmanasī śuddhe samyagupte cha sarvadā/śa vai sarvamavāpnōti vedāntopagatam phalam.

³ Man. ii, 88.

⁴ Manu. ii, 90-92.

⁵ Man. ii, 93.

⁶ Man. ii, 94.

⁷ Man. ii, 96.

so much effective in achieving self-control as the purposeful engaging of one's mind in the pursuit of better and more desirable things would prove to be. Manu indeed declares that "not a single act here below appears to have been done by a man free from *kāma* ; for, whatever he does, it is the result of the impulse of *kāma*." ¹ What every one has to take care of is to see that these desires or *kāmas* are directed in the proper manner, and towards proper ends. This is the purpose of education,—to train the young student to direct his energies towards right actions. ²

Kauṭilya also has declared that the main purpose of education is the control of the organs of sense. ³ "Absence of discrepancy (*avipratipatti*) in the perception of sound, touch, colour, flavour, and scent by means of the ear, the eyes, the tongue and the nose is what is meant by the restraint of the organs of sense (*indriyajayah*)" says Kauṭilya. "Strict observance of the precepts of sciences (*Śāstrānushthānam vā*)", he further proceeds, "also means the same ; for the sole aim of all sciences is nothing but restraint of the organs of sense (*kritsnam hi śāstramidam indriyajayah*) ; whosoever is of reverse character, whosoever has not his organs of sense under control, will soon perish, though he possesses the whole earth bound with the four quarters". The young student is therefore enjoined to "abandon lust (*kāma*), anger (*krodha*), greed (*lobha*), vanity (*māna*), haughtiness (*mada*), and overjoy (*harsha*)". ⁴ Says the *Mahābhārata*, also : "Knowledge of the *śāstras* is said to bear

¹ Man. ii, 4: *Akāmasya kriyā kāchit driśyate neha karchū hit/ yudyaddhi kurute kinchit tattatkāmasya cheshṭitam* // also Man. ii, 2. See also our discussion on the *purushārthas* in Ch. II. supra.

² Man. ii, 3 and 5.

³ Artha. i, iii, 12, 1-2.

⁴ Artha: *ibid.* Tr. by Shamasatry, p. 10.

⁵ Artha: *ibid.* Tr. by Shamasatry, p. 10.

fruit when it produces modesty and virtuous conduct.”¹ And the Śukraniti similarly observes: “The mind covetous of the meat of enjoyable things, sends forth the senses, sound, touch, sight, taste and smell;—any of these five by itself is sufficient to cause destruction. Therefore, one should check the mind; for when the mind is controlled, the senses are conquered.”² The student ought to keep himself away from gambling (*dyūtam*), idle disputes (*janavādam*), back-biting or talking scandals (*parivādam*), and lying (*anritam*). So also has he to abstain from looking at and touching women (*striṇām prekṣaṇālabham*), and from hurting others.³ It was well recognized that mere knowledge without a proper discipline and training in self-control would prove of little avail to a person who desired to promote his own happiness and progress as well as of those around him.

Thus, the teacher's duty under the Hindu system of education was to help to cultivate the moral culture of his pupil along with his intellectual culture. The harm that results, in our own times, out of the separation of the moral from the intellectual development of the young boys is expressed thus ably by John Dewey: “The much lamented separation in the (modern) schools, of intellectual and moral training, of acquiring information and growing in character, is simply one expression of the failure to conceive and construct the school as a social institution, having a social life and value within itself”.⁴ “It is false psychology”, says Dr. R. B. Cattell, “to draw any sharp distinction between character training and the acquisition of knowledge. Habits of behaviour, such as honesty, fair play, tidiness, etc. have been produced

¹ Mahā. Sabhā. 5, 112.

² Śukra. p. 195-6 (Sarkar's Tr.).

³ Man. ii, 179; also Āp. i, 3, 11, 17-24.

⁴ Dewey: “Moral Principles in Education”. p. 15.

under experimental conditions ; and it has been found out that they only maintain themselves in the field in which they were taught. This means that a boy who has learned fair play and honesty on the playing fields of Eton may yet show no signs of them on the Stock-Exchange.”¹ Therefore, every efficient scheme of education must always find an adequate place for the moral training of the young, along with the courses devised for their intellectual training. In the words of Sir T. P. Nunn : “The school must be thought of primarily not as a place where certain knowledge is learnt, but as a place where the young are initiated in certain forms of activity namely, those that are of greatest and most permanent significance in the wider world. Those activities fall naturally into two groups : In the first, we place the activities that safeguard the conditions and maintain the standard of individual and social life ; such as the care of the health and bodily grace, manners, social organization, morals and religion ; in the second, the typical creative activities that constitute, so to speak, the solid tissue of civilization ;” these are, the arts, the sciences, and literature.² In the Hindu scheme of education both these aims of education were thought out by the Hindus, in their own way, as inseparable complements that made one whole system. This is also what is expressed by the Taittiriya Upanishad when it declares : Justice (*ritam*) reading and teaching have to be practised together ; truth, reading and teaching have to be practised in harmony ; austerities, reading and teaching have to be carried on together ; self-control (*damah*) and tranquillity of mind (*śamah*), reading and teaching have to be practised at the same time ; the worship of sacred fires, reading and teaching have to be practised side by side ;

¹ Cattell : “Psychology & Social Progress.” p. 374.

² Nunn : Education : Its Data and First Principles pp. 242-3.

burnt offerings, reading and teaching have also to be carried on side by side ; nay, even the duties and obligations towards strangers (*atithayah*), duties as a human being (*mānusham*), duties of begetting offspring and those towards descendants, have to be practised by man in conjunction with his studies and teaching.¹

In all writings on the life and programme of the student, the Hindu Śāstrakāras have laid the greatest emphasis on the importance of the virtue of celibacy (*brahmacharya*) in the development of the moral culture of a student. The powers of *brahmacharya* have been described to be so great that the Rigveda declares that by virtue of it, a King is able to rule his kingdom efficiently, the gods themselves were able to attain immortality, and Indra was able to achieve the position of the chief of gods.² Some authorities would forbid the young student even from "looking at or touching women".³ Kautilya, speaking about the duties of a prince-student, says that such a one should observe celibacy till he becomes sixteen years of age.⁴ "Let him always sleep alone" ; says Manu, "let him never waste his manhood ; for he who voluntarily emits his manhood, breaks his vow (*vratam*)".⁵ This quality of *brahmacharya*, of celibacy, was thought to be so very necessary for a student, that in the course of time, the word that signifies celibacy has come to

¹ Taitt. Up. Śikshā Valli, 9: "*Ritam cha svādhyāyappravachane cha, satyam cha svādhyāyappravachane cha, damaścha svādhyāyappravachane cha, śamaścha svādhyāyappravachane cha, agnayaścha svādhyāyappravachane cha, agnihotram cha svādhyāyappravachane cha, atithayaścha svādhyāyappravachane cha, mānusham cha svādhyāyappravachane cha, prajā cha svādhyāyappravachane cha, prajanaścha svādhyāyappravachane cha, prajātiścha svādhyāyappravachanecha.*"

² Rig. V. xi, 5-19.

³ Man. ii, 179; and Gop. Br. i, 2, 1-8.

⁴ Arth. p. 19.

⁵ Man. ii, 180.

acquire the meaning of studenthood itself; the word *brahmacharya* has thus become synonymous with 'studenthood'. Every student, in order to increase the spiritual merit (*tapovriddhyartham*), must observe *brahmacharya* till he completes his studies.¹ It was thought to be incumbent upon the student to cultivate habits of purity of thought and action, as well as of the body.

One of the very important considerations with regard to a system of education is the place, value and method of punishment in that system. Should every lapse on the part of the pupil be met with the rod? Should the fear of punishment for ever loom large before the horizon of the student's vision in order to prevent him from committing mistakes? Or should his native love for the right and hate of the wrong be aroused and cultivated by a sympathetic appeal to his heart and he be thus convinced that it would be in his best interest that he should never commit a wrong again? The Hindus have answered this question in favour of sympathetic treatment in dealing with the pupil; though, according to them, the rod may be of some use at times, if properly used. Manu is quite emphatic on this point; and Gautama and Āpastamba agree with him: "Created beings", says Manu, "must be instructed in what concerns their welfare without giving them pain; and sweet and gentle speech (*vākchaiva madhurā ślakshṇā*) must be used by a teacher who desires to abide by what is *dharma*".² At other places, he has said that the teacher may beat his pupil, if he has committed a fault (*aparādha*), with a rope or a stick; but this can be done only on the back, and never on any of the noble parts of the body (*nottamāṅge*); but, even

¹ See Tait. Ār. ii, 1; Man. ii, 175; Yāj. i, 33; Kām. Sū. i, ii, 2-3; Pāras. G. S. ii, 5, 12; Gobh. G. S. ii, 1, 16; etc.

² Man. ii, 159; and Gaut. ii, 42; Āp. i, 8, 25-30.

this can be done, again, only with a view to correct or improve the student (*śiṣṭyartham*), and with no other motive.¹) Similar observations with regard to the use of the rod are made by the Gautama, Viṣṇu and the Mahābhārata.² The social bearing of the use of the rod for correcting the young is quite apparent. Locke has expressed it in these words : "If the mind be curbed and humbled too much in childhood, if their spirits be abashed and broken much by too strict a hand over them, they lose all their vigour and industry, and are in a worse state than the former. For, extravagant young fellows that have liveliness and spirit, come sometimes to be set right and so make able and great men ; but dejected minds, and low spirits are hardly ever to be raised, and very seldom attain to any thing. To avoid danger that is on either hand is the great art ; and he that has found a way to keep up a child's spirit easy, active, and free, and yet at the same time to restrain him from many things he has a mind to, and to draw him to things that are necessary to him ;—he, that knows how to reconcile these seeming contradictions, has, in my opinion, got the true secret of education."³ O'Shea has shown, by giving instances of the use and spare of the rod in different countries of Europe and America, how in actual results the rod is ineffective as a measure of corrective.⁴ In France, for instance, corporal punishment is absolutely prohibited, while in Germany it is the most used, in public schools. But the German student, as soon as he leaves the school and joins the University where the control at the point of the rod is taken off, gets into more riotous moods than

¹ Man. viii, 299-300 and iv, 164.

² Gaut. ii, 42 ; Vis. lxxi, 80-81 ; Mahā Anu. 104, 37.

³ Quick : "Lock on Education" p. 46 ; quoted by O'Shea : Op. cit. p. 260. (The above quotation is slightly modified, as the original one is in old English).

⁴ O'Shea : Op. cit. pp. 346 ff.

his French brother. What is essential for the real discipline of the student, therefore, is more a habit of self-control than a control imposed from without. Control from without may at best prevent recurrence of mistakes so long as the fear of that control from outside exists ; and at worst it may create a psychological framework of a hesitating and halting disposition in the future man. Self-control, on the other hand, is bound to be permanently effective in the individual. It is the basis of the strength of character and firmness of mind upon which, ultimately, effective and well-regulated conduct must depend ; and this is opposed to the hesitating and irregular conduct which is the outcome of direction and control from without by the help of fear.

(We thus see that the Hindu student had to learn habits of simple life, honesty, modesty and cleanliness. He had to undergo a discipline in self-control. He was by his *svadharma* bound to be friendly to all living creatures. He was to avoid bad company. In the matter of his material needs, he was to remain satisfied only with what was absolutely necessary for his bodily upkeep, whether he was a King's son or a pauper's. Under the roof of the Guru's abode, all students had the same status with reference to each other ; and every one of them had to observe the same rules of discipline and of simple living. One would very much like to see this principle of equality of treatment and habits of simple living being introduced in the modern schemes of education. As for equality of treatment, though it is absent to-day where it is most needed, it is conspicuously present where it ought not to be so at all : Equality of treatment in regard to material needs of the students has given place to equality of treatment in regard to their intellectual requirements in a sense that is quite undesirable. Education, especially in the modern class-room, cannot proceed unless it takes for granted that all the students in the class possess the

same intellectual abilities, the same capacities to grasp, the same mental outfit, and the same intellectual needs also. All of this is as injurious and unwise as anything could be ! And, proceeding upon this assumption of equal abilities and equal interests, the whole class is made to go through the self-same intellectual exercises, without regard to the personal differences of interests and abilities between the members of the class. Any scheme of education which is based on such a fundamentally false and dangerous psychological assumption must necessarily tend to retard the progress of the inherent capacities of students who may be above the average in the class, while others who are below that average might continue to progress only in their inability to keep pace with the class ! At best, such a system of education may yield its fullest and best advantages to the child of average intellect only. In all probability, it has been devised with reference to some vague notion and basis of average ability. The Hindu educator of old times, however, used to be careful enough to provide for individual attention to the pupil, regard every student as his own son, and make full allowances for individual differences in learning abilities between those that came to him to learn and to know and to do. We have several instances of how the Hindu student was, each with reference to his own talent, personally attached to the teacher—as for example, in the relations that existed between Droṇācharya and the Kaurava princes, and between Paraśurāma and Karna, in the Mahābhārata ; between Viśvāmitra and the sons of King Daśaratha in the Rāmāyaṇa ; and between Vasishṭha and his pupils in Raghuvansā (Canto I).

It stands to reason to infer that education in ancient India was free from any external control like that of the State or the Government or any party politics. It was one of the King's duties to see that the learned *pundits* pursued their studies and their duty of imparting know-

ledge without interference from any source whatever. So also, in all probability, education did not suffer from any communal interest or prejudices in India.¹ Again, there were no curricula of studies that bound down the student or the teacher. So that there was no censorship or limitation laid down in the matter of the quality or variety

¹ The deportation of the great scientist, Albert Einstein, along with many others, from Germany because he belongs to a race different from that of the dominant political party illustrates how education is influenced by party politics to-day. The "Nature", a leading British Scientific journal, gives a report of how another great man of science of Germany, and himself a Nobel Laureate, Professor Lenard, was influenced by the political views of the Government and denounced any "intellectual follower of a Jew". (See "Nature", No. 3422, vol. 135, [June 1, 1935], p. 919).

Some more instances illustrating the unhealthy influence of politics on Education are also given by Professor Newlon of Columbia University. Writing on the "Forms of Repression" upon teaching, in the U. S. A., he observes: "Repression takes various forms. Reference has already been made to the growing tendency to legislate the content of the curriculum—to compel by law the study of particular subject-matter..... or to delimit severely the areas of study.....".

"If any reader questions the reality of this problem, he is referred to Dr. Howard Beale's study of freedom of teaching in the United States"... (The study by Beale is, "Are American Teachers Free?", Scribner's, 1936)..... "Or, he is referred to numerous instances of dismissal, such as the dismissal of Professor Turner and others from the University of Pittsburgh and Professor Carrothers from the University of Ohio for political activities; this list could be extended indefinitely; instances might be cited of limitations placed upon freedom of teaching by boards and sometimes even by administrative officers; instances might be included of dismissal of teachers in the last twenty years in almost every State in the Union because they dared to make controversial social problems the subject of study in their classrooms or because of their alleged dangerous political views."

—Ch. X: Freedom of Teaching, pp. 268 ff., in "Teacher and the Society", (First Yearbook of the John Dewey Society). Appleton-Century, London and New York, 1937.

of courses to be studied or taught according to the individual needs or tastes of the pupils. Anything worth knowing, and everything that was known by the teacher, could be taught by the teacher and learnt by the student. The teacher, as we have already seen, was to explain truth exactly as he knew it ; he was enjoined not to keep back any knowledge from his student. He never worked under the influence of any person, institution or sect. And yet he was a person always honoured, respected, and listened to even by the King ; and no one, not even the King, could domineer over him.

Nor was the student in Hindu India dominated by the particular ideas and prejudices of his family. We have seen how during the course of his education, the *guru* becomes his sole mentor. True education, remarks Sumner, "means a development and training of all useful powers which the pupil possesses, and repression of all bad prepossessions which he has inherited."¹ If a real development of the useful powers of the child is the aim of education, it is essential that his mind should be kept beyond the influence of any family prejudices and family traditions ; for, these are likely to be founded more on family conveniences rather than upon rational convictions. Among the prepossessions of the child, there are also instinctive prepossessions, apart from the specific family traits. Of these instinctive prepossessions, or the original or primitive instincts of man as they are called, psycho-analytic studies of recent times have discovered that the sex instinct is the most powerful ; it is found out to be the most potent source of a greater part of the psychic energy of an individual.² Now, psycho-analysts tell us

¹ Sumner : "Folkways" p. 634.

² See e. g. Tansley : "The New Psychology" (8th imp. 1923) Ch. VII. For more details see Freud : "Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis", and his "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis".

that such a natural instinct cannot be completely destroyed by repression. On the contrary, such repression may lead to certain mental deficiencies and other harms in the child who may have to suffer due to them in later years. The most effective way to control the sway of this natural instinct is to divert the child's psychic energies to other proper channels. "In years before puberty" says Professor Tansley, "almost any direction can be impressed upon the developing mind by appropriate and sufficiently severe training".¹ By insistence on *brahmacharya* in deed and word as well as in thought, the Hindu system of education attempted to keep the student's psychic energies in proper directions. Further, throughout the day, the student was kept engaged either in studies, or in doing some personal or religious duties, or in bringing food or wood for fuel, or in some way or other helping himself or his *guru*. Purity of body, mind and thought was always insisted upon by the teacher in regard to the day-to-day behaviour of the student. The best part of his energies was thus directed towards studies and the formation of good habits.

The Hindu scheme of education which we have surveyed so far seems to have been formulated with reference to the sons of India only ; for there seems to have been no place in the whole scheme for the daughters of India. It seems, however that in the Vedic India women were able to achieve educational attainments similar to what men could achieve. ✓ The eighth and the tenth *maṇḍala* of Rigveda describe a man and his wife participating in sacrificial arrangements and performing the recitations of *mantras* together.² In the Kaushītaki *Brāhmaṇa* there is mentioned a lady named *Pathyāvasti*

¹ Tansley: "ibid. p. 96.

² Rig. viii, 31, 5; x, 85, 10.

who obtained the title of *Vāk* (learned woman) after finishing her courses of studies.¹ A lady named Gandharvagrihītā is spoken of as having specialized in a branch of knowledge (*viśeshāvijnā*).² So also, in the Brihad-āranyaka Upanishad there have been many instances of learned women. For instance, in the sixth chapter of this treatise, a certain ritual is mentioned for the father who desires his daughter to become a *paṇḍitā*, that is to say, a learned scholar;³ so also, in the second chapter, we find Yājñavalkya's wife Maitreyi discussing some problems of the deepest philosophical import, like the destiny of the soul after death, with her husband;⁴ and, in the third chapter, a lady named Gārgī Vāchaknavī is one of the learned participants in the debate held at King Janaka's Sacrifice.⁵ Besides, two ladies, named Ghoshā and Lopāmudrā are spoken of in the Rigveda Samhitā as being *mantradrik*, that is to say, well-versed in the *mantras*.⁶ Then, particular *mantras* are enjoined to be recited by the wife, according to Āśvalayana Śrauta-Sūtra;⁷ which means that the wife was expected to know some *mantras* at least. According to this and other Sūtras it seems that the wife was taught; for, otherwise, she would be unable to participate at a sacrifice as described by them.⁸

✓ Patanjali in his Mahābhāshya, refers to the lady scholars of his times who were well-versed in the "Mīmāṃsāśāstra", a work written by Kāśakritsnī; and these

¹ From Muir's "Original Sanskrit Texts, Vol. v, p. 388.

² In Kaush. Br. ii, 9 and in Ait. Br. v. 29.

³ Br. Up. vi, 4-17.

⁴ ibid. ii, 4.

⁵ ibid. iii, 6, 1.

⁶ Rig. Sam. i, 179 and ix, 39-40.

⁷ Āśv. Śrauta. Sū. i, 11: *Vedam patnyai pradāya vāchayet*

⁸ Go. G. S. i, 3, 14-15; Kh. G. S. i, 5, 17.

women were known as *Kāśakritsnā Brahmanīs*.¹ Patanjali also distinguishes the word *upādhyāyī* from *upādhyāyānī*. *Upādhyāyī* is a lady teacher under whom one studies ; while an *upādhyāyānī* is the wife of an *upādhyāya* or a teacher ; this shows that there were lady teachers in these times.²

In the Epics, there are several references to educated women. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Rāmachandra, the hero of that epic, finds his mother in the act of offering oblations with the necessary *mantras*, when he goes to bid farewell to her preparatory to his journey to the forest.³ *Tārā*, the wife of *Vāli*, is referred to as a lady who had learnt *mantras* (*mantravid*).⁴ *Hanūmat*, when he is unable to find *Sītā* in the city of *Lamkā*, feels sure that he would be able to meet her at the time of sunset on the bank of the river ; for *Hanūmat* knows for certain that she was sure to come there to perform her *sandhyā* (evening prayers and oblations which accompany the repetition of *mantras*).⁵ In the same manner, the *Mahābhārata* supplies us with instances to show that women acquired learning in those days, like men. A lady named *Śivā* was learned in the *Vedaś* (*Vedaṣṭāgā*).⁶ In the *Udyogaparva*, queen *Vidulā* gives a long discourse to her son who ran away from the battlefield, on the *dharma* of a *Kshatriya*. Another lady, princess *Sulabhā* lectures on the principles and methods of *yoga*, *samādhi* and *mokṣa* to king *Janaka*.⁷ In the *Vanaparva* again, King *Viṣṇu* is found employing a woman named *Brihannaḍā* as a

¹ iv, 1, 140.

² *ibid.* iii, 322.

³ *Ayodhyā*. 20, 15.

⁴ iv, 16-12.

⁵ *Sundar*. 15, 48.

⁶ *Vanaparva*.

⁷ *Mahā. Sānti*. 321.

tutor in the fine arts—dancing, music and painting—to the ladies of the palace. ✓

Similarly in the poetic and dramatic literature, we find actual references to ladies who were able to read and write, and in some cases at least, were even learned. In the *Śākuntalam* of Kālidāsa, for instance, Śakuntalā is said to have written a love letter to her lover. In the same poet's *Raghuvamśā*, the wife of King Aja is described as his own dearest disciple in the literary and fine arts (*priyaśishyā lalite kalāvidhau*). In another poem of his called the *Meghadūta*, the heroine of the poem is described as composing poems when the pang of separation from her lover becomes unbearable to her. So again, in the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* of Rājaśekhara are mentioned some learned ladies,—viz. Śilabhaṭṭārikā, the poetess ; Vijayāṅkā, the Goddess of Learning (Saraswatī) incarnate ; Vikalanitambā, whose poetry was extremely sweet ; Vijjikā, who was also Saraswatī incarnate ; Prabhādevī, who was adept in all the arts ; and Avantisundarī the wife of the poet himself, who was a writer on the science of poetics.¹

The “Samskāraprakāśa” of Viramitrodaya says that in former times, there were two kinds (*dvivīdhā*) of women : (1) the *Brahmavādinīs* who continued acquiring knowledge of the *Vedas*, sacrificing, and begging alms in their own houses ; and (2) the *Sadyovadhūs* who married as soon they attained the marriageable age.² Then he proceeds to quote some now well-known verses, from Yama-Smṛiti and Hārīta-Smṛiti, in his support ; these verses also record that in olden times ladies used

¹ See Venkatesvara : “Indian Culture through the Ages”, Vol. i, (1928) p. 293.

² See ‘Viramitrodayah’ of Mm. Pt. Mitra Miśra, Ed. by P. N. Śarmā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series) Benares, (1919), —Section on ‘Stryūpanayana,’ pp. 402-5.

to go through the *samskāra* (ceremony) of initiation (*maunī-bandhanam*) and enter the order of Brahmacharya ; but, it is added, that these women had to pursue their studies under the guidance of the father, uncle or brother only, and of no other person.¹

But if we turn to the other Smritis, we find a different rule laid down for women in regard to the initiation sacrament. In the opinion of Manu, the marriage ceremony (*vaiivāhiko vidhih*) of a maiden is equivalent to the initiation ceremony of a boy ; and serving her husband (*patisevā*) and staying with him is equivalent to the boy's service of the *guru* and residence in his *āśrama*.² On the other hand, however, Manu and also Yājñavalkya expect every housewife to keep accounts of the family income and expenditure.³

According to the scheme detailed out by Vātsyāyana, women are to be taught the sixty four *kalās* or arts of life, of which he has given a list.⁴ The list includes such items as music, painting, knowledge of dramas and stories (*nātakākhyāyikādarśanam*), the composing of poems (*kāvyaśamasyāpūraṇam* and *kāvyaśrīyā*), a knowledge of the language current in the country (*deśabhāṣhāvijnānam*), and even the game of dice (*dyūtaviśeshah*) and other indoor physical games (*krīḍā*). Vātsyāyana discusses the question whether women should be taught the *Śāstras* or not, and concludes that they ought to be taught these, though the content of his scheme of education for

¹ *Purā kalpe tu nārīṇām maunībāndhanamishyate/adhyāpanam tu vedānām sāvitṛivachanam tathā//pitā pitṛivyo bhrāta vā naināmadhyāpayetparah/svagrīhe chaiva kanyāyā bhaikshacharyā vidhiyate//*The same quotations from Hārīta and Yama are also given by Mādhavāchārya on *Parāśarasamhitā* (Bom. Sansk. Ser. Vol. I, pt. ii, pp. 82-84).

² Man. ii, 67 ; cf. Yāj. i, 13.

³ Man. v, 150 ; Yāj. i, 83 ; cf. also Vis. xxv, 5-6.

⁴ Kām. i, iii, 1-15.

women is, as we have seen above, different from that of men.

Thus, both Manusmṛiti and Vātsyāyana seem to think that the women's sphere of action lies in the home and that their education, therefore, must be such as to help them in securing comforts for the husband and for the other members of the family. Thus, though in the Vedic period, women could secure the same education as men, later on it seems that the content of the education for the two sexes came to be differentiated. In view of this, a woman's services to the society seem to have been conceived as concerned with, in and through the home and the family. Due to this, it may be said that on the whole, the Indian woman has had much less chances of education on terms of the chances man was accorded.¹

The above review of the salient features of the Hindu educational system will prove sufficient to impress upon our minds how it functioned as a social organization calculated to create,—so far as males at least were concerned—strong personalities whose reason was sought to be kept ever awake, whose mental powers and capacities were well-developed, whose understanding of the meaning of life, in general and in detail, was founded on a broad basis unaffected by any political, family or secular interest, and whose intellectual impulse to learn was kept pure and alive, unsullied by any pecuniary motive.

There have been no definite rules prescribed as to the period for which a student is expected to continue his studies under the guidance of his teacher. Manu, for instance, lays down that the *vrata* of studentship may be observed for thirty-six years, or for half the time or for one-fourth of the time, or, in the alternative, till the

¹ Note:—See also Ch. VII on "The Position of Woman", *infra*.

student has perfectly learnt the Vedas.¹ On the eve of his departure for home after completing his studies, the teacher advised the student in these words, according to the Taittiriya Upanishad: "Speak the truth, follow *dharma*, never swerve from thy own studies. Having pleased the *āchārya* with a gift of his choice, you should now marry and should not break the family lineage. Never swerve from truth and *dharma*. Take good care of your health (*kuśala*). Do not miss any opportunity of success or fortune (*bhūti*) in life. Do your duties towards gods and ancestors. Regard your mother as your god, the father as the god, the teacher as the god, the guest as the god; and, as such, pay your dues to them. Perform only those actions which are regarded as unblameable by people and not others; and worship and follow only those actions of ours which are praiseworthy and not others."²

Thus, the fundamental lesson in *brahmacharyāśrama* was in answer to the quest: what is *dharma*? In this *āśrama*, the pupil is taught his *dharma*, primarily as a pupil so far as his studies (*adhyayana*) are concerned, but also with reference to the future man in him, who is to go out into the society as a *grihastha*. The reading, writing, arts, sciences, and other studies also have to be consistent with the *dharma* laid down for man. He is to keep under control *artha* and *kāma* completely in accord-

¹ Man. iii, 1; cf. also, Āśv. G. S. i, 22, 3; Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 13-15; Yāj: i, 36; Āpa. i, 2, 12-16.

² Taitt. Siksā Valli, 9: "*Vedamanūchya āchāryo'ntevāsinamanuṣṭi: satyam vada, dharmam chara, svādhyāyānmā pramadah/āchāryāya priyam dhanamārṇhitya prajātantum mā vyavachchhetsyih / satyānna pramaditavyam, dharmānna pramaditavyam, kuśalānna pramaditavyam, bhūtyai na pramaditavyam, svādhyāyapravachanābhyām na pramaditavyam, deva-pitrikāryābhyām na pramaditavyam/mātridevo bhava, pitridevo bhava, āchāryadevo bhava, atithidevo bhava/yānyanavadyāni karmāṇi tāni sevītavyāni, no itarāṇi/. yānyasmākam sucharītāni tāni tvayopāśyāni no itarāṇi/.*

ance with his *dharma* in the *brahmacharyāśrama*. In fact, in this *āśrama*, *dharma* is the only immediate aim for the pupil, and his whole behaviour and conduct (*āchāra*) is in terms of *dharma* only. The rules and definitions of such behaviour are known as *vratas*, which include study proper as *one* of them. We have described these throughout this chapter.

After the student has completed his course of studies, he leaves the place of the *āchārya* and journeys back home ; this is called *Samāvartana* (returning back).¹ He is now to take a bath (*snāna*) symbolizing his 'washing off' as it were, of the *brahmacharya vrata*, and is hereafter known as a *snātaka*.²

The *brahmachārī* has to fulfil all *vratas* of *brahmacharyāśrama* before he passes on to the next *āśrama*.³ In fact, some scriptures speak of three kinds of students, who have completed their career of *brahmacharyāśrama* : (1) the *vidyā-snātaka*, (2) the *vrata-snātaka* and (3) the *vidyā-vrata-snātaka*.⁴ The *vidyā-snātaka* is one who ends his student's career as soon as his studies are finished but before he has been able to fulfil the *vratas* laid down for the *brahmachārī*. The *vrata-snātaka* is one who has fulfilled all the *vratas* satisfactorily, but has not yet completed his studies. The *vidyā-vrata-snātaka*, on the other hand, is one who ends his student's career after completing the course of his studies as well as fulfilling his *vratas*.⁵

We may close this chapter with the following quotation from Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa which quite admirably sums up

¹ Śān. G. S. ii, 18, 1-4; etc.

² Śān. G. S. iii, 1; Pār. G. S. ii, 6, 1; Āpa. G. S. v, 12, 1; Man. iii, 4; Yāj. i, 51; etc.

³ Man. G. S. i, 1, 1: "Upanayanātprabhriti vratachārī syāt.

⁴ Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 32; cf. Man. iv, 31; Āp. i, 30, 1-3; Kullūka, on Man. iii, 2, quotes a similar passage describing the three kinds of *snātakas* as above, from Hārta.

⁵ Pār. G. S. ii, 5, 32-35.

the virtues and aims of education as conceived by the Hindus :

“Now, then, the praise of the study (of the scriptures). The study and teaching (of the Veda) are a source of pleasure to man ; he becomes ready-minded (*yukta-manāh*) and independent of others, and day by day he acquires prosperity. He sleeps peacefully ; he is the best physician for himself ; and (peculiar) to him are restraint of the senses, delight in the one thing or steadiness of mind (*ekārāmatā*), development of intelligence, fame and,” last but not least in importance, “the task of perfecting the people.”¹

¹ Śāt. Br. xi, 5, 7, 1 ; the above translation is a little modified from that of J. Eggeling, in S. B. E. vol. xlv, p. 99.

CHAPTER IV
MARRIAGE

CHAPTER IV

MARRIAGE

In spite of the fact that many authoritative works on India and Indian Life are seeing the light of the day, some people in the West still seem to be persisting in their ignorance about India, or in their method of gathering information about India from unauthoritative quarters. There is yet a lamentable ignorance prevailing in the West regarding the Hindus and their ways, and the realities of Hindu social psychology ; and this can be said to be the case even among some of the eminent Sociologists. For instance, Robert Briffault's essay on "Sex in Religion"¹ refers to India as a place "where the harvest festival is a signal for general license, and such general license is looked upon as a matter of absolute necessity. Men set aside all conventions and women all modesty and complete liberty is given to the girls."² The same essay gives us other novel pieces of information about India. "In many parts of India, 'the Brahmans play the part of thorough-bred stallions, upon whom it is incumbent to ennoble the race and cohabit with virgins of inferior caste. The venerable personage scours the town and country ; the people give him presents of money and stuff ; they wash his feet, drink the dirty water and preserve the rest. After a repast of dainty meals, he is conducted to the nuptial couch, where crowned with flowers, the virgin awaits him'. The first child is accordingly held particularly sacred, and is

¹ In "Sex in Civilization" edited by Calverton and Schmalhausen, New York.

² p. 34. Mr. Briffault does not name the authority upon which he relies for this curious piece of information, though he evidently gives this as a quotation from somebody.

spoken of as 'born by the grace of God.'"¹ Here is another piece of information from the same source: "In India the amount of rain is thought to be proportionate to the number of marriages that have taken place during the season."² In the same strain, Professor Paolo Mantegazza says this about the Hindus: "In some countries of India the creditor has the right to demand the debtor's wife, whom he enjoys until the whole debt has been paid. If the woman remains with him several years, and if the debt has been paid in the meantime, the children born in this period are divided between creditor and debtor...."³ He gives, again, a partially true information when he says that "The laws of Manu allow a son to be begotten *per procura*".⁴

It is really surprising that such opinions based on incorrect reports should find place in the works of eminent writers. "Unfortunately", says Professor B. Malinowski in his excellent article on "marriage" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, "we find too often in ethnographical accounts generalities and stock phrases such as that 'the wife is regarded as the personal property of the husband', as 'his slave or chattel', or else again we read that 'the status of the wife is high'. The only correct definition of status can be given by a full enumeration of all mutual duties, of the limits to personal liberty established by marriage, and of the safeguards against the husband's brutality or remissness, or, on the other hand, against

¹ *ibid.* p. 44.

² *ibid.* p. 45.

³ "Sexual Relations of Mankind" (Anthropological studies of Professor P. Mantegazza, of the University of Florence). Privately issued by the Anthropological Branch of Falstaff Press. Tr. by James Bruce. Pub.: Anthropological Press, New York. 1932.

⁴ *ibid.*

the wife's shrewishness and lack of sense of duty.'"¹ In the present part of this study, I shall try to present the Hindu view of marriage; and this, in conjunction with the discussion of the Hindu conception of the rights and duties of the husband and the wife in the family treated in the next chapter, will give us a clear idea of the real status of each of them with reference to the other. Besides, we shall be studying the issue with reference to the original sources.

The term marriage has been generally used to denote a social institution complete by itself.² But Sumner has drawn our attention to the fact that the word does not truly denote a perfect social institution. "Although we speak of marriage as an institution, it is only an imperfect one. It has no structure. The family is the institution, and it was antecedent to marriage. Marriage has always been an elastic and variable usage, as it now is. ...In fact the use of language reflects the vagueness of marriage, for we use the word 'marriage' for wedding, nuptials or matrimony (wedlock). Only the last can be an institution."³ As a social institution, marriage is a part of, and should be included in, the family; and even though in a theoretic treatment it precedes considerations about the family, it is actually intended as a preparation for, and, therefore, the supplement of the study of the more inclusive institution called the family. Similar considerations generally apply to the discussion of the Hindu *vivāha*. For, the *Vivāha* is in essence a formality, of course very important, through which an individual has to go, to be able to start his or her life in the *Grihasthāśrama* i. e., the family life. The meaning of *vivāha* refers mainly to the ceremony of

¹ Ency. Brit. vol. 14. (14th. Ed. 1929) p. 945.

² Westermarck: "History of Human Marriage" vol. i, p. 26.

³ Sumner: "Folkways", pp. 348-9.

carrying away the bride to the house of the bridegroom. But generally the term has come to be applied to the whole of the wedlock ceremony.

As a social institution, marriage has been defined by Westermarck "as a relation of one or more men to one or more women which is recognized by custom or law, and involves certain rights and duties both in the case of the parties entering the union and in the case of the children born of it."¹ Such a definition of marriage once more indicates that certain aspects of the family itself are included in its connotation. Indeed, it would be impossible to study the problem of marriage without at the same time involving ourselves into the discussion of some important and fundamental questions relating to the institution of the family. When Westermarck, for instance, points out that "marriage is something more than a regulated sexual behaviour", and that "it is an economic institution, which may in various ways affect the proprietary rights of the parties",² he refers more to the issues connected with the structure and function of the family than to marriage itself. Any discussion of the institution of marriage, therefore, must necessarily include also some of the vital problems connected with the institution of the family. And let us state at the outset that all these considerations are equally true of the Hindu social institution of *vivāha*.

Among the Hindus, *vivāha* is generally considered as obligatory for every person ; because, in the first place, the birth of a son is said to enable one to obtain *mokṣa*. "To be mothers were women created, and to be fathers men ; therefore, the Vedas ordain that *dharma* must be

¹ Westermarck : Op. Cit. p. 26.

² *ibid.* p. 26.

practised by man together with his wife.'¹ *Vivāha* is one of the *śarīrasamskāras* (sacraments sanctifying the body) through which every man and woman must pass at the proper age and time (see Ch. on Family); Manu conceives it as a social institution for the regulation of proper relations between the sexes.² Again, it is believed that one's progeny is considerably connected with and instrumental to happiness both in this world as well as hereafter.³ "He only is a perfect man who consists of his wife, himself and his offspring."⁴ There is a story in the Mahābhārata, for whatever it is worth, of a lady who remained single because she could not find her equal to marry; she devoted her life to the practice of hard penance till old age with a view to obtaining *mokṣa*. But the sage Nārada rebuked her for remaining unmarried; he told her that it was impossible for her to gain the ultimate bliss unless she had sanctified (*asamskritā*) herself by marriage rites.⁵ Moreover, the birth of a son is conceived to be specially contributory towards helping the father to execute his obligations due to the departed ancestors (*pitrirīṇa*),⁶—one of the three *ṛiṇas* which every Hindu

¹ Man. ix, 96: *Prajanārtham striyah srisṭhāh santānārtham cha mānavāh/tasmāt sādharmaṇo dharmah śrutau patnyā sahoditah/*.

² Man. ix, 25: *Eshoditā lokayātrā nityam stripumsayoh śubhā/*.

³ *ibid.*; also Āśv. G. S. i, 6, 1 ff; Baudh. ii, 9, 16, 10; Āp. ii, 9, 24; 3.

⁴ Man. ix, 45; also cf. Āp. ii, 14, 16; and Brih. Smri. xxiv, 11. (Man. ix, 45: *etāvāneva purusho yajjāyātmā prajeti ha/viprāh prāhustathā chaitadyo bhartā sā smritānganā/* The Commentator Kullūka quotes from Vājas. Br.: "That man who does not win a wife is really half (*ardho*); and he is not the full man (*asarvo hi tāvadbhavati*) as long as he does not beget an offspring (*prajāyate*, etc.).

⁵ Mahā. Śālya. 52.

⁶ Man. ix, 106; Baudh. ii, 6, 11, 3; Vas. xi, 48, etc. See also Ch. II.

is bound to execute. The Hindu Sāstrakāras are especially particular about the *vivāha* of a woman, though it is enjoined that every male should also marry. For, a "wife is the very source (*mūlam*) of the *purushārthas*, not only of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, but even of *mokṣa*. Those that have wives can fulfil their due obligations in this world (*kriyāvantah*); those that have wives, lead a (truly) family life; those that have wives can be happy; and those that have wives can lead a full life (*śriyānvitā*)"¹ Most particular care, however, has to be taken to perform the *vivāha* of maidens who have attained the marriageable age. A girl who continues to stay in her father's home more than three years after attaining puberty, is called a *vrishalā* or a *śūdrā*; and the father or other guardian of such a girl who is not careful enough to give her in marriage in proper time is said to be incurring a great sin.² If her elders do not arrange her marriage within the proper time, it is permissible for such a young lady to take the whole responsibility upon herself of choosing her life-mate and enter into wedlock with him; she has to wait for three years only after puberty, but no more.³ Vātsyāyana, too, advises a young maiden who has attained youth (*prāpta-yauvanā*) to select a husband for herself and get married without waiting for the assistance and permission of her elders.⁴

This brings us to the various forms of the Hindu marriage. The term "form of marriage" is generally applied to the numeric variation in marriage, as Mali-

¹ Mahā. Ādi. 74, 40-41.

² Man. ix, 93; 90; Yāj. i, 64; Vis. xxiv, 41; Vas. xvii, 67-70; Baudh. iv, 1-11-14; Nār. 25-26; Gaut. xviii, 23; Parā. vii, 6. Brihas. Smr. xxiv, 3, speaks of punishing such relatives.

³ *ibid.* (all).; and Mahā. Anu. 44, 16-17.

⁴ Kāma. iii, iv, 36.

nowski puts it. Accordingly, the forms of marriage usually listed are monogamy, polygamy, polyandry and group-marriage.¹ But in dealing with the Hindu *vivāha*, we shall use the term "form of marriage" conveniently to denote the method of consecrating a marriage-union. The forms that are enumerated are :²

(1) *The Brāhma* form, consisting of the gift (*dānam*) of a daughter by the father, after decking her with ornaments, to a man, learned in the Vedas, and of a good character (*śrutisīlavate*) whom the bride's father himself invites.

(2) *The Daiva* form involving the gift of the daughter as above, to a priest who duly officiates at a sacrifice, during the course of its performance.

(3) *The Ārsha* form wherein the father gives his daughter in marriage to the bridegroom, after receiving a cow and a bull, or two pairs of these from the bridegroom, in accordance with the requirements of *dharma* (*dharmatah*) and not in any sense with the intention of selling the child (*na tu śulka buddhyā*,—says Kullūka).

(4) *The Prājāpatya* form in which the father makes a gift of the daughter, by addressing the couple with the text "may both of you perform together your *dharma*" (*sahobhau charatām dharma*), and has shown due honour to the bridegroom.

(5) *The Āsura* form : In the four forms mentioned above, the important point to be noted is that it is the father (or a person in his place) who makes a gift (*dāna*, or *pradāna*) of the bride to the bridegroom. But in the *Āsura* form, the bridegroom has to give money to the father or kinsmen of the bride, and thus, in a sense, buys up the bride.

(6) *The Gāndharva* form wherein the mutual love and

¹ Ency. Brit. art. "Marriage", vol. 14 (14th Ed. 1929) p. 949.

² Man. iii, 27-37; Yāj. i, 58.

consent of the bride and the bride-groom is the only condition required to bring about the union (*ichchhayānyonyasamyogah*). Neither the father nor the kinsmen need have a hand in bringing about the marriage.

(7) *The Rākshasa* form is described as "the forcible abduction of a maiden from her home, while she cries and weeps, after her kinsmen have been slain or wounded and their houses broken." It is the capture of the bride by force.

(8) *The Paisācha* form is one in which a man seduces, by stealth, a girl who is sleeping, intoxicated, or disordered in intellect.

In all the Smritis, the descriptions of the forms of marriage are much the same as described above.¹ Manusmṛiti further declares that of these forms, the (1) Brāhma, (2) Daiva, (3) Ārsha (4) Prājāpatya, (6) Gāndharva and (7) Rākshasa, are lawful, while the two forms (5) Āsura and (8) Paisācha are unlawful and should never be practised (*na kartavyau kadāchana*).²

The most approved form of marriage is of course the gift of the maiden, by the father or other guardian, to the bridegroom. The father, the grandfather, the brothers, the kinsmen, and the mother, in the order in which they are placed here, have the right to give young maiden in marriage, provided the giver be in good physical and mental conditions (*prakṛitiśthah*) i. e. not insane etc.³

The first qualification needed in a young man for

¹ See Yāj. i, 58-61; Vis. xxiv, 18-28; Gaut. iv, 6-15; Vas. 17-35; Baudh. i, 20, 1-21; Āp. ii, 11, 17-21. The Āśv. G. S. gives these eight forms in this order: Brāhma, Daiva, Prājāpatya, Ārsha, Gāndharva, Āsura, Paisācha and Rākshasa. Each of the first four brings purification (*punāti*) to twelve, ten, eight, and seven ancestors respectively, on both the sides; no such merit is described to be due to the remaining four.— Āśv. G. S. i, 6, 1-8.

² Man. iii, 24-251; also cf. Mahā. Anu. 44, 9.

³ Yāj. i, 63-64.

marriage is the fulfilment of his obligations of the student's life. He must have studied, in due order, the three Vedas, or two of them, or at least one, without violating any of the rules of the order of studentship (*aviplutabrahmacharya*), the first of the four orders (*āśramas*) of life.¹ The *Kāmasūtras* also follow the *Smritis* on this point ; a person who has completed his course of studies should enter then the householder's order (*gārhaṣṭhya*), and lead the life of a citizen.² In *Vatsyāyana's* opinion, only such an educated youth (*śrutawān*) had a right to marry.³

The bride to be selected must not have been already given to any one before, and she must be a virgin.⁴ Love directed to a girl who is already accepted by another (*paraṇaḥkriyā*) will evoke public censure (*pratiśhiddhaḥ*).⁵

Sumner characterises this demand for virginity in the maiden to be married as an "appeal to masculine vanity", and as "a singular extension of the monopoly principle".⁶ "In the development of the father family", he proceeds, "fathers restricted daughters in order to make them more valuable as wives. Here comes the notion of virginity and pre-nuptial chastity. This is really a negative and exclusive notion. . . . His wife is to be his from the cradle, when he did not know her. Here then, is a new basis for the sex-honour of women and the jealousy of men. Chastity for the un-married meant—no one ; for the

¹ Man. iii, 2 ; Yājñ. i, 52 ; Medhātithi expands the meaning of Man. iii, 2, by saying that one who was well educated can have the right to be a householder : And Āśv. G. S. i, 5, 2 ; says : "*buddhimatē kanyām prayachchhet*."

² Kām. i, 4, 1 : *grihītaśāstrīyaḥ . . . gārhaṣṭhyamadhigamya nāgarakavrittān varteta* /.

³ Kām. iii, 1, 2 : *Śrutawān śīlayet* /.

⁴ Kām. iii, 1, 1 : —*ananyapūrvā* ; Yājñ. i, 52 : —(*ananyapūrvikā*) Gaut. iv, 1 ; Vis. xxiv, 9 ; Vas. iii, 1.

⁵ Kām. i, 5, 2.

⁶ Sumner : "Folkways", p. 358.

married—none but the husband.”¹ The Hindu *Śāstra-kāra*’s emphasis on pre-nuptial chastity, however, does not seem to have worked on the basis of one-sidedness, and in favour of the male only. The Hindus demanded pre-nuptial chastity on the part of the male as well, in the form of *brahmacharya vrata*, as we have seen above. Evidently they were not one-sided in their valuation of chastity, but placed equal value on the pre-nuptial chastity of the boy as they did on the virginity of the maiden.

There are certain rules of endogamy and exogamy laid down in the Dharmaśāstras, for regulating the Hindu marriage with a view to control the choice of mates. According to these, the endogamic rule states that marriage must not take place between persons of the same *varṇa*.² If a person directs his love towards an unmarried girl of his own *varṇa* in accordance with the injunctions of the *śāstra*, his action deserves the approval of public morality (*laukikah*), fame, (*yaśasyah*) and good progeny (*putrīyah*). Any other way of love is against morality (*pratishiddhah*).³ We may note, here, that in practice the law of endogamy has come to play a very important part with reference to the later *jātis* within each of the *varṇas*; according to this, the endogamic circle is restricted within the orbit of each of the *jātis*. This means that members of the same *varṇa* who at the same time did not belong to the same *jāti*, could not marry each other as before.

The exogamic rules relating to Hindu marriage form a very complicated subject. The three terms *gotra*, *pravara* and *sapinda*, used in connection with the law of exogamy, have undergone so many changes, additions and modifications in their meaning and implications

¹ Sumner: “Folkways”, p. 359.

² Man. iii, 4; Yāj. i, 52; Kāma. iii, 1, 1; etc.

³ Kāma. i, 5, 1-2; etc.

through the ages since their origin, that it becomes well-nigh impossible to find out their original implications. We need not go into the problems of the origin and history of the institutions called *gotra* and *pravara*; for our purposes we shall content ourselves with a general discussion of these terms so as to bring out their social import and relation to marriageability among the Hindus.

So far as the paternal side is concerned the problem is dealt with in terms of *gotra*; and, with reference to the maternal side it is ordained that a person shall not marry a woman who is a *sapiṇḍā* on his mother's side,¹ upto the sixth degree in ascending or descending line; this means that *sapiṇḍa* relationship ceases to exist with the seventh degree in ascending or descending line between two individuals with reference to their maternal relatives.²

Next, we take up the *gotra*: It has been pointed out that *gotra* probably meant 'herd';³ and, later on it came to denote the 'family' or the 'clan'.⁴ The *gotra* of a family is said to be named after the *rishi*-ancestor who founded the family in the immemorial past. It is said that originally there were few *gotras* in existence. But, later on, as the population went on multiplying, more and more persons attained fame as *rishis* on account of their achievements; and, subsequently, *gotras* came to be formed after the names of these new *rishis*.⁵ Whatever may have been the

¹ Go. G. S. iii, 4, 4-5; Hir. G. S. i, 17, 2; etc. and Man. iii, 5; Yāj. i, 53; Bau. ii, 37-38; Vis. xxiv, 9-10; Mahā. Anu. 44, 18; etc.

² Man. v, 60; Bau. i, 11, 2; Vis. xxii, 5; Vas. iv, 17-18.

³ From 'go'—cow, *gotra* may have come to mean 'a collection of cows'. See Vedic Index, i, p. 235.

⁴ Ved. Index, i, 235.

⁵ Mahā. Sānti. 297, 17-18, says e. g.: *mūlagotrāṇi chatvāri samutpannāni bhārata/...karmato'nyāni gotrāṇi samutpannāni pārthiva/nāmadheyāni tapasā tāni cha grahaṇam satām//*

The grammarian Pāṇini has explained *gotra* as 'the descendants from grandson onwards'—iv, 1, 162.

origin of *gotra*, the exogamic rule relating to the Hindu marriage according to the *Grihya-sūtras* and the *Dharma-śāstras* is that no man shall marry a maiden from within his own *gotra*.¹

Closely connected with the *gotra* is the other term *pravara*. *Pravara* literally means 'invocation' or 'summons'.² It can be traced back to the cult of the fire-worship amongst the Indo-Aryans. The *Purohita* (priest), officiating at a sacrifice to *Agni*, used to recite the names of his famous *rishi* ancestors when invoking *Agni* to carry libations to the Gods; therefore, the *pravara* came to denote the series of such ancestors of the person who had in former times invoked *Agni*.³ Now, evidently the list of ancestors has had its social bearings: for, by and by, *pravara* came to be associated with the various *samskāras* of domestic and social nature, the most important being the *vivāha*;⁴ and it is laid down by some of the authorities that a man shall not marry a woman who can be traced from any of the ancestors as mentioned in his *pravara*.⁵

¹ See foot-note 1., supra., p. 155.

² Ved. Ind. ii, p. 39.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ For some historical details relating to the terms *gotra*, *pravara*, see K. Rangachari: Art. on 'Gotra and Pravara' in Proc. and Trans. of the Third Ori. Con., Madras (1924), pp. 635 ff.; C. V. Vaidya: Art. on 'Gotra and Pravara', in Proc. and Tran. of Ori. Con., Poona (1919); P. V. Kane: Art. on "Gotra and Pravara in Vedic Literature", J. B. B. R. A. S., News Series, Vol. xi, 1-2, Aug. 1935, p. 1 ff. None of these, however, have been able to arrive at any satisfactory solution of the problem.

⁵ E. G. Mān. G. S. i, 7, 8; Gaut. iv, 2; Vas. viii, 1; Yāj. i, 53. How and why *pravara* came to be associated with these exogamic rules is almost impossible to ascertain. For apparently there is no connection between *Gotra* which denotes the ancestry of a person, and *pravara* which denotes the ancestry of some *purohita* of one of his ancestors. It might be that in those ancient times when the Hindu sacri-

On the whole, therefore, these exogamic taboos are designed for the restriction of free marital relationship. Their psychological origin lies in the horror of incest and the consequent incest-taboo which aims at preventing sex-relations between parents and offsprings, and between brothers and sisters.¹ In course of time, however, strict adherence to the requirements of these exogamic laws must have been found so difficult, for one reason or another, that some of the Dharmaśāstras have sought to modify these rules by making them more limited in their operation. Thus, according to these, persons related with each other beyond five degrees on the mother's side and beyond seven degrees on the father's side are allowed to marry.²

ficer (*Yajamāna*) acted himself as the priest (*purohita*) reciting the various *mantras* for himself, he used to invoke *Agni* by the name of his *gotra-rishi* as well as by some other ancestors who had attained fame as *rishis*; in such a case, the *gotra* and *pravaras* are obviously related to each other as being all paternal ancestors of the sacrificer. However, later on when priesthood came to be established and certain experts used to officiate at the sacrifice for the *Yajamāna*, it is probable that the officiating priest invoked *Agni* in the name of *his* own ancestors, and so these came to be the *pravara-rishis*. The connection between *gotra* and *pravara*, once established in the more ancient past when the sacrificer himself used to be the priest, was however thoughtlessly supposed to be still holding true, and was allowed to continue.

¹ The Dharmaśāstras have declared that sex relations with mother, or with sisters by the same mother or by the same father, or with the daughter, or with the wife of a son, is a heinous sin (*mahāpātaka*)—See Man. xi, 59; Yāj. iii, 231; Vis. xxxvi, 4-7; Gaut. xxi, 1; Bau. ii, 2, 13; etc. The Vishnu Smṛiti declares that for a person who has committed such a heinous crime, there is no other way of expiation but burn himself by throwing himself into the fire.—Vis. xxxiv, 1 f.

² Vis. xxiv, 10; Vas. viii, 2; Gaut. iv, 3-5.

In view of the inavailability of sufficient data, scientifically collected and adjudged, it is extremely difficult to give any opinion on the scientific worth of the rules and practice of endogamy and exogamy as prescribed in the Hindu scriptures, in the light of modern biology and social psychology. In fact, in our own times, there is a tendency on the part of educated people not only to neglect all inquiry regarding this problem, but also to go along the path that is being trodden by the peoples of Europe. May we, however, remind ourselves that some of the best scientific workers of Europe and America have been giving out material and opinions on the question of human marriage, such as should make us feel if the Hindu rules of in-marrying and out-marrying may not have a sufficiently scientific basis and value. Eugenists have been warning the world so much against in-marrying which they have found out to be the cause of racial degeneration—physical, mental and moral; so also have these pioneer workers been telling their own people in no small voice, against unreasoned, eccentric and emotional choosing and mating, called 'falling in love' in popular parlance. If their findings can be said to be going in the right direction, may it not be a fruitful course of research that some of our scholars should measure and look deeply into the rules, methods and outlook of Hindu exogamy and endogamy, and thus test their validity in the light of modern science?

† There are other rules regarding qualifications for fitness to marry, laid down by the Dharmaśāstras. Thus, Manu gives a list of types of families, girls from which should not be accepted for wedlock, even though the families may be "ever so great, or rich in kine, horses, sheep, grain, or other property". These families are :

- (1) One which neglects the *dharma*s, i. e. their duties and obligations according to the *śāstras*.
- (2) One in which the Veda is not studied.

(3) One in which no male children are born.

(4) One, the members of which (a) have thick hair on their body ; or (b) are subject to any of the following : hemorrhoids, pthisis, weakness of digestion, epilepsy, and white or black leprosy.¹

The third and fourth types of families have to be avoided due, it is evident, to biological considerations. They suggest that the *smṛitikāras* were impressed by the influence of heredity on man. A maiden from a family in which there is a hereditary disease prevalent of the type mentioned above is quite likely to be a victim of that disease herself ; again she is likely also to transfer it to her progeny.

Similar considerations of the influence of heredity seem to prevail with the *smṛitikāras* when they prescribe certain other qualifications for the bride. Thus, a man must not marry a girl with reddish hair, or one who has a redundant or extra bodily limb, or who is sickly, or has no hair or too much hair on the body ; nor should he marry one who is garrulous or has red eyes.² He must not marry a maiden who has no brother, or whose father is not known ; for, in the former case, there is the likelihood of her being made an 'appointed daughter' ;³ and in the latter case, there is a likelihood of the young man's committing the sin of marrying either a *sagotrā* or a girl born of illicit union.⁴ In short, says Manu, a man should marry a maiden free from any bodily defects, with agree-

¹ Man. iii, 6-7 ; cf. also Yāj. i, 54 ; and Vis. xxiv, 11.

² Man. iii, 8 ; cf. Vis. xxiv, 12-16 ; cf. also Viṣṇu Purā. iii, 10.—One must "not marry a girl who is vicious, unhealthy, of low origin, ill brought-up, talks improperly, inherits some disease from mother or father, is of masculine appearance,...has hairy legs, or thick ankles.....or red eyes..." etc.

³ i. e. her son may be adopted by her father, in order to continue his family line ; and so, she may remain son-less.

⁴ Man. iii, 11 ; cf. Yāj. i, 53.

able name, with the gait of a *hamsā* or elephant, with a moderate quantity of hair on the body and head, with small teeth and delicate limbs.¹ Vasishṭha sums up the situation by saying that the maiden must come of a good family and faultless lineage.²

These qualifications apply on the bride-groom's side also, by analogy (*atideśa*).³ He too must possess these qualifications; moreover, he must be one whose powers of virility are carefully ascertained.⁴ And Nārada declares that the bride-groom is fit to be married "if his collar-bone, his knee, and bones are strongly made, if his shoulders and his hair are also strongly made, if the nape of his neck is stout and his thigh and skin strong, and if his gait and voice is full of vigour;"⁵ the man has also to undergo an examination with regard to his virility.⁶

Vātsyāyana takes a similar point of view into consideration with regard to most of the qualifications which he thinks are necessary in the bride-to-be. Thus he advises: "Let him give up a girl who, when the wooers come to woo (*varāṇe*), is found asleep, or in tears, or not at home. Let him also shun these sixteen types: (1) a girl with an unlucky name (*aprasāstanāmadheyām*), (2) One who has been kept in concealment (*guptām*), (3) One who is betrothed to another man, (4) One with red hair, (5) One with spots on the face, (6) A masculine woman (*rishabhām*), (7) One with a big head, (8) A bandy-legged woman (*vikaṭām*), (9) One with a rather too broad forehead, (*vimuṇḍām*), (10) One ceremonially impure

¹ Man. iii, 10; says Aśv. G. S. 'Buddhirūpaśilalakṣaṇasampannāmarogāmupayachchéta.'

² Vas. i, 38.

³ Yāj. i, 54; *etairéva guṇairyuktah*.

⁴ Yāj. i, 35: *yatnāt parikshitah pūmstvē*.

⁵ Nār. xii, 9.

⁶ Nār. xii, 8.

(*śuchidūshitām*), (11) One born of improper marriage (*sāmkarikīm*), (12) One who has menstruated¹ (*rākām*), (13) One who is or has been pregnant, (14) An old friend, (15) One who has a younger sister much handsomer than herself, and (16) One that hath a moist hand². The girl, further, must have both of her parents alive ; she should be younger than the man by three years at least ; she must belong to a family (*kule*) of good character (*ślāghyāchāre*), wealthy and large (*dhanavati pakshavati*) with many relatives who are attached to each other with affection (*sambandhipriye sambandhirākule*).³ She must have numerous relatives both on the father's side as well as on the mother's side.⁴ She must possess beauty as well as good conduct ; and she must be one with auspicious marks on her body (*rūpaśīḡlakshṇasampannā*). She must have neither more nor less than the proper number of any of her physical limbs like teeth, nails, ears, hair, eyes and breasts ; and must have a healthy constitution free from any disease.⁵ Manu does not speak much about the bridegroom's qualifications on the biological side as Yājñavalkya and Nārada have done.⁶ Vātsyāyana, on the other hand, specifically says that the bridegroom also must possess similar qualities described above for the bride ; and, in addition, he must have completed his course of studies.⁷

Vātsyāyana shows a truly psychological insight into the problem, again, when he points out that marriages

¹ This probably means one who is just passing through the period of three days' menstruation, for Vātsyāyana is more liberal than others in his views on marriage.

² Kām. iii, 1, 11-12 ; Peterson's Tr. J. B. B. R. A. S. xviii, p. 117. cf. Ratisāstra. viii.

³ Kām. iii, 1, 2.

⁴ *ibid.* (*prabhūtamātāpitripaksham*).

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Yāj. i, 55 ; Nār. xii, 16, 18 (See *supra*).

⁷ Kām. iii, 1, 2 : '*tathāvidha ēva śrutavān śīlayēt*'.

between persons of unequal social status are not likely to be happy unions. "Social games such as filling up '*bouts rimés*,' marriages, and social intercourse (*samgatāni*) generally, should be with a man's equals, not with those either above or below him. A man marries above him (*uchchasambandhah*) when he marries a girl only to be treated by her and her friends as a servant ever afterwards; no man of spirit will do that. He marries below him (*hīnasambandhah*) when he and his people lord it over the girl; that is a bad marriage; it too is censured by the good."¹ Inequality of social status between the two parties to a marriage union is thus likely in all probability to be a cause of disparity between the relations of the two with each other. True love-union can arise only between social equals. "Where the love between husband and wife adds lustre to both, and where it is a source of joy to families of both,—that is the only type of marriage which is worthy."² In any case one should at least take precaution not to marry with a bride from a status lower than his own. "Let a man marry above him, and walk humbly ever afterwards; but on no account let him do, what all good men disapprove of, viz., marry beneath him."³

Even though Vātsyāyana goes into such critical details about the principles that should guide the selection of the bride as well as the bridegroom, he seems to be conscious of the fact that it would be ordinarily rather difficult for every person to make a scrutinizing search into so many details while making the selection of a bride or of a bridegroom. He therefore gives one simple test, as if to make up for all the deficiencies of incomplete information, viz. "He will be a happy husband who marries

¹ Kām. iii, 1, 22-24. The Tr. is Peterson's in J. B. B. R. A. S. xviii, (1890-94) p. 117.

² *ibid.* iii, 1, 25.

³ *ibid.* iii, 1, 26.

the woman on whom his heart and eyes are set.”¹ He quotes Ghoṭakamukha on the point as saying that a man should direct his love or attention (*pravrittih*) towards that girl by marrying whom, he feels, he would be blessed and would not incur the censure of his equals.² Or perhaps,—which seems to be the more correct interpretation of his view,—*Vātsyāyana* wants that in addition to the several other qualities in the parties to a marriage, mutual attraction between the two should also be looked upon as an essential condition to bring about the marriage.

Let us now consider the rites and ceremonies (*vidhi*) to be performed at the *vivāha*. In describing the ceremonies and rituals connected with the *vivāha*, all the texts concerned refer to the bride as being given away (*dāna*) by the father or her guardian in the family, who invites the bridegroom.³ The bridegroom goes to the bride’s home⁴ where the *vivāha* is to take place. The description of these rites, therefore, may be said to refer to the *Brāhma* form of *vivāha*; and these have come down to us even to this day from ancient times. In this connection, the *Āśvalāyana-Grihya-Sūtra*⁵ tells us that there are,

¹ *ibid.* iii, 1, 14: ‘*Yasyām manaśchakshushor-nibandhanam tasyām riddhir neturāmādrīyeta/’ityeke.*

Peterson: *Op. cit.*, thinks that *Vātsyāyana* is quoting here from *Āp. G. S.* i, 3, 20.

² *Kām.* iii, 1, 3: ‘*Yām grihītvā kritinam ātmānam manyeta na cha samānairnīdyeta tasyām pravrittir iti ghoṭakamukhaḥ’.*

³ All these ceremonies are described, e. g., in *Āśv. G. S.* i, 7, 1 seq.; *Pār. G. S.* i, 5, 1, seq; *Āpa. G. S.* ii, 4, 10 seq; *Gobh. G. S.* ii, 1, 13, seq; *Khā. G. S.* i, 3, 5, seq; etc.

⁴ *Sān. G. S.* i, 12.

⁵ The different *Grihya-Sūtras* belong to the different *śākhās* of the Vedas and are followed by the different groups of Hindus according to the *śākhā* to which each of these groups belong. Thus, e. g., those who belong to the *Rigveda*,—and these predominate,—follow the authority (*pramāṇa*) of the

indeed, variations in the observation of wedding rites with peoples of different regions and villages (*janapādā-dharmā grāmadharmāścha*). However, it proceeds to tell us what is commonly accepted by all.¹ Of these rites, the *kanyā-dāna*, the *vivāha-homa*, the *pāṇi-grahaṇa*, the *agni-pariṇayana*, the *aśmārohaṇa*, the *lājā-homa*, and the *saptapadī*, each succeeding in the order given here, are important and evince several implications of a social nature. We now propose to give the salient features of each of these below, in order that these social implications may be properly understood :

The first of these is the *kanyā-dāna* ceremony performed by the father (or other guardian in his place) ; he pours out a libation of water,² symbolizing the giving up of the daughter (*dāna*) to the bridegroom ;³ the groom accepts (*pratigrinhāti*) the gift ; he then recites the *kāma-sūkta* (Hymn to Love) verse which runs thus :

Who offered this maiden?

To whom is she offered?

Kāma gave her (to me),

That I may love her.

Āśvalāyana-Grihya-Sūtra for all their *samskāras* including the *vivāha* ; those belonging to the Āpastamba *śākhā* of the Yajurveda follow the Hiranyakeśi-Grihya-Sūtra ; those belonging to the Sāmaveda would follow the Gobhila-Grihya-Sūtra ; and so on. In general, however, the main *samskāras* and the modes of their operation are, in principle, the same in all the Grihya-Sūtras.

¹ Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 2: *Yattu samānam tadvakshyāmah.*

² Āśv. G. S. i, 6, 1, etc.

³ In modern times, all these scriptural rites (*vaidika vidhi*) of the *vivāha* from *kanyā-dāna* onwards are preceeded by some other rites which are more or less of a customary (*laukika*) nature. Thus in Mahārāshṭra, for instance, all the rites from *kanyādāna* onwards start after the bride and groom garland each other in the presence of a large gathering invited to witness, or rather to declare in their presence, that *vivāha* is to take place between the bride and the groom.

Yea, Love is the giver,
 And Love the acceptor,
 Love that pervades the waters.
 With love, then,
 I receive,
 Nay, even accept her.
 May she remain thine,
 Thine own, O God of Love !¹

Thereafter the father of the bride exhorts the bridegroom not to fail the girl in his pursuit of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*;² and the groom replies, three times, that he shall never fail her in these.³ Next comes the *vivāha-homa* rite : This requires that, having placed a mill-stone to the West of the fire (which is kindled symbolically as a divine witness and sanctifier of the *samskāra*), and having deposited a water-pot to the north-east of the fire, the bridegroom has to offer oblations, the bride participating in the offering by holding the hand that makes the offering.⁴ This is followed by the *pāṇi-grahaṇa* rite : here the bridegroom stands facing the west, while the bride sits in front of him with her face to the east ; he now seizes her hand while repeating the following Vedic *mantra* :⁵

¹ "Om! ka idam kasmā adāt, kāmah kāmāyādāt, kāmo dātā, kāmah pratigrahītā, kāmam samudramāviśa, kāmēna tvā pratigrihṇāmi, kāmāitatte/" etc. The *mantra* is in Taitt. Br. II, ii. 5, 5-6.

² 'dharma cha arthe cha kāme cha nāticharitavyā tvayeyam'.

³ '.....Nāticharāmi, nāticharāmi, nāticharāmi'.

⁴ Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 3; etc.

⁵ This seizing of the hand is to be done in one of the three ways, according to some Grihya-Sūtras: The groom holds the bride's whole hand from the hairside (*romānte*) including the thumb if he desires both male and female offsprings; on the other hand, if he desires only male offspring, he seizes the thumb only; while, if he desires female offsprings, he holds her fingers, leaving the thumb free.—See Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 3-5, and Āpa. G. S. ii, 4, 12, 15.

I take thy hand in mine,
 Yearning for happiness ;
 I ask thee
 To live with me
 As thy husband,
 Till both of us,
 With age, grow old.
 Know this,
 As I declare,
 That the Gods
 Bhaga, Aryamā,
 Savitā and Purandhī
 Have bestowed thy person
 Upon me,
 That I may fulfil
 My *dharma*s of the householder
 With thee.¹

After the *mantra* is recited,* the rite of *agni-pariṇayana* follows ; here three times the bridegroom leads the bride (*trih pariṇayan*) round the nuptial fire and the waterpot, keeping their right sides towards both of them (*pradakṣiṇam*), and he reciting the *mantra* thus :

This I am,
 That art thou ;
 That indeed, art thou,
 This, yea this I am.
 I, the heaven,
 Thou, the earth ;
 I the Sāman,
 Thou then the *Rik*.
 Then, come, come,

¹ Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 3 ; etc. The *mantra* is in Rig. x, 85, 36 :—
 “*gribhṇāmi te saubhagatvāya hastam mayā pātyā jarada-*
shṭīryathāsa / bhago aryamā savitā purandhirmahyam
tvādurgārhapatyāya devāh // cf. also Ath. Ved. xiv, 1, 50.

Let us marry,
 Let us marry here.¹
 Let us join together,
 And beget our little ones.²
 Loving each other,³
 Bright,⁴
 With genial minds and hearts,⁵—
 Thus, yea thus,
 May we live
 Through a hundred autumns.⁶

At the end of each round there is another supplementary rite which is performed by the bride; this is called the *aśmārohaṇa* (mounting the stone). Here, with the helping hand of the groom, she treads on the stone as he repeats the following words :

Mount up this stone ;
 Like a stone
 Be firm.⁷
 Overcome the enemies,
 Tread over the foes,—
 (—the many difficulties through *samsāra* !—),
 Down,
 Even as you tread over
 This stone.⁸

This is followed by the *lājā-homa* rite in which the bride offers the sacrifice (*homa*) of fried grain, which is poured in her hands by her brother or a person acting in her brother's place (*brhrātristhāno vā*), to the Gods Aryaman,

¹ 'tāveva vivahāvahai'.

² 'prajāṃ prajanayāvahai'.

³ 'sāmpriyau'.

⁴ 'rochishnū'.

⁵ 'sumanasyamānau'.

⁶ Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 6; Śān. G. S. i, 13, 4 ff; etc.

⁷ 'aśmaiva tvam sthīrā bhava'

⁸ Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 7; etc.

Varuṇa, Pūshan, with Agni as the intercessor on her behalf, in order that these four may be pleased to release (*munchātu*) her from their bonds (*pāśa*).¹ Thereafter, he loosens two locks of her hair (*śikhe*) which have been previously tied, with the *mantra* :

I release thee, now,

From Varuṇa's bondage (*pāśād*).²

Then follows the most important rite in the whole *samskāra*, viz., the *saptapadī* rite near the nuptial altar ; the bridegroom leads the bride for seven steps, in the north-eastern direction ; and he recites the relevant part of the following *mantra*, as they walk each of these steps :

Let us pray together,

For life-sap, as we tread one step along,

For life-power, as we tread two steps together,

For wealth more abundant, as we go on three steps
with one another,

For happiness in life, as we walk four steps together,

For offsprings, as we move along five steps together,

For a long-wedded-life³ as we pledge six steps
together,

Be thou now my life-mate as we walk up seven steps
together.

Thus do thou go together with me for ever and for
ever.

Let us thus acquire many many sons, and long may
they live, we pray.⁴

¹ Āśv. G. i, 7, 8-15; etc.

² *ibid.* i, 7, 16-17; etc.

³ The word is '*ritubhyah*', literally meaning 'seasons'. But, as expressed in a previous *mantra* above (*jīveva śaradah śatam*) it seems to mean 'long life' here too.

⁴ Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 19: "*īsha ekapadyūrje dvipadī, rāyasposhāya tripadī, māyobhavyāya chatushpadī, prajābhyah panchapadī, ritubhyah shaṭpadī, sakhā saptapadī bhava sāmāmanuvratā bhava, putrānvindāvahai bahūnste santu jaradashṭaya iti*".
etc.

We may note here that the bride is said to have been given over to the groom by the gods, Bhaga, Aryamā, Savitā and Purandhī.¹ Some of the Grihyasūtras repeat another *mantra*, also taken from the Vedic text, which says that the bride is given over to man by three gods who were her first three husbands, viz., Soma, Gandharva and Agni. The *mantra* repeated before the nuptial fire is : 'Soma had acquired thee first as his wife ; after him the Gandharva acquired thee ; thy third lord was Agni ; and, the fourth is thy human husband. Soma has given thee to the Gandharva, the Gandharva gave thee to Agni. Besides thee, O wife, Agni has (as good as) given wealth and children to me.'² Yājñavalkya is perhaps interpreting this very Rigvedic *mantra* when he says that the God Soma conferred purity (*śaucham*) upon the woman, Gandharva bestowed upon her a sweet tongue (*śubhām giram*), while Pāvaka (i. e. Agni) bestowed upon her perfect purity (*sarvamedhyatvam*).³

After the above *vivāha* rites are duly carried out at the bride's parents' home, the wedded couple start out on their journey to the bridegroom's home ; and this is also to be done ceremoniously and with due rites. The father's parting words to the bride are the following *mantra* :

"Now from the noose of Varuṇa, I free thee, where-with most blessed Savitar hath bound thee.

In Law's seat, to the world of virtuous action, I give thee up uninjured with thy consort.

¹ See supra. Also, in Man. ix, 95, and Kullūka's commentary thereon.

² E. g., Pār. G. S. i, 4, 16; The *mantras* are in Rig. x, 85, 39-42 :—'*punah patnī magniradad ayushā saha varchasā/dīrghā-yurasyā yah patirjīvāti śaradah śatam//somaḥ prathamō vivide gandharvo vivida uttarah/tritiyo agnisṭe patis turīyas te manushyajah//somo'dadad gandharvāya gandharvo'dadad agnaye/rayim cha putrānśchādadagnir mahyamatho imām//* cf. also Ath. Ved. xiv, 1, 47-8.

³ Yāj. i, 71.

Hence (i. e. from the father's house), and not thence (i. e. from the husband's house), I set thee free. I make thee softly fettered there,

That, O bounteous Indra, she may live blest in her fortune and her sons."¹

On leaving her parental home, the bridegroom helps the bride to mount the vehicle as he repeats the following Vedic *mantra* :

"Let Pūshan take thy hand and hence conduct thee ; may the two Āśvins on their car transport thee.

Go to the house (*griha*) to be the household's mistress (*grihapatnī*), and speak as lady to thy gathered people."²

The nuptial fire is to be constantly carried along with the bridal pair during this journey.³ And again, when their destination is reached, the groom helps the bride to alight down from the car.⁴ Next follows the rite of *griha-praveśa* ; in this the groom conducts the bride into the house.⁵ The groom's father (or another person in his place) now addresses the following benedictory *mantras* to the bride :

"Happy be thou and prosper with thy children here ; be vigilant to rule thy household in this home.

¹ Rig. x, 85, 24-25 ; '*pra tvā munchāmi varuṇasya pāśād yena tvā badhnāt savitā sushevaḥ/ritasya yonau sukrutasya loke' rishṭām tvā saha patyā dadhāmi//preto munchāmi, nāmutah, subaddhāmamutas karam/yatheyamindra mīdhvāh suputrā subhagā' sati//*. (The above metrical tr. is Griffith's).

² Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 1 ; etc. The *mantra* is in Rig. i, 85, 26 :— '*Pūshā tveto nayatu hastagrihyāśvinā tvā pravahatām rathena/grihān gachchha grihapatnī yathāso vaśinī tvam vidathamāvadāsi//* (The above tr. is Griffith's).

³ Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 5 : '*Vivāhāgnimagrato'jasram nayanti*' ; etc.

⁴ Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 3 ; etc.

⁵ Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 8 ; etc.

Closely unite thy body with this man, thy lord. So shall ye, full of years, address your company.

Be ye not parted ; dwell ye here ; reach the full time of human life.

With sons and grandsons, sport and play, rejoicing in your own house.”¹

Thereafter, the nuptial fire is put in its proper place ; and newly-wedded couple offer oblations to it (*hutvā*), when the groom recites these *mantras* :²

“So may Prajāpati bring children forth to us ; may Aryaman adorn us till old age come nigh.

Not inauspicious enter thy husband’s house ; bring blessings to our bipeds and our quadrupeds.

Not evil-eyed, no slayer of thy husband, bring weal to cattle, radiant, gentle-hearted.

Loving the Gods, delightful, bearing heroes, bring blessings to our quadrupeds and bipeds.

Oh bounteous Indra, make this bride blest in her sons and fortunate,

Vouchsafe to her ten sons, and make her husband the eleventh man.

Over thy husband’s father and thy husband’s mother bear full sway.

Over the sister of thy lord, over his brothers, rule supreme.

So may the Universal Gods, so may the Waters, join our hands,

¹ The verses are in Rig. x, 85, 27 and 42.

‘*iha priyam prajāyā te samridhyatāmasmin grihe gārhapatyāya jāgrihi/ena patyā tanvam samsrijasvādḥājivri vidathamāvadāthah//ihaiva stam mā viyaushṭam viśvamāyur vyaśnutam/krīlantau putrainaptribhir modamānau sve grihe*//cf. also Ath. Ved. xiv, 1, 22.

² Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 9; etc.

May Mātariśvan, Dhātar, and Deshṭrī together bind us close.”¹

Then follows the rite of looking at the polar star Arundhati at sunset by the bride : Here, the groom shows her the star, known also as *dhruva* (firm) because of its permanently fixed position in the heaven, while he recites the verse :

“Firm (*dhruva*) be thou, thriving with me.”²

After the ceremony of *griha-praveśa* is thus completed, the couple are asked to give up all pungent or saline food, to wear ornaments, to sleep only on the floor and observe celibacy (*brahmacharya*), till three nights are over.³ Āśvalayana says that according to some, this period of self-restraint may be extended to twelve days ; or it may be as long as even one year, if the couple desire their

¹ Rig. x, 85, 43-47:—

“*Ā nah prajāṃ janayatu prajāpatiṛ aṇarasāya samanakt-varyamā/Adurmangaliḥ patilokamāviśa śan no bhava dvīpade śam chatuṣṭpade//*

Aghorachakṣhur apatighnyedhi śivā paśubhyah sumanāḥ suvarchasāḥ/Vīrasūr devakāmā syona śan no bhava dvīpade śam chatuṣṭpade//

Imām tvamindra mīḍhvah suputrām subhagām kriṇu/ Daśāsyām putrānādhehi patimekādaśam kridhi//

Samrādnī śvaśure bhava samrādnīm svasrvam bhava/ Nanāndari samrādnī bhava samrādnī adhvīrīshu//

Samanjatu viśvedevāḥ samāpo hridayāni nau/Sam mātariśvā sam dhāta samu deshṭrī dadhātu nau//

² Śān. G. S. i, 17, 3; Hir. G. S. i, 22, 6; Pār. G. S. i, 8, 19; Āp. G. S. 2, 6, 12; Āśv. G. S. i, 7, 22 (According to this last text, this rite is performed before the couple leave the bride’s father’s home); etc.

³ Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 10:—

Akṣhāralavaṇāśinau brahmachāriṇāvalamkūrvaṇāvadhaḥ-śāyinau syātām; also Śān. G. S. i, 18, 19; Pār. G. S. i, 11, 13; Go. G. S. ii, 5; Kh. G. S. i, 4, 12; Āp. G. S. viii, 8; Hir. G. S. i, 6, 23, 10; etc. cf. also Kāma. iii, 2, 1; Ratiśāstra. ix.

offspring to be a *rishi*.¹ On the fourth day some rites are performed, preparatory to the meeting of the newly wedded couple. These rites are the foetus-laying rites; they are not mentioned in all the Grihya-Sūtras.² The husband offers nine expiatory oblations to Agni.³ And, after this sacrifice to Agni is completed, he mates with her while repeating the following *mantras*: "United is our soul (*manas*), united our hearts (*hridayāṇi*), united our navel (*nābhiḥ*), united our body and skin (*tanutvachah*). I will bind thee (*yuḥyāmi*) with the bond of love (*kāma*); that bond shall be indissoluble (*avimochanāya*)."⁴ The husband embraces her while saying the *mantra*: "Be devoted to me, be my companion."⁵ Thereafter he seeks her mouth with his mouth while he recites these *mantras*: Honey! Lo! Honey! My tongue's speech is honey; in my mouth dwells the honey of the bee; on my teeth dwells concord. The (magic charm of the) concord that belongs to *chakravāka* birds, that is brought out of the rivers of which the divine Gandharva is possessed,—thereby we are concordant."⁶ He then prays the Gods Viṣṇu, Śinivali, Aśvins, Agni and Indra, for the birth of a male offspring,—'the most valiant of his kin'; he also recites the verse: "I do with thee the work that is sacred to Prajāpati. May an embryo enter thy womb; may a child be born without any deficiency, with all limbs, not blind, not lame, not sucked out by the *Piśāchas*."⁷

¹ Āśv. G. S. i, 8, 10; cf. Mānava G. S. i, 14, 14, which says the same, without, however, referring to the quality of the offspring resulting out of such penance.

² They are, e. g., in Hir. G. S. i, 6, 23, 11 to 25, 2, in details; and in Bau. G. S. i, 7 and Mān. G. S. i, 14, 1-19 in short.

³ Hir. G. S. i, 6, 23, 11 to 24, 1.

⁴ Bau. G. S. i, 5, 31; Hir. G. S. i, 24, 4.

⁵ Hir. G. S. i, 7, 25, 5.

⁶ Hir. G. S. i, 7, 24, 6.

⁷ Hir. G. S. i, 7, 25, 1.

This concludes the ritual part of the after-*vivāha* ceremonies.

These rites and the manner in which they are to be carried out, show that mating is but a serious duty devoid of selfish profligacy or lusty debauchery. Hereafter the couple start their career as keepers of the home (*griha*) wherein they do their best to fulfil their vow not to fail each other in their pursuit of *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*, for the sake of achieving *mokṣa*.¹

The above description of the rites performed at the *vivāha* must speak for itself. For the Hindu, then, marriage is a *samskāra*, and as such, the relations between the marrying parties are of a sacramental character, and not of a contractual nature. For, apart from the necessity of begetting a son in order to be saved from eternal damnation of hell-life, it has been ordained by the *Dharmaśāstras*, that the wife is a necessary complement, as the *griha-patnī*, for the proper and full execution of his *dharma*s as the *griha-pati*. This is also emphasized by the words which designate one's wife as his *dharma-patnī* and *saha-dharma-chārīṇī*, i. e. she who has to share all the sacred obligations, and, she who does carry them out in partnership with her husband. ♪

The importance of certain rites in the Hindu *vivāha* should not fail to secure the attention of a student of the Hindu *vivāha* system. A marriage is not regarded as complete unless and until certain important rites which are essential for a *vivāha* are performed. Such are the *Pānigrahaṇa*, joining of hands of the bride and the bridegroom, and the *saptapadī* ("seven steps") *mantras*. "The *mantras* of marriage" says Bhishma, "accomplish their object of bringing about the indissoluble union of marriage

¹ cf. The vow taken by the bridegroom at the *vivāha*:—
 'dharma cha arthe cha kāme cha nāticharāmi, nāticharāmi,
 nāticharāmi'. (see p. 165).

at the seventh step. The maiden becomes the wife of him to whom the gift is actually made with water.”¹ Again, “Till the hand is actually taken with due rites, marriage does not happen.”² And, the rites of marriage must take place in the presence of sacred fire.³

Nārada has said that once the *mantras* are recited by joining the hands of the bride and the bridegroom (*pāṇigrahaṇa*), the marriage becomes binding.⁴ So also Vasishṭha and Baudhāyana declare that a damsel who is not wedded in accompaniment with sacred rites may be deemed even as a maiden, and she may be lawfully given to another man.⁵ “The nuptial texts (*pāṇigrahaṇikā mantrā*)” says Manu, “are a certain proof that a maiden has been made a lawful wife ; but the learned should observe that they are complete with the seventh step.”⁶

Vātsyāyana too has attached great importance to the sacred rites performed in the wedding. He gives an advice of caution, for instance, that in the Gāndharva *vivāha* where the nuptials may have to be secretly performed, they too have to be performed before the sacred fire ; and this fire is brought from the house of a *Śrotriya* ; *kuśa* grass is spread before it ; and oblations are offered in the fire according to the rules of the *Smṛiti* (*yathāsmṛiti*).⁷ The couple is then to go thrice round the fire.⁸ The reason for this precaution to perform the rites before the

¹ Mahā. Anu. 44, 55.

² *ibid.* 44, 35.

³ *ibid.* 44, 56.

⁴ Nār. xii, 3.

⁵ Vas. xvii, 73 ; Baudh. iv, 1, 15.

⁶ Man. viii, 227,—‘*pāṇigrahaṇikā mantrā niyatam dāralakṣhaṇam/teshām tu nishṭhā vijneyā vidvadbhiḥ sapṭame pade*’/. Both Medhātithi and Kullūka, commenting on this verse, explain that this means marriage cannot be revoked or annulled after the seventh step is taken.

⁷ Kāma. iii, 5, 11.

⁸ *ibid.*

fire is, that marriages performed with fire as the witness can never be set aside.¹

In the opinion of Kauṭilya, the rejection of a bride before the rites of *pāṇigrahaṇa* is valid amongst the higher *varṇas*. Among the Śūdras, however, the rejection is valid at any time before the nuptials. But rejection of the bride even after the *pāṇigrahaṇa* rite is permitted in the case of a bride whose guilt of having lain with another man has been found out afterwards. However, rejection of the bride after *pāṇigrahaṇa* can never be allowed in the case of brides and bridegrooms of pure character and high family.²

Now, while Manu regards the first six forms, out of the list already mentioned, as lawful, he gives his particular approval to the *Gāndharva* and the *Rākshasa vivāha* forms in the case of the warrior *varṇa*, as being permitted by the time-honoured tradition.³ Baudhāyana observes that the *Gāndharva* form is recommended by some since it springs out of mutual love of the two parties.⁴ Both Baudhāyana and Nārada say that this form is meant for all the *Varṇas*.⁵ The *Kāmasūtras* have also specially recommended the *gāndharva* form of *vivāha* as being the most respected form of marriage; because, says Vātsyāyana, it is the result of mutual love, and mutual love is the true foundation as well as the true goal of marriage.⁶

In the *Mahābhārata*, out of the eight forms of marriage, the *Brāhma*, *Daiva*, *Ārsha* and *Prājāpatya* forms of

¹ Kāma. iii, 5, 13.

² Arth. 212.

³ Man. iii, 26: "gāndharvo rākshasaśchaiva dharmyau kshatrasya tau smṛitau"

⁴ Nār. xii, 44; Baud. i, 11, 20, 16 says 'gāndharvamapyeke praśamsanti sarveshām, snehānugatatvāt'.

⁵ ibid.

⁶ Kām. iii, 5, 29-30.

vivāha are said to be permissible for the *Brāhmaṇas*,¹ and the *Gāndharva* and the *Rākshasa* forms are viewed as proper for the *Kshatriya*.² At another place, *Bhīshma* says that the *Brāhma* form is followed by the righteous *Brāhmaṇas*, and the *Kshātra* form by the *Kshatriyas*;³ but when referring to the *Gāndharva* form as one in which "the father of the girl, without consulting his own wishes, gives away his daughter to a person whom the daughter likes and who reciprocates her sentiments", *Bhīshma* does not make mention of any *varṇa* in particular,⁴ as the *Smritis* mentioned above have done. Indeed, he says in a further passage in the same *Adhyāya* "The *Brāhma*, *Kshātra* and *Gāndharva* forms are righteous (*dharmyā*); pure or mixed, these forms forsooth should be followed."⁵

The *Arthaśāstra* has not said much about this point, and we naturally cannot expect much from it either. It permits, in the first instance, the first four forms as ancestral custom, valid on the father's approval. It also permits the other forms, provided the sanction of both the parents is obtained. Ordinarily, according to the *Arthaśāstra*, "any kind of marriage is approvable, provided it pleases all those (that are concerned in it)."⁶

¹ Like *Manu*. iii, 24, above.

² *Mahā. Ādi.* 73, 8-13; also 73, 27.

³ *Mahā. Anu.* 44, 4-5.

⁴ *ibid.* 44, 6: "Ātmābhipretamutsrujya kanyābhipreta eva yat/ abhipretā cha yā yasya tasmai deyā Yūdhishṭhira/ gāndharvamiti tam dharman prāhurvedavido janāh/|

⁵ *ibid.* 44, 10: "Brāhmah kshatro'tha gāndharva ete dharmyā nararshabha/prithagvā yadi vā miśrāḥ kartavyā nātra samśayah/|. The 'mixtures' of these forms are illustrated by the marriages of *Nala-Damayantī*, which is a *Brāhma-Kshātra* marriage; of *Rukmiṇi-Krishṇa* which is a *Rākshasa-Gāndharva* marriage; and of *Subhadrā-Arjuna*, which is a *Kshātra-Rākshasa* marriage.—*Comm.* of *Nilakaṇṭha*.

⁶ *Arth.* p. 172.

In the Mahābhārata, we have just seen how the Gāndharva form is defined.¹ The father or the guardian of the girl marries the bride in this form in accordance with *her* wishes, and to a man of *her* choice. In another passage it gives greater credence to the marriage by the mutual choice of the two parties than even to the engagement made by the bride's father to a man of his choice. "The engagement made by the relatives of a girl is, no doubt binding and sacred; but the engagement fixed by the bride and the bridegroom with the help of *mantras*, is much more so."²

In Vātsyāyana's book, there are good many references to courtship between the maiden and her young man. Of course, "All the world knows", according to Vātsyāyana, "that a girl however much she may be in love, will not herself make any overtures to the man."³ The whole skill, therefore, in courtship and winning over the love of a maiden rests with her lover. Vātsyāyana gives many shrewd hints for the suitor in order to enable him to accomplish his heart's desire: The suitor may, for instance, collect flowers and make garlands of these in company of and with the help of his lady-love; or, he may play some indoor games with her (like the game of dice, for example); all such things are to be practised having regard to their age and their degree of acquaintance with each other.⁴ Or, the lover is advised to seek and form acquaintances with his beloved's female friends and seek their help and guidance for the fulfilment of his quest.⁵ He is asked to spare no pains to please her by securing for her (*prayatnena sampādayet*) rare articles

¹ See (in Anu. 44, 6), p. 177 supra.

² Mahā. Anu. 44, 26.

³ Kām. tr. by Peterson: B. B. R. A. S. Jour. Vol. xviii, pp. 117-18.

⁴ Kām. iii, 3, 5, (*parichayasya vayasaschānurūpāt*).

⁵ ibid. iii, 3, 8-9.

(*apūrvāni*) which she might desire to have.¹ The *Gāndharva vivāha*, as the sage Vātsyāyana envisages it, should be the flowering of such courtship. The young man, after persuading his beloved to be his bride and life-mate, is advised to arrange, through the help of mutual friends, the time and the place for the two to meet together and sanctify their love in the presence of the sacred fire.² The two lovers should then go round the fire thrice, with due rites of oblations in accordance with the rules laid down by the Smritis.³ For ‘‘marriages performed with the sacred fire as the witness can never be rescinded’’—this is the opinion of all Āchāryas.⁴ After all this has been accomplished in secret, the parents have to be informed of the happy event.⁵ The parents and the relatives may then be won over by the lovers; when their consent is obtained, the formal marriage ceremonies are advised to be performed.⁶ Such is the *Gāndharva* form of *vivāha* according to Vātsyāyana. In case the girl hesitates to take to this course of action (*apratipadya-mānām*), it is advised that she may be brought to a secret place on some pretext (*anyakāryopadeśena*) with the help of another lady of good family; here the rites before the sacred fire should then be performed. Or, the young man is advised to persuade the mother of the girl, or her brother, and, with his or her help, to get the girl at a secret place where, with due rites as described above, the wedding should be effected.⁷ According to Vātsyāyana, this *Gāndharva* form of marriage is the most respected

¹ *ibid.* iii, 3, 11-12.

² *ibid.* iii, 5, 11.

³ *ibid.*; (*Yathāsmṛiti hutvā cha trih parikramet*).

⁴ *ibid.* iii, 5, 13: ‘*Agnisākshikā hi vivāhā na nivartanta iti āchāryasamayah*.’

⁵ *Kām.* iii, 5, 12: ‘*tato mātari pītari cha prakāśayet*’ etc.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ *Kām.* iii, 5, 18-19.

(*pūjita*) form of marriage, because, in the first place, it is founded on mutual love, and secondly, because love is the be-all and end-all of marriage ;¹ moreover, it is free from any cumbersome formalities and much trouble.²

The most emphatically denounced form of marriage is that in which money is paid to the bride or her kinsmen, as the bride-price or dowry. Selling the daughter even for the smallest gratuity, is against all morals.³ The *Mahābhārata* is quite clear on this point. According to Bhīshma, the sale and purchase of the daughter, though known to be practised by a few human beings for a long time, should never be done by good men.⁴ "No one should give his daughter to such persons (who pay money for the bride) ; in fact, they are not men with whom one may marry his daughter. A wife should never be purchased ; nor should a father ever sell his daughter."⁵ Such money, again, if paid by a person for buying a girl, need not bind her father or kinsmen to give the girl to him only. "The kinsmen of the maiden should bestow her upon him whom they consider proper. There need be no hesitation to do such a thing (*nātra kāryā vichāraṇā*) ; the righteous act thus without caring for the giver of the dower even if he be alive."⁶ Continuous sufferings in hell will be the punishment for the man who sells either his son or daughter.⁷ We are further told that "In the form of marriage called *Ārsha*, the man who marries has to give a bull and a cow ; and the father of the maiden

¹ Kām. iii, 5, 29-30 :—

'*Vyūḍhānām hi vivāhānām anurāgaḥ phalam yataḥ.....*'; and
'.....*anurāgātmatvāchcha gāndharvāḥ pravaro mataḥ*'.

² *ibid.* '*sukhatvādabahukleśāt*'.

³ Man. iii, 51 ; Āp. ii, 13, 11 ; Vas. i, 37-38 ; Baudh. i, 21, 2-3 ; Mahā. Udyoga. 97, 15-16.

⁴ Mahā. Anu. 44, 37.

⁵ *ibid.* 44, 46 ; cf. Man. iii, 51-52.

⁶ *ibid.* 44, 50-51.

⁷ *ibid.* 45, 19.

accepts the gift.¹ Some characterise this gift as a dowry (or price) (*śulka*), while others are of the opinion that it should not be considered as such. The true opinion, however, is that a gift for such a purpose, be it of small value or large, should, O King, be considered as dower or price, and the bestowal of the daughter under such circumstances should be considered a sale."² And, inspite of the fact of its having been practised by a few persons it can never be taken as the eternal *dharma* practice (*naisha dharmah sanātānah*).³ Even a human being who is not a relation of blood should never be sold. What need then be said of one's own child? No *dharma* can ever be performed with the riches acquired by doing such acts against the dictates of *dharma*.⁴

Regarding the age of marriage of a girl or a boy, there is a great variety of opinion among the Hindu writers ; and it is extremely difficult to say anything specific and uniform about their general opinion. ¹Manu has said that a man of thirty should marry a girl of twelve ; and, a man of twenty-four should marry a girl of eight. ²Manu's commentators Medhātithi and Kullūka inform us that this rule was not followed to the letter. In the Mahābhārata at one place we find Bhīshma, while explaining to Yudhishtīra about *vivāha*, saying that "A person of thirty years of age should marry a girl of ten years of age wearing a single piece of cloth. Or a person of one and twenty years of age should marry a girl of seven years of

¹ *ibid* 45, 20; See Manu. iii, 29.

² Mahā. Anu. 45, 20: "*Alpo vā Bahu vā rājan vikrayastāva-deva sah*" /also in Man. iii, 53.

³ Mahā. Anu. 45, 21.

⁴ *ibid.* 45, 23: "*Anyo'pyatha na vikreyo manushyah kim punah prajāh/adharmamūlair hi dhanaistair na dharmo kathamcha na* //

⁵ Man. ix, 94.

age.”¹ All agree upon one point, viz. that the bride must be younger by three years or more than the husband.² Vātsyāyana also says that the bride must be at least three years younger than the bridegroom.³

In the Grihya Sūtras, the marriageable maiden is referred to as a *nagnikā*.⁴ And Dr. Ghosh has pointed out in this connection that Mātridatta's commentary on this word explains it as referring to a girl who has attained perfect maturity.⁵ “Nagnikā, therefore,” in Dr. Ghosh's opinion, “in ancient times meant a young but mature girl. It is difficult to believe that *nagnikā* meant a naked girl having regard to the fact that the Mahābhārata advocates the marriage of a girl, a *nagnikā* of sixteen.”⁶ Further, we may note that the Grihya-Sūtra rules about the observance of *brahmacharya* by the couple for three days after *vivāha* and of co-habitation on the fourth,⁷ positively assume a mature age of marriage, both for the bridegroom as well as the bride.

In Vātsyāyana's *Kāma-Sūtra*, we have a description of the various ways and means employed by wooers to win over young maidens for marriage by showing their skill in the various arts or by giving attractive presents to them.⁸ There are also references, in these *sūtras*, of various other means on a more romantic level ; for instance, lovers sent messages and love-letters to each other through persons in whom both the lovers could repose their full confidence ; or friends of one party praised the virtues and attainments of the lover to the beloved or

¹ Mahā. Anu. 44, 14.

² Gaut. iv, ; Yāj. i, 52 ; Man. iii, 4, 12 ; Āpa. ii, 6, 13, 1 ; etc.

³ Kām. iii, 1, 2 :—(*trivarshāt prabhriti nyūnavayasām*).

⁴ Gobhi. Gr. S. iii, 4, 6 ; Mān. Gr. i, 7 ; Hiraṇyakeśi Gr. i, 19, 2 ; Vaikha. Gr. iii, 2, 1, etc.

⁵ *Nagnikām maithunārham*.

⁶ Ghosh : “Hindu Law of Partition etc.” p. 707.

⁷ See supra. pp. 172-174.

⁸ Kām. iii.

deprecatd and found faults with any other possible suitor, in the interest of the one whom they praised.¹

Yet it is very difficult exactly to define the attitude of Vātsyāyana's Kāmasūtra regarding the age of the bride, inspite of the fact that it is a text which concerns itself with problems of sexual psychology and morality in details. For, even while talking about courtship to the maidens (*kanyā*), he refers to a *Bālā*, as well as a *Yauvane sthitā* and a *Vatsalā*. A *bālā* may be won over by plays and games befitting a very young person (*bālakriḍana-kair*); an adult damsel (*yauvane sthitā*) may be courted by demonstration of skill in various arts (*kalābhik*); while a *vatsalā*,—by which may be implied a lady of more advanced years, who is capable of offering love (*vatsalam*) herself—may be solicited by confiding in persons in whom the lady puts her faith (*viśvāsyajana*).² But in the description which he gives of the girl who has fallen in love with her suitor as a result of his enthusiastic and untiring efforts, he seems evidently to presuppose the young maiden to have attained a fairly mature age. Thus, he gives certain signs (*lakṣhaṇāṇi*) from which her love for a man may be suspected and ascertained: The lady who has fallen in love avoids looking straight in the face of her lover (*sanmukham*); or she shows signs of bashfulness when he looks at her.³ Further on, Vātsyāyana gives a piece of advice to the young maiden that she should

¹ Kām. iii, 2; 3; 5; etc.

² Kām. iii, 3, 43-44. In the *Ratīśāstra*, similar terms are referred to, and explained thus: 'A maiden is called *bālā* till she attains the sixteenth year of her age; she is known as a *taruṇī* till she attains the thirtieth year; thereafter, till the age of fifty-five, she is called a *prauḍhā*; while after the fifty-fifth year of age, she becomes a *vriddhā*'—Ch. iv. (Tr. adapted from Gamber's). The author goes on further to describe different ways of courtship of these girls, similar as the above of the *Kāmasūtra*.

³ Kām. iii, 3, 25; cf. 'Ratīśāstra', Ch. vi.

choose the man who would truly love her, rather than a man endowed with many virtues or riches.¹ "Out of many suitors of equal merits (*guṇasāmye'bhīyoktrīṇām*), choose him", the sage advises, "who is in love with thee (*anurāgātmaḥ*)."²

¶ On the whole, we may say, that Vātsyāyana does not seem to have been in favour of child-marriages; for he refers to the bride as *prāptayauvanā* and *vigādhayauvanā*. His description of *Gāndharva* form of marriage as a highly respected one, of the love-letters exchanged between the wooer and the wooed, and of the methods to be employed in courting love, perhaps too clearly demonstrate that he was all in favour of mature marriages.

In the Mahābhārata as well as in the Smritis again, (even though these prescribe, sometimes, very low age for girls to marry), there are many indications to show that, in fact, the age-limit was carried higher. The various duties prescribed for the housewife in the Smritis as well as the Śukranīti, for instance, are such as could not be performed by too young a girl.³ Of course this does not give a strong evidence in favour of the position that Smritis too expected complete maturity of body and mind in marriageable girls; for the duties may have as well been intended, not for the newly married bride, but for the wife after she has attained maturity of age and intellect in her husband's home. The Mahābhārata, on the other hand, gives numerous actual instances where the bride-to-be was a maiden, who had attained an adequate physical as well as intellectual status deemed necessary for a

¹ ibid: iii, 4, 52 and 55:

'Kanyābhīyujyamānā tu yam manyetāśrayam sukham/
anukūlam cha vaśyam cha tasya kuryāt parigraham//
varam vaśyo daridro'pi nirguṇo'pyātmadhāraṇah/guṇair-
yukto'pi na tvenam bahusādhāraṇo patih//

² ibid. iii, 4, 59.

³ See next chapter.

married life. The marriages of Dushyanta and Śakuntalā, Sāvitrī and Satyavāna, Subhadṛā and Arjuna, Rukmiṇī and Krishṇa, Nala and Damayantī, to mention some only, are all marriages where the maiden, out of love, marries the man of her own free choice. In the *svayamvara* of the Epics the bride very often made a selection out of several suitors for her hand. There are also several other instances in the dramatic and the poetic literature regarding such choosing by the bride of her own husband ; for instance, Bāṇa's *Kādambarī* depicting the romances of two pairs of lovers, viz. Kādambarī-Chandrāpīḍa, and Mahāśvetā-Puṇḍarīka, and Kālidāsa's *Mālatī-Mādhava*, *Vikramorvaśīyam* and *Śākuntalam*, give rich and vivid descriptions of such happenings.

In connection with the age of marriageability for boys and girls, it should be observed here that a life of sex-experience at too early an age has been found to be harmful to the development of the personality,—physical and intellectual,—of the male as well as the female. It is equally harmful to start sex-life too late. Hamilton and McGowan have shown, for instance, that sexual frigidity of later life in women is due mostly to repressions during childhood, as also to lateness of sexual experience. Therefore, in their opinion, "Early sexual experience is valuable to the mental health and the marital normality and happiness of women."¹ If proper precautions are taken, early marriages,—by which is not meant child marriages, but marriages at a fairly mature age but not much later—are bound to be happier, both from the point of view of psychological as well as physical compatibility of the partners concerned. Apart from the absence of repressed morbidity already mentioned above, there is a positive advantage of a psychological nature in early marriages.

¹ Ch. on "Physical Disabilities in Wives", in "Sex in Civilization" Ed. by Calverton & Schmalhausen, pp. 235-36.

The likes and dislikes and the general mental attitude of men and women, become more and more formed and fixed as the individuals advance in age, so that there is often little or no room left for mutual give and take and for psychological compatibility of a couple which happens to come together at a rather late age. On the other hand, psychological compatibility between the two is certainly more possible and even probable, if they come together at an age when their mental attitudes are rather tender, flexible and mobile in regard to mutual adjustment, so that there is likely to be little room for serious conflicts between the two who become pledged to live together for life. Thus, the problems of the adaptation to each other's tastes, conduct and attitudes are likely to be obviously easier for solution at an early age than later in life. In the words of Williams, "the case for early marriage, from the psychological point of view, lies in the fact that, if married early, the nature of each is still plastic, and there is a greater possibility of congeniality than later when the characteristic attitudes have become fixed."¹ "On the other hand", however, he proceeds to say, "If marriage is delayed until the character is formed, then both the man and woman are more sure of what their natures are and of the kind of person with whom they will be congenial".²

But then, even if the adult man or woman reaches the age when his or her character is fixed and when he or she has attained the maturity of judgment to know the kind of person who should be chosen as the life-mate, such persons cannot be said to be free from the dangers of misjudgment and even folly. For, the courtship of the adult need not, and in fact in many cases, does not, lead to a really congenial choice of mate. The

¹ Williams: "Prin. Soc. Psy." p. 288.

² Williams: "Prin. Soc. Psy." p. 288.

period of courtship is more or less full of excitement and thrill ; so that there is little room for real reflexion and calm and balanced observation. During the period of courtship when living together is not possible, each is apt to be attracted to the other by favourable points of consideration ; this increases the likelihood that each may even overlook the unfavourable ones. In fact, the emotional situations involved in courtship must leave little room for the judicial exercise of wisdom and reason. And, "the thrills of courtship prove little as to the wisdom of courtship."¹ But there is more to be said still : What is essentially required for happiness in wedded life is not wise or judicious choice, or agreement of temperament ; it is perhaps the attitude of mind towards compromise and avoidance of strife, a willingness to give and take and to adapt.

It seems fair, therefore, to conclude from what has been said so far, that in deciding the marriageable age for boys and girls, the chief point to remember is that too late marriages are likely to be as harmful as, or even more harmful than, too early marriages. This is not to say that we are in favour of infant and child marriages. It is only intended to point out that the sponsors of late marriages will have to pause and think over and answer the same difficulties, plus a few more in all probability, before advocating a late age-limit of marriage.

Concealment of the defects of the bride by her father or her kinsmen is a highly punishable offence.² Once, however, the defects or blemishes of the bride are openly declared before marriage, the kinsmen are not liable to any punishment even if the blemishes amount to such

¹ Williams: *ibid.* p. 290.

² Yāj. i, 66:—(*Uttamasāhasa*, or offence punishable by a fine of 1080 *pañas*) ; Nār. xii, 31 ; Man. ix, 224 (fine of 96 *pañas*).

serious disease as leprosy, or to such serious blemish as loss of virginity (*sprishṭamaithunā*).¹ If, however, the husband discovers such disease or loss of chastity in the bride after the marriage, and these were not disclosed to him before, he may abandon her.² Nay, even the whole agreement of marriage may be annulled, if the girl possesses blemishes which were not declared before.³ According to Nārada, if any concealed defects in the husband were disclosed after marriage to the woman, who is herself faultless, such marriage could be dissolved.⁴

Kautilya says that the person who marries a girl without declaring his own blemishes shall be punished not only with double the fine imposable upon the father or other kinsmen of the bride for a similar offence on their part in concealing her defects, but he shall also forfeit the *śulka* and the *strīdhana* that might have been paid by him for the bride.⁵ Ordinarily, in the opinion of Kautilya, a bride cannot be rejected after the *pāṇigrahaṇa* rite is performed; but she can be rejected even after *pāṇigrahaṇa* if it is afterwards detected that she had been unchaste. Such rejection, however, never holds good "in the case of brides and grooms of pure character and high conduct."⁶

Nārada and Parāśara have laid down that marriage could be dissolved if the husband is found to be impotent (*klība*).⁷ Nārada's theory is that woman is the field (*kshetra*) and man is the seed-giver (*bījīn*); so the field must be given to one who has seed (*bījavate*).⁸ Hence she who finds her husband devoid of virility may,

¹ Man. viii, 205.

² Man. ix, 72; Yāj. i, 66, Vis. v, 162.

³ Man. ix, 73.

⁴ Nār. xii, 16; 96.

⁵ Arth. p. 213. (Shamasastri's Tr.)

⁶ Arth. p. 212. (Shamasastri's Tr.)

⁷ Nār. xii, 16; Parā. iv, 28.

⁸ Nār. xii, 18-19.

after waiting for six months, choose another man as her husband. There are, according to these two Smritis, "five cases of legal necessity" whereby the wife is allowed to marry a second husband: She may take a second husband, if the first is lost (*nashṭe*) or dead (*mrite*), or becomes an ascetic (*pravrajite*) or is impotent (*klībe*), or is expelled from the caste (*patite*).¹ In case the husband is lost, the wife who has no issue already must wait for his return for four years if she is a Brāhmaṇa, for three years if she is a Kshatriya, and for two years if she is a Vaiśya. But, if the wife has already had an issue from the lost husband, then each of these, respectively, is asked to wait for double the periods mentioned above.² Gautama suggests that a wife may wait for six years for her husband who has disappeared.³

Kauṭilya has similarly permitted a woman to abandon her husband if he is a bad character, or is long abroad, or has become a traitor to the king, or is likely to endanger the life of his wife, or has fallen from his caste or has lost virility.⁴ Also in cases of the husband's absence long abroad, the Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra wife has to wait for four, two, three and one years respectively, for his return, if she has no issue. But if she has an issue already, she must wait for double the period prescribed above; and during this period, the

¹ Nār. xii, 97; cf. Parā. iv, 28; cf. also Mahānirvāṇatantra xi, 66: "*Shaṇḍhenodvāhitām kanyām kālātite'pi pārthiva/jānanudvāhayedbhūyo vidhiresha śivoditah*/" Nārada says that in these cases, she shall be enjoined by her relatives to seek another man, if she does not herself think of doing it! (xii, 96). Mādhavāchārya, commenting on Parā. iv, 28, quotes an identical *śloka* from Manu, which is however not to be found in the recension of Manu which has come down to us.

² Nār. xii, 98-99; Vas. xvii, 75-79; Gaut. xviii, 15-17.

³ Gaut. xviii, 15.

⁴ Arth. p. 175 (Shamasastri's Tr.)

jnāti or the community must provide her with maintenance, if she has none. She may wait for less period only if she is not provided with maintenance. After this period of waiting is over she may marry any one whom she likes.¹

Kauṭilya also speaks of divorce (*moksha*). A divorce may be obtained only in the case of mutual enmity and hatred between the husband and his wife. Neither the husband nor the wife could dissolve the marriage against the will of the other party.² But even Kauṭilya, who alone of the Śāstrakāras gives a consideration to the problem of the divorce (*moksha*) of marriage unlike the repudiation or rejection or abandonment (*tyāga*) as prescribed by the Smritis, also expressly declares, like the smritis, that marriages consecrated according to the Brāhma, Daiva, Ārsha and Prājāpatya forms cannot be dissolved at all.³

The remarriage of widows is generally not favoured by the Smritis. "Once is a woman given in marriage", seems to be the general rule of observance.⁴ The Smritis as well as the Kāmasūtras refer to a remarried widow as a *punarbhū*.⁵ A true wife must preserve her chastity as much after as before her husband's death.⁶ She should never insult his memory. Manu declares that the remarriage of widows is nowhere prescribed in the Śāstras which treat of marriage.⁷ The Smritis eulogize the woman

¹ Arth. pp. 180-81.

² Arth. p. 171.

³ Arth. p. 177.

⁴ Man. ix, 47: '*sakritkanyā pradīyate*'; Yāj. i, 65; also Nār. xii, 28.

⁵ e. g. Man. ix, 175; Nār. xii, 46; Vas. xvii, 20; Vis. xv, 8.

⁶ Man. v, 151; Yāj. i, 75, 83; Vis. xxv, 13-14.

⁷ Man. v, 162, '*na dvitīyaścha sādhuvinām kvachid-bharto-padiśyate*'; and in ix, 65: '*na vivāhavidhāvuktam vidhavā-vedanam punah*'.

who keeps her husband's bed unsullied after his death.¹ Vātsyāyana too, though he gives reference to the *Punarbhū*, speaks of her in rather reproaching terms. He refers to a *punarbhū*, as a widow (*vidhavā*) who, because she is unable to resist her lust,² seeks for a person who is after enjoyment (*bhogin*).³ He also calls her a seeker after pleasure.⁴ At another place he says that sexual relations with a *punarbhū* and a *veśyā* (prostitute) are not proper (*na śisṭah*), but that they are not forbidden (*na pratishiddhah*) as they are meant merely for she is unable to resist her lust,⁵ seeks for a person relation with a widow in the same category as that with a prostitute. The marriage rites, as we have already seen, require the bride necessarily to be a virgin according to Vātsyāyana also.⁶ This means that for a widow, there could be no regular rites of marriage, according to him also. If there be a widow, as mentioned above, having intimate relations with a man, then evidently for Vātsyāyana, such relations are non-marital. Manu and Yājñavalkya would say that the widow must not even mention the name of another man after her husband's death; she may spend her days of widowhood by emaciating her body, by living on pure flowers, roots and fruits.⁷ The widow who remains chaste (*brahmacharye vyavasthitā*) reaches heaven

¹ Man. v, 151-65; Yāj. i, 75-77.

² 'indriyadaurbalyādāturā'.

³ Kām. iv, 2, 39.

⁴ ibid: 'saukhyārthini'.

⁵ Kām. i, 4, 3.

⁶ See ante. p. 153.

Also Man. viii, 226: "The nuptial texts are applicable solely to virgins and nowhere among men to females who have lost their virginity, for such females are excluded from religious ceremonies (*pānigrahaṇikā mantrāḥ kanyāsveva pratishṭhitā nākanyāsu kvachit nrīṇām luptadharmakriyā hi tāḥ*).

⁷ Man. v, 157; Yāj. i, 75.

after her death even though she has no son.¹ A widow who becomes unfaithful to her deceased husband has no claim on the property of her husband,—not even for maintenance ; she may even be excommunicated.²

The Smritis, however, give two cases in which a woman can re-marry with the recitation of the sacred *mantras*, the first marriage being considered by them as no marriage at all. Thus a damsel, abducted by force, and not wedded with the recitation of sacred texts, may be lawfully given to another man ; “she is even like a maiden.”³ The second case is that of a damsel who is married with the recitation of the sacred texts, but whose husband dies before the consummation of the marriage.⁴ If such a woman is still a virgin, she can go through the sacrament of *vivāha*. The Mahānirvāṇatantra gives a similar case when a married woman is allowed to marry a second time. It says that a maiden who has been married (*pariṇītā*) but who has not co-habited (*na ramitā*) with her husband till his death, is eligible for marriage again ; such is the law among the Śaivas (*śaivadharmeshvayam vidhih*).⁵

A person who has entered the *grihasthāśrama* must not, under the rules of the Smritis, remain single. After the death of his first wife, he should, according to the religious rites, take another wife without delay.⁶ The *Mitākṣarā*, commenting on this rule of Yājñavalkya, says that it holds good in case the husband has not obtained any male issue from his first wife. So that, in the last

¹ Man. v, 160; Yāj. i, 75; Parā. iv, 26; Vis xxv, 17.

² Nār. xii, 51 ff; Par. x, 26-35.

³ Vas. xvii, 73; Baudh. iv, 1, 15.

⁴ Man. ix, 176: ‘*sā chedakṣatayoniḥ syāt.....paunarbavenapunah samskāramarhati*/; also Nār. xii, 46; Vas. xvii, 20; Baudh. iv, 1, 16; Vis. xv, 8.

⁵ Mahānirvāṇatantra xi, 67.

⁶ Yāj. i, 89; cf. Man. v, 167-9.

case, even during the life-time of the first wife, the husband is allowed to take another wife. The Smritis allow a man to marry any number of wives from his own *varṇa* or from any of the lower ones ; but he has never to take a wife from a *varṇa* higher than his own.¹ Yājñavalkya interprets this regulation as putting a restriction on the number of wives allowed for a man. Thus, a Brāhmaṇa can marry four wives, one from each *varṇa* ; so, the Kshatriya can marry three wives, one from his own *varṇa* and one from each of the next two *varṇas* ; similarly, the Vaiśya can marry two wives ; and the Sūdra can marry only one wife.²

From the point of view of the Hindu, there is an important question to be considered in relation to the number of wives allowed for a man. That question is regarding the continuity of the family line. It takes us back to the very basis upon which the Hindu *vivāha* system is based. According to it, marriage is necessary because the continuity of the progeny is essential.³ Again, this continuity depends on the male issue ; for the daughter is a member of the family only till her marriage.⁴ It is therefore of the very essence of a marriage union that sons should be born of it. Beatitude is obtainable through sons and grandsons.⁵ Therefore, man should marry more than once in case the first marriage fails to promote its true object of begetting a male offspring. This seems to be the main idea underlying the polygamous system in India. This is evident from a consideration of the demands

¹ Man. iii, 13 ; Yāj. i, 57 ; Bau. i, 16, 2-5 ; Vas. i, 24-25 ; Vis. xxiv, 1-4.

² Yāj. i, 57.

³ Yāj. i, 77 ; Āp. ii, 5, 11, 12 ; etc.

⁴ Excepting in the case of an 'appointed' daughter, which is a remedy for continuity of family line devised by the Hindu law-givers.

⁵ Yāj. i, 77 ; Āp. ii, 5, 11, 12.

of mutual relations of fidelity between husband and wife, which we have discussed elsewhere.¹ It is their duty to perform religious rites and sacrifices together. And, so long as a householder (*grihasta*) has already a wife who is able to take part with him in his religious duties as a *grihasta*, and also has borne him issues, he must not take another woman for his wife.²

That polygamy, though thus theoretically sanctioned, was looked upon as an abnormality, is evident also from a consideration of the rules laid down for the supersession of the first wife. Thus according to Manu, a wife who is barren (*vandhyā*) may be superseded by another wife in the eighth year after marriage; she whose children do not survive, may be superseded by another wife in the tenth year after marriage; she who brings forth only female issues may be superseded by another wife in the eleventh year; while a quarrelsome wife may be superseded by another without any delay.³ But a wife who is "kind to her husband and virtuous in her conduct may be superseded only with her consent, and must never be disgraced", even though she happens to be diseased (*roginī*).⁴ The most desirable state of married life is of course that in which both the husband and his wife are mutually devoted to each other till death.⁵ "Let man and woman united in marriage, constantly exert themselves, that they may not be disunited and may not violate their mutual fidelity."⁶

The Arthaśāstra lays down slightly different rules for marrying more wives than one, of which the following

¹ See next Chapter on Family.

² Āp. ii, 11, 12—(*dharmaprajāsampanne dāre nānyām kurvīta*).

³ Man. ix, 81.

⁴ Man. ix, 82; *Yā roginī syāttu hitā sampannā chaiva śīlatah/sānudnāpyādhivettavyā nāvamanyā cha karhichit/|*

⁵ Man. ix, 101: "*Anyonyasyāvvyabhichāro bhavedāmarāṇāntikah/esha dharmah samāsena jñeyah strīpumsayoh parah/|*"

⁶ Man. ix, 102.

would be a short statement :¹ If the first wife has no issue at all, or has no male child, the husband has to wait for eight years ; thereafter he may marry another woman. If she ever bore a dead child, the waiting period for the husband is extended to ten years. And if she is a mother of female issues only, the husband has to wait for twelve years before marrying another woman. For, "women are created for the sake of sons."² The man who violates the above rule will have to pay the first wife not only her *Śulka* and *Strīdhana* property, but also an adequate monetary compensation (*adhivedanikamartham*), in addition to a fine of twenty four *paṇas* to the Government. In fact, he may marry "any number of women", provided he gives his wives proportionate compensation and adequate subsistence (*vritti*).³

Vātsyāyana's view about the number of wives allowed for a man is a little different from those stated above. He advises the first wife herself, if she happens to be barren, to persuade her husband to marry another wife. The man should marry a second wife if the first wife bears no male issue, and if the continuity of the family is not ensured.⁴ Though, at one place, he refers to the person devoted to one wife (*ekachārin*),⁵ the reference looks like a eulogy bestowed on an exceptional virtue. For at another place, he advises the young maiden to choose a poor husband who may be solely devoted to herself only (*ātmadhāraṇah*) rather than a rich man whose riches would probably divide his love between many (*bahusādhāraṇah*).⁶ But here it is also probable that Vātsyāyana is perhaps referring not to the love that was divided between more than one law-

¹ Arth. pp. 174 f.

² Arth. p. 174.

³ Arth. p. 174.

⁴ Kām. iv, 2, 3.

⁵ Kām. i, 4, 43.

⁶ Kām. iii, 4, 55-56.

fully wedded wives, but between the wife and the paramours and mistresses, of whom he gives lengthy descriptions, and which seems to have been a characteristic of the rich of his times.¹

—Continuity of the family as has been already pointed out, is the primary object of *vivāha*. A man is allowed to marry any number of wives primarily with this object in view. There is also another provision mentioned for the widow whose husband dies without bearing her a son. Such a woman is allowed to bear a son to the younger brother of her husband, or any *sapinda* or *sagotra* of the husband.² This custom was known as *Niyoga* (levirate); it was actuated with the sole purpose of begetting a son for the son-less widow. The person who was appointed under *niyoga* to beget a son for the widow was to approach her “anointed with clarified butter, silently, to give her one son only, and, by no means, a second.”³ After the purpose of *niyoga* was attained, the man and the woman had to behave towards each other like a father and a daughter-in-law.⁴ If they behaved otherwise, they became guilty of defiling the bed of a Guru or of a daughter-in-law.⁵ The child born of *niyoga* was regarded as a *kshetraja* son of the deceased husband, i. e. he was obtained in the field (*kshetra* i. e. the wife) of the deceased; therefore he was considered as belonging to the deceased husband.⁶ However, this custom has been looked down with distinct abhorrence by the Smritis. Manu calls it as fit for cattle (*paśudharmo*), and therefore inhuman,

¹ See Kām. v.

² Yāj. i, 68-89; Gaut. xviii, 4; Man. ix, 59-60; Āpa. 20, 27, 2-3; Nār. xii, 80-81.

³ Man. ix, 60; Yāj. i, 68; Nār. xii, 80-81.

⁴ Man. ix, 62, ‘*guruvaścha snuśāvaścha varteyātām paraśparam*’.

⁵ Man. ix, 63.

⁶ *ibid.*

and prescribed nowhere in the *Dharmaśāstras*.¹ Other *Smṛiti* writers too do not regard it as a proper custom.²

This brings us to a close of the survey of the institution of *vivāha*. Before concluding, however, a few remarks on the system and institution of *vivāha* as the Hindu conceives it, would not be out of place. The various Vedic *mantras* recited at the *vivāha* ceremony reveal some of the vital social implications underlying the Hindu view and aim of *vivāha*. Socially as well as biologically, both the husband and wife are conceived as equal, having equally important functions and status. The couple are asked to start their after-marriage career as the joint keepers of the home, in which capacity they are exhorted to strive their best to fulfil their marriage vow of not failing each other in the pursuit of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. In the home, both the husband and wife are conceived as possessing rights, obligations and status consistent with the nature and the capacity of each of the two; and these rights, obligations and status, though rightly *not* regarded as *identical*, are nonetheless viewed as equal in importance for the proper nurture of the family and its traditions and culture. Thus, the wife is as much the mistress of the home (*griha-patnī*) as the husband is the master of the home (*griha-pati*). Besides, the wife is the supreme ruler (*samrājñī*) of the household. Each of them is repeatedly reminded to regard the other as his and her indispensable complement for the fulfilment of the various social and domestic obligations enjoined on those in charge of the household (*gārhapatyāya*). The newly married couple is exhorted to live in perfect harmony with each other, ever avoiding quarrelling and always happy (*modamānau*; *mā*

¹ Man. ix, 66-68.

² Brih. Smr. xiv, 12; Baudh. ii, 3, 33 f; Āp. ii, 27, 2 ff; Hār. xii, 81; and 48; Nār. iv, 17.

viyaushṭam) ; and the couple on their part pray together that the Higher Powers bless them with a complete union of hearts (*samāpo hridayāni nau*) as well as of bodies (*tanvam*). The couple was exhorted not only to fulfil the biological obligations of reproduction and nurture of the children, but to live to be father and mother of heroes (*vīrasū*). And, they were asked not only to carry out the social obligations connected with the *dharma*s of the *grihastha*, but also to fulfil the individual or psychological obligation of exerting to attain the fullness of each other's personalities in each other's company, till their bodies withered by age and death came to them. From the social side, *vivāha* may be said to be a recognition and acceptance by the bride and the groom of the *āchāras* and *dharma*s, the practices and the ideals, that prevail in and rule the community to which they belong.

Also, our brief survey of the problem of marriage will give a fair indication of the ideas, ideals and purposes underlying the Hindu marriage. In the first place, one of the purposes underlying the *vivāha* seems to be in the endeavour to secure the best progeny for the family, for the fulfilment of which man must take the best bride available and the maiden is wedded to the best groom available. The *gotra* taboo can be said to be, in this sense, intended for the maintenance of the quality and the quantity of the progeny. Secondly, the problem of marriage-relationship is not decided somehow or anyhow by the parents ; it is sought to be solved, on the contrary, with a view to serve the needs of regulated social behaviour, organization and control ; all these are broadly and generally defined by the *Grihya-Sūtras* and the *Dharma-Sūtras* ; though later on they are modified or altered by customs of the *varṇas*, and of the times and places, all the same the *Sūtra* tradition may be said to have been generally followed and practised by all the *varṇas* and the *jātis*. In fact, the problem of marriage relationship was sought to be solved on the basis

of deliberation, choice and selection with reference to certain guiding principles and rules, and not of any personal infatuation or fancy.

And, if in addition to this, we consider the after-marriage relations between the man and his wife as sanctified ceremoniously in terms of the *samskāras* that follow the *vivāha*, we may be enabled to see the depth of the seriousness and scrutiny which amounts to sacredness that is attached to married life. In these ceremonials, the vow (*vrata*) of celibacy (*brahmacharya*) has to be observed for some time after marriage ; and the foetus-laying rites, presuppose and ordain the absence of mere sex-impulse between the couple and reminds them that they are wedded and they mate essentially in order to live a life of higher purposes. Further, if we consider the other rules laid down in the *Dharmaśāstras* regarding the control of sex-life, wherein sexual relations are considered lawful only under certain conditions of the body and the mind and the whole being of each of the parties concerned, while all other sexual relations are classified as *vyabhichāra* or unlawful or not becoming human being¹, and if we put and co-ordinate all these considerations together, we can well understand how the best interests, of the propagation of the species, of the upkeep of the line of *pitris* whose descendants' sacred place of dwelling and doing is to be the home, are expected to be subserved by the institution of *vivāha* by observing a life of self-control of both the man and his wife who become the managers of the home for the while.

¹ See next Chapter.

CHAPTER V
THE HINDU FAMILY

CHAPTER V

THE HINDU FAMILY

The family is perhaps the most fundamental of all social institutions. It is the "basic social group", "the matrix in which the most significant habits and attitudes are laid down in the individual."¹ Apart from the biological function of procreation and nurturing of children, it performs the all-important psychological function of shaping the personality of the individual in accordance with the trend of life in the society in which he or she is expected to live. The family, as a social unit, has already assimilated, through years and ages, the traditions, the sentiments and modes of behaviour of the society. It therefore plays the part of a suitable medium to convey these to its individual members. In the family the child learns his language; and in this process of learning it, he gathers "the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and standards contained in the tradition of the civilization, or at least of the class to which the parents belong."² Therefore, "we must regard the family, when stable and well-organized, as the most suitable and natural environment for the development of all the natural powers and capacities which the child will need in his social life."³

Similar socio-psychological influence of the family on the individual is brought out by other writers on the subject. "Here (in the family) he acquires his personal habits, his primary conditioning to his mother, father, brothers and sisters, and other relatives. Here he gets his first

¹ Young: "Social Psychology", p. 21.

² Ellwood: Introduction to Social Psychology. p. 135.

³ *ibid.* p. 136.

training in the moral codes of his society. Here he obtains most of the fundamental values which are woven into his life-organisation. Moreover, the family is the only social group which integrates the biological and the socio-psychological aspects of human behaviours. The family is rooted in the procreation and rearing of children.....On this substructure the personal, social and cultural elements were later developed.”¹ Thus in the family, “the biological, psychological and sociological forces meet in giving the individual his start in life.”² Another social-psychologist brings out the same point by indicating the harms into which a disorganised family is likely to involve the individual. “Families develop moral codes, more or less in conformity to the general sentiments but with interesting variations. The family, more than any other group perhaps, affects the development of the individual’s moral attitudes. It has an almost uncontested control over children in their earlier and most impressionable years. Sensitive to the prevailing culture, it seeks to transmit the moral ideas of the group to its members. When it fails in this task, through disorganisation, the child may grow up with distorted sentiments and find itself socially isolated or at war with the community.”³

(What are the foundations of the institution of family? It seems that the chief foundations of the family institution are the two great primary instincts, the sexual instinct and the parental instinct. Upon the basis of these two fundamental instincts, the whole superstructure of the family is erected.⁴ It is the greatest concern of the social group or the community to see that these two instincts

¹ Young. Op. Cit. pp. 21-22.

² Young. Op. Cit. p. 237.

³ Kreuger and Reckless: “Social Psychology” p. 274.

⁴ See, e. g. Ellwood: “Sociology in its Psychological Aspects” pp. 213 ff.

are so guided as to make them socially useful. To achieve this end, the group tries to keep a control over them through the agencies of law, moral and religious sanctions, customs, and usages.)

(It has been suggested that all social and altruistic sentiments of the later life of man are derivations from these instincts connected with the family life. "The reproductive instinct," says McDougall, "is in a sense anti-social rather than social. Nevertheless its importance for society needs no demonstration ; for it is clear that if it could be abolished in any people, that people would very soon disappear from the face of the earth." The reproductive and the parental instincts are correlated in human beings. "It is probable that these two instincts in conjunction... directly impel human beings to a greater sum of activity, effort and toil, than all the other motives of human action taken together. The parental instinct especially impels to actions that involve self-sacrifice, in forms of suppression of the narrower egoistic tendencies and of heavy and unremitting toil on behalf of the offspring."¹ Cooley tries to expound the same view by pointing out that the primary ideals of human society—ideals of love, service, self-sacrifice—have their original schooling in the family, because the family normally illustrates the practices for which these ideals stand.²) And, the social instincts and feelings are taken by Kirkpatrick to be only an extension of the parental instinct from the family to the larger group.³

The studies carried on by some psychoanalysts also emphasise this aspect of psycho-social influence of the family on the individual. Flügel observes that "Even on a superficial view it is fairly obvious that, under existing social

¹ McDougall: "An Introduction to Social Psychology" (1928) pp. 229 and 231.

² Cooley: "Social Organization", Chs. III and IV.

³ Kirkpatrick: "Fundamentals of Child Study", p. 113.

conditions, the psychological atmosphere of the home life with the complex emotions and sentiments aroused by and dependent on, the various family relationships must exercise a very considerable effect on human character and development. Recent advances in the study of human conduct indicate that this effect is even greater than has been generally supposed : it would seem that, in adopting his attitude towards the members of his family circle, a child is at the same time determining to a large extent some of the principle aspects of his relations to his fellowmen in general ; and that an individual's outlook and point of view in dealing with many of the most important questions of human existence can be expressed in terms of the position he has taken up with regard to the problems and difficulties arising within the relatively narrow world of the family."¹ Adler's studies of the child in its relation to the family, and Freud's psychoanalytical studies are too famous in this connection. Comte recognised this deep influence of the family life upon the individual, when he said : "In the family life alone can the social instincts find any basis for growth."² To sum up, the family, as has been well said, "is based on a complex of the most profound impulses of our organic nature, those of mating, procreation, maternal devotion, and parental care, and is fortified in man by a highly significant and close-knit group of secondary emotions, from romantic love to the pride of the race, from the affection of the mates to the desire for economic security of a home, from the jealousy of personal possession to the baffled yearning for perpetuity. It presents the first social environment and the profoundest formative influences of the awakening lives of which it is

¹ Flügel: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*", p. 4.

² Comte: "Positive Philosophy" vol. II, ch. V, quoted by Ellwood.

the source.”¹ All the altruistic attitudes of man could be traced to have their roots in the family life ; co-operation, self-sacrifice, service to humanity, universal brotherhood, love of living beings, have been traced back to their origins to co-operation in the family-life.² The interaction of each of the members with the others in the family is of profound significance in determining the individual's mental attitudes and his behaviour in society. Dr. Burgess, therefore, has rightly stressed the importance of family as a unit of interacting personalities.³

I

/ With this preliminary discussion on the socio-psychological implications of the institution of family, let us now start on our inquiry of the structure and functions of Hindu Family. The real family life of a *Snātaka*, i. e. one who has completed his course of the *brahmacharyāśrama*, starts with his marriage (*vivāha*). Beginning from the acceptance of the bride's hand, that is, as soon as he is wedded, the man is to prepare himself to undertake the duties connected with the 'home' (*grihyam*).⁴ Here, according to the Hindu Dharmaśāstras, he has to practise all those rites (*vidhis*) intended for the preservation and continuity of the *kula*, which word may be translated as the 'family'. With the sacred fire kindled at the wedding, the *grihī* (i. e. the *grihastha*) has to follow, according to the injunctions of the *śāstras* (*yathāvidhi*),

¹ McIver: "Society, Its Structure and Changes" p. 118.

² Ellwood: "Sociology in its Psychological Aspects" pp. 213 ff.

³ E. W. Burgess: "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities", in "The Family", Vol. VII, (March, 1926), pp. 3 ff.

⁴ Āśv. G. S. i, 9, 1: '*pāṇigrahaṇādi grihyam paricharet*'; also Pār. G. S. i, 2, 1; Kh. G. S. i, 5, 1; Sān. i, 1; Hir. G. S. i, 7, 22, 2-3; Āp. G. S. ii, 5, 14; etc.

the domestic duties (*grihyam karma*) and the five great sacrifices (*pancha yajnas*).¹ These five sacrifices are intended to expiate the sins committed by a *grihastha*, and which as a *grihastha*, he cannot but help committing, at the five 'slaughter-houses',² as it were, which are found in each home, viz., the hearth (*chullī*), the grinding-stone (*peshaṇī*), the broom (*upaskarah*), the pestle and mortar,³ and the water-vessel.⁴ The five great sacrifices are the *Brahma-yajna*, the *Pitri-yajna*, the *Deva-yajna*, the *Bhūta-yajna* and the *Nri-yajna* (or *Manushya-yajna*).⁵

These expiating sacrifices are performed in terms of executing certain duties. Thus teaching and studying are pursued as expressive of the *brahma-yajna*, which is offered to the memory of the distinguished and learned sages of the past (*rishis*); the offering of water and food known as *tarpana* and offered at the *śrāddha* ceremony forms the sacrifice to the manes (*pitri-yajna*); oblations offered to the sacred fire (*homa*) have reference to the sacrifice to the gods (*deva-yajna*); offering of food to alleviate and propitiate the spirits which are supposed to influence human being constitutes the *bhūta-yajna*; and the hospitable offerings of food and shelter to the guests and strangers (*atithipūjanam*) has to be performed in a spirit of sacrifice to man (*nri-yajna*).⁶ Every householder (*kuṭumbin*) must offer these five great sacrifices in order to gain permanent (*nityam*) happiness.⁷ Indeed, these five viz. the sages, the manes, the gods, the spirits and the strangers look up (*āśāsate*) to him in expectation of these

¹ Man. iii, 67; also, Yāj. i, 97; Śān. G. S. i, 1 ff; Āśv. G. S. i, 9; Pār. G. S. i, 2; Gob. G. S. i, 1, etc.

² *Sūnā—paśuvadhasthānam* (Kullūka).

³ *Kaṇḍaṇi—ulūkhalamusale*.

⁴ *Udakumbha*.

⁵ Man. iii, 68-69.

⁶ Man. iii, 70 and 81; Yāj. i, 102; Āśv. G. S. iii, 1, 1-4.

⁷ Man. iii, 79-81; Yāj. i, 23; 104.

offerings.¹ The *grihastha* and his wife (*dampatī*) should take their meals only after (*śeṣha-bhug*) they have duly honoured the *rishis*, *devas*, *pitris*, *grihya-devatās* (the guardian deities of the home), the *atithis* (i. e. guests) and the servants (*bhṛityas*).² Therefore, a discipline of 'giving away,' of parting with things of worldly value, is sought to be cultivated in the home. Clarified butter, which is one of the most costly articles of food, has to be poured out in large quantities into the fire.³ The householder ought never to seek to accumulate or amass wealth; he should live in the manner of a *śilonchha*, i. e. in the manner of one who does not accumulate the harvest of the farm, but distributes that to those who are in need of it, while he himself lives on the fallen and abandoned stalks of corn and grain that remain on the farm after the harvest is taken away.⁴

The sacred fire kindled at the time of the *vivāha* has to be kept on going ceaselessly with great vigilance.⁵ When the husband is absent from the house (as when he is on journey, etc.), this fire is to be looked after and worshipped by his wife, or son, or daughter or the pupil (*antevāsi vā*).⁶ The wife has to undergo fasting if it goes out, in the opinion of some, says Āśvalāyana.⁷

✓The Grihya-Sūtras have prescribed ceremonies and rituals for building a house too. The ceremonies symbolise prosperity of wealth, cattle and progeny in the house. The home is supposed to be the dwelling place not only

¹ Man. iii, 80.

² Man. iii, 116-17; also Pār. G. S. ii, 9, 12-14; Yāj. i, 105. (Pār. G. S. ii, 9, 15, however adds: "The householder, may, however, eat before other members of the house").

³ cf. Thoothi: "Vaishnavas of Gujarāt", p. 32.

⁴ Yāj. i, 128.

⁵ Āśv. G. S. i, 9, 2.

⁶ Āśv. G. S. i, 9, 1; Śān. G. S. ii, 17, 3.

⁷ Āśv. G. S. i, 9, 3.

for the living members of the family, but also for the fathers and fore-fathers who have passed away and for the children and grand-children who are to come.) The owner of the house to be built draws, with an Udumbara branch, three times a line round the building-ground while uttering : "Here I include the dwellings for the sake of food", and sacrifices in its centre on an elevated spot, with the texts, "Who art thou? Whose art thou? To whom do I sacrifice thee, desirous of dwelling in the village? *Swāhā!* Thou art the god's share on this earth. From here have sprung the fathers who have passed away..." etc.¹ There are invocations to the deities asking them to guard the home, that it may be "prosperous, long-lasting, standing amid prosperity", and to which "may the child come; and the calf".² The builder of the house establishes the sacred fire inside the house after it is built,³ and entering the house offers oblations to the Vāstoshpati in order that He may be saviour of the human beings and animals that may come to dwell in the house.⁴

✦ In such a home, the *grihastha* (*kuṭumbin*) has to please the *rishis* by studying and learning (*svādhyāyena*), worship the *devas* (gods) by burnt oblations (*homa*) remember the *pitris* (manes) by *tarpaṇa* offerings (*śrāddhaiścha*), serve men by offering food (*annair*) to them, and other living creatures (*bhūtas*) by the *bali* offerings.⁵ And after he has paid his debts (*ānṛiṇyam gatvā*) to the great sages, the manes, and the gods, according to the *śāstras* (*yathā-*

¹ Śān. G. S. iii, 2, 1-2; cf. also Āśv. G. S. ii, 7 f.; Gobh. Gr. S. iv, 7; etc.

² Śān. G. S. iii, 2, 9; Āśv. G. S. ii, 8, 16; Pā. G. S. iii, 4, 4; etc.

³ Pār. G. S. iii, 4, 5, gives a lengthy ritualistic description of this.

⁴ Śān. G. S. iii, 4, 2; Pār. G. S. iii, 4, 7; Kh. G. S. iv, 2, 6-21; Āp. vii, 17; etc.

⁵ Man. iii, 81; also Yāj. i, 23; 104.

vidhi), he is to make over everything to the son, and dwell in his home without caring for any worldly concern.¹

The *grihasta* has to do all these as a matter of duty ; besides, by fulfilling these obligations, he accumulates *dharma*. For, after a *kuṭumbin's* death neither father, nor mother, nor wife, nor sons, nor relations stay to be his companions to help him (*sahāyārtham*) ; *dharma* alone remains with him.² "Single is each person born, single he dies ; single he enjoys the fruit of good deeds, and single he suffers the penalty of sins. Leaving the dead body on the ground like a log of wood or a clod of earth, the relatives depart from him. Only his spiritual gatherings (*dharma*) follow him. Let him, therefore, incessantly be after the gradual accumulation of *dharma*, in order that it may be of help to him after death. For with the help of *dharma*, he will be able to traverse a gloom (*tamas*) which is otherwise difficult to pass through."³

The foregoing outline of the Hindu's *griha*, its relation to the householder, and the rites and rituals by which it has to be incessantly hallowed is sufficient to give us some clue into the psychology of the Hindu home. As we have said, the Hindu home is the dwelling-place not only of the living members of the family, but also of the *pitris*, the ancestors, under the care and blessings of *Agni*,—the sacred Fire, the presiding deity of the home. The *pañchamahāyajnas* have to be performed in the presence of *Agni*. The fathers and fore-fathers are to be remembered every day at the time of *pitri-yajna*. And, even the *Sūdra* is allowed to practise the *pañchamahāyajnas*, though he has to do this without the recitation of the *mantras*.⁴ Thus the psychology of spiritual continuity

¹ Man. iv, 257.

² Man. iv, 239.

³ Man. iv, 239-242.

⁴ Yāj. i, 121 ; Man. x, 127, and Kullūka's commentary on it ; also cf. Vis. Purā. iii, 8, 33 ; Mahā. Śānti. 60, 35-37.

forms the basis of the Hindu's family and its traditions (*kuladharmā*). The living members of the family are, so to speak, trustees of the home which belongs to the *pitrīs*, in the interests of the *putrās*,—the future members of the family. All the property enjoyed by the members of the family belongs to the home, and not to any particular member or members of the family. And the home consists of a continuity of all the members of the family—past members that are no more, present members that are living, and future members that are to come into being. The home therefore is the place wherein there is common kitchen, common property, common god, common weal and common woe. The central idea here is the worship of the family (*kula*) as a temple of sacred traditions.

Life in this world, for the Hindu, is a sojourn.¹ The individual does not belong to the home, nor does the home belong to the individual. He comes from elsewhere, belongs to elsewhere, where he shall have to go. The individual has to perform his due *dharma*s and *karma*s here, without manifesting any sign of ownership. All the home property belongs, in the social meaning, to the individual's fore-fathers, and their children, not to the individual himself. In this sense, we may say, that the home is supposed to belong to the perpetual Agni in the home, the symbol of the continuity of the family.

The home, moreover is the place where the *Dharmaśāstras* as also the *Arthaśāstras* and *Kāmaśāstras* are practised. It is the place where the *dharma*s and the *karma*s are thought out, practised and idealized. Even though the *grihastha* is free to behave in any way he likes within normal limits, within the four walls of his house, there is always present a divine witness (*sākshī*), to each

¹ See our discussion in Ch. I.

and every one of his deeds, in the form of the Agni, the permanent sacred fire of the home, who keeps watch over, blesses, directs and inspires the *dharma*s and the *karma*s of the inmates of the home. He is also the intercessor between man and his departed forefathers, and between man and the Gods. He is the God's representative to interpret the divine to man and the human to the Gods.¹ The *griha* thus belongs, in this sense, to *Agni-deva*, and to the past and coming members of the family, and partially only—and that in a limited sense—to the *grihasta* himself.

It is in view of these ideas and ideals that the *grihasta* is asked to live a life of non-attachment in the family; thus a spirit of selflessness, (*alīptatva* or *saṁnyasta vṛitti*), even while conducting the affairs of the world, restrains and dominates his thought and action. The *grihasta* himself has to feel himself perfectly at peace in the *griha* realising that after all the *griha* is really in charge of and under the guidance and supervision of Agni.

We can thus see that there are two kinds of checks upon the Hindu *grihasta*: In the first place, the individual himself does not belong to this *samsāra*. He belongs to elsewhere. For him, the *samsāra* is *kṣaṇabhaṅgura*—a temporary field of action (*karmabhūmi*). In the second place, his life in *grihasthāśrama* must be lived and directed only in terms of necessary *dharma*s and *karma*s. To the extent to which the individual performs these, he prepares himself for the final goal, viz., *mokṣa*.

II

With this preliminary survey of the salient points in the general psychology of Hindu family life, we shall now commence a review of the Hindu family, in relation to

¹ Cf. Thoothi: The Vaishṇavas of Gujarat. p. 32.

its members and *vice versa*, and the interpersonal relations of the members among themselves, in order to get a complete view of the social implications of the Hindu family. The first thing that strikes us when we consider the Hindū family is its joint nature. All the members of the family live together in the same abode. Thus the family circle was not the narrow one consisting of parents and children only ; it used to be very often as wide as could be, there being presumably no limit on the size of the family ; but it seems that normally the joint-family includes three generations ; for, the life-span of three generation is usually a hundred years ; and it would be exceptional that any individual may outlive a century. The Hindu law texts have taken note of this fact, since, under the rules of the Law of Partition, any member of a joint family who is removed more than three degrees from the common ancestor, can claim a share on partition.¹ Frequently, however, the family may include in the Hindu society any number of members.² "Not only parents and children, brothers and step-brothers live on the common property, but it may sometimes include ascendants, descendants and collaterals upto many generations."³

All these members of the joint family lived under the same roof, and shared the property of the family in common.⁴ Brihaspati speaks of the Hindu family as one, the members of which share a common kitchen (*ekapākena vasatām*).⁵ The members performed their daily sacred *sandhyā* rites before the same fire, and the daily sacrifices

¹ Jolly : Outlines of an History of the Hindu Law of Partition, Inheritance and Adoption. 1885 (Calcutta, Tagore Law Lectures), pp. 89 ff.

² See Jolly : Hindu Law & Custom, p. 168.

³ *ibid.* p. 168.

⁴ Nār. xiii, 38.

⁵ Bri. xxv, 6.

and worship of fire used to be performed at the common hearth. Every member of the family had to undergo the *Samskāras*, the sacraments prescribed by the *Śāstras*, for sanctifying the body ; and the sacrificial rites at these *samskāras* were performed at the common fire.

1

According to the Hindu *Dharmaśāstra*, the individual has to pass through many *samskāras*—*śarīrasamskāras* as Manu has called them ;¹ for, these are intended to sanctify the body, beginning from the moment the foetus is laid (*garbhādhāna*) to the death (*antyeshti*) of a person ; thus they are supposed to purify (*pāvanah*) the person of a human being in this life and after death.² Each of these *samskāras* is preceded by a sacrifice (*homa*). The number of these *samskāras* differs according to different authorities ; the Grihyasūtras enumerate about forty ; while the Gautama Dharmaśāstra names forty-eight.³ It will be sufficient for us to consider the more important of these in connection with our discussion. These are as follows :⁴

✓ (1) The '*garbhādhāna*' or the foetus-laying ceremony is performed at the consummation of marriage.⁵ This ceremony is in continuation of the pledge taken by the marrying parties at their marriage, viz ; to help towards the production of progeny in the family. Also, the mating of husband and wife as identified with the foetus-laying, suggests that mating is conceived as a part of the duties of the married couple towards the family and the community.

¹ Man. ii, 26.

² *ibid.*

³ These *Samskāras* are treated in minute and lengthy details in the Grihya-Sūtras, for these texts are written with the special purpose of describing all the domestic (*grihya*) rites.

⁴ e. g. Man. ii, 26-28 ; cf. Yājñ. i, 10-13.

⁵ See last Chapter, p. 173.

(2) The *pumsavana samskāra*, or the 'male-making' rite is performed during the third month of the wife's pregnancy.¹ It is intended to propitiate the deities which are supposed to govern the destinies of the foetus, so that thereby a male issue may be born. The male issue is an important adjunct in the family; for he helps the continuity of the family. In view of this, we may say that in the *pumsavana* rite, the aim of mating is conceived as serving the welfare of the family, and through it, the welfare of the community.

• (3) The *jātakarma* ceremony is performed at the birth of the child: Here the father touches and smells (*avaghrāṇam*) the child and utters benedictory *mantras* into its ears, expressing his wish that it may be endowed with long life (*āyushman*) and intelligence (*medhā*). The child is then fed with honey and butter and is thereafter fed on the breast by the mother for the first time.² The umbilical cord of the child is cut after this. General care is thus taken to ensure the safety of the mother and the child.

• (4) The *nāma-dheya* rite is performed on the tenth or twelfth day after the birth of the child when it is given a name. The question of naming is important according to some authorities; and certain broad rules have to be followed here in order that the name may refer to the family, the community and the occupation to which the person belongs. In Manu's opinion, for instance, the name given to the new-born baby should be such as to signify his *varṇa*. Thus the name of a Brāhmaṇa should

¹ Śān. G. S. i, 20; Āśv. G. S. i, 13; Go. G. S. ii, 6; Hir. G. S. ii, 1, 2. etc.; and in Yāj. i, 11. It is not mentioned by Manu.

² Śān. G. S. i, 24; Āśv. G. S. i, 15, 14; Pār. G. S. i, 16, 4., etc. (The order of *avaghrāṇa*, touching the child, uttering *mantras*, and feeding the child is not the same in all the *Grihya-Sūtras*).

denote something auspicious (*māṅgalyam*) and imply contentment (*śarmavat*); this last word is taken by some to mean, "ending in *śarman*", as e. g., in *Vishṇu-Śarmā*. So again, the name of a Kshatriya should denote power (*bala*) and imply his duty of protection (*rakshā*) as e. g. 'Balavarmā'. That of a Vaiśya should denote wealth (*dhana*) and express prosperity (*pushti*) as e. g., 'Vasubhūti'. Lastly, the Śūdra's name should denote something simple and humble (*jugupsitam*) and his duty of service (*preshyasamyutam*) as e. g., 'Dīnadāsa'. The names of women should be easy to pronounce; they should not imply anything dreadful (*akrūram*), possess a plain and unambiguous meaning (*vispashtārtham*), and must be pleasing and auspicious (*manoharam māṅgalyam*); besides, they should end in long vowels and contain a term of benediction (*āśirvādābhidhānavat*), as e. g., in the name 'Yasodādevi'.¹

•(5) The *nishkramaṇa* ceremony is performed in the fourth month after the child's birth: Here the child is, as if, presented to the Sun; and thus its first contact with the greatest power that weilds the world, as also its first contact with the world outside the home, is ritually celebrated. ✓

• (6) The *annaprāśana* rite is performed during the sixth month after birth. The child is now fed with cooked food for the first time.² Here the question of the upkeep and maintenance of the growing body of the child occupies the minds of the parents.

•(7) The *chudākarma*, or the first tonsure of the hair,

¹ See Man. ii, 31-33; and Kullūka's commentary thereon. Also cf. Pār. G. S. i, 17; Āśv. G. S. i, 15, 4-5.

² It may be noted here that the *Grihya-Sūtras* recommend flesh of different kinds of fowl and fish for the child at this ceremony—See Sān. G. S. i, 27, 2 ff; Āśv. G. S. i, 16, 3; Pār. G. S. i, 19, 8 ff., etc.

for the sake of *dharma*,¹ is performed in the first or the third year, or at any age according to the custom of the family.² This ceremony is perhaps intended to celebrate the child's introduction to the rules of bodily hygiene.

(8) The *upanayana* ceremony when the boy is initiated into the study of the Vedas, is performed at different ages for different *varṇas*.³ With this ceremony the boy is really accepted as a member of the group and of the spiritual life of the community to which his fore-fathers belong; for, from now onwards, he has a right to know and learn the secret and sacred lore of the community. He now enters the *brahmacharyāśrama*. In fact, the rite of *upanayana* heralds the second birth of the individual,⁴ — the spiritual birth of the individual as a member proper of the group and its cultural heritage. It is therefore significant of the appellation *dvijāti* (or *dvijanman*, or *dvija*, i. e. 'twice-born') given to the members of the first three *varṇas*, in that any one born within any of these *varṇas* must, of necessity, go through the *Upanayana* rites.

(9) The *sāvitrī* is to be performed, according to the Grihyasūtras, immediately after the *upanayana*, or during the third year after *upanayana*; according to Manu, it is to be performed some time before the completion of the sixteenth year for a Brāhmaṇa, twenty-second year in the case of a Kshatriya, and twenty-fourth year in the case of a Vaiśya.⁵ This rite forms a part of the duties of *brahmacharyāśram* (*brahmacharya vrata*).⁶ ✓

(10) The *samāvartana* rite celebrates the return of the student to his ancestral home after the completion of his studies at the *āśrama* of his *guru*. This *samskāra* is the

¹ 'dharmatah' = *dharmārtham kāryam*—Kullūka on Man. ii.

² Man. ii, 35; Āśv. G. S. i, 17, 1;—*Yathākuladharmam vā*.

³ See Chapter iii.

⁴ Man. ii, 68: "*aupanāyaniko vidhih utpattivyanjakah*" etc.

⁵ Man. ii, 38.

⁶ See Chapter iii.

point, in the individual's career, which marks the completion of his education, and his fitness to enter into and accept the responsibilities of family life.

*(11) The *vivāha* (marriage) ceremony marks the individual's entry into the *grihasthāśrama*. This ceremony may be said to be sealing the socialisation proper of the individual; for here he takes the pledge to assist in the continuation of the race, and actually commences his efforts in that direction. Here, again, he accepts the fundamental doctrine of *Yajña* in its fullest sense;¹ he takes a vow also, to keep on the home Fire (*Agni*) continuously burning.

*(12) The *antyeshti* or the funeral rite performed at the death, marks the end of the human career of the individual, and his entrance into the realm of ancestors (*pītris*).

This whole series of sacraments has to be performed for the females also in order to sanctify the body (*samskārartham śārīrasya*), in their proper order and at proper times (*yathākālam yathākramam*), only with this difference, that the sacred *mantras* are not to be recited on these occasions (*amantrikā*).² So also, so far as woman is concerned, the nuptial ceremony is to be regarded as equivalent to the *Vaidika samskāra* called *Upanayana*.³ Thus for a woman, devoted service of her husband is equivalent to residing at the *Guru's* home and serving him; and her devotion to various household duties is but the same as the worship of *agni* (sacred fire).⁴

In the same way, the *Śūdras*, like women, can go through these *samskāras*, without the recitation of sacred *mantras*.⁵

¹ See next section.

² Man. ii, 66; See also Āśv. G. S. i, 15, 10; 16, 6; 17, 19; Yāj. i, 13.

³ Manu. ii, 67; Yāj. i, 13.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ See Man. x, 127; Yāj. i, 121.

All these *samskāras* are a part of 'varṇa-dharma', the duties of the *varṇas*, as well as the *āśrama-dharma*. While the *Varṇa* system is intended to regulate the life of the community in the main, the *Āśrama* system is essentially devised to regulate the life of the individual. And between these two stand the *samskāras*, through which the individual becomes, from stage to stage till he retires from active life, organised into a more and more perfect social being. Thus, the natural man is raised to the fullest social status from point to point, till *vivāha*, when the orbit of his life becomes essentially dedicated to the service of social ends; hereafter, till he retires from his duties as a householder, he is pledged to produce worthy progeny, which becomes the joint duty and interest of the man and his wife for which the two have become one.

And yet, while all efforts are made towards the socialisation of the man, the man himself as an individual is not lost sight of. There are several ways and means, prescribed by the *Dharmaśāstras*, with the help of which the individual is expected to cultivate his personality in spite of, apart from, and yet in the midst of a life that is pledged to serve social ends. This is especially apparent from the fact that after all *grihasthāśrama* has to be pursued only as a stage and step to secure the entrance into the *Vānaprastha* and the *Samnyāsa*.¹

↓ The various *samskāras* performed in the first half of a man's life are so many stages for the individual in the process of socialisation. All the rituals and ceremonies at these *samskāras* have a reference to the socialisation of the individual. The individual is, as it were, carried over from one experience to another, at each particular point in his life, in order that he may feel himself more and more at one with the community of which he is a part. These rituals and ceremonies are common to all members of the

¹ See Chapter II on the *Āśramas*, supra.

Hindu community ; thus they signify the common bonds that hold the members of the community together.

These *samskāras* and the elaborate ceremonies performed in association with them, signify both to the individual as well as to the community, that something important is coming to happen to the individual on these particular occasions, in which both the community as well as the individual have their interests. Thus, the *Upanayana* ceremony, for instance, of which we have already spoken in Ch. II and above, signifies that the individual is now to prepare himself to learn the community lore, for his own good as well as for that of the community. The very elaborate ceremony of *vivāha* again, signifies the most important step taken by the individual for the welfare of the community, in that he accepts the responsibility of reproducing for the increase of the strength of the community. And it also signifies a very important step taken by the individual for his own good, in that he shows readiness to start *grihasthāśrama*, and, through it seeks to accumulate *dharma* for his future welfare towards *mokṣa*. The rituals thus signify that the individual is being entrusted with certain obligations and responsibilities for his own welfare as well as for the good of the community, from which obligations and responsibilities he was so far free.

III

We now take up the problem of specific relations of the members of the Hindu family with each other and with the family. Thus we shall have to consider the relations of the husband, the wife, the son, the daughter, and the parents with each other and with the rest of the members of the family.

I

Regarding the mutual relations between the husband and the wife, the Manusmṛiti has declared that mutual

fidelity till death is the summary of the highest *dharma* for husband and wife.¹ Manu further says that once they are united by the nuptial ceremony, they must always exert themselves to see that they are never at variance with each other, and that they must ever remain faithful to each other.² The true goal of marriage lies in "the consciousness of a permanent and unbreakable friendship" as Urwick would say; this cannot be reached unless marriage itself is made unbreakable. The natural basis of the family is the care of the young;⁴ that is the primary function of the family. "The normal function of the family is to secure what is best, or the best available for the nurture of the children, with a view to their preparation as citizens of a larger community."⁵ The monogamic family, it follows therefore, is the natural form of association, "being the only one in which both the parents can normally devote themselves whole-heartedly, and with cordial co-operation to the necessary task"⁶ of taking the care of the young. The Hindu writers have devoted much of their energy not only in praising monogamy (one wife at one time), but they have gone further in eulogising life-long union of one man to one woman, such that after the death of the one, the survivor remains single and faithful to his or her memory (i. e. *ekachāritra* or *ekapatnīvrata*). The epic story of Rāma is an example of such ideal realised. So again, is the story of King Aja

¹ Man. ix, 101. "Anyonyasyāvyabhīchāro bhavedāmarāṇāntikah/ esha dharmah samāsenā jñeyah strīpumsayoh punah/"

² Man. ix, 102: "tathā nityam yateyātām strīpumasau tu kṛitakriyau/ yathā nābhicharetām tau viyuktāvitaretaram/ esha strīpumsayorukto dharmo vo ratisamhitah/

³ Urwick: "Social Good" p. 137.

⁴ J. S. Mackenzie: "Introduction to Social Philosophy", p. 77.

⁵ *ibid.* p. 80.

⁶ *ibid.* p. 77.

in Kālidāsa's '*Raghuvansā*'. The codes of Manu and Yājñavalkya instruct the husband to be devoted solely to his wife.¹ He should respect her and please her.² Vātsyāyana also speaks of the husband devoted to one wife in highly eulogistic terms.³ The Mahābhārata gives similar instructions as the Smritis.⁴ All the daily sacrificial rites, designed to ensure happiness after death, have to be performed by man and wife together.⁵ In the family, the husband ought to exert himself to live in harmony with his wife and children.⁶ The family in which the two chief members, viz., the husband and wife, are mutually satisfied and thus in harmony with each other, is assured a most happy life.⁷

The primary object of marriage is the continuity of the family line, according to the Smritis.⁸ If, therefore, the first marriage of a man does not succeed in this object, he is allowed to marry again even while the first wife is alive. Vātsyāyana observes, that the wife who bears no child may herself advise her husband to marry another woman; and he advises such a first wife to regard the second wife as her younger sister.⁹ Yet, on the whole, the Smritis urge that the husband should not marry another wife if his first wife is able to share in the performance of his religious obligations, and has also borne him

¹ Man. iii, 45; Yāj. i, 81.

² Man. iii, 55-60; Yāj. i, 82.

³ Kām. i, 3, 4.

⁴ Mahā. Anu. 46—the whole Adhyāya.

⁵ Man. ix, 96.

⁶ Man. ix, 45; Āp. ii, 14, 16.

⁷ Man. iii, 60: '*santushṭo bhāryayā bhartā bhartrā bhāryā tathaiva cha/yasminneva kule nityam kalyāṇam tatra vai dhruvam*'

⁸ Yāj. i, 78; Āp. ii, 5, 11, 12; etc.

⁹ Kām. iv, 2, 1-5.

sons.¹ The wife of the same *varṇa* as the husband alone can personally share with her husband and assist him, in the performance of religious rites.² Such a wife, if she is kind to her husband and virtuous in her conduct, must never be shown disrespect by her husband by marrying another woman.³ He may, however, marry another woman if the first wife gives her consent to do it.⁴

Ordinarily, therefore, divorce is not known to the Hindu institution of marriage. Husband and wife are bound to each other, not only till death, but even after death, in the other world.⁵ But, the Arthaśāstra makes mention of dissolution of marriage (*moksha*) in the case of marriages *not* consecrated under any of the first four forms of marriages; viz., the Brāhma, Daiva, Ārsha and Prājāpatya.⁶ This dissolution from marriage in cases of marriages contracted under forms other than these four, again, cannot be availed of against the will of the two parties. It is available only on the ground of enmity of both the parties towards each other.⁷

As regards the husband's power over his wife we must not consider this in isolation from certain other things which are connected with it. It is along with the obligations and duties of the husband towards the wife as complements of his rights and power over her that we must consider the Hindu husband's dominion over his wife. He

¹ Yāj. i, 73; 76; Āp. ii, 5, 11, 12; cf. Man. ix, 95; 80; 81.

² Man. ix, 86; Yāj. i, 88.

³ Man. ix, 82.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ Man. v, 160-1; 164; Śuk. Nī. iv, 4, 57-9; Kāt. 837 (Kane's Ed.); also Rāmā. ii, 29, 17-18: "She who is given away as wife by her father to the man, with due ceremonies belonging to each class by touching holy water, belongs to him even in her life in the next world."

⁶ Arth. p. 177.

⁷ Arth. 176.

is the lord and master of his wife and as such he should be worshipped by her, even though he is devoid of virtues.¹ He is her guardian in her youth, just as her father guards her in childhood, and her sons are bound to do in her old age.² Husband is known as *Bhartri*,³ because he is the support of his wife ; and he is known as *Pati*⁴ because he is to protect her.⁵ When he fails to discharge these two functions, he ceases to be both *Bhartri* and *Pati*.⁶ "This eternal course of *dharma* is ever followed by pious men,—viz., that the husband, however weak he might be, ought to guard his wedded wife."⁷ For by guarding one's wife, one guards one's own offspring ; and, by guarding the offspring, one guards one's own self.⁸ The wife is known as the *Jāyā*, because one's own self is begotten on her.⁹ It is further ordained that the woman whose hand is accepted in marriage should be treated with respect and kindness ; and all that is agreeable to her should be given her.¹⁰ So also, her elder relatives-in-law, namely, the father-in-law, the brother-in-law, the mother-in-law, are exhorted to please her with affection ;¹¹ for, she is the cause of the begetting of offsprings, their nurture, and the fulfilment of other factors, so necessary for the good of society.¹² By cherishing woman, one but worships the goddess of prosperity herself ; by afflicting her, one but afflicts the goddess of prosperity.¹³ A man's half is his wife ; the wife is her husband's best of friends ;

¹ Man. v, 147-54; Yāj. i, 77; Vis. xxv, 12-14.

² Man. ix, 3.

³ From '*bhri*'—'to support' or 'maintain'.

⁴ From '*pā*'—'to protect' or 'guard'.

⁵ Mahā. Ādi. 104, 28.

⁶ Mahā. Sānti. 266, 37.

⁷ Mahā. Van. 12, 68.

⁸ *ibid.* 12, 69.

⁹ *ibid.* 12, 70—(From '*jan*'—to beget).

¹⁰ to ¹³ Mahā. Anu. 46, 1-13.

the wife is the source of *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma*; and she is also the source of *Mokṣa*.¹ "No man, even when he is in anger, should ever do anything that is disagreeable to his wife. For happiness, joy, virtue—all depend upon the wife."² Further in the *Mahābhārata*, Bhishma gives a piece of sound advice to the husband in regard to his manner of behaviour in the family. "A householder should be content with his own married wife", says he.³ He should avoid any act such as may cause a breach of peace in the family. He should never fall out with his kinsmen in the family, his brothers, sons, wife, daughter and even his servants."⁴ "With endurance," he should "bear without excitement or anxiety every sort of annoyance, and even censure" from these members of the family.⁵ In general, in family affairs, "he should keep self-controlled; he should avoid malice and curb his senses."⁶ The unity and harmony of family-life is well brought out in the following passage: "The eldest brother is like a father (to all his younger brothers); the wife and the sons are but one's own body; one's menial servants are, as it were, one's shadow; and the daughter is an object of profound love".⁷

Nārada forbids the husband or the wife even from ever bringing their quarrels to the notice of their relatives, or the king⁸ —(i. e., perhaps, to the Court for redress or trial).

The *Mahānirvāṇatantra* gives the husband another striking piece of advice with regard to the treatment towards his wife: He should never punish her; rather, he

¹ *Mahā. Ādi.* 74. 40.

² *Mahā. Ādi.* 74, 50.

³ *Sānti.* 243, 14.

⁴ *ibid.* 243, 15-16.

⁵ *ibid.* 243, 21.

⁶ *ibid.* 243, 14.

⁷ *ibid.* 243, 20.

⁸ *Nār.* vii 80

should always protect her with the respect due to mother (*mātrivat*). A virtuous wife who dearly loves her husband (*sādhvī pativrata*) should never be abandoned, even if the husband happens to be in grave peril.¹

Yājñavalkya, in the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, has clearly brought out the psychological unity of man and wife in the family. He explains that man, who was originally one, cleft himself into two, because he felt no pleasure in loneliness, and wished for a second; these two became the husband and wife. The two separately, he says, are like half of a shell, each; together, they are one whole.² We are told in the Rāmāyaṇa, that Vasishṭha asked Sitā to remain at home while Rāma would go to forest, and rule the kingdom in Rāma's place; for, "the wife is the very soul (true representative) of him who marries her."³

Here we may also remind ourselves of the ceremonies centering round the *vivāha*, especially the *saptapadī mantras* in which the bride and the groom walk together before the nuptial alter over seven heaps of rice.⁴ The whole ceremony of marriage, indeed, is significant in connection with our present discussion; but the *saptapadī* rite is specially so, because the seven pledges which the bride takes here perhaps best summarize the whole psychology underlying mutual relations between the husband and the wife in the family.

2

Next we consider the position of the wife in the Hindu family. Mrs. Bosanquet has rightly observed that in the family, the wife comes as a stranger,⁵ in a sense. All the

¹ Mahānirvāṇatantra, viii, 39.

² Br. Up. i, 4, 3.

³ Rāmā. ii, 37, 23-24.

⁴ See pp. 164-168.

⁵ "The Family", p. 258.

other members of the family have already imbibed the family traditions, customs and usages ; and the family sentiments have become quite a part of their lives. The newly-wedded wife, on the contrary, is a perfect stranger in the family. Her first important duty on entering her new home, therefore, would be to exert towards adapting herself to the traditions and sentiments of the house of which she now becomes a member. A true adaptation, however, would become the most difficult task if it is one-sided only ; it is desirable that the other members of the household too should attempt to be of real help to the new-comer, and take a lenient view of her acts of omission and commission. The greater part of this burden which falls on the shoulder of the other members of the family, has naturally to be shared by husband. We have already seen what the Mahābhārata has to say regarding the husband's part in this matter.¹ In the same passage, the parents-in-law and other relatives-in-law of the new bride are called upon to treat her with respect and kindness, if they desire for happiness in the family ; "for such conduct on their part always produces considerable happiness and advantage."² The wife is "a friend bestowed on man by Destiny", says Yudhishṭhira to the Yakṣa.³ The wife of King Daśaratha, in the Rāmāyaṇa, is described as being to him like "a friend, wife, sister and mother" as well.⁴ On occasions of joy, the wife who has a sweet tongue is like a friend who increases the joy by sharing with her husband ; on religious occasions, she is to him what a father should be ; in times of distress and worry, she is to him what a mother would prove to be.⁵ The Mahābhārata declares

¹ Mahā. Anu. 46, 1-13 (See p. 225 f.) etc.

² Anu. 46, 3.

³ Mahā. Vana. 373, 72.

⁴ Rāmā. ii, 12, 68-69.

⁵ Mahā. Ādi. 74, 72.

that in truth, a householder's home, even if crowded with sons, grandsons, daughters-in-law and servants, is virtually a lonely place to live, if there is no housewife.¹ One's home is not the house made of brick and mortar ; it is the wife who makes the home. A home without the wife is like a wilderness.² Thus, the very important part played by the wife, has received great attention by Hindu writers. The husband's true attitude towards his wife cannot be better described than what is done by the poet Kalidāsa in *Raghuvansā* wherein King Aja laments for his deceased wife thus : "She was my *grihinī* (the queen of the house), my guide in intellectual matters (*sachivah*), my true friend (*sakhī*) in private, and, in fine arts my dearest disciple".³

All this clearly shows what part the husband is to play in his relation to his wife. Out of all the relatives by marriage, the husband is the wife's nearest relation. To the task of her adaptation to the family life, his contribution must naturally be the most helpful to her. Of all the family members, it is the husband, first and foremost, who is expected to give the wife a response of heart and mind.

¹ Mahā. Sānti. 144, 5 :

"*putrapautravadhūbhṛityairākīrṇamāpi sarvataḥ/ bhāryā-hīnam grihasthasya śūnyameva griham bhavet/*"

² *ibid.* 144, 6 :

"*na griham grihamityāhur grihinā grihamuchyate/griham tu grihinhīnam araṇyasadrīṣam matam/*"

See also *ibid.* 144, 12-17 :

"*vrikshamūle'pi dayitā yasya tishṭhati tad griham/prāsādo'pi tayā hīnah kāntāra iti nīśchitam//dharmārthakāmakāleshu bhāryā pumsah sahāyini/videśagamane chāsya saiva viśvāsakārikā//bhāryā hi paramo hyarthah purushasyeha paṭhyate/asahāyasya loke'smin lokayātrā'sahāyini//nāsti bhāryāsamo bandhur nāsti bhāryāsamā gatih/nāsti bhāryāsamo loke sahāyo dharmasamagrahe//yasya bhāryā grihe nāsti sādhrvī cha priyavādini/araṇyam tena gantavyam yathāraṇyam tathā griham/*"

³ *Raghu.* viii, 67.

And no unity between man and woman can be perfect without the psychological concord of their spirit and emotions. Each must go out in sympathy to the other ; each must give the greater part of her or his affection to the other ; and, each must, in fact, in every possible way, try to be a perfect psychological complement of the other.

And yet, though the Hindu writers expect much from the husband in this direction of mutual sympathy, mutual affection, and mutual congeniality, much more still is expected by them of the wife. The wife herself seems to be held by them to be the most responsible of all for her adaptability in the family. Thus, the mistress of the house is asked by Manu and other *Smṛitikāras* to obey her lord as long as he lives, and remain faithful to his memory after his death.¹ They sometimes go even farther than that ; they declare that she should worship him as a deity even though he happens to be a man of bad character and has no good quality in him.² Brihaspati says that the wife, who feels afflicted when her husband is afflicted, and feels happy when he is happy, is the truly devoted wife of her husband.³ Woman is the "goddess of fortune" in the family, because, she can make or mar happiness in the family.⁴ She is the immediate person concerned with the nurture and bringing up of the children ; so, she plays the most important part in family life.⁵ On the lady of the house alone, says Manu, depends the due performance of all acts of *dharma* (*dharmakāryāṇi*), heavenly bliss for oneself and one's ancestors, the due care of the offspring, and, on the whole,

¹ Man. v, 151; Yāj. i, 75; 83; Vis. xxv, 13-14.

² Man. i, 154-6; Yāj. i, 77; Vis. xxv, 15; Kāt. 836.

³ Brihas. Smr. xxiv, 8.

⁴ Man. ix, 26.

⁵ Man. ix, 27: *utpādanamapatyasya jātasya paripālanam/ pratyaham lokayātrāyāḥ pratyaksham strīnibandhanam.*

“the highest conjugal happiness”¹ (*ratiruttamā*). It falls to her lot, therefore, as her important responsibility, to maintain peace in the house and promote happiness in the family. She must do her utmost towards conducting the affairs of the family smoothly by controlling her thought, speech and actions (*manovāgdehasamyatā*), and by doing her duty towards her husband.² Such a wife is called the *sādhvī*, by the virtuous, in this world.³

As a wife, woman has to subject herself to the authority of her husband.⁴ She should never, in the opinion of Manu, do anything that might displease him, whether he be alive or dead.⁵ As the mistress of the house, she should always be of cheerful attitude, managing her household affairs cleverly and efficiently, and spending economically.⁶ Vyāsa gives a similar account of the housewife's duties : She is to rise up early in the morning before her husband, take her bath, and clean the house, the yard of the house, and the utensils of cookery. Then she is to light the fire in the oven, make arrangements for different kinds of tasty dishes for the day, give the servants orders of their work for the day, and make out an estimate of the expenses necessary for the day. She should then pay her respects to the elders in the house. After the meals are prepared, she should first serve the children in the family, then her husband and afterwards take her own meals. After the meals are over, she should prepare accounts of the family income and expenses.⁷

¹ Man. ix, 2, 8.

² Man. ix, 29 and v, 165 (both identical).

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Man. v, 148-9; Yāj. i, 85-6; Śukra. Ni. iv, 4, 25; Vis. xxv, 13; Bau. ii, 3, 45; Vas. v, 3.

⁵ Man. v, 156.

⁶ Man. v, 150; Yāj. i, 83; Vas. xxv, 4-6.

⁷ Vyāsa. Sm. ii, 20 ff.

Vātsyāyana agrees with the Smritis in regard to the duties of the mistress of the house.¹ He advises her to exert herself towards gaining the full confidence of her husband;² she should obey her husband's elder relations and behave courteously towards the servants of the family;³ "If he sins against her, let her be indeed a little angry and scold him, but not too much."⁴ She may engage herself in amusements of every description, but only so far as may please her husband.⁵ "Angry words, angry looks, speaking with averted head, standing at the door and looking out, talking in the garden, remaining long in a place apart—all these things let her shun;"⁶ she is not to go out of the house without the husband's permission;⁷ and, if the husband is used to spending too much money, or not spending it wisely, let her tell him of that in private.⁸

The Mahābhārata goes on in a similar strain with regard to the attitude of the wife to the husband. Bhīshma reports a conversation between Sumanā and Śāṇḍilī. The former wanted to know by what penances the latter was able to obtain celestial regions. Śāṇḍilī replied that it was not by virtue of any hard penances at all; but, by virtue of her obedience and devotion to her husband she was able to achieve paradise.⁹ In the Vanaparva, Kṛishṇa's wife Satyabhāmā desires to know of Draupadī how she was able to "rule the sons of Paṇḍu", her five

¹ Kām. iv, 1, 1-55;—Peterson's Tr. in J. Anthr. Soc. Bom. Vol. ii, No. 7 (1891), pp. 459-66.

² *ibid.* v, 1.

³ *ibid.* v, 37.

⁴ *ibid.* v, 19.

⁵ *ibid.* v, 16.

⁶ *ibid.* v, 22.

⁷ *ibid.* v, 25.

⁸ *ibid.* v, 14.

⁹ Mahā. Anu. 23.

husbands.¹ How was it that they were so obedient to her and were never cross with her?² Satyabhāmā thought it was all due probably to some magic power which Draupadī possessed. Draupadī, however, assured her that it was all entirely due to her obedience and devotion to her husbands. She took her bath, ate and slept after her husbands, and after all the servants and attendants.³ She was always engaged in serving her husbands.⁴ She renounced whatever her husbands did not enjoy.⁵ In her opinion, "the husband is wife's god; he is her (sole) refuge;...My husbands have become pleased with me and are at my beck and call on account of my diligence, my alacrity, and for the humility with which I serve my elders."⁶

The Rāmāyaṇa is full of the stories of the wife's devotion to husband, its heroine Sītā being herself the chief object of the poet's eulogy. Sītā says that in this world, the wife is the sharer of her husband's destiny; all other relatives are each responsible for his or her own destiny only.⁷ The husband is indeed a Deity for the wife.⁸ "Women who love their husbands,—whether he treats them well or ill, whether he lives in the city or in forest,—attain high status; and, the husband, whether wicked or lustful, is the highest God to the wife of good morals."⁹

There is another aspect of the duties of the mistress of the house. She is held to be responsible for the general comfort of all the members of the family. Manu observes

¹ Mahā. Vana. 232, 4.

² *ibid.* 5-6.

³ *ibid.* 24.

⁴ *ibid.* 29.

⁵ *ibid.* 32.

⁶ *ibid.* 37 and 39.

⁷ Rāmā. ii, 27, 4-18.

⁸ Rāmā. ii, 39, 31.

⁹ Rāmā. ii, 117, 22-28.

that she should undertake the management of household affairs, collection and expenditure of his wealth, preparation of food, keeping everything clean in the house, and fulfilling all the sacred obligations (*dharma*).¹ She should not sleep at odd hours ; nor should she wander about, mixing with wicked people ; nor should she ever drink spirituous liquors.² She should rise before the other members of the house and pay her respects to the elder members of the family.³ She should be always cheerful, and should manage the affairs of the family with cleverness ;⁴ and, she has to take care to keep everything clean in the home, and should be economical in regard to expenditure.⁵ In this regard, Draupadī explains how she followed this duty of the wife as the manager of household affairs. She used to keep all articles and utensils and food in the house clean, to prepare food at the proper hour, to offer the religious oblations and worship, and to look to the comfort of the guests of the house.⁶ Draupadī indeed, with pride, goes on to boast that she alone knew, better than any one else, about what the servants, attendants, and even the cow-herds and shepherds in her palace did and what they did not do ; in fact, she alone had the fullest knowledge of the secrets of the wealth and the income and expenditure of the huge royal establishment of her lord.⁷ This illustrates the Hindu conception of the wife's duties and responsibilities in the family.⁸

¹ Man. ix, 10-11.

² Man. ix, 13 ; also Br. Smr. xxiv, 7.

³ Br. Smr. xxiv, 7.

⁴ Man. v, 150.

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Mahā. Van. 232 and 233.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ Cf. also similar enumeration of the housewife's duties given by Hārīta, in Colebrooke's "Digest" Bk. iii, Ch. ii, Sect. 1, p. 141, Cii. (Quoted in S. C. Vidyārṇava's "Yājñavalkya-smṛiti", pp. 147-48).

Vātsyāyana, speaking about the duties of a Hindu wife, likewise describes her as the manager of the home; the wife must look after the household work and arrangements;¹ she is to make purchases of things of domestic necessity, like utensils, oil, salt, drugs, etc.;² and, she has also to keep accounts of income and expenditure, and check them.³ Vātsyāyana also says that the lady of the house is to keep a good garden for vegetables to be used in the kitchen, as well as a garden for fruits and flowers.⁴ In the *Śākuntalam* of Kālidāsa, the sage Kaṇva's advice to his adopted daughter Śākuntalā, on the eve of her departure for her husband's abode, is the same as Vātsyāyana's. Śākuntalā is advised by Kaṇva to obey her husband's parents and behave courteously with servants; and above all, says he, "do not fall out with your husband even if he happens to insult you."⁵

In the *Śukranīti*, we find almost similar account of the duties of a housewife.⁶ She has to get up before her husband, clean all utensils, sweep the house, pay her respects to the elders in the family, cook the food, and so on. Women, according to *Śukranīti*, have no separate right to the use of means for the realization of the three-fold aims of life—*Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma*—except in terms of service of the home and of the husband.⁷ "The wife should be pure in mind, speech and action; she should abide by the instructions of her husband, and follow him like a pure shadow; she must be a friend in all his good activities, and a servant at all his commands."⁸ In the

¹ Kām. iv, 1, 3; cf. Ratiśāstra. vii.

² *ibid.* vv, 26-28; cf. Ratiśāstra, *ibid.*

³ *ibid.* v, 32; cf. Ratiśāstra, *ibid.*

⁴ *ibid.* vv, 6-8.

⁵ Peterson infers that Kālidāsa is quoting Vātsyāyana here.

⁶ Śukra. iv, iv, 11 to 65.

⁷ *ibid.* 11.

⁸ *ibid.* 23-25.

home she should be sweet and gentle in speech, and courteous in behaviour.¹ "The father gives measured things, the brother and son also give only limited things. Who does not worship the husband who is the giver of infinite (blessings)?"² The wife should practice music and gentle manners, "according as the husband is master of these, and thus practise the fine arts of winning over, with regard to him."³

Under the Hindu ideal of marriage, man and wife become united according to the sacred *mantras* and rituals with the blessings of the gods. Indeed, in the *Mahābhārata* we come across a statement that "According to the injunctions of the Scriptures, the husband should regard his wife as an acquisition due to his own pristine deeds or what has been ordained by God."⁴ "The husband is declared to be one with his wife" says Manu. He adds also, that "he only is the perfect man who consists of three persons united viz., his wife, his offspring and himself."⁵ 'Mutual fidelity till death' is, in Manu's opinion, the summary of the highest law for the husband and wife to follow.⁶ The harmony of intellect and feeling between the two main component members of the family was of supreme importance in the view of Hindu writers on the subject. The *saptapadī* brings forth most vividly the bearing of this intellectual and emotional unity of the married couple. This psychological harmony is further emphasized by the fact that all daily rites and *dhārmika* duties to be performed in order to win happiness here and hereafter, have to be performed by man and wife

¹ *ibid.* 37-42.

² *ibid.* 64-65.

³ *ibid.* 55-56.

⁴ *Mahā. Anu.* 44, 27.

⁵ *Man.* ix, 45; also *Āp.* ii, 14, 16.

⁶ *Man.* ix, 101-103.

together.¹ Brihaspati speaks of the wife as *sahadharma-chāriṇī* and also as *ardhāṅgī*, i. e., half the body of her husband.²

The Smritis and the Mahābhārata refer to the wife by the name *Jāyā*, because, according to them the husband becomes an embryo and is born again (*jāyate*) of his wife as her son.³ Every family has to take care that its offsprings are of pure blood. *Mokṣa* is obtainable through sons and grandsons. Continuity of the family line (*ānantyam loké*) was the main object of taking a wife, and with this primary aim of marriage in view, the husband should carefully guard the wife so that the children born out of the union are of pure blood.⁴ If the wife is not well guarded, she may bring disgrace on both the families,—her husband's as well as her father's.⁵ By carefully guarding the wife, the husband is able to preserve the purity of his offspring, his family, himself, and his means of acquiring *dharma*.⁶ The use of force is inadvisable in guarding women; moreover, man will be unable to guard them completely by force.⁷ Manus suggests that instead of using force against his wife, the husband shall try to keep her engaged in the management of the household affairs, so that she may not get idle moments for thinking of or doing any undesirable or untoward act.⁸ Thus, for Manus and Brihaspati, the management of household affairs, as we have described before,⁹ is, in a way, a means of engaging the wife's mind which may otherwise be led

¹ Man. ix, 96.

² Brihas. xxiv, 10-11.

³ Man. ix, 8; Yāj. i, 56; Mahā. Van. 12, 70.

⁴ Yāj. i, 78; Āp ii, 5, 11, 12; and Mahā. Ādi. 74, 35.

⁵ Man. ix, 5.

⁶ Man. ix, 7.

⁷ Man. ix, 10.

⁸ Man. ix, 10-11; also Br. Sm. xxii, 4.

⁹ See pp. 233-34, ante.

astray, since "the empty mind", as they say, "is the devil's workshop".

This reminds us of the late Professor Cooley's remarks: "Nothing works more for sanity and contentment than a reasonable amount of necessary and absorbing labour; disciplining the mind and giving one a sense of being of use in the world. It seems a paradox to say that idleness is exhausting, but there is much truth in it, especially in the case of sensitive and eager spirits. A regular and necessary task rests the will by giving it assurance, while the absence of such a task wearies it by uncertainty and futile choice. Just as a person who follows a trail through the woods will go further with less exertion than one who is finding his way, so we all need a foundation of routine, and the lack of this among women of the richer classes is a chief cause of the restless, exacting, often hysterical spirit harassing to its owner and every one else, which tends towards discontent, indiscretion and divorce."¹ The Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa and Vātsyāyana's Kāma-Sūtra, however, do not refer to any such motive when they prescribe similar duties for the lady of the house. Of the very high value placed on the virtue of chastity in women, numerous instances could be adduced from the Epics and other works. After the death of the husband, remark Manu and Yājñavalkya, the wife must not even mention the name of another man.² The woman who is unfaithful to her husband suffers disgrace in this world and, after death, she loses her place by the side of her husband in heaven.³ But the wife who maintains chastity (*brahmacharya*) after her husband's death attains heaven even though she has no son.⁴ }

¹ Cooley: "Social Organization". p. 368.

² Man. v, 157; Yāj. i, 75, 77.

³ Man. v, 161; 164; Vas. xxi, 14.

⁴ Man. v, 160; Yāj. i, 75; Sukr. iv, 4, 57-59; Kāt. 837; Vis. xxv, 17; Par. iv, 26.

But even here, as is observable in other cases when we come to examine the Dharmaśāstras, we are not treading on smooth grounds free from difficulties. For the Smritis, at certain places, also require the husband to keep a distance between himself and his wife. For instance, he is not to eat in the company of his wife, nor is he to look at her when she is eating, sneezing, yawning or sitting at her ease.¹ On the other hand, the descriptions in the epics and poetry and drama speak of the housewife as taking part in the husband's affairs on a status of equality. The verse in the *Raghuvansa* already quoted,² for instance, is quite in contradiction to such injunctions of the Smritis. In Vātsyāyana's opinion, the wife could take the liberty of rebuking her husband, if he is a spend-thrift, or, again, if he commits any wrong against her.³ Draupadi's advice to her husband Yudhishtira, on what his duty was and what it was not, at the time when he declared his intention to renounce worldly engagements and lead an ascetic life, clearly indicates her status of the wife as the advisor of her husband.⁴ She even goes to the extent of rebuking him for making his brothers and herself suffer the tortures of forest life, though the rebuke is couched in "soothing and sweet words", as Vaiṣampāyana puts it. "Why.....did you say to these brothers, then living with you", she demands, ".....these words, viz. 'we will kill Duryodhana and enjoy Earth'.?... Having yourself said these words to your brothers then, why do you depress our hearts now?"⁵ Of course equality of status did not mean identity of rights

¹ Man. iv, 43; Yāj. I, 131; Vis. Lxviii, 46; Vas. xii, 31; Gaut. ix, 32.

² *Grihiṇī sakhīvaḥ sakhī mīthah, priyaśishyā lalite kalāvidhau* / see p. 229.

³ Vāt. op. Cit. (Peterson) vv. 19 & 14.

⁴ Mahā. Śānti. 14, vv. 6-37.

⁵ ibid. vv. 7 and 11.

and functions of the man and the wife. It meant that each of the two was recognized as possessing equal importance as member in charge of the home. The functions, and therefore also the rights and privileges, of the two sexes were always considered to be dissimilar in nature. Nevertheless, there was no distinction of degree, in terms of 'higher and lower', between them. There was only a distinction of kind. And in the drama of family life, woman's place was as high as man's.

Manu declares that a wife can never be released (*vimuchyate*) by repudiation.¹ But the husband may abandon (*tyajet*) his wife, only in case she possesses some blemish, disease, or faults which were not disclosed to him before marriage.² Even if she hate him, he is not allowed to abandon her immediately. He has to bear with her at least for one year ; and if she continues to hate him even after that period, he may deprive her of her property, and cease to cohabit with her ;³ she must, even then, be maintained, however, by him. If she shows disrespect for the husband who has some vice, or who is given to drinking, she shall be abandoned only for three months and shall be deprived of her ornaments and furniture.⁴ But a wife cannot be cast off if she shows disrespect, or even aversion, to her husband who is insane (*unmatta*), or a eunuch, or who is destitute of manly strength (*abījam*), or who is suffering from serious disease (*pāparoginam*).⁵

Vasishṭha and Yājñavalkya however, give us slightly different regulations regarding abandoning a wife. They are not in favour of abandoning her except in cases of certain very serious offences. She shall be abandoned only

¹ Man. ix, 46.

² Man. ix, 72 ; Yāj. i, 66.

³ Man. ix, 77 ; and comm. by Kullūka.

⁴ Man. ix, 78.

⁵ Man. ix, 79.

if she commits adultery with her husband's pupil or Guru, or with a man of low caste.¹ In no other case should she be absolutely abandoned according to these Smritis. The wife who proves unfaithful otherwise than in the cases mentioned above should be deprived of her authority and allowed only sufficient food to maintain her body; she should be treated with disdain and made to sleep on bare ground.² But after one month of suffering of this punishment, says Vasishṭha, she becomes purged of the sin.³ Even if she has committed a sin, or if she is quarrelsome, or has left the house, or if she has suffered criminal force, or has fallen into the hands of thieves, the wife must not be abandoned; the husband should wait till her courses appear, because by her temporary uncleanness of the menstruation period she becomes pure afterwards when the course have ceased and when she has taken a bath.⁴ Says Yājñavalkya: "Women are pure in all limbs; they never become entirely foul; they are purified of all their sins every month by their temporary uncleanness; they are always pure, whatever offences they commit."⁵

3

The scriptures have given detailed instructions in regard to the days after a woman's monthly sickness during which period only she is supposed to be able to conceive a child.⁶ And, a married couple is enjoined to desist from

¹ Yāj. i, 72; Vas. xxi, 9; cf. Man. ix, 80.

² Yāj. i, 70; Vas. xxi, 6.

³ Vas. xxi, 6.

⁴ Vas. xxviii, 9 and 4.

⁵ Yāj. i, 71-72; also Vas. xxviii, 9 & 4; cf. Vis. xxiii, 40; Baudh. ii, 2, 4, 4.

⁶ Man. iii, 45: '*ritukālābhigāmī syāt*'; also in Śān. G. S. iv, 11, 17; Pār. G. S. i, 11, 7-8; Āp. G. S. ii, 1, 17-18; Yāj. i, 79-81; Vas. xii, 21-24; cf. Kūrma Purā. i, 2, 15, 11 ('*ritukālābhigāmī syāt yāvat putro'bhijāyate*'); etc.

sexual union on days other than these. Besides even on these days, they are enjoined to mate in the interest of and with a view to reproduction only. Thus sexual relation between a man and his wife is viewed as not proper even if it is executed during the right period, when it merely serves as means for satisfying sex ; so also, sexual union between the husband and his wife is not proper, even if it takes place with a view to reproduction, when it is not performed during the right period prescribed by the *śāstras*. Regarding the proper time of mating, Manu says that, the natural season (*rituh svābhāvikaḥ*) of women consists of sixteen days in each month, from the first day of menstruation ; of these, however, the first four days of menstrual period, the eleventh (*ekādaśī*) and the thirteenth (*trayodaśī*) are forbidden and the rest are recommended for mating.¹ Special care has to be taken by the husband to avoid mating with his wife when she is passing through the menstrual period ; for, if he approaches her in such condition, he is apt to lose his vitality (*āyuh*), his energy (*teja*), his strength (*bala*), his wisdom (*prajñā*) and also his sight (*chakshu*).² By avoiding sexual intimacy with the menstruating wife, on the other hand, he will augment these powers.³ The *grihastha* who avoids indulgence on all the days forbidden for mating as above, is considered as good as a *brahmachārī* himself,⁴ of course in a qualified sense !

Manu perhaps finds the above rules a little too rigorous to be followed by all *grihasthas* and at all times ; for he also adds that the husband may approach his wife

¹ Man. iii, 46-7; cf. Yāj. i, 79.

² Man. iii, iv, 41.

³ Man. iii, iv, 42.

⁴ Man. iii, 50: "*brahmachāryeva bhāvati yatratatrāśrame vasan*".

on any day except the *parvas*,¹ with the intention of gratifying the desire of his wife.² Further, it is also enjoined that the man who does not mate with his wife in the proper season is a sinner.³ Lastly, the husband is enjoined to seek sexual gratification through his wife only, and no other woman.⁴

4

Coming now to the position of the son in the family, we may note at the outset, that the acquisition of sons was the primary aim of Hindu marriage. The son rescues the souls of the deceased ancestors from the hell into which they might fall without his birth. "Because the son rescues his ancestors from the hell called *Put*, he has been called *Putra*."⁵ "A man conquers the world by the birth of a son; he enjoys eternity by that of a grandson; and, the great grand-fathers enjoy eternal happiness by the birth of a grandson's son."⁶ This is the religious view in support of the necessity of having a son. The Mahābhārata looks at the necessity of a son in the family from another angle of vision also; the child is looked upon as a great bond of affection in the family, the centre to which the love of the parents converges: "What is a greater happiness to a father than what the father feels when his son, running to him, clasps him with his (tiny little) arms though his body is full of dust and dirt?"⁷ And, "even

¹ i. e. *amāvāsyā*, the thirtieth day of the month, regarded as an inauspicious day for certain occasions; and a few such other days in each month.

² "*tadvrato ratikāmyayā*"—"tadvrato" is explained by Kullūka as '*bhāryāprītirvatam yasya sa tadvratah*'.

³ Bau. iv, 1, 17; and also Devala, quoted by Mādhavāchārya on Parāśarasamhitā, p. 100, (Bombay Sanskrit Series).

⁴ '*svadāraniratah sadā*'—Man. iii, 45; also Yāj. i, 81.

⁵ Man. ix, 138; Mahā Ādi. 74, 37; cf. also Rāmā. ii, 107-12.

⁶ Mahā. Ādi. 74, 38.

⁷ ibid. Ādi. 74, 52.

the touch of the sandal paste, or that of a woman and water, is not so pleasing as that of one's own infant son, locked into his embrace ;"¹ truly "there is nothing in the world whose touch is more pleasing than that of a son."² The Brāhmaṇas utter the following Vedic *mantras* (on behalf of the father), adds the Mahābhārata, at the birthday ceremony of the child : "You are born of my body ; you have sprung from my heart. You are myself in the form of my son...My life depends on you. The continuation of my race depends on you. Therefore live in happiness for one hundred years."³ "The man who having begotten a son who is his own image, does not look after him, never gains the higher worlds. The *Pitris* (ancestors) have said that the son continues the race and supports the relatives ; therefore to give birth to a son is the best of all pious acts."⁴ Manu expresses the view that it is necessary to acquire a son, if one desires to unite with the state of eternal bliss, the *Mokṣa*.⁵

The position of the eldest son, however, is peculiar in the Hindu family. He has the authority to offer the funeral cake (*piṇḍa*) at the *Śrāddha* ceremony of the father and the ancestors. On the birth of the first (*jyeshṭha*) son, the father is freed from his debt to the manes.⁶ Manu says that the eldest son on whom the father throws his debt (*ṛiṇam*) and through whom he obtains immortality (*ānantyam*) is alone begotten for the fulfilment of *dharma* (*sa eva dharmajah putrah*) ; all the rest are considered as the offspring of desire (*kāmajāh*).⁷ The eldest son makes the family prosperous or brings it ruin ; he is worthy of

¹ *ibid.* 74, 55.

² *ibid.* 74, 57.

³ *ibid.* 74, 61-63.

⁴ *ibid.* 74, 96-97.

⁵ *Man.* ii, 28.

⁶ *Man.* ix, 106.

⁷ *Man.* ix, 107.

honour, and is not to be treated with disrespect by the righteous.¹ So long as the eldest brother behaves as an eldest brother ought to behave (*jyeshṭhavrīṭṭih*), he should be honoured and respected by his younger brothers like mother and like father ; and, even if he behaves in a manner unworthy of an eldest brother (*ajyeshṭhavrīṭṭir*), he should yet be honoured like a kinsman (*bandhuvat*).²

After the father's death, the sons may live under the eldest brother's control, paying him the same reverence and honour which they used to pay to their father.³ If the brothers want to separate, under the Smṛiti rules, they have to give the best portion of the ancestral property and a larger share to the eldest brother.⁴ If, however he is unworthy, he would forfeit this special right of his.⁵ In the *Māhābhārata*, Bhishma gives a discourse on the duties of the younger brothers toward the eldest, and his obligations towards the younger ones :⁶ The eldest brother should always treat the younger brothers in the way in which a preceptor treats his disciples.⁷ The eldest brother should at times overlook the faults of his younger brothers ; and, though possessed of wisdom, he should at times act as if he is not aware or mindful of their faults ; if the younger brother be guilty of any sin, the eldest brother should correct him by indirect ways and means.⁸ A great deal of the security of family happiness depends on the behavior of the eldest brother

¹ *ibid.* 109.

² *ibid.* 110.

³ *Man.* ix, 105 ; also *Gaut.* xxviii, 1, 3 ; *Bau.* ii, 3, 13 ; *Āp.* ii, 14, 6.

⁴ *Man.* ix, 111-12 ; *Yāj.* ii, 114 ; *Gaut.* xxviii, 4-7 ; *Vis.* xviii, 37.

⁵ *Man.* ix, 213.

⁶ *Mahā. Anu. Adhy.* 105.

⁷ *ibid.* 105, 2.

⁸ *ibid.* 105, 4.

towards the younger ones. "It is the eldest brother who increases the prosperity of the family or destroys it entirely. If the eldest brother happens to be not gifted with sense, and is of wicked conduct, he encompasses the destruction of the whole family."¹ After the father's death, the younger brothers should "rely upon the eldest brother, as they did upon their father during his life time."² He is to maintain them and protect them.³ The Mahābhārata deprives eldest brother of his share in the family property, if he in any way injures his younger brother.⁴ According to the Mahābhārata, if the brothers wish to partition the family property during the father's life time the father should give equal shares to all of them.⁵

Thus in the Hindu family, the eldest son is a particularly favoured person as compared to the other relatives. It is of course natural, generally speaking, that the first-born child should attract greater part of the attention and affection from the parents.⁶ But in the Hindu family, this natural partiality to the eldest child—provided he is male, of course—is more exaggerated by the added force of moral injunctions to that end.⁷

¹ *ibid.* 105, 7.

² *ibid.* 105, 18.

³ *ibid.* 105, 7.

⁴ *ibid.* 105, 7.

⁵ *ibid.* 105, 12.

⁶ Cf. Young: *Social Psychology*, p. 240 ff; Brown: *Social Psychology*: pp. 88-92.

⁷ Professor Brown cites from a discussion by an Oriental student about his own position in the family. The boy was the eldest son of his parents. From his childhood he was brought up as somebody more important and deserving more attention than his younger brothers. And later on, the parents were not prepared to take the risk of sending him to a "far place from home" like America for his education. Though

5

Let us now try to see the position of the daughter in the family. It is enjoined that the father should look upon his daughters with the tenderest feeling. The grihastha should never quarrel with his daughter.¹ One should regard one's daughter as the highest object of tenderness (*duhitā kṛipāṇam paraṁ*).²

On the other hand, there are also statements which go to show that the birth of a daughter was looked with a little disfavour. Thus the wife who was successively giving birth to daughters only, was allowed to be superseded, after eleven years since marriage, by marrying another wife.³

One who has no son is allowed to 'appoint' his daughter (*sutām kurvita putrikām*), so that her son may perform his funeral rites.⁴ Manu tells us that the great Dakṣa, the lord of all created beings, himself followed this rule and appointed all his daughters to give their sons into his family, in order to multiply his race (*vivridhyartham svavamsasya*).⁵ The son of such an appointed daughter inherits the whole estate of the maternal grandfather.⁶ If a son is subsequently born to the maternal grandfather,

the father was persuaded to yield without great efforts, it was found to be the most difficult task to persuade the mother to send him away from home. She "could hardly believe the safety of letting her first son go out" to such a distant place as America. (See Brown: "Social Psychology" pp. 88-89).

¹ Man. iv, 180; Mahā. Śānti. 243, 15-16; Yāj. i, 158.

² Man. iv, 185 (—*kṛipāṇam* = *paraṁ kṛipāpātram*—Kullūka), Mahā. Śānti. 243, 20-1.

³ See Supra.; Man. ix, 81; Bau. ii, 4, 6; cf. Nār. xii, 94.

⁴ Man. ix, 127; Vis. xv, 5; Vas. xvii, 15-17; Gau. xxviii, 18; Bau. ii, 3, 15.

⁵ Man. ix, 128.

⁶ Man. ix, 128.

Both of them shall share equally in the estate.¹ The separate property of the mother, however, is shared by the unmarried daughter; the son of the appointed daughter has no share in it.² A daughter who is not married till her father's death shall receive from each of her brothers, after the father's death, one-fourth part of his share.³

The daughter must be given in marriage by the father at the proper time.⁴ If a proper suitor of good qualities and of the same *varṇa* is found even before the maiden has attained marriageable age, the father should not hesitate to give his daughter to him.⁵ The *Mahānirvāṇatantra* says that the daughter, like the son (*evam*), should be brought up and educated with care till her marriage.⁶ The maiden, on the other hand, is granted the privilege of remaining unmarried till her death in her father's house, rather than marrying a person destitute of good qualities (*guṇahīna*).⁷ She may wait for three years, after she has attained the proper age, for being wedded. After that time she may take it upon herself to choose her mate from her own *varṇa* and worthy of her (*sadriśam*) without waiting for the help of her father.⁸ She incurs no guilt thereby.⁹ Only, she is not entitled, then, to take away with her the ornaments which her parents, or her brothers might have given her.¹⁰ On the other hand, if the young

¹ Man. ix, 134.

² Man. ix, 133; Yāj. ii, 128.

³ Man. ix, 118; Yāj. ii, 124; Vis. xviii, 35; Brihas. xxv, 64.

⁴ Man. ix, 4; Yāj. i, 64; Vas. xvii, 69-70; Bau. iv, 1, 12, 17-19; etc.

⁵ Man. ix, 88; Vas. xvii, 70; Gau. xviii, 21; Bau. iv, 1, 11.

⁶ Mahānirvāṇatantra, viii, 47.

⁷ Man. ix, 89.

⁸ Man. ix, 90; Yāj. i, 64; Vis. xxiv, 40; Gau. xviii, 20; Vas. xvii, 67-68; also Mahā. Anu. 44, 16.

⁹ Man. ix, 91.

¹⁰ Man. ix, 92; Gau. xviii, 20.

maiden who has attained marriageable age has no father or other guardian to arrange for her marriage, then she may approach the King, and with his permission, may herself choose her groom (*varayet svayam*) and marry him.¹ Vātsyāyana also declares that a maiden, who, though possessed of good qualities and born in an humble family or even when well-born, is destitute of wealth, or has been deprived of her parents, and is come of age, should move herself to arrange her own marriage.²

Once a daughter is betrothed to a man, she shall be given to him only.³ "Neither ancients nor moderns who were good men have done such a deed,—that after promising a daughter to one man, they gave her to another."⁴ Nārada however gives some exceptions to this rule: Thus, should a more respectable suitor appearing eligible in point of capacities to acquire *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* is found, then the former engagement may be broken even though *śulka* has been already accepted for the maiden.⁵ So also, when a groom goes abroad after having espoused (*pratigrihya*) a maiden, she should wait for him till she passes through three monthly sicknesses, and then choose another husband.⁶ On the other hand, when a man, after having plighted his faith to a maiden, abandons

¹ Nār. xii, 22; 'yadā tu kaśchinnaiva syāt kanyā rājānam-
āśrayet/anujñāyā varam tasya parikshya varayet svayam//.

² Kām. iii, 4, 36.

³ Man. ix, 47; Nār. xii, 28.

⁴ Man. ix, 99.

⁵ Nār. xii, 30: *kanyāyām prāptaśulkāyām śreyanśched vara
āvrajet/dharmārthakāma-samyuktam vākyam tatrānritam
bhavet//*.

⁶ Nār. xii, 24: "pratigrihya cha yah kanyām naro deśāntaram
vrajet/trin ritūn samatikramya kanyānyam varayed varam//
(The above tr. is Dr. Jolly's).

her, although she is faultless, he shall be fined and shall be compelled to marry the maiden even against his will.¹

The sale of a daughter in marriage has been forbidden to a Hindu father. Even a Śūdra ought not to take nuptial fee, when he gives away his daughter; for, he who takes a fee sells his daughter.² Again, "No father who knows (right and wrong), must take even the smallest gratuity in return for his daughter; for, a man who, through avarice takes a gratuity sells his offspring."³

6

Lastly, we consider the position of the parents in the family. The word *pitri* is derived from 'pā' to "protect" or "to preserve" and *pitri* therefore etymologically means "protector". The derivative meaning of the word thus emphasizes the most important obligation of the father with reference to the offspring. That obligation is to look after the helpless young one and give it care and protection. The Rīgveda refers to the father as the symbol of all goodness and kindness.⁴ He is described as fondly carrying the child in his arms, and playing with it on his lap.⁵ On the other hand, the father's word is to be always obeyed by the son.⁶ The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa⁷ narrates the story of a boy named Śunahśepa being sold by his father; so also there is a story in the Rīgveda of Rājāśva who was blinded by his father.⁸ But such acts have been

¹ Nār. xii, 41: "pratigrihya cha yah kanyām aduṣṭām utsrujet narah/vineyah so'pyakāmo'pi kanyām tāmeva chedvahet//".

² Man. ix, 98; cf. Āp. ii, 13, 11-12.

³ Man. iii, 51; cf. Bau. i, 21, 2-3; Vas. i, 37-38; Āp. ii, 13, 11.

⁴ Rīg. iv, 17, 17; viii, 86, 4 etc.

⁵ Rīg. i, 38, 1; v, 43, 7.

⁶ Rīg. i, 68, 5.

⁷ Ait. Br. vii, 12 ff.

⁸ Rīg. i, 116, 16; also 117, 17; (From Ved. Ind. i, 526).

condemned in the same passages, no sooner than narrated. As MacDonell and Keith have pointed out in this connection, "to lay stress on...isolated and semi-mythical incidents would be unwise."¹ So, it becomes a really difficult task to judge how far the father exercised dominion over his son in the Vedic period.

There are, though, other instances of the son carrying out the word of the father without even questioning its morality or propriety. Rāma gives his mother some instances of this kind:² Rishi Kaṇḍu, at his father's order, killed a cow even though he knew it was a sinful act on his part to do so; King Sagara at his father's command, started digging the earth and himself perished in the act; Paraśurāma, again, committed the most heinous crime of murdering his own mother at his father's command. Rāma plainly tells his mother that his duty was to obey his father, even if that meant disobedience of the mother's command. Thus, of the two parents, the father's word is the more to be honoured than the mother's.³ And the Śukraniti has said that it was through the strength of their father's penances that Paraśurāma got back his mother alive, and Rāma got back his kingdom.⁴ And, due to the disobedience of their father's commands, the sons of Yayāti, and of Viśvāmitra, came to be degraded to the lowest positions in life.⁵ "One should always keep up the habit of serving one's father in word, thought and action; one should ever do that by which the father is satisfied; one should not do that by which the father is pained even for a single occasion."⁶ Generally speaking, however,

¹ Ved. Ind. i, p. 526.

² Rāmā. ii, 21, 30 ff.

³ Śukr. ii, 78-79.

⁴ ibid. 83-85.

⁵ ibid. 86-87.

both the parents have to be respected by the offsprings with equal reverence.¹

The Mahābhārata inculcates the same spirit of obedience to the parents on the part of the offspring. The story of Bhīshma remaining a *brahmachārī* to the end of his life for the sake of his father's wish is well-known. To carry out the father's word is the supreme duty of the son.² The father, the mother and the *guru*—these three are always to be obeyed, and never to be insulted; there is no sinner in the world equal to the son who insults any of these three.³ The five Pāṇavas married one wife just to carry out the command of their mother, though it was given under ignorance of the situation.⁴ Numerous instances could be given from the two Epics to show the very high degree of filial reverence expected of the sons and daughters. The story, for instance, is told of a boy Chirakārīn, son of Gautama, who was ordered by his father to kill his mother Ahilyā with whom Indra had committed adultery. Chirakārīn—he was so called because he would always reflect for a long while (*chiram*) before acting—however, pondered a great deal over the propriety of the order given by his father; he could not commit the sinful act of killing his mother at all; for though obedience to the father was a very high *dharma* for him (*piturādānaṁ paro dharmah*), by his own *dharma* he was also bound to protect his mother (*svadharmaṁ mātṛirakṣaṇam*).⁵ Who could be happy after killing his own mother? On the other hand, who could ever acquire prosperity (*pratiṣṭhā*) by disobeying his father?⁶ The father is the son's foremost of *gurus* (*gururagryah*) and his highest

¹ Rāmā. ii, 30, 35 ff.

² Śānti. 272, 15.

³ Śānti. 108, 29-31.

⁴ Ādi. 211.

⁵ Mahā. Śānti. 266, 11.

⁶ ibid. 266, 12.

dharma (*paro dharmah*);¹ the father being pleased, all gods are pleased.² But the mother too, is equally venerable; she is the principal cause (*hetuh*) of the union of the five elements (*pañchabhautikah*) which make for his birth as a human being.³ She is the soothing balm against all sorts of calamities of the son;⁴ with the mother, the man feels protected; without her, he feels deserted.⁵ "The man who, though shorn of all prosperity (*śriyā hino'pi*), enters his home calling out—'O mother!—does not suffer from grief; nor does decrepitude (*sthāviram*) ever attack him."⁶ A person whose mother is alive, even if he has sons and grandsons and is a hundred years old, is for her but a child of two.⁷ Able or disabled, lean or robust, the son is always protected (*rakshati*) by the mother... When his mother leaves him, then does the son become old, then does he become stricken with grief, then does he feel lonely in this world (*śūnyam jagat*). There is no shelter like the mother; there is no refuge like her; there is no defence better than her; there could be no one dearer than her (to the son).⁸ The mother is called *Dhātṛī* of her son, because she has borne him (*kukshisamdharanāt*); she is called *Jananī*, because she is the principal cause of the son's birth (*jananāt*); she is known by the name *Ambā* also, for she rears his limbs (*angānām vardhanāt*); she is *Virasū* because she gives birth to valiant children; and she is *Suśrū* for she nurses and looks after (*suśrūshanāt*) the son.⁹ In the

¹ *ibid.* 266, 17.

² *ibid.* 266, 21.

³ *ibid.* 266, 25.

⁴ *ibid.* 266, 26: (—'sarvasyārtasya nirvritih').

⁵ *ibid.* 266, 26: (—'mātrilābhe sanāthatvam anāthatvam viparyaye').

⁶ *ibid.* 266, 27.

⁷ *ibid.* 266, 28.

⁸ *ibid.* 266, 29-31.

⁹ *ibid.* 266, 32-33.

person of the father is a combination of all gods ; but in the person of the mother, however, is a combination of all gods and also all humanity.¹—All these and such other thoughts had filled Chirakārīn's mind, and he passed a long time, in fact many days in this manner, till the father returned back, now repentant of his cruel order given to his son, and burning with grief ; he was, however, delighted to find out that his son had not carried out the order. —

Under the injunctions of the Dharmaśāstras, the father is the object of the deepest reverence for the sons. He is the first of those in the family to whom respect has to be paid by the children of the family.² Manu says that the father, indeed, is the *Guru* of his son.³ Some Smṛitikāras have given the father a very high position of authority in the family ; he rules over his family as a king over his subjects.⁴ Vasishṭha has said that the father has the power to drive his son out of the house, and even to sell him.⁵ But Manu and Yājñavalkya forbid that the father should ever cast off his son, unless he has committed a very serious crime.⁶ Even if the child has to be punished by beating which should be done only when the parent wants to correct him, not otherwise, it is ordained that the beating could be done on his back, and never on a noble part of the body.⁷ And, the Mahābhārata similarly advises that the son should be only "mildly reprimanded by parents for purposes of instruction."⁸

¹ *ibid.* 266, 43.

² *Man.* ii, 145; *Gaut.* vi, 1-3.

³ *ibid.*; cf. *Yāj.* i, 34.

⁴ *Nāra.* i, 32-42.

⁵ *Vas.* xv, 2.

⁶ *Man.* viii, 389; *Yāj.* ii, 237; Similarly in *Yāj.* i, 35; *Gau.* vi, 51; *Vas.* xiii, 48 etc.

⁷ *Man.* iv, 164 and viii, 299-300; cf. *Vis.* Lxxi, 80-81.

⁸ *Mahā. Anu.* 104, 37.

In the Smritis, at some places, the mother is referred to as more venerable than even the father. She is said to be thousand times more venerable than the father.¹ In general, the Smritis, too, emphasize that the mother, the father and the preceptor, as well as the elder brother must be respected and obeyed by every one.² And, one should never offend one's father, mother and Guru.

These are some of the salient aspects of the Hindu family life. The *kula* or the family was no doubt regarded by the Hindu as the place of nursery where the individual learns his lessons in social life. Here, in the *kula*, were given him lessons in affection, lessons in giving respect to elders, lessons in subserving individual inclinations and even aspirations, towards the attainment of collective ends. The sex instinct has to be directed to the end of the continuity of the family. The home (*griha*) is primarily the place where the three objects of life, *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*—spiritual merit, wealth-earning, and the gratification of senses—have to be practised in terms of a harmonious synthesis together, towards the end of attaining the final beatitude (*mokṣa*); and, as has been observed by Manu, the real good of man consists in a proper aggregate of these three *purushārthas*.³

And in this *grihasthāśrama*, again, is *yajna* preached for the *grihastha*. The definition of *yajna* as preached in this *āśrama* is perhaps the most important. Living in the midst of circumstances and situations which are likely to develop the ego and of 'mine'-ness 'thine'-ness—living as a *grihastha*, as a *kuṭumbin*, as a man of the world (*nāgarika*),—the individual is asked to live and believe

¹ Man. ii, 145; "Sahasram tu pitrīn mātā gauravenātirichyate".

² Man. ii, 225-37; Vis. xxx, 1-10.

³ Man. ii, 224.

that this is not the final end for which he is born.¹ The individual is expected to believe that his life as a man of the world is only a part of his duties (*niyata karma*) whereby he is to fulfil his obligations to his wife, to his children, to his family, to his departed ancestors and to his community. And, in the midst of all these circumstances, the individual is expected to live out of, and, as if, apart from these, as if he were performing the *Yajna*. In the midst of world and wordliness, the *grihasta* is no doubt a part of it; yet he is called upon to behave with a spirit of detachment in all his sense-doings, in the true spirit of a *yajna*. The symbolic fire in the home and its continuity and its worship, the various ceremonials that centre round it,—all these show that the home is only a trust vested in the *grihasta*, a *yajna-kunḍa* as it were, in which the *grihasta* and those under his care have to pour their life for the perpetuity of that fire and what it represents and embodies.

¹ Cf. Thoothi: "The Vaishnavas of Gujarat" p. 54.

CHAPTER VI
THE WOMAN IN HINDU SOCIETY

CHAPTER VI

THE WOMAN IN HINDU SOCIETY

The attitude of a community towards the woman has a great social significance in any society—especially so in the Hindu society. This has of course been considered by us along with our discussions on education, marriage and family ; but that had necessarily to be from specific points of view. Here we shall consider the problem of the attitude of the Hindu towards womankind as a whole and in general, so as to complete the whole picture of the woman's place in Hindu society.

In the Rigveda, the husband and the wife are described as taking equal part in the sacrificial rites. The '*dampati*'—the householder and his wife—with 'one accord' press the Soma, rinse and mix it with milk, and offer adoration to the God.¹ The Vedic literature mentions many a woman's name who attained eminence as philosophers along with men. Viśvavārā, of the family (*gotra*) of Atri, is described as a philosopher (*brahmavādinī*) and well versed in the sacred texts (*mantradrashṭrī*), and is the author of a hymn in the Rigveda ;² Ghoshā the daughter of sage Kakshīvān, was the author of two hymns of Rigveda ;³ and Lopāmudrā, wife of Agasti, composed two verses.⁴ Queen Śāśvatī, wife of King Asanga, is also a philosopher of the Vedic times ;⁵ so was Āpālā, another philosopher (*brahmavādinī*) well versed in the

¹ Rig. viii, 31, 5 ; cf. also x, 186 ; viii, 27, 7.

² Rig. v, 28.

³ Rig. x, 39-40.

⁴ Rig. i, 179, 1-2.

⁵ Rig. viii, 1, 34.

sacred texts (*mantradrashṭrī*).¹ Indrāṇī, the consort of Indra, too was a *mantradrashṭrī*.² So again, two ladies, Sikatā and Nivāvarī, composed ten verses of a hymn.³ The Rigveda also relates us the story of Brihaspati and his wife Juhū in this connection ; he left his wife and went away for practising penances ; but the gods explained to him how it was improper to perform penances alone without wife.⁴ These are some of the instances from the Vedas which speak for the status of woman during the Vedic period.

Thus, during the Vedic period, we have reasons to believe that so far as education was concerned, the position of women was generally not unequal to that of the men. Woman had similar education as man ; she took part in philosophic debates like man and with men ; she practised penances like man. This shows that man and woman were regarded as having equally important status in the social life of the early period.

Similarly, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* informs us that woman was regarded as an equal sharer with man of the responsibilities and duties in the home. The following passage from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* will be sufficient to illustrate this : "When the husband is about to ascend (the sacrificial altar), he addresses his wife in these words : 'Come, wife, let us ascend to heavens', and the wife answers, 'Yes, let us ascend'. The reason why he addresses his wife thus is that she is one half of his own self ; therefore as long as he has no wife, so long he does not propagate his species, so long he is no complete individual : but when he has a wife, he propagates his species, and then he is complete. 'Complete I want to go to that

¹ Rig. viii, 80; 91.

² Rig. x, 86 and 145.

³ Rig. ix, 86, 11-20.

⁴ Rig. x, 109.

supreme goal',—thus he thinks ; therefore he addresses his wife in this manner."¹ This passage brings out to us that, at least biologically speaking, the woman was regarded as having an equally important share in the drama of human life as man. Man without woman is considered incomplete, because he is not by himself able to propagate his species.

But in the same Brāhmaṇa there is another passage which shows that woman is regarded as intellectually inferior to man, or rather, that she is regarded as more emotional and less rational by nature than man ; therefore, she is apt to fall an easy prey to external appearances ; she lacks the ability for true appreciation or balance of mind and does not possess depth of reason. This passage relates to the story of the theft of *soma* (nectar or elixir) from heaven. While Gāyatrī was carrying *Soma* away from heaven, a Gandharva stole it away from her. The Gods devised a trick to get *Soma* back from the Gandharvas. They knew that the Gandharvas were 'fond of women'. So they sent *Vāk* (the Goddess of Speech) to them ; and she managed to bring *Soma* back to the Gods. But the Gandharvas too followed her, and said to the gods, '*Soma* shall be yours, and *Vāk* ours'. 'So be it!' said the gods ; 'but if she would rather come hither, do not carry her away by force ; let us woo her'. The gods accordingly wooed her. "The Gandharvas recited the Vedas to her, saying 'see how we know it, see how we know it!' " The gods, however, once more decided to take advantage of their knowledge of woman's nature ; they created the lute, and sang and played upon it and amused *Vāk*, whereupon she returned to them. "But in truth, she returned to them vainly ; for, she turned away from those engaged in praising and pray-

¹ Sat. Br. v, 2, 1, 10, Tr. by J. Eggeling (in S. B. E. vol. xii)
[Slightly modified.]

ing (i. e. the Gandharvas), to dance and song (i. e. to Gods). Wherefore, even to this day, women are given to vain things; for, it was on this wise that *Vāk* turned thereto, and other women do as she did. And hence, it is to him who dances and sings that they most readily 'take a fancy.'¹ This passage purports to explain that a woman has the weakness of being emotional or sentimental and can be easily deceived by external appearance. It also shows that the fair sex is more sensitive to expressions of fine arts. As we proceed we shall find similar opinion about woman's nature in the Mahābhārata and other works.²

¹ Sat. Br. iii, 2, 4, 2-6.

² With such views, we may profitably compare the following from Dr. A. A. Roback of Harvard:

"Women, too, are, as many great novelists and essayists have remarked, incapable of acting with consistency, and, unless moved by pity, are prone to commit many unfair acts on various pretexts, chief among which is that, being the weaker sex, or the weaker of two of their own sex, or having "gone through" more than their rival or expecting to enjoy life less than some one else, they ought not to lose at least this opportunity of making up for the hardship either already endured or in store for them.

"Consistency Lacking in Woman:—Such a warm champion of woman's cause as Moll tries to gloss over this character defect by an explanation which leaves much to be desired. 'When women', he writes, 'are so frequently denied the sense of justice, it is...a matter of the present motive preventing other considerations from presenting themselves.' (A. Moll: "Sexualität und Charakter": Sexual-Probleme; Zt. f. Sexualw'ft. u. Sexualpolitik, 1914, Vol. X). What is this but an admission of the fact that they are not considerate of others, in other words, that they lack the impulse to apply to others the same measure as they apply to themselves?

"We hear it said and repeated almost *ad nauseam* that women are prompted by their feelings rather than by their reason. But such a hollow statement possesses no scientific value. Many women reason well enough at the very time they are supposed to be guided by their feelings. Their reasoning,

In the epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, the question of the position of woman could be studied from so many points of view. And the views expressed are not always free from contradiction of each other, as we shall see presently.

The Rāmāyaṇa is a glorious illustration for the Hindu of the ideal womanhood. Sītā is prepared to cast off all the luxuries of the palace and accompany her husband to the forest. She is one of the five ideal women of India; even the mere memory of the names of these five is said to purge the sinner of his sins. Ahilyā, (the wife of sage Gautama), Draupadī, Sītā, Tārā (wife of Brihaspati), and Mandodarī (the wife of Rāvaṇa, the enemy of Rāma), are the five ladies. On the eve of Rāma's departure to

however, lacks consideration for others. It is the element of consistency alone which is wanting—a gap which is sometimes filled by the substitute of pity. If the above time-honoured and apparently universal belief about the main-springs of woman's conduct is to be invested with any psychological meaning, we should necessarily hold to one or the other of these alternatives: either that women, on the whole, are born with stronger instinctive tendencies, or else the consistency urge is weaker in them than in man. The former alternative does not seem plausible, more especially as the maxim of parsimony would lead us to explain the phenomenon through some weakness in the one factor rather than in the many.

"It is, therefore, not in the relative strength of the instinct that we shall find the reason for the lack of objectivity in female conduct, but in the *relative weakness of the fundamental principle of conduct* which has its root psychologically in some mechanism making for consistency." (Italics by the present writer). —A. A. Roback: "The Psychology of Character". 2nd Ed. (1931) pp. 488-89.

With the above quotation from Roback, cf. Freud's view: "It may be admitted that women have but little sense of justice, and this is no doubt connected with the preponderance of envy in their mental life".—Freud: "New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" (1934) pp. 134 ff.

the forest, Rāma declared to Sītā that he had no heart to take her with him and make her suffer so many hardships ; against this she argued thus :

“My lord, the mother, sire and son,
Receive their lots by merit won ;
The brother and the daughter find
The portions to their deeds assigned.
The wife alone what'er await,
Must share on earth her husband's fate ;
So now the King's command which sends
Thee to the wild, to me extends.
The wife can find no refuge, none,
In father, mother, self or son :
Both here, and when they vanish hence,
Her husband is her sole defence.¹

In the Mahābhārata, there are some notable instances which illustrate how women used to take upon themselves the task of directing man on religious and social question. Thus, a lady named Sulabhā discusses the problem of attaining *mokṣa*.² It is a fairly long discourse. Sulabhā who was “gifted with *yogic* powers”,³ had really come to test the knowledge of King Janaka. Both of them exchanged whatever he and she had to say on the problem. After “hearing the words of Sulabhā fraught with excellent sense and reason”, King Janaka could not reply thereto.⁴ Again, the Brāhmin preceptor (*guru*) of King Senajit, cites to him the authority of the verses sung by a courtesan (*veśyā*) called Pīṅgalā (*piṅgalayā gītā gāthā*) on the problem of life, death, and knowledge.⁵ In the

¹ Rāmā. (Tr. by Griffith) ii, 27.

² Mahā. Sānti. 321, vs. 20-192.

³ ibid. 321, 16.

⁴ ibid. 321, 193.

⁵ Mahā. Sānti. 174 (In the Mahābhārata, this story is narrated by Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira.)

Vanaparva, again, Draupadī gives a long lecture to Yudhishtira and Bhima upon certain problems of conduct and morality.¹

In a later Parva, Draupadī is once more found giving a long discourse² to her husband on his duties as a Kshatriya. Yudhishtira, disgusted with war and its evil effects, is in favour of renunciation of all worldly affairs. But Draupadī reprimands him for this foolish idea of his. "If," says she, "these brothers of yours had been sane, they would have locked you up with all the unbelievers (in a prison) and taken charge of the government of the earth. The man, who, on account of feeble intellect, acts thus never succeeds in winning prosperity."

Let us try to find out some more light on the question from the views on woman expressed in the Mahābhārata itself. In the Anuśāsanaparva we are told that Yudhishtira requested Bhīshmapitāmaha to enlighten him regarding the nature of women (*strīnām svabhāvam*).³ "It is said that woman is the root of all evil, and that she is narrow-minded," says Yudhishtira.⁴ Bhīshma replies to him that, in a sense, the female is naturally a temptress and a lurer;⁵ moreover, she is not endowed with strength of will enough to resist temptation; therefore, she always stands in need of protection by man.⁶ "Amongst women, both kinds are to be found; that is, those who are virtuous and those who are not so. The virtuous women are highly blessed. They are the mothers of universe." Besides, we are told that those women, who are sinful, and of wicked conduct, can be ascertained by marks (*lakṣhaṇa*) expressive of the evil that is in them, which appear

¹ Mahā. Van. 28 ff.

² Śānti. 14 (The whole *adhyāya*).

³ Mahā. Anu. 38. 1.

⁴ *ibid.* 'strīyo hi mūlam doṣhānām laghuchittā hi tāh smritāh

⁵ Mahā. Anu. 38-39.

⁶ Mahā. Anu. 43, 19.

on their persons.¹ The face, in Bhīṣma's opinion here, seems to be the index of a woman's character.² It is because of this natural weakness of her character that she is not to be held as much responsible as a man for her sins. Woman should not be condemned altogether as a sinner because she naturally lacks the strength of mind to resist temptations. "...Woman commits really no offence", says Chirakārin, referring to Indra's adultery with his own mother by duping her. "It is man only who commits offences. By committing an act of adultery, only the man becomes sullied with sin... Women can commit no sin. It is man who becomes sullied with sin. Indeed, on account of the natural weakness of the sex as shown in every act, and their liability to solicitation, women cannot be considered as offenders."³ The Rishi Ashtāvakra, who went out in search of knowledge of the nature of woman, is informed in a similar manner of "the lightness of the female character" by the celestial lady to whom he approached to obtain the knowledge.⁴

In another Adhyāya in the same Parva we find Bhīṣma speaking in terms of high reverence about woman.

¹ ibid. 43, 19-21; "striyāḥ sādhyo mahābhāgāḥ sammatā lokamātarah/dhūrayanti mahīm rājannimām savana-kānanam//asādhvyaśchāpi durvrittā.../vijneyā lakṣhaṇair duṣṭaiḥ svagātrasahajair nriṇa//".

² For a modern discussion of the problem, see Ludovici: "The Choice of a Mate", Part II, pp. 239 seq., where he discusses the question of physiognomy, human points and morphology, as avenues of approach from the visible to the invisible, in order to know the man or the woman.

³ Mahā. Śānti. 266, 38 & 40: "evam strī nāparādhnōti nara evāparādhyati/vyuchcharaṇścha mahādosham nara evāparādhyati/nāparādhosti nārīṇām nara evāparādhyati/sarvakāryāparādhyatvān nāparādhyanti chāṅganāḥ// "aparādhyatvāt=anurodhyatvāt alpabalatvena sarvathā puruṣādhīnatvāt"—Nilakaṇṭha's commentary.

⁴ ibid. 19-21.

“Women should always be adored and treated with love (*pūjyā lālayitavyā*).”¹ Where women are treated with honour, the very gods are said to be propitiated; and where women are not adored all acts become fruitless (*sarvāstatrāphalāḥ kriyāḥ*).² If the women of a family, on account of the treatment they receive, indulge in grief and tears, that family soon becomes extinct.³ Those homes which are cursed by women meet with destruction and ruin as if scorched by some Atharvan rite; such homes lose their splendour; their growth and prosperity cease.⁴ Bhīṣma further tells Yudhishthira that Manu, on the eve of his departure from this world, made over women to the care and protection of men; for he knew that women are weak, that they would fall an easy prey to the seduction of men, that they possess a sensitive temperament which quickly responds to any offer of love or affection and also that they excel in sincerity (or truthfulness).⁵ “There are others among them who are full of malice, covetous of honours, fierce in nature, unlovable, and impervious to reason. Women, however, generally deserve to be respected. Do ye men show them honour!”⁶ The execution of the *dharma* of man depends upon woman; all pleasures and enjoyments also entirely depend upon her; men should therefore serve women and bend their wills before them.⁷ In childhood, the father is her guardian; the husband protects her in youth; when she becomes old, her sons protect her; therefore, at no period

¹ Mahā. Anu. 46. 5.

² ibid. 5-6.

³ ibid. 6.

⁴ ibid. 7.

⁵ ibid. 8: “*abalāḥ svalpakauṣṭhinaḥ suhridāḥ satyajishṇavaḥ*” (“*svalpa īśhadāyāsena āpaneyah kaupīno guhyāchchhāduna-
paṭāyāsāṃ sadyohāryā ityarthah*”—Nīlakaṇṭha.)

⁶ ibid. 9.

⁷ ibid. 10: “*striṇṇatraya hi vai dharmo, ratibhogaścha
kevalah/paricharyā namaskārastadāyattā bhavantu vah/*.”

of her life can a woman enjoy unrestrained freedom.¹ Women are the dieties of prosperity; the person who desires affluence and prosperity should honour them.² We are also told in the Mahābhārata that the Goddess of Prosperity (*śrīh*)³ resides within the woman, who is given to truth and sincerity and who adores the gods,⁴ who is pleasing and merry in appearance, and is blessed and gifted with virtues;⁵ and the Goddess avoids those women who are inclined to sinfulness, and uncleanness, or impurity, or who are fond of disputes and quarrelling, or are indolent, sleepy or inclined to laziness, or those who often visit other people's houses, or those who lack modesty.⁶

Umā, the wife of God Śiva, was once asked to discuss the subject of woman's duties with a view to give an authoritative statement to the world, so that the course of conduct laid down by her "will be followed from generation to generation;"⁷ she is then said to have given a detailed description of what a woman should do and what she should not do (*strīdharmāh*).⁸ These *dharma*s are generally in agreement with what has been said already in connection with the wife's duties in the family,—to serve her husband and his elders, to act as her husband's companion in the performance of all

¹ *ibid.* 14.

² *ibid.* 15: "*śrīya etāh striyo nāma satkāryā bhūtimichchhatā/pālītāni grihitā cha śrīh strī bhavati bhārata*".

³ Mahā. Anu 11.

⁴ *ibid.* 11, 11: "*satyasvabhāvārjavasamyutāsu vasāmi devadvijapūjikāsu*".

⁵ *ibid.* 11, 15: "*priyadarśanāsu saubhāgyayuktāsu guṇān-vitāsu*".

⁶ *ibid.* 11, 12-13: "*parasya veśmābhiratām alajjām /pāpūmachokshām avalehinīm cha vyapetadhairyām kalahapriyāmcha/nidrābhibhūtām satatam śayānām evamvidhām tām parivārajāmi*".

⁷ Mahā. Anu. 146. 10: "*lokeshveshā gatih sadā*".

⁸ *ibid.* 12.

dhārmika acts, to be sweet in speech and manners, and so forth.¹

In the *Anuśāsanaparva* we are told that on the whole the woman cherishes a deeper attachment for her children than man.² The woman, in general, is said to be capable of loving more strongly and more profoundly than man.³

The same Epic has opined that woman should not be forced to marry or live with a person whom she dislikes or even does not like. It says: "Manu does not sr highly of the practice of a girl living with a person she does not like. Living as a wife with a person she does not like, produces disgrace and sin".⁴ is an instance in *Mahābhārata* in which a girl was not merely saved from marrying one whom she did not like but was also given assistance to marry of her own choice: Bhīshma captured the three daughters of Kāśī in order to marry them over to himself. The eldest intimated to him that she had fallen in love with the King of Saubha who had been banished and that she would have chosen only him if svayamvara arranged by her father had been held. Bhīshma, who was himself well-versed in the *(dharmajñāna)*, after consultation with the sages in the Vedas, sent her back to the lover.

If we turn our attention from the Epic to the *Manu* we meet with similar conceptions about the status of the woman.

Thus, Manu says that "women must always be loved and respected (*pūjyā bhūshayitavyāś*).

¹ Ibid. 33-37.

² Mahā. Anu. 12, 46: "*striyāstvabhyadhikāh sneha purushasya vai*".

³ Ibid. 12. 52: "*striyāh purushasamyoge prītirabhyadhi*" and 12. 54: "*evam striyā mahārāja adhikā prītiruchyate*".

⁴ Mahā. Anu. 44. 23.

⁵ Mahā. Ādi. 102.

fathers, brothers, husbands and brothers-in-law who desire their own welfare". And, "where women are honoured (*pūjyante*), there the very gods (*devatāh*) are pleased, but where they are not honoured, no sacred rite¹ yields rewards". The family (*kulam*) in which women (*jāmayah* = female members of the family) are passing their lives in suffering will soon crumble to pieces (*inaśyatyāśu*). One who desires prosperity (*bhūtikāma*) family life should always respect the women-folk of the house.² In the family (*kule*) in which the wife (*bhāryā*) lives with the husband, and the husband feels happy in his wife, prosperity (*kalyāṇam*) always resides.³ The husband (*grihī*) should always try to maintain peace in the members of the house.⁴ These statements do not give us much knowledge of the specific duties of the woman, but they give us a knowledge of her attitude towards her in the family.⁵

In addition, women were created by the almighty, just as men were created to be his subjects, he says, it has been ordained by the almighty that all the activities belonging to *dharma* should be performed by man and wife together. A maiden may be given in marriage, even if she has not attained the proper marriageable age, if she is of equal *varṇa* and excellent qualities are found. But, on the other hand, a maiden should acquiesce in her guardian's desire to give her in marriage if she is of bad character or even destitute of any qualities (*guṇahīnāya*). She should rather prefer to

yāh—*Yāgādikriyāh*"—Kullūka.

Man. iii, 55-59; cf. Yāj. i, 82.

Id. iii, 60 ff.

Id. iv, 180-81; cf. Yāj. i, 157-8.

⁵ also Chapter v, pp. 227 ff.

1. ix, 96.

remain unmarried in her father's house till her death (*āmaraṇāt*). Or, as we have pointed out elsewhere, she may wait for three years after she has attained the age of puberty (*ritumatī*), after which period, if her guardians have failed to arrange for her marriage, she may herself (*svayam*) choose her match who may suit her (*sadrīśam*) and marry him.¹

This seems to give a good deal of freedom to the unmarried girl in the family at least in the matter of choosing her life-companion. But at other places, Manu and other Smritikāras are not prepared to allow any kind of independent activity to women,² without consultation or permission of the male members of the family; as already pointed out, she is subject to the guardianship of the father during her childhood, of her husband during her youth, and of her sons after the death of her husband. She is not allowed to do anything independently (*svātantryena*) even in her own home.³ *Vātsyāyana*, who generally holds more liberal views than Manu about the fair sex, also looks upon unrestrained independence for women with disapproval; for he gives instructions as to the manner and the ways by which the citizen (*nāgaraka*) should protect his womenfolk (*antahpura*)⁴ and his wife (*dārā*).⁵

We have also seen how the Smritikāras have disposed of some of the *samskāras*, intended to sanctify the human body, in the case of the woman. In her case, they are to

¹ Man. ix, 88-92; also cf. Yāj. i, 64; Vis. xxiv, 40-41; Vas. xvii, 69-71; Gau. xviii, 20-23; Bau. iv, 1, 11-14.

² Man. v, 148: (—*na bhajet strī svatantratām*).

³ Man. v, 147-48 (*na svātantryena kartavyam kinchitkāryam griheshvapi*) cf. also, Yāj. i, 85-86; Vis. xxv, 12-13; Vas. v, 1-3; Gau. xviii, 1; Bau. ii, 3, 44-5; Kāt. 930; and Man. ix, 2-3 (*na strī svātantryamarhati*).

⁴ Kām. v, 6; iv, 2, 72-84.

⁵ *ibid.* v, 6, 43 ff.

be performed without the recitation of sacred texts.¹ Again, for woman, the nuptial ceremony (*vaivāhika vidhih*) is equivalent to the *upanayana* or initiation ceremony of males; serving the husband (*patisevā*) is equivalent to serving the teacher (*guru*), and residing in the husband's house and doing her household duties (*grihārtho*) is equivalent to the daily sacrifices and worship of fire (*agniparikriya*) by man.² Sacrifice by a woman displeases the gods;³ indeed the woman who offers an *agnihotra* sacrifice (burnt oblation) will sink into hell (*narake*).⁴

Hārīta informs us that there were two kinds of women, the *Brahmavādinīs*, i. e., those versed in metaphysical knowledge, and *sadyovadhvāh*, i. e., those who preferred to lead the life of a married housewife.⁵ Therefore, says Hārīta, women are not on the same level of status as the Śūdras; for, he argues, the three *varṇas* cannot be produced from the womb of a Śūdra.⁶ Therefore, he further proceeds, women must also undergo sacramental rites with Vedic *mantras*.⁷ But Mādhavāchārya, who quotes the above verses of Hārīta, declares that this applied to women of ancient times. And, in support of this view he also quotes Yama, saying that women were formerly entitled to be initiated with the sacred mantras, and also to teach the Vedas and recite the *Sāvitrī*.⁸

¹ Man. ii, 16; Yāj. i, 13; Vis. xxvii, 13.

² Man. ii, 67; cf. Yāj. i, 13; Vis. xxii, 32.

³ Man. iv, 206.

⁴ Man. xi, 36-37.

⁵ Hārīta. xxi, 23 (Quoted by Mādhavāchārya, in "Parāśara samhitā", Ed. by Islāmpūrkar, Vol. i, Pt. ii, pp. 82-84).

⁶ ibid. "na śūdrasamāh striyah na hi śūdrayonau kshatrayavaiśyā jayante" (Hār. xxi, 20-21).

⁷ ibid. "tasmāt chhandasā striyah samskāryāh" (Hār. xxi, 12).

⁸ ibid. "purā kalpe tu nārīṇām..." See p. 137 f.

A woman in her monthly course is regarded untouchable. The husband should not approach (*nāpagachchhet*) his wife, even though he may be mad with desire (*pramattoṇi*), when she is in her courses; nor should he sleep with her in the same bed; if he does so, his wisdom (*prajñā*), energy (*tejo*), strength (*balam*) sight (*chakshur*) and vitality (*āyuschaiva*) shall diminish.¹ Such a woman becomes touchable or pure (*viśuddhyati*) again by taking bath after the period is over.² A person even by merely touching (*sprishṭvā*) a woman in her monthly course himself becomes impure and untouchable; he becomes pure (*śudhyati*) by taking a bath.³ It is also said that the mouth of a woman is always pure.⁴ And this is explained by saying that it is to be regarded as pure for the purposes of kissing or other intimacies.⁵ Yājavalkya has also said speech from Gandhāra, purity from the God Soma, sweet Agni; therefore Parva, and perfect purity again from This, again is, women are always pure (*medhya*).⁶ women should be explained by Mitāksharā, by saying that purposes of should be regarded as pure (*śuddhāh*) for the touching or embracing (*sparśālinganādishu*).⁷

Manu has a rather peculiar opinion about the nature of the fair sex in general. "It is the nature of women to seduce men in this world;⁸ for that reason the wise never remain unguarded (*na pramādyanti*) in the company of female slaves (*pramadāsu*).⁹ For, women are able to lead astray the ignorant, but even a learned man, and make

¹ N

² N

³ N

⁴ N

⁵ N

⁶ N

⁷ N

⁸ N

⁹ N

lan. iv, 40-42; cf. also Yāj. i, 138.

lan. v, 66; Yāj. iii, 20.

lan. v, 85; Yāj. iii, 30.

lan. v, 130; (*nityamāsyam śuchi strīnām*). cf. Yāj. i, 187;

Vis. xxiii, 49; Bau. i, 9, 2; Vas. xxviii, 8.

See Mitāksharā, on Yāj. i, 187.

Yāj. i, 71.

Mit. on ibid.

(*svabhāva esha nārīnām narūnāmiha dūṣhaṇam*).

Man. ii, 213.

him a slave of lust and anger (*kāmakrodhavaśānugam*).¹ Therefore, one should not sit in a lonely place with even one's own mother, sister or daughter; for the senses are powerful (*balavān indriyagrāmo*) and master even a learned man.² Manu calls woman the temptress, (*pramadā*), a noun derived from the verb *pra-mad*, which means 'to intoxicate', or 'to inflame with passion'. The

himself may speak suggestively in respect to the
 But we have already seen that there
 expressed in the *Mahābhārata* too;
 charge Manu as being the only
 of the woman-kind.

are similar opinions. He should regard his daughters
 we therefore need not fear; he has to bear their
 writer with such a view. A true householder should

In the family, the *grihasta*.
 as the highest objects of tenderness or mother's sister,
 offences without resentment.³ A mother is the most
 respect his elder sister and father more than the
 as his own mother (*mātrivad*).⁴ The more venerable
 venerable person in this world—ever. and times more
 father. The father is a hundred times a father and
 than the teacher, but the mother is a thousand times more venerable to
 venerable than even the father.⁵ The mother is offended
 the family affairs is on the same footing as the teacher. the re-
 the teacher. One should always do what is agreeable to one
 these three, even though one may be grievously offended by that he
 by these.⁶ When these are pleased one gets all the sake of
 wards in this world and the next. As long as they live
 should always inform and consult them about all that
 proposes to do "in thought, word or deed for the sake of

¹ *ibid.* ii, 214.

² *ibid.* 215.

³ Man. iv, 185: "duhitā kṛpāṇam param...tasmā
dhikshiptah sahetāsamjvarah sadā //.

⁴ Man. ii, 133: 'mātrivad vṛttimātishthet'; cf. Vis. xx

⁵ Man. ii, 145; Yāj. i, 35; Gau. vi, 51; Vas. xiii, 48.

⁶ Man. ii, 225: 'nārtanāpyavamanantavyā'; cf. Vis. xxxi
 Gau. xxi, 15; Āp. i, 14, 6.

etaira-

xii, 3.

, 1-3;

the next world.”¹ Every other *dharma* must be regarded as subordinate to the *dharma* of honouring these three.² Obedience to father, mother as well as elder brother is expected of every person.³ These and the *Guru*, the teacher, should never be offended.⁴ One who castes off (*tyajét*) his mother has to pay the very high penalty of six hundred *paṇas*;⁵ such a man, moreover, should never be invited⁶ at any sacrificial ceremonies (*havyakavyah*).

Women who have no one to protect them, who are barren, who have no sons, whose family is extinct, widows who are faithful to their departed husbands, and women afflicted with diseases, have to be given protection by the King. So also, the King must protect the property of such women, and punish their relatives in case they misappropriate their property during their life-time.⁷

Sex-union with sisters by the same mother, with unmarried maidens, with females of the lowest castes, with the wife of a friend, or with the wife of a son, is a mortal sin—a *mahā-pātaka*;⁸ such conduct is equivalent to violating the *Guru's* bed, and has the same punishment prescribed.⁹ Sex-union with a woman given to drinking is a minor sin (*upapātaka*) which must be punished by the expulsion of the man from his caste.¹⁰

¹ Man. ii, 235-36: ‘*tat tat nivedayét tébhyo mano-vāk-kāya-karmabhih*’; cf. Vis. xxxi, 6.

² Man. ii, 237: ‘*esha dharmah parah sākshād upadharma'nya uchyate*’.

³ Man. ii, 225-37; Vis. xxxi, 1.

⁴ Man. iv, 162; Āp. i, 1, 14; Gau. xxi, 5.

⁵ Man. viii, 389; Yāj. ii, 237; Vis. v, 163.

⁶ Man. iii, 157; Yāj. i, 224; Vis. Lxxxii, 23, 29.

⁷ Man. viii, 28-29; Vis. iii, 65.

⁸ Man. xi, 59; Yāj. iii, 231; Vis. xxxvi, 4-7; Gau. xxi, 1; Bau. ii, 2, 13; Āp. i, 21; 8-9, 17-18.

⁹ Man. xi, 171; Yāj. iii, 233; Vis. xxxiv, 2; Liii, 1; Vas. xx, 15-16; Gau. xxiii, 12-13, 32.

¹⁰ Man. xi, 67; Yāj. iii, 236-37; 239; Vis. xxxvii, 13, 31, 33; Gau. xxi, 1, 11; Vas. i, 23.

The husband of a widow who has remarried must not be entertained at a sacrifice.¹ Such a woman is called a *punarbhū*, and has no social status; and her husband would be generally censured in the society.

The one great issue which presents itself to our mind when we consider the position of woman in India, is with regard to her relation to the scheme of the *āśramas*. The women, along with the *Śūdras*, are not taken into account so far as the management of life through the *āśrama* stages is concerned. The explanation given for the exclusion of women from the *āśrama* scheme is that her life is so much related to man, and that the lives of the *grihastha* and his *dharmapatnī* are mutually adjusted according to the *Dharmaśāstra*. We have already seen, for example, in the Chapter on Education, how the nuptials and the life of a housewife are considered for the woman as equivalent to the *brahmacharya* and the *grihasthāśrama* of man. There is historical evidence, as we have narrated elsewhere, that *vānaprasthāśrama* and *samnyāsāśrama* were available for women; and in actual practice, according to the Hindu theory, with the permission and consent of the husband, a woman could enter the *vānaprastha* or the *samnyāsa āśrama*, just as a man can enter these with the consent of his wife. Usually, of course, the man and wife enter these two *āśramas* together, in theory at least. So far as the first *āśrama* is concerned, however, the great question that presents itself to us is: Why should woman be denied the right and privilege to learn and to teach systematically, which the male individual gets and gathers and may also impart—why should that discipline and purpose during the *Brahmacharyāśrama* be denied to the woman? Apart from the few names of women-teachers that we had noted, almost all teachers were

¹ Man. iii, 166; Yāj. i, 224; Gau. xv, 16.

males. Is the natural inherent difference to be regarded as such a defect in the female sex as to be the cause of the absence of such rights in the case of woman? The answer to all this is given by saying, as we have seen, that the āśrama for the woman to learn is the home. Woman's part was perhaps supposed to be in the conserving and propagation of the race; and these functions were probably thought to be naturally inherited by her, and as not in need of training through the *āśramas*, as man required. Also, the burden of maternal duties was probably thought to be too heavy to add any other liabilities upon her. It is extremely difficult to decide to what extent this can be proved to be true. The woman is also denied many of the *samskāras* including that of *upanayana*.) Here also, she is supposed to become a *dvijā* when she marries. Now, the explanation offered in support of all this seems to amount to this, that the lives of man and woman after marriage were considered as one and the woman could never be thought of independently of married life. But then, in this connection, the questions of perpetual widowhood, absence of divorce, and absence of a public career for woman are three issues very difficult to answer. Also, if the theory that the life of man and woman who are married to each other, is one and sacred, be granted as true, how could it be possibly maintained that man may marry, under any circumstances, more than one wife?

These are the ways in which the womankind was judged in old India. The judgements may often seem contradicting each other and at places even self-contradictory. She is a *devatā* (goddess) as well as a *pramadā* (seducer). She is truth-loving and yet she has weakness of character, lack of judgement and of equilibrium of mind. She is the queen of the house, but she does not deserve freedom and independence, even in the family affairs. What may apparently seem as a contradiction of statements, how-

ever, is in truth, not a contradiction. The Śāstrakaras and the Epic and other writers have viewed the problem of woman from different points of view and during different periods. And since at each time the universe of discourse is changed, the views opined appear to be contradictory. Thus, from the point of view of family stability and happiness, the woman is to be respected and honoured ; and, in view of the inherent weakness of her nature she is conceived as needing the protection of man, and to that extent, dependent on man. But if we are minded to look at the Hindu conception and treatment of womankind on the whole, we must admit that the Hindu seers have honestly and sincerely made repeated inquiries into the problems of the nature and position of the fair sex for the maintenance, growth and development of the best and the noblest of the human heritage in any society. It may be that due to several reasons, which must have formed the signs and characteristics of the times, they seem to be conservative in one cycle and liberal in another regarding certain aspects of the life of woman ; but, along with these and inspite of these strong opinions, or even prejudices, against the nature of woman, the Hindu sages have never failed woman in giving her entire due as a maiden, a wife, a mother, a householder and as a matron in the economy, upkeep and exaltation of the family and its best traditions.

CHAPTER VII
THE FOUR *VARNAS*

CHAPTER VII

THE FOUR *VARṆAS*

We have already noted the fact that just as the *āśrama-dharma* is formulated more with reference to the conduct of the individual's life in the world, so there is another co-ordinate system, devised by the Hindu, called the *varṇa-dharma* which is formulated more with reference to the society in which the individual lives.¹ Of course, both the kinds of *dharma*s concern themselves with the organisation and management of the individual as well as the group or the society ; but the difference may be said to lie in the manner of approach and emphasis in the organisation of man and his activities in regard to the two kinds of *dharma*s. In the scheme of the *āśramas*, the problem is approached from the point of view of the training of the individual through specifically provided environments at different stages of his life ; in the *varṇa*-organization, on the other hand, the problem is considered from the point of view of the larger group, and the individual's position is defined in this group with reference to his innate nature, tendencies and dispositions. We have already considered the *āśrama* scheme and its purpose and method in the preceding chapters. In this chapter we take up the *varṇa*-organisation for our review. We may begin with the views of Hindu thinkers of old on the problem of *varṇa*-organisation, and then, in the light of this, we shall try to evaluate the same.

I

There are several passages in the oldest Vedic literature dealing with the origin of the *varṇas*. The oldest is the

¹ See the opening remarks in Ch. II.

hymn in the *Purusha-sūkta* of the *Rigveda* which says that the *Brāhmaṇa varṇa* represented the mouth of the *Purusha*,—which word may be translated as ‘the Universal Man’, referring perhaps to mankind as a whole,—the *Rājanya* (i. e. *Kshatriya*) his arms, the *Vaiśya* his thighs, and the *Śūdra* his feet.¹ Zimmer and others have held the opinion that this *Purusha* hymn was a later interpolation and that the institution of caste was not *Rigvedic*, but of later origin.² But it has been shown that there are other passages, apart from the *Purusha Sūkta*, in which the division of society into *varṇas*, though not in the rigid form of later times, is mentioned. Thus, in *Rig. VIII, 35, 16-18*, the three *varṇas*, the *Brāhma*, *Kshatram*, and *Viśah* are mentioned, while in *Rig. I, 113, 16*, the four *varṇas* are referred to thus: “One to high sway (i.e. *Brāhmaṇa*), one to exalted glory (i.e. the *Kshatriya*), one to pursue his gain (i.e. the *Vaiśya*) and one to his labour (i.e. the *Śūdra*),—all to regard their different vocations, all moving creatures hath the Dawn awakened.”³ Further, the division into four *varṇas* is here mentioned with reference to the duties of each *varṇa*. Haug’s opinion on the origin of the institution of caste seems to be correct. “It has been of late asserted,” he observes, “that the original parts of the *Vedas* do not know the system of caste. But this conclusion was prematurely arrived at without sufficiently weighing the evidence. It is true that caste system is not to be found in such a developed state; the duties assigned to the several castes are not so clearly defined as in the law-books and *Purāṇas*. But nevertheless the system is already

¹ *Rig. x, 90, 12.*

² *Colebrooke: Miscellaneous Essays i, p. 309 note.*

MaxMüller: Ancient Sanskrit literature, p. 570; etc. (From Muir: Ori. Sanskrit Texts i, p. 12 f.)

³ *Dutt: “Origin and Growth of Caste in India” Vol. I (1931), p. 39.*

known in the earlier parts of the Vedas, or rather presupposed. The barriers only were not so insurmountable as in later times."¹

Let us take up the passage from the *Purusha-sūkta*, quoted above, for our consideration. Here in this passage, an allegorical meaning is suggested by the whole *sūkta* with reference to the *Purusha* and the creation of *varnas* from his limbs. The *Purusha* is described as being himself "this whole universe, whatever has been and whatever shall be."² Further, we are also told that the moon sprang from his mind (*manas*) the Sun from his eye, Indra and Agni were created out of his mouth, and air or wind from his breath.³ Again, from his navel arose the atmosphere (*antariksham*), from his head the sky, from his feet the earth (*bhūmi*), and from his ear the four quarters (*diśah*); in this manner, the worlds were created.⁴

The passage in Rig. X, 90, 12 has been interpreted as having an allegorical significance behind it from another point of view also.⁵ Thus, the mouth of the *Purusha* from which the Bāhmaṇas are created is the seat of speech. The Brāhmaṇas therefore are created to be teachers and instructors of mankind. The arms are symbol of valour and strength; the Kshatriya's mission in this world is to carry weapons and protect people. It is difficult to interpret that portion of the hymn which deals with the creation of the Vaiśyas from the thighs of the *Purusha*. But the thigh may have been intended to

¹ Quoted by Dutt: *Origin & Growth of Caste*, i, pp. 38-39. He also mentions that Oldenberg and Geldner held similar views.

² Rig. x, 90, 2; "*purusha ivedam sarvam yad bhūtam yachcha bhūvryam*".

³ *ibid.* x, 90, 13.

⁴ *ibid.* x, 90, 14.

⁵ See Haug. "On the Origin of Brāhmaṇism", p. 4, (Quoted by Muir: "*Ori. Sansk. Texts*, Vol. i, p. 14).

represent the lower portion of the body, the portion which consumes food, and therefore the Vaiśya may be said to be created to provide food to the people. The creation of the Śūdra from the foot, symbolizes the fact that the Śūdra is to be the "footman", the servant of other *varṇas*. The whole social organization is here conceived symbolically as one human being—the "Body Social", we may say—with its limbs representing the social classes based on the principle of division of labour.

We also find that in the Vedic Period there were no restrictions as regards particular occupations for persons belonging to a particular *varṇa*. Thus, a person born as a Brāhmaṇa may take to the occupation of a physician without thereby in any way degrading his social status, "With Soma as their sovereign lord the Plants hold colloquy and say : Oh king, we save from death the man whose cure a Brāhmaṇa undertakes."¹ A Brāhmaṇa *rishi* says : "I am a poet, my father is a physician, my mother a grinder of corn. With our different views, seeking after gain, we run as after cattle."² The Ribhus were skilful artisans ; and yet they were given high divine honours.³ And, of the descendants of the Brāhmaṇa *rishi* Bhrigu, some were reported to be expert in the art of making chariots.⁴ There is no trace of heredity defining the occupation of an individual.

The Śūdras of the Rigvedic period seem to be no other than the non-Āryans, the Dāsas or the Dasyūs who differed from the fair-skinned Āryas on account of their black complexion (*krishṇattvach*), flat-nose, unintelligibility of speech, absence of sacrificing among them (*ayajnan*), absence of the worship of god amongst them,

¹ Rig. x, 97, 22; From Dutt: Op. Cit. p. 59.

² Rig. ix, 112, 3; From *ibid.* pp. 59-60.

³ Rig. i, 161, 1-5; From *ibid.* p. 6.

⁴ Rig. x, 39, 14; From *ibid.* p. 60.

and the prevalence of foreign customs which they followed (*anyavrata*),—all of which were obviously strange to the Āryas.¹ They were kept by the Āryans as slaves. There is no obvious explanation of the term *Sūdra* which later came to signify the *Dāsas*; it is, however, suggested that '*Sūdra*' was probably the name of some prominent *Dāsa* tribe, and, in course of time, the word became synonymous with the whole community of slaves, by usage, just as at Athens the term *Karian* became synonymous with the word slaves.²

It has also been shown that there were no restrictions in the Rigvedic society in the matter of diet and drink between the different *varṇas* such as we find in the later society.³ Whatever food or drink was usual was common to all the *varṇas*. So too, there was no "higher" or "lower" *varṇa* for matrimonial alliances.⁴ "There were no definite restrictions on intermarriage between the different classes of the Āryan race; in fact there was no necessity, as the different groups in society, whatever might be their occupations, were by complexion, features, language and creed practically homogeneous.. Nowhere in the Rigveda is any mention of a *Vaiśya* being regarded as less pure than a *Brāhmaṇa*, and of social intercourse between the two as degrading to the latter".⁵ There are no instances recorded of mixed marriages in the Rigveda. But this happened, perhaps, as Dutt observes, due to the fact that the *jātis* as separate communities prohibiting intermarriages did not exist in the Rigvedic period.⁶ Several instances, however, happened in the Rigvedic

¹ *ibid.* p. 60-63.

² Dutt; *op. cit.*; and in "Camb. Hist. Ind."—Ch. x, "Life & Customs in the *Sūtras*", by Hopkins, p. 234.

³ See Dutt. *op. cit.* pp. 64 ff.

⁴ See *ibid.* pp. 68 ff.

⁵ *ibid.* p. 68.

⁶ See Dutt: *ibid.*

period and recorded in later literature, of such mixed marriages, are in fact known to us, like those between Yayāti and Devayānī, Dushyanta and Śakuntalā. Both these are instances of marriages between Kshatriyā and Brāhmaṇa. Similar are the cases, mentioned by the commentator,¹ of a *rishi* Syāvāśva marrying the daughter of Kshatriya King Rathavīti; of the marriage of King Asanga with a woman of Angirasa family;² and of a *rishi* Kakshivan marrying the daughters of King Svanaya.³

From the above account during the Vedic period, the *varṇas* seem to have been 'open classes', to use a term of Cooley.⁴ They were not watertight compartments, the membership of which was determined by virtue of heredity only; they were, to use Cooley's words again, "more based on individual traits and less upon descent."⁵

Gradually, however, the *varṇas* came to be distinguished from each other. Each *varṇa* became more and more marked off and separated from the other. The four *varṇas* came to be addressed in four different ways, differing in degrees of politeness as indicated by the terms *ehi*, *āgachchha*, *adrava* and *adhava* to be used for welcoming persons of different *varṇas*.⁶ Different sizes of funeral cakes (*pinda*) were prescribed for different *varṇas*.⁷ When reciting the *Gāyatrī mantra* the three *varṇas* were to start each with different word: the Brāhmaṇa with 'Bhūh', the Kshatriya with 'Bhuvah' and the Vaiśya with 'Svah'.⁸ Indeed, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* says that the *varṇas* are created from these words in their order, the Brāhmaṇa

¹ On Rig. v, 61.

² Rig. viii, 134.

³ Rig. i, 126; (From Dutt: Op. Cit. pp. 68-69).

⁴ See his "Social Organization", Ch. xxi.

⁵ *ibid.* p. 239.

⁶ *Śatapatha Br.* i, 1, 4, 12; (From Dutt: Op. Cit. pp. 85 ff).

⁷ *Sat. Br.* xiii, 8, 3, 11. (From *ibid.*)

⁸ *Sat. Br.* ii, 1, 3, 4. (From *ibid.*)

being created from the word *Bhūh*, the Kshatriya from *Bhuvah* and the Vaiśya from *Svah*.¹ Further, the Brāhmaṇa is asked to use *Palāśa* wood for sprinkling purposes at sacrifices, the Kshatriya to use *Nyagrodha* wood, and the Vaiśya to use *Aśvattha* wood.² According to the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, the Brāhmaṇa *varṇa* must recite the *Gāyatrī* metre, the Kshatriyas the *Trishtubh* metre, and the Vaiśyas the *Jagatī* metre at the initiation rite.³ According to the *Taitirīya Brāhmaṇa*, the Brāhmaṇa *varṇa* should perform their sacrifice during the spring, the Kshatriya *varṇa* during summer, and the Vaiśyas during autumn.⁴ Thus, a gradual increase in the distinction between the different *varṇas* in terms of different rights and privileges is noticeable as we pass on from the Rigvedic literature to the Brāhmanic literature, viz., in the *Samhitās*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, and the *Upanishads*.

In this later period, the *Śūdra* still held the position of a menial labourer or slave; and, he was still a non-Āryan. Even then, there was less restriction upon him; and, he was at times allowed the liberty of even taking part in sacrificial ceremonies.⁵ Instead of the three varṇas, mention is now usually made of the four varṇas together, the *Śūdra* also finding a place along with the three other *varṇas*. The prayer goes, for instance; "Bestow splendour on our Brāhmaṇas; bestow splendour on our Kshatriyas; bestow splendour on our Vaiśyas and *Śūdras*; bestow splendour upon me."⁶ In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, a *Śūdra* attends to a *Pitrimedha Yajña*;⁷ the *Chhândogya Upanishad* relates a story about a *Brāhmaṇa*

¹ Śat. Br. ii, 1-4, 11, fl. (Muir: Ori. Sansk. Texts, i, p. 17).

² Śat. Br. v, 3-2, 11; (From Dutt. Op. Cit.).

³ Ait. Br. i, 5, (From *ibid*).

⁴ Taitt. Br. i, 1, (From *ibid*).

⁵ Śat. Br. i, 1, 4, 11. (From *ibid*).

⁶ Taitt. Sam. v, 7, 6, 4. (From *ibid*).

⁷ Śat. Br. xiii, 8, 3, 11. (From *ibid*).

teaching the sacred knowledge to a Śūdra, and accepting¹ in return from him rich gifts and also his daughter.¹ Even in the account of the creation of the *varṇas*, the Śūdra finds a place equal to the other *varṇas* in position. "He lauded with one (*ekayā astuvata*),—living beings were formed ;...He lauded with three,—the Brāhmaṇa was created ;...He lauded with fifteen,—the Kshatra was created ;...He lauded with nineteen,—the Śūdra and the Ārya (i. e., Vaiśya) were created."² In another passage again, the four *varṇas* are referred to as having sprung from the divine element of Agni in each of the *varṇas* ; through the divine Brāhmaṇa a human Brāhmaṇa is created ; through the divine Kshatriya a human Kshatriya sprang ; through the divine Vaiśya a human Vaiśya is originated ; and through the divine Śūdra a human Śūdra is created.³

Though the Śūdra was now accepted as belonging to a fourth *varṇa* along with the three other *varṇas* and though he was given some freedom with regard to attendance at sacrificial parties, he was not yet quite free from many of the old disabilities. Thus, he had for himself no right to perform a sacrifice like the three higher *varṇas*.⁴ His duty continued to be, as in older times, to serve the other *varṇas*. He might attend a religious ceremony only to wash the feet of persons of the other *varṇas*, and that because his very origin was out of the feet of Prajāpati (Creator).⁵ He had no god ; and consequently

¹ Chhānd. Up. iv, 2. (From *ibid*).

² Vājasaneyā Samhi. xiv, 28 ff. (= Taittiriya Samhi. iv, 3, 10, 1)—Muir: Ori. Sansk. Texts. i, p. 18.

³ Śat. Br. xiv, 4, 2, 27 (= Br. Up. i, 4, 11 ff.)—Muir: *ibid* Vol. i, p. 19.

⁴ Śat. Br. iii, 1, 1, 10 and Panchivimśa Br. vi, 1, 11 ;—from Dutt: p. 104.

⁵ Taitt. Sam. vii, 1, 1. (From *ibid*).

he could not perform sacrifices.¹ He would not be even spoken to directly by any person who is engaged in performing important sacrificial rites. "Every one cannot obtain this, for the gods do not associate with every man but an Ārya, a Brāhmaṇa or a Kshatriya or a Vaiśya; for, these can perform a sacrifice. Nor should one talk with every body except only with an Ārya, a Brāhmaṇa or a Kshatriya or a Vaiśya; for, these can sacrifice. If any one has occasion to speak to a Śūdra, let him say to another person: 'tell this man so and so'. This is the rule for an initiated man".² Even the touch of a Śūdra to articles like milk, meant for use of a sacrifice, was prohibited.³

There seem to be no restrictions during this period of the Brāhmaṇas and Samhitās as regards marriages between the Varṇas, excepting perhaps the restriction upon marriage with a Śūdra male or female by a member of another *varṇa*. There are not, however, many instances specifically mentioning the absence of such restrictions; but that may be due to the fact that no particular attention was attracted by inter-*varṇa* marriages, as in all probability they must have been very frequent and not exceptional. The Atharva Veda declares at one place that a Brāhmaṇa's claims to marry a Vaiśya girl must be given priority to the claims of a Vaiśya youth.⁴ Of course, cases are pointed out, where marriage of a man of a higher *varṇa* with a Śūdra woman was looked upon with disfavour. Kavaśa Ailuśa was expelled from a sacrifice because his mother was a dāśī; but he was re-admitted after the gods had shown him special favour.⁵ Another man Vatsa, in order to prove himself as born of Brāhmaṇa

¹ Panch. Br. vi, 1, 11; (From *ibid*).

² Śat. Br. iii, 1, 1; (From Dutt. p. 104).

³ Taitt. Br. iii, 2, 3; (*ibid*. p. 105).

⁴ Ath. Ved. v, 17, 9 (*ibid*. p. 109).

⁵ Ait. Br. ii, 19; Kaush. Br. xii, 1, 3; (From *ibid* p. 110).

parents, had to walk through fire unharmed, before he was admitted to be present at a sacrifice.¹

Of the Upanishads, the *Bṛihādaranyaka* gives us an account of the origin of the *varṇas* in this way : In the beginning there was *Brahman* only. But alone, he could not prosper well (*na vyabhavat*). Therefore, he further created a form or a pattern or type with a view to make progress (*śreyo rūpam*), viz. the *Kshatra* ; this consisted of the gods Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mritya and Īśāna...Still, however, *Brahman* found that it could not fare satisfactorily ; therefore, it created the *Vaiśya*-hood (*viśam*) in the form of the gods Vasus, Rudras, Ādityas, Viśvedevas and the Maruts. Even then, *Brahman* could not make good progress ; so it created *Śūdra Varṇa* in the form of the god Pūshan. In spite of these creations, again, *Brahman* did not develop well ; therefore, he still further created the propitious form (*śreyo rūpam*) viz. *Dharma*. The earthly *varṇas* are, in the opinion of *Bṛihadāranyakopaniṣad*, thus created out of these divine *varṇas*.² This theory does not refer to any social gradation amongst the *varṇas*. On the contrary, each *varṇa*, as also the *dharma* for them, were conceived as all created with a view to contribute to the social welfare. Regarding birth in a particular *varṇa*, the *Chhāndogya* tells us that this depends upon the nature of our deeds in the former birth. Those who are of good conduct here, will attain good birth as Brāhmaṇas or as Kshatriyas or as Vaiśyas. But those who are of bad

¹ Panch. Br. xiv, 6, 6; (ibid).

² Brih. Up. i, 4, 11-15.

³ Professor Ranade, in "A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy", p. 60, observes in this connection: "In this unorthodox theory, we have the origin of the earthly caste-system on the pattern of a heavenly caste-system almost in the manner in which the ectypes in Plato's theory of Ideas are merely replicas of the archetypes".

conduct here, will be born again as dogs, swines or out-castes;¹ here, only the first three *varṇas* are mentioned. In all these views, however, there seems to be no reference to any status or an idea of 'higher or lower', between the three *varṇas*.²

II

(1)

There is a great deal of theorizing in the *Epic* and the *Dharmaśāstra* literature on the problem of origin and development of *varṇas*. There were no distinct castes in the Kṛita Yuga, according to the Mahābhārata.³ At other place, the sage Bhrigu says that only a few Brāhmaṇas were first created by the great Brahman.⁴ But later on, the four divisions of mankind—the Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra were created. The complexion (*varṇah*) of the Brāhmaṇas was white (*sita*),⁵ that of Kshatriyas red (*lohita*), that of the Vaiśyas yellow (*pīta*), and that of the Śūdras black (*asita*)—thus does the *rishi* Bhrigu explain his theory of the origin of the *varṇas* to Bharadvāja. But Bharadvāja asks : If the various *varṇas* had to be distinguished simply by means of

¹ Chhând. Up. v, 10, 7.

² In Chhând. viii, 14, also, only Brāhmaṇa, Rājan, and Viś, are mentioned.

³ Mahā. Vana. 149, 18: (cf. also Rāmā. Uttar. xxx, 25-26) "*ekavarṇā mayā buddhyā prajāḥ sṛishṭāḥ tathā prabho/ ekavarṇah...*" and, "*tāsām nāsti viśesho hi darśane lakṣaṇe'pi vā//*"; and, Bhāg. Purā. ix, 14, 4: "*eka eva purā vedah...eko'gnir varṇa eva cha//*".

⁴ See Mahā. Śānti. 188, 1-17, for the views of Bhrigu given here.

⁵ Nilakaṇṭha comments: "*varṇah sāttrvikam rājasam tāmasam miśram cheti, svachchhatvādisāmyāt guṇavṛittam varṇa-śabdena uchyate//*". Thus, '*sita*' = *sattvagūṇah*; '*lohita*' = *rajogūṇah*; '*pīta*' = *rajastamovyamiśrah*; '*asita*' = *tamogūṇah*'.

the colour of their complexion, then surely this must have been found to be an impossible task ! For there are endless varieties of men and colour. How could so many different varieties (*vividha*) be classed under four orders only ? To this Bhrigu replies that there is in reality no distinction between the different classes.¹ At first the whole world consisted of Brāhmaṇas.¹ "Created equally by Brahman, men have, on account of their acts, been divided into various *varṇas*." The theory goes on to explain how the four *varṇas* and other castes (*jātayah*) arose out of the one original class of Dvijas. They who found excessive pleasure in enjoyment, became possessed of the attributes of harshness and anger ; endowed with courage, and unmindful of their own dharma, (*tyakta-sva-dharmāh*), those Dvijas possessing the quality of Redness (*raktāṅgāh*)² became Kshatriyas. Those again, who unmindful of the duties laid down for them, became endued with both the qualities of Redness and Darkness (*pītaḥ*)³ and followed the occupations of cattle-breeding and agriculture, became Vaiśyas. Those Dvijas, again, who were given to untruth and injuring other creatures, possessed of cupidity (*lubdhāh*), who followed all sorts of occupations for their maintenance (*sarvakarmopajīvinah*), who had no purity of behaviour (*śauchaparibhrashtāh*), and who thus nursed within them the quality of Darkness (*krishṇah*)⁴ became Śūdras." Thus, "divided by these occupations, the Dvijas, (who were, in the first instance, all Brāhmaṇas),

¹ *ibid.* 188. 10: *Na viśesho'sti varṇānām sarvam brahmanidam jagat/brahmaṇā pūrvasrishṭam hi karmabhirvarṇatām gatam/.*

² '*raktāṅgah* = *rajo-guṇamayah*'—Nilakaṇṭha.

³ '*pītaḥ* = *rajastamomayah*'—Nilakaṇṭha.

⁴ '*krishṇah*' = *kevalatamomayah*—Nilakaṇṭha.

due to falling away from the duties of their own order, became members of the other three *varṇas*. All the four *varṇas*, therefore, *always possess the right to perform all the dharma and yajna duties.*'¹ Those of the mankind, further, who through their ignorance, fell away from their prescribed duties, and led a loose life (*svachchhandāchāracheshṭitāh*), formed themselves in the various lower castes (*jātayah*), viz., in the Piśāchas, the Rākshasas, the Ghosts or the Evil-spirited (*pretah*), and the various *mlecchh* *jātis*.² The theory of the origin of the *varṇas* from the various parts of the Creator's body also finds a place in the Mahābhārata. Thus the Brāhmaṇa is said to have originated from the mouth of the Brahman, the Kshatriya from his arms, the Vaiśya from his two thighs, and the Sūdra from his feet.³ The Brāhmaṇa was created to preserve the Vedas and the other scriptures, the Kshatriya for ruling the earth, holding the rod of punishment, and protecting all other creatures, the Vaiśya for supporting the two other orders and himself by cultivation and trade, and the Sūdra to serve the three orders as a servant.⁴

But theorizing about the origin and the distinction between the four *varṇas* does not end with these views only. King Janaka asks a very pertinent question to the rishi Parāśara on this subject: The whole of mankind has sprung from Brahman. Now, it is a law of nature, and the Śrutis too say the same, that the offsprings share in common the nature of that from which they are created. Therefore, all the men on earth must have been of one *varṇa* when they were created. Whence, then, did the

¹ ibid. Śānti. 188, 10-14: "ityetaih karmabhir vyastā dvijā varṇāntaram gatāh/dharmo yajnakriyā teshām nityam na pratishidhyate//".

² ibid. Śānti. 188, 17-18.

³ ibid. Śānti. 72, 4-5.

⁴ ibid. 72, 6-8.

Sons begotten by twice-born men (*dwijas*, i. e. Brāhmaṇas, Kshatriyas and Vaiśyas) of wives from the immediate lower class belong no doubt to the *varṇa* of their fathers; but they are censured on account of the fault inherent in their mothers (*mātridosha*).¹ Such is the traditional (*sanātana*) law (*vidhih*) applicable to children of a wife from a *varṇa* only one degree lower than her husband's.² The real "mixture" of *varṇas* (*varṇasamkarah*) therefore arises with offsprings born of a woman two or three degrees lower. Thus the son born of a Brāhmaṇa father and Vaiśya mother would be called an Ambashṭha; that born of a Brāhmaṇa father and a Śūdra mother would be called a Nishāda, and so on.³ The mixture of *varṇas* takes place in other ways also. Of a Kshatriya father and Brāhmaṇa mother spring issues belonging to the Sūta caste; children born of a Vaiśya father and Kshatriya mother or a Brāhmaṇa mother, belong to Māgadha and Videha respectively, and so on.⁴ And inter-marriages between these new castes give rise to newer and newer castes, so that the process goes on multiplying.⁵ Here in this *śloka* (X, 11), Manu has used the word *jāti* as different from *varṇa*. This *śloka* opens the topic concerning offsprings begotten on a woman of higher *varṇa* by a man of lower *varṇa*. Thus the Sūta, the Māgadha and the Vaideha are so named according to their *jāti* (*jātitah*). And, in the next *śloka*, Manu also uses the term *Varṇa-samkarah*, mixture of *varṇas*, in this connection.⁶

—Here, it would be advantageous for us to firmly fix in our mind that the '*varṇa* theory' of society is not to be

¹ Man. x, 6; Such children are *apasadas* (base-born)—x, 10.

² Man. x, 7.

³ Man. x, 11-13; See Yāj. i, 93-94; Vis. xvi, 4-6.

⁴ Man. x, 18-45.

⁵ Man. x, 11.

⁶ Man. x, 12; See also Yāj. i, 90-94.

confused with the 'jāti-system' which we meet with to-day in the Hindu society, and which is usually described by the term the 'caste-system'. The word caste was first used in India by the Portuguese to denote the several *jātis*¹ which they found existing here, and which continue to exist even to this day. Dr. Dutt summarizes the most apparent features of the Hindu caste-system of to-day by pointing out that "the members of the different castes cannot have matrimonial connections with any but persons of their own caste ; that there are restrictions, though not so rigid as in the matter of marriage, about a member of one caste eating and drinking with that of a different caste ; that in many cases there are fixed occupations for different castes ; that there is some hierarchical gradation among the castes, the most recognized position being that of the Brāhmaṇas at the top ; that birth alone decides a man's connection with his caste for life, unless expelled for violation of his caste rules, and that transition from one caste to another, high or low, is not possible. The prestige of the Brāhmaṇa caste is the corner-stone of the whole organization."² These are the most salient features of the *jāti* system or the caste-system into which the original *varṇa* theory of the Hindus has come to be evolved. The word "jāti" originates from the Samskrit word "jan" "to take birth", while the word "varṇa" would mean "colour". *Varṇa* has also been derived from "vri" "to choose", meaning accordingly, "choice of vocation". Anyway it has nothing to do, in its origin, to the purely hereditary principle involved in the word *jāti*./

The view that "*varṇa*" and "*jāti*" are distinct and "essentially independent", though "by the reaction of principles on fact the two institutions may have become

1 N. K. Dutt: "The origin & Growth of Caste in India", p. 1.
Also, P. Masson-Oursel & Others: "Ancient India and Indian Civilization", p. 78.

² Dutt: *ibid.* p. 3.

fused together'' later on,¹ was put forward by E. Senart ; this is generally accepted by both Iranian and Vedic scholars like Geldner and Oldenberg, as well as by Indologists like Barth and Jolly.² This theory ''supposes a distinct value for the two terms'' *jāti* and *varṇa*.³ Senart has shown how the *Āryans* first used the word ''*Ārya Varṇa*'' in Rigvedic literature to distinguish themselves from the ''*Dāsa Varṇa*'', the enemies of the *Āryans*.⁴ In the opinion of Senart, the word *varṇa* was used to denote the distinction between the *Āryas* and the non-*Āryas* ; but it ''was later split up, if I may so express it, so that it might apply no longer to these two primitive *varṇas*, but to more numerous categories. It has not lost all traces of its origin. It does not signify caste in general and in the strict sense, but only 'the four castes' ''',⁵ while the castes which are actually found in practice and which do not truly correspond with this theoretical fourfold division into *varṇas*, were designated by the law-books by the term ''*jāti*''.⁶ The water-tight compartments of the *jāti*-system therefore are due to later Brāhmanic interpretation of the term *varṇa*, and, ''to interpret the Vedic testimony by the Brāhmanic theory of a more recent age, is to reverse the true order of things.''⁷

III

(1)

Let us next take into consideration the classification of duties with reference to the *varṇa* scheme. Bhīṣma, with an obeisance to the *Dharma* Deity, opines that the control

¹ Senart: Caste in India (Tr. by Ross, 1930), p. 153.

² Masson-Oursel: Ancient India & Indian Civilization, p. 83.

³ *ibid.* p. 83.

⁴ Senart: Caste in India, pp. 122-23 (following Zimmer).

⁵ Senart: *ibid.* p. 128.

⁶ Senart: *ibid.* pp. 128-29.

⁷ Senart: *ibid.* p. 126.

of anger, speaking the truth, justice or equity or fair-mindedness (*samvibhāgah*), forgiveness, begetting children of one's own married wife, pure conduct, avoiding quarrel, uprightness (*ārjavam*), and the maintenance of one's dependents (*bhṛitya*),—these are the nine duties, common to all the four varṇas (*sārva-varṇikah*).¹ Then follows the familiar division of *dharma*s among the four *varṇas*. Thus, teaching, self-control and the practice of *tapas* (austerities) are the specific (*kevalam*) duties of the Brāhmaṇas; study, protecting people, performing sacrifices, making gifts, are the specific duties of a Kṣatriya; study, making gifts, celebrating sacrifices and acquiring wealth by fair means are the specific duties of a Vaiśya; and the Śūdra, created "as the servant of the other three *varṇas*" should never amass wealth (*saṃchaya*m) for himself, for then "he makes the members of the three superior orders obedient to him. By this he would incur sin."² He is to be maintained by the three other *varṇas*.³ Whatever he possesses, belongs to his master.⁴ Sacrifice, the Śūdra can perform; but he is not held competent to recite *svāhā* and *sadhā*, or any other Vedic *mantra*.⁵ "Sacrificing, of course, is as much sanctioned for the Śūdra as for the other three."⁶ There are two kinds of sacrifices which are common to all *varṇas*,—the sacrifice in the form of faith or belief (*śraddhāyajna*) in god and *dharma*, and what may be called the mental sacrifice (*yajno manishayā*)⁷ in the sense of cultivating a discipline of non-attachment to material possessions.⁸ Therefore,

¹ Sānti. 60, 7.

² *ibid.* 60, 8-29.

³ *ibid.* 60, 31.

⁴ *ibid.* 60, 36.

⁵ *ibid.* 60, 40.

⁶ *ibid.* 60, 37.

⁷ *ibid.* 60, 44-45.

⁸ Nilakaṇṭha comments: "tathā cha manase devatoddeśena dravyatyāgātmake yajne sarve varṇā adhikriyante, ityarthah".

says Bhīṣma, the moral (*nirṇayah*) of *varṇa-dharma* is that members of all the *varṇas* should always, and by every possible means in their power, perform *yajna*.¹ There is nothing in the three worlds equal to *yajna*; therefore, it is said that every one, with his heart free from malice, and with implicit faith as the sacred foundation of his acts, should perform *yajna* to the best of his abilities and fullest satisfaction.²

The Great God *Maheśvara* gives a similar account of the division of duties for the *varṇas*: The duties common to all the *varṇas* are: hospitality towards all (*sarvātithyam*), the pursuit of the three-fold objects of life (viz., *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma*), and giving alms and gifts according to one's means.³ Then, some of the specific duties of the Brāhmaṇa are: observance of fasts, listening to the intricacies of *dharma*, observance of vows laid down in the Vedas, attention to the sacred fire in the home, constant recitation of the Vedas, performance of sacrifices, and complete abstention from injuring any creature.⁴ In addition to the specific duties of the Kshatriya already referred to above (p. 299), he should also have "perseverance in acts that have been undertaken"⁵ by him, he should give punishment to offenders proportionate to the offences committed, and he should not hesitate to interfere for helping the distressed.⁶ The Vaiśya's main duty

¹ *ibid.* 60, 53; "*Sarvathā sarvadā varṇair yashṭavyamiti nirṇayah/na hi yajnasamam kinchit trishu lokeshu vidyate/*".

² *ibid.* 60, 54; "*Tasmād yashṭavyamityāhuh puruṣeṇānusūyatā/śraddhāpavitramāśritya yathāśakti yatthechchhaya/*".

³ *Mahā. Anu.* 141, 61-79.

⁴ *ibid.* 141, 36-41.

⁵ *ibid.* 141, 49.

⁶ *ibid.* 141, 51-52.

is honest trade ; and, as usual, the Śūdra's duty consists in attendance upon the three other varṇas.¹

For the Smritis the common dharmas for the four varṇas are : abstention from injury to any living creature (*ahimsā*), pursuit of truth (*satyam*), abstaining from unlawfully appropriating what belongs to another (*asteyam*), purity of conduct and life (*śaucham*) and control of sense-organs (*indriyanigrahaḥ*, *indriyasamyamah*) ;² to this, are also added self-restraint (*damah*), forgiveness (*kshamā*), uprightness (*ārjavam*) and generosity (*dānam*).³ The specific dharmas of each of the varṇas are the same as noted above by us from other sources.⁴ Manu summarizes them by saying : "Among the several duties, the most commendable (*viśiṣṭāni*) are, teaching the Veda for the Brāhmaṇa, protecting the people (*rakṣaṇam*) for a Kshatriya, and trading (*vārtā*) for a Vaiśya".⁵

In times of distress (*āpatsu*), however, the Brāhmaṇa may follow the occupations of the Kshatriyas ; or he may even follow the occupations of the Vaiśyas, if he is not capable to perform the duties of Kshatriya (*aśaktah kshātra-dharmena*).⁶ Only, there are certain reservations in this rule ; the Brāhmaṇa should not, even when following the Vaiśya's occupations, sell wines, salt, sesamum seeds, animals having manes, bulls, honey, meat and cooked food, under any circumstances.⁷ It follows, of course, that a Kshatriya could follow the Vaiśya's occupations in such times of distress. Whether the three higher

¹ *ibid.* 141, 55-57 : "*Suśrūṣhā cha dvijātishu*"/. *Suśrūṣhā* means, literally, 'desire to hear'.

² *Man.* x, 63 ; *Yāj.* i, 122 ; *Vis.* ii, 16-17.

³ *Yāj.* i, 122.

⁴ *Man.* i, 88-91 ; and x, 74-80 ; *Yāj.* i, 118-19 ; *Vis.* ii, 5-9 etc. cf. *supra.* pp. 298-300.

⁵ *Man.* x, 80.

⁶ *Mahā. Śānti.* 78, 1-2.

⁷ *ibid.* 78, 4-5.

varṇas could follow the Śūdra's occupation of service is not mentioned at all ; but, it seems that they could not do so under any circumstance. In all such relaxations of rules of dharma, the particular time and place is viewed as of fundamental importance. For, says Bhīṣma, dharma may become adharmā and adharmā may become dharma according to time and place (deśakāla) ; such is the significance and power of time and place.¹

The *Dharmaśāstras*, too, have similar relaxations on the prescribed occupations and duties of the four *varṇas* in times of distress. Thus, a Brāhmaṇa who cannot maintain himself by means of the occupations specially prescribed for him alone, may adopt the Kshatriya's mode of life. If he is unable to subsist even by this, he may adopt the Vaiśya's mode of life, i. e., trade, agriculture and cattle-rearing. The Kshatriya of course can adopt the Vaiśya's mode of living during times of distress. But here again there are reservations ; the Brāhmaṇa and the Kshatriya, when living upon agriculture, must carefully avoid injury to animals ; and, when they have to take to commerce, they may sell the commodities which the Vaiśya sells, with the exception of cooked food and sesamum, stones, salt, cattle, human beings, dyed cloth as well as cloth made of hemp or flax or wool, fruits, roots, medical herbs, water, weapons, poison, meat, *soma*, perfumes of all kinds, milk, butter, oil, wax, sugar, beasts of the forest, birds, liquors, indigo, lac, and all one-hoofed beasts.² Further, a Vaiśya who is unable to subsist by following his own duties and occupations (*svadharma*) of trade and agriculture, may maintain himself by following the Śūdra's mode of life.³

¹ *ibid.* 78, 32: "bhavatyadharmo dharmohi dharmādharmā-vubhāvāpi/kāraṇād deśakālasya deśakālah satādriṣah//".

² *Man.* x, 81-89; *Yāj.* iii, 32-39; *Vis.* Liv, 18-21.

³ *Man.* x, 98.

But the noteworthy point for Manu is that one should under no circumstances adopt the mode of life prescribed for the *varṇa* or *varṇas* 'higher' than his own.¹ "It is better to discharge one's own *dharma* incompletely [or imperfectly] (*vigraṇah*), than to perform completely that of another (*na pārakyah swanushthitah*)".²

In general, during times of famine or in dire necessity when one is in danger of dying for want of food, acceptance of such a thing as a dog,³ or a cow,⁴ from even a Chāṇḍāla,⁵ for the purpose of eating, is no sin. A person accepting such food on such occasions "is no more tainted by sin than the sky by mud."⁶ Manu further gives "ten modes of subsistence" (*daśa jīvanahetavah*) open to all men in distress. These are : learning, mechanical arts, work for wages (*bhritih*), service (*sevā*), rearing cattle, trade (*vipanīh*), agriculture, contentment (*dhritih*), alms (*bhāikshyam*) and receiving interest on money (*kuśīdam*).⁷

The rishi Mārkaṇḍeya narrates the story how a Brāhmaṇa ascetic named Kauśika was taught the principles of the *varṇas* and their *dharma*s by a dutiful fowler (*Dharmavyādha*) of Mithilā.⁸ This man, whose occupation was selling meat, was actually found "selling venison and the flesh of the buffalo".⁹ The Brāhmaṇa was surprised to find that this person was acclaimed to have been a most virtuous man even though he followed 'such a dishonourable profession'!¹⁰ But Dharmavyādha retorts to the

¹ Man. x, 95-96:—*na tveva jyāyasīm vrittim abhimanyeta karhichit/*.

² Man. x, 97.

³ Man. x, 106.

⁴ Man. x, 107.

⁵ Man. x, 108.

⁶ Man. x, 104.

⁷ Man. x, 106; also Yāj. iii, 42.

⁸ Mahā. Vana. 205, 44.

⁹ ibid. 206, 11.

¹⁰ ibid. 206, 19.

In Maheśvara's opinion, also, a person of lower *varṇa* may attain the status of a higher *varṇa* in the next birth by following his own *dharma* in this birth.¹ The person who does not follow his own *dharma* will be born again in a lower *varṇa*. Thus, deeds may succeed in securing higher *varṇa* for one, but not in this life, according to this theory. The duties which befall one in this life are due to one's past deeds ; therefore they must be carried out and also atoned for by discharging the present *dharma*s in a just manner, if a better life is desired in the next birth. So that higher *varṇa* is attainable through an evolution of births through which the individual attains higher and higher merit by dint of his pursuit of *dharma*.

(2)

But there is another view also in the Mahābhārata itself expressed in clear and unmistakeable terms, that the *varṇa* of a person at the present is in accordance with what he does in the present and not merely with reference to his birth. King Yudhisṭhira, who had earned the title of Dharmarāja by virtue of his strict adherence to *Dharma*, expounds this view to king Nahusha in the Vanaparva. In his opinion, that person is a Brāhmaṇa in whom are found the virtues of truthfulness, charity, forgiveness, good conduct, benevolence, complete self-control and mercy.² "He who is distinguished by these qualities is a Brāhmaṇa ; and he who does not possess them is a Śūdra."³ The Śūdra who possesses these characteristics is no Śūdra but a true Brāhmaṇa ; and the Brāhmaṇa who lacks these is no Brāhmaṇa but a Śūdra.⁴ Yudhisṭhira further points out that it is very difficult to

¹ Anu. 143, 1-59.

² Vana. 180, 21.

³ *ibid.* 180, 26.

⁴ *ibid.* 180, 25.

classify persons in the four groups of the *varṇas* unless we have a knowledge of the personal character of individuals as the guiding principle, rather than the mere facts regarding their birth; for, there is “promiscuous intercourse amongst all the *varṇas*,” and, “men of all the four *varṇas* have been, without restriction, constantly begetting children of women of all the *varṇas*”; and, also, because “speech, cohabitation, birth and death of men of all the orders are similar in all respects.” “It is on this account,” says Yudhiṣṭhira, “that the wise have asserted that the personal character of an individual is the chief and needful thing.”¹ On this theory, further, every person is born a Śūdra; and he would attain the status of one of the three *varṇas* not by merely going through the purificatory rites—the various *samskāras*,—but also, in addition, if thereafter he regulates his conduct in accordance with the rules laid down for the respective *varṇa*. We are told that Nahusha was very pleased to see that Yudhiṣṭhira’s talk evinced his acquaintance with the proper knowledge about the subject.²

In the *Bhāgavata* also we are reminded of the fact that *varṇa* is to be known and designated by the deeds of a person rather than his birth. “If the marks of conduct (*lakṣhaṇam*), already explained as indicative of the *varṇa* of a man be (absent in one person and) found in another, then call that person by the *varṇa* as denoted by these marks (*lakṣhaṇa*),”³ and not by that of his birth. This ‘*lakṣhaṇa*’ also evidently refers to the nature of the person as indicated by his deeds.

The *Śukranīti* gives us a similar basis of the four

¹ Vana. 180, 31-34.

² *ibid.* 180, 34-36.

³ *ibid.* 180, 38.

⁴ *Bhāg. Purā. Skanda vii, xi, 35:—*

*“Yasya yallakṣhaṇam proktam puṁso varṇābhivyaṇjakam/
yadanyatrāpi dṛiṣyeta tat tenaiva vinirdiśet/|.*

varṇas. Thus, "Not by birth are the Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra and Mlenchchha¹ separated, but by their respective virtues and deeds."² And further, in the description of the *dharma*s of different *varṇas*, the Śukranīti classifies men in accordance with what they do, and not their duties in accordance with their already defined position. Thus, one who can protect men, who is valorous, is a Kṣatriya for the Śukranīti. And similarly about the other *varṇas*.³

We have already referred to Maheśvara's view of how good deeds would lead to higher *varṇa*, by evolution, in the next birth. But during the course of the same discussion on *varṇa*, Maheśvara has also opined that 'all the Brāhmaṇas in this world could be really called Brāhmaṇas only on the merit of their conduct or mode of living (*vṛittam*) ; and, a Śūdra, if he is of good conduct, is considered to have attained to a Brāhmaṇa-hood.'⁴ Even a Śūdra, we are told, who has purified his soul by pure deeds and who has controlled all his senses, deserves to be waited upon and served with the respect due to a Brāhmaṇa—this is what is said by Brahmā himself.⁵ And, his own opinion also, says Maheśvara, is the same.⁶ "Neither birth, nor *samskāra*, nor learning, nor begetting could be considered as cogent grounds for conferring a *varṇa* of the *dviija* kind (i. e. one of the first three *varṇas*)

¹ A fifth "*varṇa*" is here added.

² Sukra. i, 75-76.

³ *ibid.* i, 77-88.

⁴ Mahā. Anu. 143, 51: "sarvo'yam brāhmaṇo loka vṛittena tu vidhīyate/vṛitte sthītaṣtu śūdro'pi brāhmaṇatvam niyachchhati/".

⁵ *ibid.* 143, 48: "karmabhiḥ śuchibhir devī śuddhātmā vijitendriyah/śūdro'pi dvijavatsevyā iti brahmā'bravīt svayam/".

⁶ *ibid.* 143, 49.

upon a person ; his mode of behaviour (*vṛitti*) only could be the basis of conferring such dignity upon him.”¹

In the Mahābhārata, once more, we find Rishi Bhrigu lecturing on *varṇadharma* to Bharadvāja ; and his view is noteworthy here in that he explicitly bases the *varṇas* on the *dharma*s, and not the *dharma*s on the *varṇas*. Thus for Bhrigu, he who has been sanctified (*samskritah*) by *Jātakarma* and other *samskāras*, who is pure in conduct, who is devoted to the Vedic study, and who is always mindful of his vows (*nityavratī*) and of truth,—he with whom truth, charity, abstention from injury to others (*adrohah*), mercy, modesty (*trapā*), benevolence, and penance are associated—such a person is called a Brāhmaṇa.² He who follows the duties proper for a Kshatriya, studies the Vedas, makes gifts, and captures wealth, is called a Kshatriya.³ He who tends cattle, is engaged in agriculture and the means of acquiring riches, who is pure in conduct and attends to the study of the Vedas is called a Vaiśya.⁴ Lastly, “one who accepts any sort of food indiscriminately (*sarvabhaksharatih*), who is prepared to do any work (*sarvakarmakarah*), who does not study the Vedas, and whose conduct is generally indiscriminate (*anāchārah*) and impure (*aśuchiḥ*)”⁵ is a Śūdra. Bhrigu further adds : If those marks as described so far of a Śūdra are not to be seen in a so-called Śūdra, and those marks described regarding a Brāhmaṇa are not observable in a so-called Brāhmaṇa, then, such a Śūdra is no Śūdra, and such a Brāhmaṇa, too, is no Brāhmaṇa at all.⁶ This last, is a clear declaration to the effect that a

¹ *ibid.* 143, 50: “*na yonir nāpi samskāro na śrutām na cha santatih/kāraṇāni dvījatvasya vṛittāveva tu kāraṇam*||”.

² Śānti. 189, 2-4.

³ *ibid.* 189, 5.

⁴ *ibid.* 189, 6.

⁵ *ibid.* 189, 7.

⁶ *ibid.* 189, 8.

man's *varṇa* has to be measured by his deeds and mode of behaviour, and not merely by his descent or birth.

Rishi Parāśara too gives a similar criterion of the basis of *varṇa* as *Bhrigu* has given above, when he advises King Janaka on the problem of the *varṇas*. "Brāhmaṇas learned in the Vedas", says he, "regard a virtuous Śūdra as equal to Brāhmaṇa himself. I, however, regard such a Śūdra as the effulgent Viṣṇu of the universe, the foremost one in all the worlds."¹ Members of the lower *varṇas* (*nihināh*) may, with the intention and purpose of raising their own souls to higher levels (*uddidhishavah*), follow the conduct of the higher *varṇas*, though without *mantras*.² To the question of Janaka, whether it is birth (*jāti*) or the deed (*karma*) which pollutes (*dūshayati*) man, Parāśara answers, that in a sense, both may equally pollute man.³ However, there is a difference (*viśesham*) between the two : The man who is sullied by birth, but does not commit low acts (*pāpam*), is not really sullied by the taint of mere low birth ; on the other hand, the man who, thought born in a high family (*jātyā pradhānam*), yet perpetrates censurable (*dhikkritam*) deeds, is polluted by such deeds.⁴ Of the two, birth and deed, therefore, it is more or less deeds that pollute man.⁵

There are various instances recorded of the *varṇa* of persons being known by their deeds :

The story of Viśvāmitra, a Kshatriya, becoming a Brāhmaṇa by dint of his own efforts (*balāt*), is recorded

¹ Śānti. 297, 28: "vaidehakam śūdrāmudāharanti dvijā mahārāja śrutopapannāh/aham hi paśyāmi narendra devam viśvasya viṣṇum jagatah pradānam/" (The above tr. is Dutt's).

² Śānti. 297, 29-30.

³ ibid. 297, 31-32 (*ubhayam doshakāraṇam*'').

⁴ ibid. 297, 32-34.

⁵ ibid. 297, 34.

both in the Mahābhārata¹ and in the Rāmāyaṇa.² It has been suggested that the great difficulties which Viśvāmitra had to undergo in order to attain the position of a Brāhmaṇa are indicative of the fact that such a change of *varṇa* was not countenanced with much favour. But, if we take into consideration the division of *varṇas* as based on the dominance of one or the other psychological qualities called *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṃas*, the difficulties which Viśvāmitra had to undergo will have to be interpreted and assessed in psychological terms rather than in terms of the social colour and prejudice which is usually given to them.³ It is indeed the most difficult task to change one's innate psychic equipment. The actual barriers described as being against Viśvāmitra's change⁴ were not social but psychic, since he had to undergo severe mental discipline and training in order to transform his *rajas* nature into a life of *sāttvika* qualities. It was not merely the question of change of functions or occupations; it was rather a problem of spiritual transformation. And, this view is further confirmed by the nature of the several "tests" which Viśvāmitra had to undergo in order to prove his Brāhmaṇahood.

The story of Paraśurāma, a Brāhmaṇa, who became a Kshatriya by profession is too well known to be related here.⁴ There are other notabilities in the Mahābhārata, who were Brāhmaṇas by birth but were Kshatriyas by deeds, viz., Dronāchārya, Kripāchārya and Ashvatthāman. All these three attained the positions of Commanders-in-Chief in the Kaurava army. Two Kshatriya princes, Devāpi and Sindhudvīpa attained Brāhmaṇa-

¹ Ādi. 71, 79.

² Bālakāṇḍa LVII, ff.

³ The implications of these qualities are discussed below, pp. 313 ff.

⁴ Mahā. Vana. 115.

hood.¹ So also, prince Vitahavya was able to attain Brāhmaṇahood.² Indra, again, though son of a Brāhmaṇa by birth, became a Kshatriya due to his deeds (*karmanā*).³

In the Bhāgavata Purāṇa many other instances of the change of *varṇa* are recorded: Gārgya, the son of a Kshatriya attained Brāhmaṇahood.⁴ Duritakshaya, Pushkarārūni, Traiyyārūni and Kavi became Brāhmaṇas likewise.⁵ So again, King Śaryāti became a great Brāhmaṇa (*brahmishṭha*) and officiated as a sacrificial priest.⁶ And Nābhāga, another Kshatriya Prince, became Vaiśya owing to his deeds (*karmanā*).⁷ Prishadhra, a Kshatriya prince, became a Sūdra.⁸ Not only individuals, but whole families and communities are said to have attained a change of varṇa in this manner. Thus in the same Purāṇa, a whole clan or group of people (gotram) known by the name Maudgalya is recorded to have attained Brāhmaṇahood, though it descended from one Mudgala who was a Kshatriya.⁹ Then, out of the hundred sons of King Rishabha-deva, eighty-one became Brāhmaṇas. And, a whole community of Brāhmaṇas is said to have descended (*brahmakulam jātam*) from a Kshatriya named Dhrishṭa. The Padma-Purāṇa tells us that Vyāsa and Vaibhāṇḍaka, though born of very low origin (asatkshetrakule), were respected and honoured as dvijātis; and so was Vasishṭha who was the son of a courtesan (veśyāputrah)¹⁰

There are several other instances recorded of change of *varṇa*, for instance, in the Matsya Purāṇa (L. 88),

¹ Mahā. Śalya. 40.

² Mahā. Anu. 30.

³ Mahā. Sānti. 22, 11.

⁴ Bhāg. Pu. ix, xxi, 19.

⁵ ibid. ix, xxi, 20.

⁶ ibid. ix, iii.

⁷ ibid. ix, ii.

⁸ ibid. ix, ii.

⁹ ibid. ix, xxi, 33.

¹⁰ Padma Purā. xLvi, 47-48.

the Vāyu Purāṇa (XCIX, 278 and LVII. 121) and in the Harivamśa (XXVII 1469 and XXXII, 1773).

In the Mahābhārata, there are instances recorded of intermarriages also between the varṇas. King Śantanu married Satyavatī, who was apparently the daughter of a Śūdra. King Dushmanta (or Dushyanta) married Śakuntalā, supposed to be the daughter of rishi Kaṇva¹ who was a Brāhmaṇa. And, King Yayāti similarly marries Devayānī, the daughter of a Brāhmaṇa priest Śukrāchārya.² In the Vanaparva, rishi Chyavana is said to have married princess Sukanyā.³ And two rishis, apparently Brāhmaṇas, called Nārada and Parvata have a quarrel over the daughter of a Kshatriya King Srinjaya whom each of the two sought to marry.⁴ Such instances of intermarriages are many in the Mahābhārata, and once more suggest that the varṇa-barriers were not regarded as insurmountable even in such an important question as marriage.

--IV--

Of all the attempts of the Hindu thinkers on the organisation of the varṇas (varṇa-vyavasthā), the attempt made by the Bhagavadgītā is perhaps the most outstanding and specific; we shall therefore review this theory of the Gītā here. The theory classifies society into four varṇas (chāturvarṇyam) in terms of the dominant guṇas, that is to say, in accordance with one or the other of the synthetic moulds arising out of different psychic energies innate in the biological and psychological apparatus of man. In this sense, the guṇas may be said to be the psycho-moral basis of the varṇa organisation.

¹ Ādi. 71.

² ibid. 81.

³ Vana. 122.

⁴ Droṇa. 55.

Before we take up the structure of *varṇas*, therefore, let us here try to envisage the *guṇa*-theory as propounded by the *Gītā* :

The whole *karma-kāṇḍa* or the world of activities is said to be a result of the complex intermingling of the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*,¹ according to Śrī Krishṇa in the *Gītā*. He also says : "The whole world knows Me not, since they are deluded by the effects produced by these *guṇas*."² The world of human beings is but a part of the whole creation, and, as such, it is also fettered by these three *guṇas*.³ Now, of the *Guṇas*, *sattva* is characterised by purity (*nirmalatvāt*) ; consequently it is of an enlightening and healthy nature ; and, it binds the soul by an attachment to ease or peacefulness and to knowledge.⁴ *Rajas* is in essence passion ; it is the source of yearnings and clings ; and it fetters the soul in the body with attachment to activity.⁵ *Tamas* is born of ignorance ; it is the source of delusion of all souls, binding them by the fetters of heedlessness, sloth and sleep.⁶ *Sattva*, then, bids for a life of ease and peacefulness, *rajas* for restless activity, and *tamas*, veiling right perception, leads to misapprehensions or follies.⁷ By

¹ Gī. ii, 45 : "traiguṇyavishayā vedā nistraiguṇyo bhavārjuna / ibid. vii. 12 : "Ye chaiva sāttrikā bhāvā rājasastāmasaścha ye/matta eveti tām viddhi na tvaham teshu te mayi/".

² ibid. vii, 13 : "tribhīrguṇamayair bhāvairbhīh sarvamidam jagat/mohitam nābhījānāti māmehbhyah paramavyayam/".

³ ibid. xiv, 5 : "sattvam rajas tama iti guṇāḥ prakṛitisambhavāḥ/nibadhnanti mahābāho dehe dehinamavyayam/".

⁴ ibid. xiv, 6 : "tatra sattvam nirmalatvāt prakāśakamanāmayam/sukhasamgena badhnāti jñānasamgena chānagha/".

⁵ ibid. xiv, 7 : "rajo rāgātmakam viddhi trishṇāsamgasamudbhavam / tam nibadhnāti kaunteya karmasamgena dehinam/".

⁶ ibid. xiv, 8 : "tamastvājñānam viddhi mohanam sarvadehinām/pramādālasyanidrābhīstannibadhnāti bhārata/".

⁷ ibid. xiv, 9 : "sattvam sukhe sanjayayti rajah karmaṇi bhārata/jñānamāvṛitya tu tamah pramāde sanjayatyuta/".

suppressing *rajas* and *tamas* in a man, *sattva* rules supreme ; by supplanting *sattva* and *tamas*, *rajas* predominates ; while *tamas* dominates in a man by suppressing *sattva* and *rajas*.¹ The *sattva* quality can be known to have been fully developed in man when the light of knowledge shines in his body, through all its gates (i. e. sense-organs) ;² that is to say, all his activities show him to be a man with understanding. On the other hand, a man in whom *rajas* has waxed full shows signs of greed, undertakes and plans various schemes of works, and expresses restlessness and longings.³ And *tamas*, when it gets the upper hand in an individual, manifests itself through ignorance, slothfulness, misapprehension, and a state of perplexity.⁴ Śrī Kṛṣṇa tells us further about the effects of such a development of the *guṇas* upon the individual : The person who dies with the *sattva-guṇa* fully developed in him, will attain the pure worlds of the most exalted who know the Highest.⁵ If, however, he dies with the *rajas* quality developed in him, he will be born again amongst those that are bound down to *karma*.⁶ And, if he dies full of *tamas*, then he would be born amongst the most deluded.⁷ The fruit of good deeds, it is said, is *sāttvika* and pure ; of actions full of *rajas*, the

¹ ibid. xiv, 10: “*rajastamaśchābhibhūya sattvam bhavati bhārata/rajaḥ sattvam tamaśchaiva tamaḥ sattvam rajas tathā*||”.

² ibid. xiv, 11: “*sarvadvāreṣu deheṣmin prakāśa upajāyate/jñānam yadā tadā vidyāvivṛiddham sattvamityuta*||”.

³ ibid. xiv, 12: “*lobhaḥ pravṛittirārambhaḥ karmaṇāmaśamah spṛihā/rajasyetāni jāyante vivṛiddhe bharatarshaḥ*||”.

⁴ ibid. xiv, 13: “*aprakāśo'pravṛittischa pramādo moha eva cha/tamsyetāni jāyante vivṛiddhe kurumandana*||”.

⁵ ibid. xiv, 14: “*yadā sattve pravṛiddhe tu pralayaṃ yāti dehahṛit/tadottamavidāṃ lokānamulān pratipadyate*||”.

⁶ ibid. xiv, 15: “*rajasi pralayaṃ gatvā karmasāngishu jāyate/tathā prāṇastamasi mūḍhayoniṣhu jāyate*||”.

⁷ ibid.

fruit or end is misery ; and, the result of actions full of *tamas* is ignorance.¹ From *sattva*, again, is achieved knowledge, from *rajas* arises greed, and from *tamas* only misunderstanding, delusion and ignorance can grow.² ↪

Now, when a person is able to realise that the doer of actions is not himself but the interplay of *guṇas* within him, and he also fathoms That which is beyond the *guṇas*, then, says the Lord, is he able to attain to My Being.³ When the soul of such a person transcends the three *guṇas* which are the cause of the body, he enjoys immortality, and becomes free from birth, death, age and sorrow.⁴ Śrī Kṛishṇa further describes the marks of such an individual who has transcended the *guṇas* (*guṇātita*) : Such a man hates not enlightenment, activity or delusion,—i. e., from the context, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*,—when they are at work or befall him, nor desires them when they have ceased their operations ; he is in fact, unconcerned, undisturbed by the *guṇas*, remains unshaken, unperturbed, thinking that the *guṇas* do and must but act according to their natures ; for him, happiness and misery are alike ; he abides in himself, i. e., is self-contained and content with what he is and has ; for him a clod of earth, a stone and gold are all alike ; to such a man what is liked and what is disliked, praise and censure, are the same ; he is the same when honoured or dishonoured, the same with friends and foes ; he has abandoned all

¹ *ibid.* xiv, 16: “*karmaṇaḥ sukrutasyāḥ saṭtvikam nirmalam phalam/rajasastu phalam duḥkhamajñānam tamasaḥ phalam/*”.

² *ibid.* xiv, 17: “*sattvātsanjāyate jñānam rajaso lobha eva cha/pramādamohau tamaso bhavato'jñānameva cha/*”.

³ *ibid.* xiv, 19: “*nānyam guṇebhyaḥ kartāram yadā drashtā'nupaśyati/guṇebhyaścha param vetti madbhāvam so'dhigachchhati/*”.

⁴ *ibid.* xiv, 20: “*guṇānetānatītya trīṇ dehī dehasamudbhavān janmamṛityujarāduḥkhair vimukto'mritamaśnute/*”.

personal claims of actions ; and, he serves Me with the unswerving discipline of devotion (*bhakti-yogena*)—Such a person is said to have transcended the rule and sway of the *guṇas* ; thereafter he becomes fit to attain the eminence of *Brahman*.¹ *Tyāga* (renunciation) of *karma*, again, does not mean the absolute giving up of doing anything (*parityāga*), or inaction ; such a giving up of all activity would partake of the quality of *tamasa* nature.² On the other hand, when *karmas* are abandoned from fear of physical sufferings and pain, it is called *rājasa tyāga*, and will never yield the fruit of a real *tyāga*.³ The real *tyāga* is the *sāttvika tyāga*, which is accomplished when *karmas* are performed because they have but to be performed, abandoning all attachment as also the desire for their fruit.⁴

Now, just as Śrī Kṛṣṇa tackles the problem of the individual, his inclinations, expressions and aspirations in terms of the *guṇas* innate in him, so also does he propound and settle the problem of social organisation, social relations and social characteristics in terms of the *guṇa*-theory. The *guṇas*, we may say in the light of our discussion so far, are normally inherited from father to son ; they get co-ordinated and settled, due to occupational

¹ “*prakāśam cha pravrittim cha mohameva cha paṇḍava / na dveshti sampravrittāni na nivrittāni kāṅkshati*||”

“*udāsīnavadāsīno guṇairyo na vichālyate / guṇā vartanta ityeva yo’vatishṭhati nengate*||”

“*samaduhkhasukhah svasthah samaloshṭāśmakānchanah / tulyapriyāpriyo dhīras tulyanindātmasamstutih*||”

“*mānāpamānayostulyas tulyo mitrārīpakshayoh / sarvārambhaparityāgī guṇātīlah sa uchyate*||”

mām cha yo’vyabhichāreṇa bhaktiyogena sevate / sa guṇān samatīyātān brahmabhūyāya kalpate||”

—ibid. xiv, 22-27.

² ibid. xviii, 7.

³ ibid. xviii, 8.

⁴ ibid. xviii, 9.

traits, in the individual ; and through the individuals they get stabilised in the family and the group or the community. This kind of stabilisation of one dominant *guṇa* or another in social groups through common environment, tradition, home and occupation have their own part to play in regard to the settling of emotions, and, ultimately in an organised manner, making them permanent in terms of the dominance of one *guṇa* or the other. Such stabilisation of the predominance of the *guṇa*-trait affects the heredity of the individual, biologically, psychologically, intellectually and spiritually. And this factor is to be taken into account when the individual's relations with the society and for the purposes of social order and organisation are to be considered. All the *karmas* necessary for the social organisation, upkeep and progress are classified in accordance with these psychological apparatuses in the individual called *guṇas* (*guṇa-karma-vibhāgaśah*)¹

Again, just as the predominant *guṇa* in an individual determines the general trend of his nature, so also the different types of *karmas* are expected of and imposed (*karmāṇi pravibhaktāni*) upon different types of men according to the *guṇas* with which each type is naturally endowed (*svabhāva-prabhavair*).² Thus, the *karmas* of a Brāhmaṇa in accordance with his natural inclinations are, leading a life of serenity, self-restrain, austerity, purity, forgiveness, straightforwardness, knowledge, wisdom and belief in God ;³ the *Kshātra-karmas*, in view of the natural inclinations of a Kshatriya, are connected with expressions of valour, prowess, courage, alertness, bravery, generosity, and giving protection to the weak.⁴ The *Vaiśya-karmas*, again, considering his nature, are connected with agriculture, trade and merchandise ; and

¹ Gi. iv, 13.

² Gi. xviii, 41.

³ Gi. xviii, 42.

⁴ ibid. xviii, 43.

the *karmas* of the Śūdra are of the nature of service and attendance of the other *varṇas*¹ in respect to the fulfilment of their *karmas* as noted above (*paricharyātmakam karma*).)

We have also seen elsewhere, how in the *Mahābhārata* too there are theories according to which *varṇas* were determined according to the *karmas* and not by the mere fact of one's birth. There is much semblance of this way of determining the *varṇa* with the *varṇa* theory based on the psychological principle of *guṇas*. In the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, once more, we meet with this psychological basis of *varṇa*. It is said there that when the Creator *Brahmā* desired to create, those in whom *sattva guṇa* was predominant sprang from his mouth and were known as *Brāhmaṇas*. Those in whom *rajas* predominated originated from his breasts and were known as *Kshatriyas*. Those in whom both *rajas* and *tamas* predominated originated from his thighs, and were known as *Vaiśyas*. Lastly, the *Śūdras* sprang from his feet, and their predominant psychological characteristic was *tamas* (*tamah-pradhānāḥ*).² The *Vāyu Purāṇa* gives the account of *varṇas* in the same psychological terms.³ In the same *Purāṇa*, the division of means of subsistence (*vārtāyām*) between the four *varṇas* is said to have been done by the *Svayambhu* "according to their tendencies" (*yathā-rābhāḥ*).⁴ "Those of them who were rapacious and destructive, he ordained to be *Kshatriyas*, the protectors of others. The men who attended on these, fearlessly speak-

¹ *ibid.* xviii, 44.

² *Vishṇu. Purā.* i, 6, 3-5; (—from Muir's *Ori. Sanskr. Texts*, Vol. i, p. 60).

³ *Vāyu-Purā.* ix, 36-42; (—Muir's *Ori. San. Texts*, i, pp. 81-82).

⁴ The *Mārka. Purā.* has "*yathānyāyam yathāguṇam*", "according to fitness and other qualities."—As noted by Muir. i, p. 97 note.

ing the truth, and propounding the sacred knowledge with exactness (*yathābhūtam*), were made Brāhmaṇas." Those engaged in cultivation, etc. were Vaiśyas, the providers of subsistence (*vritti-sādhakān*); and, those who did menial works were Śūdras.¹ Similarly, in the Bhāgawata-Purāṇa we are informed that the four *varṇas* are meant to follow the four classifications of duties and obligations which we have already noted elsewhere.²

The Śukra-nīti speaks the same thing in different words. Men are said to be of three classes according to their nature and characteristics—*sāttvika*, *rājasika*, and *tāmasa*.³ It is these characteristics, and not mere birth, that determine a man's *varṇa*. But, for Śukranīti, these characteristics determine a man's *varṇa* even before his birth, influencing his destiny (*prāktana*), and yielding for him birth in a particular *varṇa*.⁴ What the Śukranīti really seems to say is that an individual's birth in a *varṇa* is not the *original* determinant of his *varṇa*, but that this birth itself has been determined by his *sāttvika*, *rājasika* or *tāmasa* kind of *tapas* (discipline) of his actions in his former births. And, what is more, his "intellectual disposition" in this birth too is determined "according to the effects of his deeds in the previous births" (*prākṛkarmaphala*).⁵ This is similar to the theory that we have met with at one place in the Mahābhārata, where it is explained by Maheśvara.

V

We may now consider modern views on the classification of a Society into different groups in general, and

¹ Vāyu-Purā. ix, 160-165;—from Muir. Ori. Sansk. Texts, i, pp. 86-87.

² Bhāg. Purā. vii, 11, 14-24.

³ Śukra. i, 69-72; etc.

⁴ *ibid.* 73-92.

⁵ *ibid.* i, 89-92.

on the castes in particular. This will serve to enlighten us regarding the genesis of social classes and their effect upon the social organisation; on the other hand, our view of the Hindu conception and theory of the *varṇas* may also offer criticisms against the opinions generally held in modern times on the problem of social classes. A mutual criticism of the Hindu view of social classification into the *varṇas* and the modern views of social classification in the West, may thus enable us to arrive at a proper formula of society such as is likely to function with the best possible results.

Western students of social institutions have been recently pointing out that some sort of social classification has always been present and is found to exist in any society, ancient or modern, which is not too crude or primitive.¹ Ward, for example, has pointed out how social classes similar to castes in India were in existence in European society. "The four so-called 'Estates' of European History, so clearly recognised in the eighteenth century, correspond so well to the four great castes of India."² Thus, the First Estate which consisted of the clergy, the Second Estate consisting of the warrior or ruling class—the nobility, the Third Estate consisting of the merchants and the business-class, and the Fourth Estate consisting of the commons of England or the bourgeoisie of France—the labourers and artisans, correspond to the Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya, Vaiśya and the Śūdra *varṇas* of India. In Ward's view, castes exist in all countries which have undergone the struggles between different races through history. In support of this view,

¹ cf. e. g. MacIver: "Community," pp. 124-5; also, Cooley: "Social Organization," pt. iv—"Social Classes."

² L. F. Ward: "Social Classes and Sociological Theory" in Amer. Jour. of Socio., Vol. xiii, pp. 617-27. Cf. also Ralph Linton: "The Study of Man," pp. 127-128, Appleton—Century, 1936.

he adduces evidence from the forms of social organisation in Greece, Rome, Polynesia and other countries. Similarly, Small also opines that in every society, there exists the tendency to create social classes and further their stratification into castes—especially into the three rigid classes, viz., the privileged, the middle class, and the lower unprivileged class without property rights or influence.¹ The privileged classes make all attempts and try all methods to perpetuate this kind of social differentiation in order to retain their privileges; and thus, the process of social stratification once started, continues to persist for a long time and is even intensified by passage of time.² And, MacIver and Cooley have pointedly drawn our attention to the fact that in the West today 'wealth' is a determinant of social classes as against 'birth' in the East; and we may add, that to some extent at least, in the West to-day, birth also is a determinant of the social class to which the individual is to belong. However, wealth may be said to be a less rigid determinant of social class than birth; because wealth is concrete, acquirable and alienable, while birth is not so.³ And here, therefore, may be said to be the fundamental distinction between social class and caste, more or less similar to the distinction between *varṇa* and *jāti*. A caste is comparatively a more rigid social class, to which transition from another class becomes well-nigh an impossibility. The still-prevailing distinction between the nobility and the common people in some Western countries is an instance of caste-consciousness, where even wealth or intellect could not yield that status which birth may yield. As Kroeber has said, "castes are a special form of social classes which, in tendency at least, are present in every

¹ A. W. Small: *General Sociology* (1920), pp. 275 ff.

² *ibid.*

³ MacIver: "Community", p. 124, note.

society."¹ While social classes are comparatively flexible, castes are rigid groups, permanently separated from each other by tradition, custom or even law.

(As we have said, then, some kind of classification is bound to exist in all societies. Social classification is a phenomena which it would be impossible to abolish in any society. Men differ from each other in their natural endowments. Howsoever much we may cry for equality amongst humanity, we cannot avoid differences between man and man in terms of natural abilities, capacities, intelligence, and aptitudes. In social affairs and social communications, such individual differences are apt to give rise to the formation of social groups, each of which consists of individuals who find themselves agreeable to each other because of similarity of tastes, vocations, likes and dislikes, social status, and such other factors.² Apart from this similarity of views and tastes which brings individuals together, there is another factor referring to social utility that binds men together into different groups. A human being is able to accomplish skill, mastery and success better and more efficiently in company and in co-operation with a group of persons engaged in common occupations. Such co-operation of a group of minds is, on the one hand, due to common calling, common problems, common solutions; and, on the other hand, it is fostered and nurtured by all these, and by a feeling of common bond underlying their activities and their minds. Here, we must also reckon with another factor which is closely allied with the above, viz., a feeling of being different from other social groups

¹ "Ency. of Soci. Sc." Ed. by E. R. A. Seligman and A. Johnson, Vol. iii—Art. "Caste", by A. L. Kroeber.

² See, e. g., R. S. Ellis: "The Psychology of Individual Differences", Ch. xvi—Individual Differences and Social Differentiation (1930), pp. 386-404.

on account of differences in callings, giving rise to different problems and difficulties from those other groups.)

There is yet another force which may foster and perpetuate class-differentiations. This force works through the family institution. It is not only most likely that the father may transmit his occupation and calling to the son, but it is in most cases also advisable that this should be so. The father is conversant with the secrets as well as the difficulties of his own occupation or craft and their solutions, due to long experience; and the son can take advantage of this knowledge and experience without any special efforts or trouble or expense of energies on his part. So again, the son's constant contact with the family occupations is naturally likely to create in him a predisposition towards them. It is therefore natural as well as desirable, in the ordinary course of events, that family trades and occupations should be carried over from father to son.

The psychological factors which go to make the social classifications an accomplished fact have been interpreted in terms of the modern theory of 'sentiments.'¹ Now, sentiments "are systems of emotions or emotional dispositions centering around a common object or having a common nucleus." The sentiments which form the basis of class-formation are of three kinds: (1) The first important psychological factor in this connection is what is called "a consciousness of kind"² in relation to the

¹ Ency. Soci. Sc., vol. iii—Art. "Class Consciousness", by M. Ginsberg.

² Note: This term was first coined by Giddings and explained by him in his *Principles of Sociology* (pp. 16 ff.). T. N. Carver in his "Essential Factors of Social Evolution" remarks that this is "one of the most clarifying concepts ever introduced in sociological discussions. It is the key to understanding a great many problems of both theoretical and practical nature" (p. 164). The phrase was coined by Giddings to express his

members belonging to one's own social class, "a confidence that one can meet on equal terms and that one's mode of behaviour will be in harmony with the behaviour prevalent in the group." (2) The second psychological factor which enters into class-formation of a rigid nature is a feeling of superiority in relation to the members belonging to the social classes which stand below in the social hierarchy.¹ Now, we can easily see here that this does not apply to the original *varṇa* theory as expounded by us through the preceding pages. For, in strict accordance with the basis of *varṇa* theory, there can be no question of superiority or inferiority of status between the *varṇas*. Each *varṇa* has its due and legitimate place with reference to specific as also general social ends. (3) The third factor, that forms part of the characteristics of class-formation of a rigid kind, is the feeling of inferiority complex in relation to the members belonging to the social classes which stand higher in the social hierarchy.² This characteristic also

conception of the basis of group life." Giddings explains the term thus: "The original and elementary subjective fact in society is the "consciousness of kind". By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognises another conscious being as of like kind with itself...In its widest extension, the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it next marks off species and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the more definite ethnical and political groupings, it is the basis of class distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance, of rules of intercourse and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct towards those whom we feel to be most like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from our conduct towards others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves". (Giddings: "Prin. of Socio." pp. 17-18, quoted by T. N. Carver, op. cit.).

¹ Ency. Soci. Sc., op. cit.

² *ibid.*

cannot in any way be said to be part of the pure *varṇa* theory as explained by us.

Such criticisms, therefore, though applicable to the social classes which have attained permanence and fixity purely on the basis of descent, cannot be applicable to the strict *varṇa* theory. For, it has to be specially noted, that the *varṇa* organisation is so conceived that there could be no room for any *varṇa* to consider itself as having been placed in a position of greater or less advantage or disadvantage with reference to another. (Each *varṇa* is designed to occupy a particular position in the society, not with reference to any advantages or special rights, but with reference to its capability and likelihood to carry out a particular portion and aspect of social obligations; and what may appear to be advantages or special privileges of a *varṇa* are primarily intended only to secure the best possible environment and circumstances in order to enable that class to carry out its obligations to the best of its abilities. To take a concrete illustration: The Brāhmaṇa is entrusted with the duty, pre-eminently, of transmitting the intellectual and the spiritual culture of the people, and also to keep it unsullied by generally maintaining its sterling quality. With this end in view, he may have been granted certain apparently advantageous rights and privileges, as say, for instance, a right to start education at an earlier age than members of the other *varṇas*, or an easy access to the King, or a general respect and honour at the hands of all the other *varṇas*. But it would be wrong therefore to suppose that he stands in a specially advantageous position as compared to the other *varṇas*, when we take into consideration the *dharma*s of a Brāhmaṇa defining his obligations and duties which refer almost entirely to the general, material and spiritual well-being of the whole group; and also that he is called upon, more than any other *varṇa*, to cultivate a spirit of selflessness and self-surrender with a view to

maintaining general social stability. Upon his shoulders rest the highest responsibilities ; and failures, and errors of omission or commission on his part make him more severely liable to punishments than any other *varṇa*.¹ Similar responsibilities with their attendant privileges and liabilities are defined for each of the other *varṇas*. In fact, the entire *varṇa*-scheme is devised to coordinate and assemble the best and the utmost of group welfare, by yoking each section of the group on to duties and responsibilities in terms of the efficiency of the specific work and service each of the sections is able to render unto the community-life.

The *varṇa* scheme could be said to promote social organisation in another direction also. It seeks to build up and promote social equilibrium and solidarity through the economic organisation. Thus, the *varṇa-dharma* denies the accumulation of wealth to the Brāhmaṇa ; his main *dharma* lies in spiritual and intellectual quests. The Kshatriya may accumulate wealth so much as is necessary for the upkeep and protection of the people dependent upon him ; his principal *dharma* lies in directing his energies towards expression of valour, bravery and even might, but with a view to give protection to the weak. The Vaiśya is allowed to accumulate wealth, but with a view to strengthen mainly the economic resources of the society of which he is a member and not for the purposes of hoarding merely for personal use. In this way, the three *varṇas* are expected to make their efforts towards a constructive contribution to the social well-being. But there is always bound to be, in any society, a class of in-

¹ See: e. g. Man. viii, 337-38, where, in the case of theft, the Śūdra is required to repay eight times more in value of the goods stolen, the Vaiśya sixteen times more, the Kshatriya thirty-two times more, while the Brāhmaṇa is to repay "sixty-four times, or a hundred times, or even twice sixty-four times" in value. Cf. also, Gaut. xii, 15-17; Yāj. ii, 206.

dividuals, which is by nature incapable of contributing any constructive efforts for the society ; such class, designated as the Śūdras, may yet help the others who are doing actual constructive work, by directing their energies towards the service of the other *varnas*. That there was no question of prestige and dignity involved in such classification is evident from the fact that according to the theory, each person is said to be born a Śūdra ; and, we may say, he should be so regarded unless he shows his hand in any of the higher departments of constructive social work. On the whole, therefore, the *varṇa*-theory was devised with a view to engage the different types of human energies in different channels suitable to each of them, and all towards the one end of social organisation and social stability.

VI

Now the question before us is : if it is not possible to demolish the natural human tendency to create classes in society, could it be possible in any way to demolish or check the segregative and separatist tendencies to which these social classes may give rise ? In other words, if the rise of social classes is an unavoidable phenomena in the society, in what way could it be possible, in the interest of social solidarity and social organisation, to avoid the stratification of the classes, to check the tendency to turn these classes into water-tight compartments with rigid restrictions on the communications between any two classes ?

The remedy, one may be allowed to say, could be found in our own "sociological heritage". If only we try to look back, through the hundreds of years, to the original spirit in which our social institutions were conceived and formulated, we shall find much light on the very vexed problems confronting the stability of our society today.

The first point to be made in this connection is that the greater evil of the present caste-system is a product of the uncompromising rigidity of the heredity principle involved in it. In the system of castes now in vogue,—in India, and all over the world in some form or other,—we have gone far astray from the original principles which governed the *varṇas*. The original principles on which the *varṇas* used to be based were, as we have already noted, either the principle of choice of the duties prescribed for any of the *varṇas*, or the principle of the *guṇas*—the innate psychological disposition of man determining his inclination towards one of the four kinds of vocations and duties. We must try to fix *varṇa* on the basis of what man does, or rather what he is actually capable of doing, amongst his fellow-beings and for them, and not merely on the basis of whom he is born of. Social classes, on such understanding, should be so flexible, so open, as to admit transition of individuals from one to the other if desired and deserved without any undue respect to descent.

There is another very pertinent and noteworthy consideration in this connection. The idea of “rank” and the consequent ideas of status ought never to be associated with the idea of *varṇa*. There ought to be no special rights, no special privileges and no special dignities which may be considered as advantageous prerogatives over others, associated with any *varṇa*. The ideas of “social distance”, of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’, among the *varṇas* ought never to find place in the practice of *varṇa*-theory. In other words, if the formation of social classes is an inevitable phenomena in any society, it must work on the basis of co-operation and equality, and not of competition and inequality. A co-operation among the *varṇas* based on the principle of division of labour in accordance with natural capacities and aptitudes will preserve the social energy and therefore is sure to make for progress.

On the other hand, the separatist tendencies at present working among the castes are sure to create disruption in society. Social utility, and not class-dignity, should be the principle governing social differentiation into classes.

One thing must be made very clear here. It must be remembered that here, as elsewhere, equality of status does not mean and has not to be confused with identity of occupation, calling or vocation. Any honest occupation is to be deemed as worthy of respect and honour as any other. We must try to forget entirely the idea of associating particular vocations with respect, and particular other vocations with disrespect. (All persons must be deemed equal in the eyes of law and morality. There must be equality of opportunity to all in the social, political as well as economic fields. In the place of degenerate descent and heredity, honour must be given to ability and intelligence. Descent should not be allowed necessarily to come in the way of any person's social status. In order to achieve these results, we must take the aid of knowledge.//The spread of knowledge, irrespective of caste and on equal bases, will cure many a social disease.

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

The studies in Hindu Social Institutions which we have made in the pages that precede have been offered with the hope that thereby we may be enabled to envisage, in answer to contemporary social quest, the material, moral and spiritual background of the drama of social life and institutions as conceived by the Hindu.

And, as the main purpose we have set to ourselves concerns with a scientific consideration of the fundamental ideology and spirit around which social order, institutions and purposes have been sought to be formulated and reared, the sources of our presentation must, of necessity, be limited to the older Sanskrit lore. What specifically that lore is, has already been dealt with by us in the Prologue, the introductory part of our survey.

In addition to what is said in the Prologue, the considerations which have persuaded us to undertake the task may be noted here as below : There has been a hue and cry, during recent days, on the one hand, by some of us who have been openly seeking to re-form social institutions by considerably or altogether doing away with Hindu ideas, traditions and forms ; this they call 'Social Reform'. On the other hand, there are many amongst us who have been vehemently crying against such rejections ; they proclaim : Whatever is Hindu in practice, in ideas, in ideals, and in institutions, must be kept up and preserved as the most sacred heritage of our forefathers ! The conflict between these two extremes has become extremely pointed and acute during our own times. To add to this, issues like untouchability and inter-caste marriages have been creating bitterness between these two extreme groups ; each group has its own *pundits* to hold up its

doctrines. At such a juncture, a cool-headed, dispassionate, scientific piece of work that investigates into the basic principles of Hindu Social Sciences will considerably help the clarification of ideas and issues, and may even point us the way for the future.

It would be wrong to suppose that we would deprecate the efforts of the social reformers, in this work. We admit that, in view of the enthusiasm created by the new learning of the West, the old type of Hindu life and institutions must have been proving, for these men, rather a groundless, formalistic, insipid and deadening mass of traditions, formalities and impositions, thwarting the expression and expansion of the inner-most longings of the individual and the group. At the same time, we must not hesitate to state that the ideological and mental apparatus with which these reformers worked was rather shallow and superficial ; nor was the spiritual basis behind Western life and learning sufficiently understood and appreciated in all its bearings by these well-intentioned men. Their understanding of Western thought and culture was mainly on the mere intellectual plane ; and, the deeper spiritual and psychological background behind this, if and when at all attempted to be understood, was only superficially discerned by them. Therefore, the ideology of our Social Reformers has proved to be vague, shows lack of a spiritual content, though it is full of enthusiasm and even good will on the part of those that thought it out and fostered it. Without fully grasping the implications of European values which had evolved out of spiritual struggles for centuries of human effort, our Social Reformers abandoned the institutions of their forefathers, in whatever decadent conditions they found them, without sufficiently understanding or delving into the spiritual principles underlying the foundations of their own social heritage. All this has resulted in creating fresh social problems which Hindu India has now to solve ; for, the 'reform movement' has

failed to tackle the evils it sought to remedy ; and, it has rather created complexities and angularities in social life and outlook which have really become very acute during our own days.

On the other hand, let us also point out that the champions of orthodoxy were not altogether without their own shortcomings. They could not and would not understand the incoming and the onrush of the new issues that contact and even conflict with an alien civilisation was incessantly bringing on Hinduism, in terms of a new learning and a strange economic order which was slowly but surely seeking to hold its sway on the mind and ideology of the best and the most enthusiastic members of the Hindu community. The Hindu priest had lost his power of vivifying and revivifying the spiritual life of his flock due to the decadence of the old learning with great deal of which he was often not even aware. Due to such decadence of knowledge, *Śāstric* injunctions tended to be misconstrued and misinterpreted as if they were inflexible masses of taboos, heaven-born and therefore unmodifiable ; and yet they were hailed as spiritual in spite of this inflexibility. The result of all this was that the Hindu social institutions of today are not exactly, even generally, in accordance with the picture of human life, conditions and control, presented by the original *Śāstras*. They deviate from their original *Śāstric* concepts, sometimes in fundamental respects, and sometimes in minor details. Such deviation is particularly noticeable in the matter of regulations regarding the *āśrama* system and the *varṇa*-organisation. The deviation of the actual Hindu social institutions of today from the original *Śāstric* bases became the more magnified, in view of the disparity, and sometimes even opposition, between precept and practice in the actual life of those that loudly upheld orthodoxy and the social institutions that it supported. Orthodoxy had, and has, little

understanding or care that something has been wrong with itself, that underneath its citadel of learning and life and practice and religion and morals lay a foundation that was decaying or that was tending towards decay. Their fundamental mistake seems to be their comfortable undisturbed attitude towards things that should have really mattered out of the cry of reform, even though that cry came from the 'Social Reformers'. They should have tried to look into every bolt and nut, every nook and corner, every piece of their social and spiritual structure from its foundation to roof, to find out if the good old house was quite in order, if it needed repairs, even drastic, in answer to the call of the human spirit that hungered and thirsted for solutions of the inmost problems of life, generated by the new Western intellectual enlightenment.

While such criticisms may generally stand well against orthodoxy, we may point out that the reformers, on their part, could not, would not and did not put their case either properly, that is to say, in terms understandable to orthodoxy, or with any faith in the ideals of the forefathers. In the midst of hurry and enthusiasm, the Reformers failed to realize what the *Sāstras* have actually done towards preserving, in theory at least, the best and the noblest in the Hindu culture. It is true, though in a limited sense, that every phase of the individual's life is marked out by the *Sāstras* in all its details. Apparently little was left for the individual to think out for himself or herself. Coupled with this, there was the demand of meek obedience to the letter of these injunctions, taking them to be unmodifiable and unalterable, under any circumstances. All this seemed to be so oppressive and unjust to the votaries of the new learning. In the midst of these circumstances, the virtues and excellences of the old Hindu theory and conception of human life and organisation came to be overlooked. In their attempts to do away

with some of the degenerated practices and theories in Hindu life of their own days, the Reformers ignored the possibilities of resuscitating the ancient lore of the forefathers and take the advantage of their wisdom, preserved, accumulated and enriched by experience and reflection through centuries ; and instead, they sought to adopt the ways and outlook of the West more or less half-heartedly. Thus they failed to estimate the value of the *Dharma-śāstras* on the intrinsic merits of their contents, without minding that the undesirable forms into which Hindu practices have come to be today were due, of course, to certain historical causes. The intrinsic merit, even in practical life, of our ancient heritage, has the testimonies of foreign travellers in India like Megasthenese and Houen-tsang, at a time when the real spirit of Hindu Dharma-śāstra was actually translated into practice. To this may also be added the evidence afforded by our literature of old times i. e. in the drama, the poetry and the folklore, of the times. The *Dharma-śāstras* were obeyed not under coercion, but with a high sense of duty, and with a view to maintain and further the good of the community. And it is evident that the good of the community was made quite practicable by this attitude of the ancients as envisaged by the *Dharma-śāstras*. It is no wonder, therefore, that the *Śāstras* should have such a great influence over the psychology and ethos of our forefathers. Instead of reminding ourselves of our noble heritage, and trying to live up to it, we have been either misconstruing it, or otherwise trying to ape blindly the ways and methods of alien cultures and peoples.

II

We may now direct our efforts to state shortly and in general what a useful and valuable heritage the ancient Hindu seers have given us towards the solutions of human problems which we are now facing even more

acutely than the ancients must have done. If our description of the *āśrama* and the *varṇa* schemes in the preceding pages has sufficiently made out that both these schemes were devised as instruments of life, as the best means towards the fulfilment of what was conceived to be the fullest and the most efficient management of the individual, and of the social and economic orders as a whole, then, in this sense, these two schemes are the unique gifts of Hinduism to the world.

It may be that to us of the present age the scheme of the *āśramas* in all its detailed curricula as laid down by the ancients may not be fully acceptable. But if order, progress and social equilibrium have to be sought, the modern world may profitably accept the spirit behind the thinking out and formulation of the *āśrama* system as a whole in order to solve problems connected with the nurture of the individual with reference to the specific and general conception of human life and labour which forms the background of community-life. It may be, that details will differ with different peoples, and, in different regions. But, without doubt, the general frame-work of the scheme will prove efficient and of eternal values for those that seek and hold it hard into their breast. The young boy-student would be certainly well-advised to live a disciplined orderly life, like the one laid down for the *brahmachārī*. After his studies are over, he is enjoined to marry, and enjoy the gifts of life, but only within the meaning and limits of the obligations and duties expected of a *grihastha* as member of a family and of a community. When after these obligations and duties are executed in the midst of the fulness of the joys of living, the person may well spend his declining years in retirement, in a spirit of less and less of attachment to the things of the world ; instead of struggling with the strifes of existence, he should now quite advisedly direct his attention more and more to a life of inward peace and meditation ; at the

same time, he must always be willing to give the benefit of his experience of the world, and of his moral presence, to the younger folk when they need it and seek it. If this is the general statement of the *āśrama*-scheme, there must be a universal acceptance of the moral and the higher basis of the *āśrama-dharma*. If properly grasped and worked out, it should be reasonably acceptable to any society, at any level of its development, in any age and country.

Then about the *varṇa*-organisation: Modern studies and researches in Europe and America tend more and more to give importance to the influence of heredity in the affairs of man. Galton adduced proofs and evidence¹ that genius is hereditary, and that, among humanity, there is a genius class which in the man contributes to the real progress of a social group. Karl Pearson and others have been collecting great masses of statistical data on the basis of biometrics in order to ascertain the effects and influence of heredity in man;² studies in family pedigrees have been carried out with a view to find out how eugenic selection of mates in marriage has been bringing out healthy results, not merely in terms of physical efficiency, but also in terms of intellectual and moral excellence. It is true that nothing like finality can be achieved by such studies even for decades to come; but what has been so far found out is enough to convince us that the problem

¹ Galton: "Hereditary Genius" (1892); "Natural Inheritance" (1889).

² See e. g. Pearson: "Treasury of Human Inheritance"; "Nature and Nurture"; and other nos. of the "Eugenics Laboratory Lecture" Series, London. See also, Gates: "Heredity and Eugenics"; Newman (Ed.): "Evolution, Genetics and Eugenics", (containing excerpts from representative writers); Schwesinger: "Heredity and Environment"; Holmes: "Human Genetics and its Social Import";—to mention only a few works explaining the significance of heredity in human life.

of heredity is increasingly coming to occupy its permanent place in regard to the control and direction of human affairs. And, what is the *varṇa* theory of the Hindus, if not, broadly speaking, a huge experiment of the management and direction of human affairs towards the perfecting of human ability in terms of the principle of heredity? It may be that sometimes, genius arises out of low or otherwise unwarranted origins ; nevertheless, it would be but wise and proper for any society to fix certain general principles of selection in terms of heredity, for carrying out the various social responsibilities in the most efficient manner possible and practicable. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that though the presumption would ordinarily be along the lines of these general principles of heredity, yet, of course, no undue importance need be given to mere heredity so as to thwart human ability from expression.

In view of the great upheaval that European and American eugenists have brought about, it really would surprise us to see that there are writers who would have nothing to do with heredity in regard to the growth of social classes. Says Cooley, for instance, "A low state of communication and of enlightenment are favourable to caste, while intelligence, specially political intelligence, and facilities of intercourse antagonize it, becomes evident when we consider what, psychologically speaking, caste is. It is an organisation of a social mind on a biological principle. That functions should follow the line of descent instead of adjusting themselves to individual capacity and preference, evidently means the subordination of reason to convenience, of freedom to order." According to this writer, the "ideal principle" would be "not biological but moral, based that is, on the spiritual gifts of the individual without regard to descent." This 'ideal principle', he says, would be successfully achieved "when

the population is so mobilized by free training and institutions that just and orderly selection is possible.”¹

Let us frankly admit that Professor Cooley's criticism would stand well if it refers to the pathological state of a social order that depends entirely upon heredity. We have given the above extracts from his writing in order to put his position as clearly and as fairly as possible, in his own words. May we now be permitted to consider, one by one, the issues our author has raised? To begin with, his statement frankly proposes to discard considerations of heredity in the management of social affairs. He thinks that a social classification based on heredity, is but an organisation of the social mind on a biological principle; he sees, underneath such a social classification, a subordination of reason to convenience, subversion of freedom in the mere interest of maintaining the existing social order; and, he plainly says it out that the ideal principle must not be biological but moral, as if the biological is necessarily anti-moral. And yet, strangely enough, he talks of individual capacity and preference, spiritual and moral gifts of individuals, without any regard to descent. Heredity-considerations are for him subversive of morals, freedom and reason, and are ministrant only to convenience and the upkeep of existing social order, as if reason and convenience cannot go together, freedom and order are opposed to each other, and heredity and mobilisation of population by free training and institutions are contradictories of each other! In our opinion, these can be seen to be complementaries of each other, the more we look into the nature and functions underlying these pairs of supposed opposites. We assert, therefore, that a just and orderly selection is possible and attainable only if society looks after both biological and

¹ Cooley: "Social Organisation" p. 226 et. seq.

nurtural issues relating to the individual and the social group to which he belongs.

Whatever may have been the source of Professor Cooley's information, in whatever part of the world he may have found such a dictation of the biological principle, we must say that the *varṇa* system of the Hindus has nothing to do with it. In fact, as we have already made out, the *varṇa* system as envisaged by the ancients has taken into consideration all the issues—biological and moral, social and individual, material and spiritual—raised and even missed by our author. Thus, the *varṇa*-organisation was based not only on biological, but also on psychological and even ethical grounds, after a rationalisation of the problems of life, individual and social, so that a complex coordination of all these factors may be made concretely available in terms of organised social institutions. In this manner, the *varṇa* theory along with the *āśrama* system seeks to achieve social efficiency consistent with, and for the sake of, the physical, mental and moral well-being of the community and its members. The *varṇa* and *āśrama* schemes were thus conceived to enable the society to make the best of the potentialities in the individual, so that through the functioning of the best and the finest that individuals are capable of, the best may be formulated and inherited by the group. While the *āśrama*-scheme pre-eminently conceives the proper nurture of the individual through life, so that the best and the noblest may be born out of it, the *varṇa*-scheme dominantly envisages a proper coordination of the natures of the individual and the group in the interest of social efficiency.

It may be that, due to historical causes, while the hereditary aspect of the individual has come to be over-emphasized, the nurture of the individual in terms of the *āśrama* scheme has come to be overlooked and even neglected. And, we humbly suggest that it is due to this

mishap more than anything else, viz., the neglect of the individual's nurture, that the hereditary principle seems to have been over-emphasised and has therefore been misunderstood as even failing us, as if on account of some anti-social element which is supposed to be an essential part of the same.

As we have already said, the degeneration of *varṇa* and *āśrama* organisations has come to be so due to historical causes ; and therefore that in no way can be said to be the fault of the basic ideology behind the *varṇa* and the *āśrama* institutions at all. In fact, the ancients had envisaged the possibility of degeneration and even of the divorce and separation of these two schemes as it has come about. Throughout the Hindu scriptures, the possibilities of change and degeneration in all things is a very popular theme of discussion. Śrī Kṛishṇa himself talks of the cycles of degeneration of *dharma* and its repeated resuscitation and revivification established by the Divine Hand. And, if the *varṇa* and *āśrama* schemes were formulated essentially for the practice and upkeep of *dharma*, certainly the degeneration or mal-adjustments of these two schemes in any period of history is part of the theory of *dharma* as laid down by Śrī Kṛishṇa and other Hindu seers. Thus Hinduism should entertain every hope for the survival and revival of their social institutions.

The Hindu thinkers saw no opposition between social good and social ends on the one hand, and of individual good and individual ends on the other. The basis of the Hindu social order is *dharma* ; in terms of *dharma*, all human activities—biological and psychological, economic and moral, personal and social—are defined and coordinated. The ancient seers had clearly understood the intimate relation of these two schemes with each other ; and, unless the pristine balance between these two fundamental contributions of the Hindu sages is secured and maintained hereafter, it will not be possible to live

life to its fullest stature, not merely for the Hindus but also for the peoples of all the world. We venture to suggest that the conflict between man and man, community and community, occupation and occupation, politics and economics, economics and ethics, philosophy and life, religion and science, that we are witnessing to-day in terms of war, could be effectively dissolved and resolved in terms of peace, if these two great instruments of life, of *āśrama* and *varṇa*, that the ancient Hindus found out and practised, are adopted by the peoples of the world, if the theory of *dharma* which these two institutions manifested in the concrete is accepted by them, and if the *dharma* that defines human existence as an opportunity of self-understanding and self-conquest through a self-rendering life of service and devotion to duty runs incessantly through their hearts.

With such findings and belief, we may fitly conclude this work with the memorable Bhāratasāvitṛi verses with which the sage Vyāsa concludes the writing of the Great Epic.

Raising up my hand,
I declare with all my might :
From *dharma* follow *artha* and *kāma* :

Why not then practise *dharma*?

However,

So few pay heed to me !

But, be it remembered

That *dharma* should never be abandoned

To fulfil the demands of *kāma*,

Or, through fear or avarice,

Or, even when one's life is at the stake ;

For,

Dharma is eternal,

While the joys and sorrows of life

Are but fleeting and transitory,

Even as the soul is eternal,

Though the means and instruments it uses
Are but frail and transient.''¹

¹ Mahā. Svargā. 5, 62-63: *ūrdhvaabāhurviraumyesha na cha
kaśchichchhruṇoti mé/
dharmād arthaścha kāmāścha sa kimartham na sevyaṭe//
na jātu kāmān na bhayān na lobhād/dharmam tyajet
jīvitasyāpi hetoh/
nityo dharmah sukhaduḥkhe tvanitye/jīvo nityo heturasya
tvanityah//*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. ORIGINAL SOURCES

- Rigvedasamhitā* : (Sanskrit) with Sāyana's Bhāṣhya. Ed. by MM. Rājārām Śāstri Bodas, and Śivarām Śāstri Goré. 8 Volumes. Bombay.
- Griffith, R. T. H. : (Tr.) *Rigveda*, Vols. I & II. Benares; E. J. Lazarus & Co. 1896.
- " : " *Yajur Veda* " "
- " : " *Sāma Veda* " "
- " : " *Atharva Veda*, 2 Vols. " "
- Bloomfield, M. : *Hymns of the Rigveda*. Clarendon Press, Oxford and Bks. of the ... 1897.
- Whitney, W.D. & Lanman, C. R. } : *Atharva Veda*, Har. Ori. Ser. 1908.
- Roer, Rajendralal } : *The Twelve Principal Upanishads*, Theosophical Publishing, Madras. 1931-32.
- Mitra & E. B. } : *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, Uni. Pr.
- Cowell } : *Thirty Minor Upanishads*, Madras. 1914.
- Hume R. E. : *Mahānārāyaṇa Upanishad*, (Ed.) 1888.
- Aiyar N. K. } : *Rig Veda Brāhmaṇas—The Aitareya Kaushitakī* (Tr.). Har. Ori. Ser. 1920.
- Jacob, Col. G. A. } : *Rig Veda Brāhmaṇas—The Aitareya Kaushitakī* (Tr.). Har. Ori. Ser. 1920.
- (Ed.) } : *Rig Veda Brāhmaṇas—The Aitareya Kaushitakī* (Tr.). Har. Ori. Ser. 1920.
- Keith, A. B. : *Rig Veda Brāhmaṇas—The Aitareya Kaushitakī* (Tr.). Har. Ori. Ser. 1920.

Volumes of translations in the Sacred Books of the East Series (Edited by F. Max Müller):—

- The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. (Tr. by J. Eggeling) Vols. xii & xxvi.
- The Laws of Manu* (Tr. by G. Bühler) Vol. xxv.
- The Dharmasūtras of Vasishṭha and Baudhāyana* (Tr. by G. Bühler) Vol. xiv.
- The Sūtras of Āpastamba and Gautama* (Tr. by G. Bühler) Vol. ii.
- The Institutes of Viṣṇu* (Tr. by J. Jolly) Vol. vii.
- Nārada and Some Minor Law Books* (Tr. by J. Jolly) vol. xxxiii.
- The Grihya-Sūtras*. (Tr. by H. Oldenberg) Vols. xxix & xxx.

Āśvalāyana-Grihyasūtra: Ed. by Dinkar Keshav Gadgil (*Poṭhī*) Pub. by Pt. Nārāyan Mulji, (Tattvavivechak Press), Bombay, Śaké 1817.

Āpastamba-Grihyasūtra: Ed. by Pt. A. Chinnaswāmī Śāstri, (Kāśī Sanskrit series). Benares, 1928.

- Baudhāyana-Grihyasūtra*: Ed. by R. Shāma Sāstrī. Mysore 1920.
- Kāthaka-Grihyasūtra*: Ed. by Dr. W. Calland. (Dayānanda Mahāvidyālaya Sanskrit Granthamālā), Lahore, 1925.
- Khādīra-Grihyasūtra*: Ed. by A. M. Sāstrī and L. Śrīnivāsachārya. Government Oriental Library Series. Mysore, 1913.
- Mānava-Grihyasūtra*: Ed. by R. H. Sāstrī (Gaekwad's Oriental series). Baroda, 1926.
- Pāraskara-Grihyasūtra*: Ed. by Mahadeva Gangadhar Bakre. (Gujarati Printing Press), Bombay, 1917.
- Āpastambīya Dharmasūtram*: Ed. by G. Bühler. Third Ed. passed through the Press by M. G. Shastri (Bombay Sanskrit Series). 1932.
- Gautama-Dharmasūtram*: Ed. by L. Śrīnivāsachārya (Government Oriental Library Series). Mysore, 1917.
- ✓ *Manusmritih*: Ed. by P. H. Pandya (Gujarati Printing Press) Bombay, 1913.
- Nāradya Manusamhitā*: Ed. by K. Sāmbaśiva Sāstrī (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series). 1929.
- Parāśaradharmaśamhitā*, or *Parāśurasmritih*: With the Bhāshya of Sāyaṇa Mādhavāchārya. Ed. by Pt. V. S. Islāmpūrkar (Bombay Sanskrit Series). 3 Vols. 1893.
- Dutt M. N.: Tr. of the *Dharma Śāstras* of *Angiras*, *Atri*, *Dakṣa*, *Hārīta*, *Kātyāyana*, *Likhita*, *Samvarta*, *Sankha*, *Sātātapa*, *Uśanā*, *Vrihaspati*, *Vyāsa*, *Yama*. 2 Vols. Calcutta.
- Yājñavalkya Smṛiti*—Tr. by S. C. Vidyabhushan.
- Yājñavalkya Smṛiti*—(Sanskrit) Ed. by Wāsudeo Laxman Sāstrī Paṇṣikar. 3rd Ed. Bombay, Nirṇaya-Sāgar Press, 1926.
- Kātyāyanasmṛitisāroddhārah*: with Tr. by P. V. Kane. Bombay, 1930.
- Mitra Miśra, Mm. Pt.: *Vīramitrodayah*, Ed. by Pārvatīya Nityānanda Śarmā. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1913.
- Bhaṭṭa Gopīnātha Dikshita: *Samskāra-ratna-mālā*. Ed. by Kaśīnātha Sāstrī Āgāśé, and Bābāśāstrī Phadaké. Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series. 2 Vols. Poona.
- Chandēśvara Ṭhākura: *Grihastha-Ratnākara*. Ed. by Mm. Kamalākarakrishṇa Smṛititīrtha (Bibliotheca Indica, Work No. 249). Calcutta, 1928.
- Kauṭīliyam Arthaśāstram*: Ed. by R. Shama Sastri. Mysore, 1919.
- Arthaśāstra*. Tr. by R. Shama Sastri, 3rd Ed. 1929.

- Śrīmad-Bhāgawata Purāṇa*: Tr. by S. Subba Rao. 1928.
 " " : With Marāṭhi Trans. Pub. by
 Dāmodar Sāvalārām & Co., Bombay.
- Viṣṇu Purāṇa*: Tr. by H. H. Wilson, 5 vols. 1864-77. —
- The Mahābhārata* (Tr. by M. N. Dutt).
- The Rāmāyaṇa* (Tr. by R. T. H. Griffith). 1870-74. (1915 Ed., Benares).
- Vālmiki-Rāmāyaṇam*: Ed. by T. R. Krishṇācharya. Nirṇaya-Sagar Press, Bombay. 1911-13.
- Śrī-Mahābhārata*: (Sanskrit). With the commentary of Nilakaṇṭha. Ed. by Pandit Rāmachandraśāstri Kinjawadekar. 7 vols. Chitraśālā Press, Poona, 1929-1936.
- Nītisāra of Kāmandaka*: Ed. by T. Gaṇapati Śāstri (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series). 1912.
- Kāmandakīya Nītisāra*: Eng. Tr. by M. N. Dutt. Calcutta, 1896.
- Śukranītisāra*: Eng. Tr. by B. K. Sarkar. Allahabad, Pāṇini Office.
- Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyanamuni*: Ed. by Goswāmi Dāmodar Śāstri. (Kāśī Sanskrit Series), Benares, 1929.
- Patanjali: Yoga System of Patanjali*, Ed. by J. H. Woods. Har. Or. Ser. Vol. 7.
- Patanjali: Yogasūtras*. Tr. by Rāma Prasāda, with Intro. by S. C. Vasu. ('Sacred Books of the Hindus', Vol. IV). Allahabad, Pāṇini Office, 1912.
- Bhagavadgītā*.
Anāsaktiyoga: Mahātmā Gāndhī. (Marāṭhi Trans.). Aundh, 1931.
- (1) *The Bhakti-Sūtras of Nārada*: } Tr. by Nandalal Sinha
 (2) *Śaṇḍilya-Sūtram*: and } (Sacred Books of the
 (3) *Bhakti-Ratnāvalī*: } Hindus), Allahabad,
 1917-18.

2. GENERAL

- Abbott, J. : *The Keys of Power*. A study of Indian Ritual and Belief. Methuen, London, 1932.
- Adams, Sir J. : *The Evolution of Educational Theory*. Macmillan, London, 1912.
- " " " : *The Teacher's Many Parts*. University of London Press, 1930.

- Adamson, J. E. : *Individual and the Environment*. Some Aspects of the Theory of Education as Adjustment. Longmans, 1921.
- Addams, J. : *Democracy and Social Ethics*. Macmillan, New York, 1920.
- Adler. A. : *Understanding Human Nature*. Tr. by Dr. W. B. Wolfe. Allen & Unwin, London, 1932.
- „ „ : *The Science of Living*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1930.
- „ „ : *What Life Should Mean to You*. Ed. by A. Porter. Allen & Unwin, London, 1932.
- Aiyangar, K. V. : *Considerations of Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity* (Sir Subramani Aiyar Lects., 1914). Madras University, 1935.
- Aldrich, C. R. : *Primitive Mind and Modern Civilization*. Kegan Paul, London.
- Allport, F. H. : *Institutional Behaviour*. Uni. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, U. S. A., 1933.
- Altekar A. S. : *Education in Ancient India*. The Indian Book Shop, Benares, 1934.
- „ „ : *A History of Village Communities in Western India*. Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1927.
- Ambedkar, B. R. : *Castes in India*. 1917.
- Bader, C. : *Women in Ancient India*. Kegan Paul, London, 1925.
- Bagehot, W. : *Physics and Politics*. Kegan Paul, London, 1934.
- Bagley, W. C. : *Education and the Emergent Man*. Thomas Nelson & Sons.
- Baldwin, J. M. : *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. 4th Ed. New York, 1906.
- „ „ : *Individual and the Society*. Richard G. B. Badger, Boston, 1911.
- Bandopadhyaya, N. C. } : *Kautilya, A. Critical and Historical Study*. R. Cambray & Co., Calcutta, 1927.
- Banerjee, P. : *Public Administration in Ancient India*. Macmillan, London, 1916.
- Banister, H. : *Psychology and Health*. Camb. Uni. Press, London, 1935.

- Barnett, L. D. : *Antiquities of India*. Philip Lee Warner, London, 1913.
- „ „ : *Bhagavad-Gītā, or the Lord's Song*. Dent, London, 1928.
- Bartlett, F. C. : *Psychology and Primitive Culture*. Macmillan, London, 1923.
- „ „ : "Group Organization and Social Behaviour". Art. in *Inter. Jour. of Ethics*, (1925), Vol. 35, No. 1.
- Barth, A. : *Religions of India*. Tr. by Rev. J. Wood. Trubner's Oriental Series, London, 1914.
- Basu, P. C. : *Indo-Aryan Polity (Rigvedic)*. 2nd Ed. 1925.
- Belvalkar, S. K. & R. D. Ranade. } : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II—*Creative Period*. Bilvakunja Publishing House, Poona, 1927.
- Bernard, L. L. : *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. Henry Holt, New York, 1926.
- „ „ (Ed.) : *The Fields and Methods of Sociology*. Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1935.
- Bergson, H. : *Creative Evolution*. Tr. by A. Mitchell, Macmillan, London, 1919.
- „ „ : *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. (Tr. by R. A. Audra & C. Bereton). Macmillan, London, 1935.
- Betts, G. H. : *The Mind and Its Education*. 3rd Rev. Ed. D. Appleton, New York, 1923.
- „ „ : *Social Principles of Education*. New York, 1912.
- Bhagwan Das, Babu : *The Essential Unity of All Religions*. Theos. Pub. House, Adyar, Madras, 1932.
- „ „ : *Krishna — A Study in the Theory of Avatāras*. 3rd Ed. Revised. Adyar, 1929.
- „ „ : *The Science of Social Organization*, 2 Vols. 2nd. Ed. Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras (India), 1932-35.
- Bhandarkar, D. R. : *Some Aspects of Ancient Hindu Polity*. Benares Hindu Uni., 1929.
- „ „ : *Lectures on the Ancient History of India*—650 B. C. to 325 B. C. Calcutta, 1919.
- „ „ : *Aśoka*. 2nd Ed. Rev. and Enlarged. University of Calcutta, 1932.

- Bhandarkar, R. G. : *Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*. Strassburg, 1913.
- Bhattacharya, J.N. : *Hindu Castes and Sects*. Calcutta, 1896.
- Bloomfield, M. : *The Religion of the Veda*. Knickerbocker Press, 1908.
- Boas, F. : *The Mind of the Primitive Man*. Macmillan, New York, 1924.
- Bogardus, E. S. : *Introduction to Sociology*. 4th Ed. 8th Imp. Jesse Ray Miller, Los Angeles, U. S. A., 1929.
- Bokil, V. P. : *The History of Education in India*. Bombay, 1925.
- Bosanquet, Helen : *The Family*. Macmillan, London, 1915.
- Bose, Phanindra } : *Teachers of Buddhist Universities*. Theosoph. Pub. House, Adyar, 1923.
- Nath } :
- Bose, P. N. : *Survival of Hindu Civilization*. Newman, Calcutta, 1913.
- Bossard, J. H. S. : *Social Change and Social Problems*. Harper, New York, 1934.
- Bradley, F. H. : *Ethical Studies*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927.
- „ „ : *Collected Essays*. 2 Vols. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1935.
- Branford, V. & } : *The Coming Polity*. Wms. Norgate,
- P. Geddes } : London, 1919.
- „ „ : *Our Social Inheritance*. Wms. Norgate, London, 1919.
- Brown, J. F. : *Psychology and the Social Order*. McGraw-Hill, London, 1936.
- Brown, L. Guy : *Social Psychology; The Natural History of Human Nature*. McGraw-Hill, New York & London, 1934.
- Bristol, L. M. : *Social Adaptation*. Har. Uni. Press, 1915.
- Buch, M. A. : *The Principles of Hindu Ethics*. Baroda, 1921.
- „ „ : *The Spirit of Ancient Hindu Culture*. Baroda.
- Bury, J. B. : *The Idea of Progress*. Macmillan, London, 1920.
- Briffault, R. : *The Mothers; A Study of Origins of Sentiment and Institutions*. 3 Vols. Macmillan, New York, 1931.

- Bushee, F. A. : *Principles of Sociology*. Holt, New York, 1933.
- „ „ : *Social Organization*. Holt, New York, 1930.
- Calverton, V. C. & }
S.D. Schmalhausen } : *Sex in Civilization*.
(Ed.)
- „ „ (Ed.) : *The New Generation*. The Macaulay Co., New York, 1930.
- The Cambridge History of Ancient India*. Vol. I. Ed. by E. J. Rapson. Cambridge University Press, 1922.
- Carver, T. N. : *The Essential Factors of Social Evolution*. Harvard University Press, 1935.
- Carr-Saunders, A.M. : *Eugenics*. Home Uni. Library, 1926.
- Catell, R. B. : *Psychology and Social Progress*. London, C. W. Daniel Co., 1933.
- Cavenagh, F. A. }
(Ed.) } : *James and John Stuart Mill on Education*.
Camb. Uni. Press, 1931.
- Chakladar, H. C. : *Social Life in Ancient India; Studies in Vātsyāyana's Kāmasūtras*. Greater India Society, Calcutta, 1929.
- Chanda, R. : *The Indo-Aryan Races*. Varendra Research Society, Rajshahi, India, 1916.
- Chapman J. C. & }
G. S. Counts. } : *Principles of Education*. Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1924.
- Chattopadhyaya, K. : Art. : "The Origin of Caste" in *Vishwa-Bhārati Quarterly*, Vol. II (1924-5), pp. 347-58.
- Childe, V. G. : *New Light on the Most Ancient East*. Kegan Paul, London, 1935.
- Cole, G. D. H. : *Social Theory*. Methuen & Co., London, 4th Ed. 1920.
- Conklin, E. S. : *Heredity and Environment in the Development of Man*. Princeton Uni. Pr., 1930.
- Cooley, C. H. : *Social Organization — A Study of the Larger Mind*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1927.
- „ „ : *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Scribner's, New York, 1922.
- „ „ : *Social Process*. Scribner's, New York, 1924.

- Cooley, C. H.,
R. G. Angell &
L. J. Carr. } : *Introductory Sociology*. Scribner's, New
York, 1933.
- Cowdry, E. V.
(Ed.) } : *Human Biology and Racial Welfare*.
Hoerber, New York, 1930.
- Crawley, E. : *The Mystic Rose*. 2nd Ed. Revised and
enlarged by Theodore Bestermann, 2
Vols. Methuen, London, 1927.
- Dalal, V. J. : *History of India from the Earliest Times*.
Vol. I. 1914.
- Das, A. C. : *Rigvedic India*. Vol. I. R. Cambray &
Co., Calcutta, 1920.
- „ „ : *Rigvedic Culture*. R. Cambray & Co.,
Calcutta, 1925.
- Das, S. K. : *The Educational System of the Ancient
Hindus*. Mitra Press, Calcutta, 1930.
- Das Gupta, R. : *Crime and Punishment in Ancient India*.
- Das Gupta, S. N. : *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*. Kegan
Paul, London, 1924.
- „ „ : *Yoga Philosophy*. Calcutta University,
1930.
- „ „ : *A History of Indian Philosophy*. 2 Vols.
Cambridge Uni. Press, 1922-1932.
- Davenport, C. B. : *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*. Holt,
New York. 1911.
- Davids, Mrs. Rhys : *Indian Religion and Survival*. Allen &
Unwin, London, 1934.
- „ „ : *The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its
Development in Buddhism*. Luzac,
London, 1936.
- Davids, T. W.
Rhys } : *Buddhist India*. T. Fisher Unwin,
London, 1911.
- Davis, J., Barnes
H. E., et al } : *An Introduction to Sociology*. Rev. Ed.
D. C. Heath, London & N. Y., 1931.
- Dealy, J. Q. : *The Family in Its Sociological Aspects*.
London, 1913.
- Demiaskevich, M. : *An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Education*. American Bk. Co., New York,
1935.
- Denison, J. H. : *Emotion as the Basis of Civilization*.
Scribner's, New York, 1932.
- Deussen, P. : *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*.
T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1919.

- Deussen, P. : *The System of the Vedanta, according to Shankara*. Tr. by C. H. Johnston. Open Court, Chicago, 1912.
- „ „ : *Outline of the Vedanta System of Philosophy, According to Shankara*. Tr. by J. H. Woods & C. B. Runkle. 2nd Ed. Cambridge, U. S. A. 1927.
- Dewey, John. : *Human Nature and Conduct*. An Introduction to Social Psychology. 1st Ed. 9th Imp. Henry Holt, New York, 1927.
- „ „ : *Philosophy and Civilization*. Putnam's Sons, New York & London, 1931.
- „ „ : *Democracy and Education*. 19th Imp. Macmillan, New York, 1930.
- „ „ : *Sources of a Science of Education*. Horace Liveright, New York, 1929.
- „ „ : *Interest and Effort in Education*. Boston, 1913.
- „ „ : *Educational Essays*. Ed. by J. J. Findlay. Blackie, London (no date).
- „ „ : *Moral Principles in Education*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1909.
- „ „ : *How we Think*. New Ed. Rewritten. D.C. Heath & Co., London and New York, 1933.
- Dewey, J. & J. H. Tufts. } : *Ethics*. Bell & Sons, London, 1910.
- Dikshitar, V.R.R. : Art. "Kauṭilya & Machiavelli", in *Ind. Hist. Quar.* 1927, pp. 176-80.
- „ „ : "The Arthashastra Re-examined", in *Ann. of Bhand. Res. Insti.*, Poona, Vol. XV, pp. 212-19.
- „ „ : Art. "Is the Arthashastra Secular"? in *Proc. of the Third Ori. Con.*, Madras, 1924.
- „ „ : *Hindu Administrative Institutions*. University of Madras, 1929.
- „ „ : *The Mauryan Polity*. Madras, 1932.
- Dresser, H. W. : *Human Efficiency*. 1912.
- Dubois, A. J. A. & } : *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1906.
- Beauchamp, H. K. }
- Dunlap, K. : *Social Psychology*. Williams & Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 1925.

- Dunlap, K. : *Civilised Life* (A Revision and Enlargement of "Social Psychology", 1925). London, George Allen, 1934.
- Durant, Will : *Philosophy and the Social Problem*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.
- Durkheim, E. : *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Tr. by J. W. Swain. London, Allen & Unwin, (No date).
- Dutt, N. K. : *The Aryanization of India*. Calcutta, 1925.
- " " : *The Origin and Growth of Caste in India*. Vol. I. The Book Co., Calcutta, 1931.
- Dutt, R. C. : *History of Civilization in Ancient India*. Rev. Ed. 2 Vols. London, Kegan Paul, 1893.
- " " : *Ancient India*, 1913.
- Dixon, R. B. : *The Building of Cultures*. Scribner's, New York, 1928.
- Edman, I. : *Human Nature Traits and Their Social Significance*. Houghton Mifflin, 1923.
- Ellis, Havelock : *Man and Woman*. 8th Rev. Ed., Wm. Heinemann, London, 1934.
- " " : *"Studies in the Psychology of Sex"; Vol. VI.—Sex in Relation to Society*. Philadelphia, F. A. Davis & Co., 1928.
- " " : *Psychology of Sex*. A Manual for Students. Wm. Heinemann, London, 1933.
- " " : *Little Essays on Love and Virtue*. A. C. Black, London, 1930.
- " " : *The Task of Social Hygiene*. Constable, London.
- Ellis, R. S. : *The Psychology of Individual Differences*. 2nd Imp. D. Appleton, New York and London, 1930.
- Ellwood, C. A. : *Intro. to Social Psychology*. D. Appleton & Co., New York and London, 1926.
- " " : *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1915.
- " " : *The Psychology of Human Society*. D. Appleton & Co., New York and London, 1931.

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Ed. by J. Hastings, with the assistance of J. A. Selbie, & L. H. Gray. 13 Vols. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1925-1934 (Second Imp.).

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Ed. by E. R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson. New York, Macmillan Co., Vols. I — XV 1930-35.

Eubank, E. E. : *The Concepts of Sociology*. Heath, Boston. 1932.

Fairchild, H. P. : *General Sociology*. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1934.

Faris, E. : *The Nature of Human Nature*, and other Essays in Social Psychology. McGraw-Hill, New York and London, 1937.

Farquhar, J. N. : *The Crown of Hinduism*. Ox. Uni. Pr. 1913.

„ „ : *Religious Life in India*. Ox. Uni. Pr. 1916.

„ „ : *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India*. Oxford University Press, London, 1920.

„ „ : *Modern Religious Movements in India*. Macmillan, London, 1929.

Fick, R. : *The Social Organization in N. E. India in Buddha's Time*. Tr. by S. K. Maitra. University of Calcutta, 1920.

Findlay, J. J. : *Foundations of Education*. 2 Vols. London, 1925-27.

Finney, R. L. : *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*. Macmillan, 1928.

Flügel, J. C. : *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*. The International Psychoanalytic Press, London, 1921.

„ „ : *Men and their Motives*. Kegan Paul, London, 1934.

Folsom, J. K. : *Social Psychology*. Harper & Bros., New York and London, 1931.

„ „ : *The Family; Its Sociology and Social Psychiatry*. John Wiley & Sons. Inc. New York, 1934.

„ „ : *Culture and Social Progress*. Longmans, New York, 1928.

- Forel, August : *The Sexual Question*. English Adaptation by C. F. Marshall. Rev. Ed. Wm. Heinemann, London, 1929.
- Frazer, Sir J. G. : *The Golden Bough*. Abridged Edition. Macmillan, London, 1925.
- „ „ : *Psyche's Task*. 2nd Ed. Macmillan, London, 1913.
- „ „ : *Man, God and Immortality*. Passages chosen from the writings of Sir James Frazer. Macmillan, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *Totemism and Exogamy*. 4 Vols. New Ed. Macmillan, London, 1935.
- Freud, S. : *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Tr. by J. Strachey. London, Inter. Psychoana. Library, London, 1922.
- „ „ : *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. Macmillan, 1917.
- „ „ : *Totem and Taboo*, New Republic, Inc., New York, 1927.
- „ „ : *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Inter. Psychoana. Li., 1930.
- „ „ : *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. London, 1922.
- „ „ : *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Tr. by W. J. H. Sprott. Hogarth Press, London, 1933.
- Galton, F. : *Hereditary Genius*. Macmillan, London, 1869.
- „ „ : *English Men of Science, their Nature and Nurture*. Macmillan, London, 1874.
- „ „ : *Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development*. Macmillan, London, 1883.
- „ „ : *Natural Inheritance*. Macmillan, London, 1889.
- Gates, R. R. : *Heredity and Eugenics*. Constable, London, 1923.
- „ „ : *Heredity in Man*. Rev. Ed. Macmillan, London, 1929.
- Ghose, Śrī } : *Essays on the Gita*. Two Series. Arya
Aurobindo } Publishing House, Calcutta.
- „ „ : *The Yoga and Its Objects*. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.

- Ghose, Srî } : *Bases of Yoga*. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.
 Aurobindo } :
 „ „ : *Lights on Yoga*. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.
 „ „ : *The Ideal of the Karma-Yogin*. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.
 „ „ : *A System of National Education*. Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.
 Ghoshal, U. N. : *A History of Hindu Political Theories*. 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press, London, Bombay & Madras, 1927.
 Ghurye, G. S. : *Caste and Race in India*. Kegan Paul, London, 1932.
 Gillin, J. L., & } : *Outlines of Sociology*. 3rd Ed. Macmillan, New York, 1933.
 F. W. Blackmar } :
 Giddings, F. H. : *Principles of Sociology*. Macmillan, New York, 1916.
 „ „ : *Civilization and Society*. Holt, New York, 1932.
 „ „ : *Scientific Study of Human Society*. Chapel Hill, The Uni. of North Carolina Press, 1924.
 Ginsberg, M. : Art: "Class Consciousness", in *Ency. of The Social Sciences*, Vol. III. 1930.
 „ „ : *Studies in Sociology*. Methuen, London, 1932.
 „ „ : *The Psychology of Society*. 4th Ed. Methuen, London, 1933.
 „ „ : *Sociology*. Home Uni. Library, 1934.
 Gode, P. K. : *The Bhaktisūtras of Nārada and the Bhagwadgītā*. Offprint from the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1923.
 Goldenweiser, A. A. : *Early Civilization*. A. A. Knopf, New York, 1922.
 „ „ : *Anthropology*. Harrap, London, 1937.
 Goodsell, W. : *A History of Marriage and the Family*. Rev. Ed. Macmillan, New York, 1935.
 Grady, S. G. : *Manual of Hindu Law*. Wildy & Sons, London, 1871.
 Grousset, R. : *The Civilizations of the East: India*. Tr. by C. A. Phillips. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1932.

- Guyer, M. F. : *Being Well-Born*. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1927.
- Hadfield, J. A. : *Psychology and Morals; An Analysis of Character*. Methuen & Co., London, 1923.
- Hadfield, J. A. (Ed.) : *Psychology and Modern Problems*. Methuen, London, 1935.
- Haldane, J. B. S. : *The Inequality of Man and Other Essays*. Chatto & Windus, London, 1932.
- Hall, G. S. : *Morale, or the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*. D. Appleton, New York & London, 1920.
- „ „ : *Adolescence*. D. Appleton, New York & London, 1911.
- „ „ : *Youth*. D. Appleton, New York & London, 1928.
- „ „ : *Senescence*. D. Appleton, New York & London, 1922.
- Hankins, F. H. : *Introduction to the Study of Society*. Macmillan, New York, (Rev. Ed.), 1935.
- Hart, C. A. (Ed.) : *Philosophy of Society*. The Dolphin Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1934.
- Hart, Hornell, & E. B. } : *Personality and the Family*. D. C. Heath & Co., 1935.
- Havell, E. B. : *The History of Aryan Rule in India*. Harrap, London, 1918.
- Hayes, E. C. : *Sociology*. Appleton—Century, New York & London, 1930.
- Healy, W., A. E. } : *The Structure and Meaning of Psycho-*
- Bronner, & A. M. } *analysis as Related to Personality and*
- Bowers } *Behaviour*. Knopf, New York, 1930.
- Hertzler, J. O. : *Social Institutions*. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1929.
- Hetherington, H. } : *Social Purpose*. Allen & Unwin, London,
- J. W. & J. H. } 1918.
- Muirhead }
- Hobhouse, L. T. : *Morals in Evolution*. 4th Ed. Chapman & Hall, London, 1923.
- „ „ : *Social Evolution and Political Theory*.
- „ „ : *Development and Purpose*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *Social Development, Its Nature and Conditions*. George Allen. London, 1924.
- „ „ : *The Elements of Social Justice*. 2nd Imp. Allen & Unwin, London, 1930.

- Hobhouse, L. T.,
M. Ginsberg &
G. C. Wheeler } : *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*. Chapman & Hall, London, 1915.
- Hogben, L. T. : *Genetic Principles in Medicine and Social Sciences*. Wms. Norgate, London, 1931.
- „ „ : *Nature and Nurture*. Wms. & Norgate, London, 1933.
- Holmes, S. J. : *Human Genetics and its Social Import*. McGraw-Hill, 1936.
- „ „ : *The Trend of the Race*. Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1921.
- Holt, E. B. : *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*. Henry Holt, New York, 1915.
- Hopkins, E. W. : *The Great Epic of India*. Scribner's, New York, 1902.
- „ „ : *India, Old and New*. Scribner's, New York & London, 1902.
- „ „ : *The Ethics of India*. Yale Uni. Press, New Haven, 1924.
- „ „ : *The Mutual Relations of the Four Castes According to Mānava-dharma-Sāstram*. Leipzig, 1881.
- Horne, H. H. : *The Philosophy of Education*. Macmillan, New York, 1916.
- House, F. N. : *The Development of Sociology*. McGraw-Hill, 1936.
- Howard : *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*. 3 Vols. Chicago. 1904.
- Ibbetson, D. : *Punjab Castes*. The Punjab Govt. Printing Press, Lahore, 1916.
- Jacobi, H. : *Gleanings from Kauṭilya* — Cultural, Literary, Linguistic and Historical. Tr. by N. P. Utgikar, in "Ind. Anti.", 1924 from Proc. of the Roy. Pruss. Aca. of Sciences, 1911-12.
- Jaspers, K. : *Man in the Modern Age*. Tr. by E. & Cedar Paul, from the 5th German Ed. Routledge, London, 1933.
- Jastrow, J. : *The House That Freud Built*. Greenberg, New York, 1932.
- Jayaswal K. P. : *Hindu Polity*. Butterworth, Calcutta. 1924.
- „ „ : *Manu and Yājñavalkya*. Butterworth, Calcutta. 1930.

- Jayaswal, K. P. : *History of India* (150 A. D.—350 A. D.). Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, Lahore, 1933.
- Jennings, H. S. : *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*. Faber & Faber, London, 1930.
- „ „ : “Heredity and Environment”, *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 19, pp. 225-38.
- Jha, Mm. } : *The Yoga-Darśana*. Tattva-Vivechaka Press, Bombay, 1907.
- Gangānātha } : *The Yoga-Sāra-Samgraha of Vijnāna-Bhikshu*. Tattva-Vivechaka Press, Bombay, 1923.
- „ „ : „
- Joad, C. E. M. : *A Guide to Modern Thought*. Faber & Faber, London, 1933.
- „ „ : *A Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*. Gollancz, London, 1937.
- Jolly, J. : *Outlines of an History of Hindu Law*. Tagore Law Lects. Calcutta, 1885.
- „ „ : *Hindu Law and Custom*. Tr. by B. K. Ghosh. Greater India Society, Calcutta, 1928.
- Jones, E. (Ed.) : *Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis*. Lects. Delivered Under the Auspices of the Sociological Society, by E. Jones, J. Glover, J. C. Flügel, M. D. Eder, B. Low, & E. Sharpe. Wms. Norgate, London, 1924.
- Judd, C. : *The Psychology of Social Institutions*. Macmillan, New York, 1927.
- „ „ : *Education and Social Progress*. Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1935.
- Kane P. V. : *A History of the Dharmaśāstras; Ancient & Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law*. Vol. I. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, India, 1930.
- „ „ : *Kātyāyanasmṛitisāroddhārah* (Tr.). Bombay, 1933.
- „ „ : *The Vedic Basis of Hindu Law*. Reprinted. Karnatak Printing Works, Dharwar, 1936.
- „ „ : Art: “Gotra and Pravara”, *Jour. of the B. B. R. A. S.* New Series, Vol. XI (Aug. 1935).

- Keay F. E. : *Ancient Indian Education*. Ox Uni. Pr., London, 1918.
- Keith, A. B. : *A History of Sanskrit Literature*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928.
- „ „ : *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanishads*. 2 Vols. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusettes, U. S. A., 1925.
- Keller, A. G. : *Societal Evolution*. Rev. Ed., Macmillan, New York. 1932.
- „ „ : *Starting-Points in Social Science*. Ginn & Co., Boston, U. S. A., 1925.
- Kelsey, Carl. : *The Physical Basis of Society*. D. Appleton, New York, 1928.
- Ketkar, S. V. : *The History of Caste in India*. Taylor & Carpenter, Ithaca, New York, 1909.
- „ „ : *An Essay on Hinduism ; Its formation and Future*. Luzac & Co., London, 1911.
- Keyserling, Count H. (Ed.) } : *The Book of Marriage*. Jonathan Cape, London, 1927.
- Kidd, B. : *Social Evolution*. Macmillan, 1894.
- Kilpatrick, W. H. : *A Source Book in the Philosophy of Education*. 10th Imp. Macmillan, 1930.
- King, I. : *Education for Social Efficiency*. Enlarged Ed. Appleton, New York, 1915.
- Kirkpatrick, E. A. : *The Individual in the Making*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston & New York, 1927.
- „ „ : *Fundamentals of Child Study*. A Discussion of Instincts and other Factors in Human Development with Practical Applications. Rev. Ed. Macmillan, New York, 1927.
- Kolnai, A. : *Psychoanalysis and Sociology*. Tr. by E. & C. Paul. Allen & Unwin, London, 1921.
- Krueger, E. T. & W. C. Reckless. } : *Social Psychology*. Longmans, Green, London, 1931.
- Kroeber, A. L. : *Anthropology*. Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1923.
- „ „ : Art. "Caste" in *Ency. of the Soc. Sci.* Vol. III. 1930.
- Kulp II, Daniel H. : *Educational Sociology*. Longmans, Green. London & New York, 1932.

- Law, N. N. : *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity*. Longmans, Bombay & Calcutta, 1914.
- „ „ : *Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1921.
- „ „ : *Studies in Indian History and Culture*. Luzac, London, 1925.
- Le Bon, G. : *The Crowd*. 11th Ed. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1917.
- „ „ : *The Psychology of Peoples*. Tr. by R. Derechef. Allen & Unwin, London, 1898.
- Leighton, J. L. : *Individuality and Education*. D. Appleton & Co., New York & London, 1928.
- Levy-Bruhl, L. : *Primitive Mentality*. Tr. by L. A. Clare. Allen & Unwin, London, 1923.
- Lightenberger, J. P. : *Development of Social Theory*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1923.
- Linton, Ralph, : *The Study of Man*. Appleton—Century, New York & London, 1936.
- Lippmann, W. : *A Preface to Morals*. Macmillan, 1929.
- Locke, John : *The Educational Writings of John Locke*. Ed. by J. W. Adamson. Camb. University Press. London, 1922.
- „ : *Some Thoughts Concerning Education, by John Locke*. Ed. by R. H. Quick. Cambridge University Press, London, 1913.
- Lofthouse, W. F. : *Ethics and the Family*. London, 1912.
- Lorand, Sandor } : *Psychoanalysis Today. Its Scope and*
(Ed.) } *Function*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1933.
- Lowie, R. H. : *Primitive Religion*. Boni & Liveright, New York, 1925.
- „ „ : *Are We Civilized?* Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1929.
- Ludovici, A. M. : *The Choice of a Mate*. (The International Library of Sexology & Psychology, Ed. by Norman Hair.) John Lane the Bodley Head, London, 1935.
- Lumley, F. E. : *Principles of Sociology*. 6th Imp. McGraw-Hill, 1928.
- Lyall, A. C. : *Asiatic Studies; Religious and Social*. 2 Vols. 2nd Ed. John Murray, London, 1907.

- McCrindle, J. W. } ; *Ancient India as Described by Magasthenese and Arrian*. Chuckervetty Chatterjee & Co., Calcutta, 1926.
(Tr.)
- McCunn, J. : *The Making of Character: Some Educational Aspects of Ethics*. Camb. Uni. Pr., 6th Rev. Imp., 1912.
- McCurdy, J. F. : *Problems in Dynamic Psychology: A Critique of Psychoanalysis and Suggested Formulations*. Camb. Uni. Press, London, 1923.
- Macdonell, A. A. : *A History of Sanskrit Literature*. 4th Imp., William Heinemann, London, 1913.
- „ „ : *Vedic Mythology*. V. Von K. J. Trübner, Strassburg, 1897.
- „ „ : *Lects. on Comparative Religion*. University of Calcutta, 1925.
- „ „ : *India's Past*. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927.
- Macdonell, A. A. } ; *Vedic Index*. 2 Vols. John Murray, London, 1912.
and Keith, A. B. }
- McDougall, W. : *Introduction to Social Psychology*. 12th Ed., Methuen, London, 1928.
- „ „ : *Psycho-Analysis and Social Psychology*. Methuen, London, 1936.
- „ „ : *The Group Mind*. Camb. Uni. Press, London, 1921.
- „ „ : *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*. Methuen, London, 1926.
- „ „ : *Religion and the Sciences of Life*. Methuen, London, 1934.
- „ „ : *An Outline of Psychology*. Chas. Scribner's, New York, 1923.
- „ „ : *The Frontiers of Psychology*. Nisbet & Co., London, 1934.
- MacIver, R. M. : *Community: A Sociological Study*. 3rd Ed. Reprinted. Macmillan, New York, 1928.
- „ „ : *Society, Its Structure and Changes*. Ray, Long and Richard R. Smith, Inc., New York, 1931. New Revised Ed., entitled "*Society: A Textbook of Sociology*". Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1937.

- McKenzie, John, : *Hindu Ethics*. Oxford University Press, London, 1922.
- McKenzie, J. S. : *Outlines of Social Philosophy*. 2nd Ed. Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *The Fundamental Problems of Life*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1928.
- McKown, H. C. : *Character Education*. McGraw-Hill, London & New York, 1935.
- MacNicol, Nicol, : *Indian Theism*. Oxford University Press, London, 1915.
- Maine, H. S. : *Ancient Law*. 10th Ed. Reprinted. John Murray, London, 1911.
- „ „ : *Lects. on Early History of Institutions*. John Murray, London, 1875.
- Maitra, S. K. : *The Ethics of the Hindus*. Cal. Uni. Pr., 1925.
- Majumdar, R. C. : *Corporate Life in Ancient India*. 2nd Ed. University of Calcutta, 1922.
- Malinowski, B. : *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*. Kegan Paul, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *The Sexual Life of Savages in N. W. Malenesia*. Routledge, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. Kegan Paul, London, 1926.
- „ „ : Art. on "Marriage", in *Ency. Brit.*, 14th Ed. Vol. 14, pp. 940-50.
- Marett, R. R. : *Psychology and Folklore*. Macmillan, London, 1920.
- „ „ : *The Threshold of Religion*. 3rd Ed. Methuen, London, 1914.
- „ „ : *Man in the Making*. Rev. Ed., T. Nelson & Sons, London, 1937.
- „ „ : *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion*. Clarendon, Oxford, 1932.
- „ „ : *Sacraments of Simple Folk*. Clarendon, Oxford, 1933.
- „ „ : *Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evolution*. Hutchinson's Scientific Books, London, 1935.
- Marshall, T. H. : Art. "Social Class", *Sociological Review*, London, Vol. 26 (1934), pp. 55-76.
- Martin, E. D. : *The Behaviour of Crowds*. Harper & Bros, New York, 1920.

- Masson-Oursel, P.,
H. de William—
Grabowska, & P. } : *Ancient India and Indian Civilization*.
Stern. : Tr. by M. R. Dobie. Kegan Paul,
London, 1934.
- Maudsley, H. : *Organic to Human; Psychological and Sociological*. Macmillan, London, 1916.
- MaxMüller, F. : *India, What Can it Teach Us?* Longmans, London, 1910.
- „ „ : *Chips from a German Workshop*. 4 Vols. Longmans, London, 1868-75.
- „ „ : *Origin and Growth of Religion*. 2nd Ed. Longmans, London, 1878.
- May, Geoffrey. : *Social Control of Sex Expression*. George Allen, London, 1930.
- Mayne, J. D. : *A Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage*. 1914.
- Mecklin, J. M. : *An Introduction to Social Ethics*. Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1920.
- Mees, G. H. : *Dharma and Society*. Luzac & Co., London, 1935.
- Meyer, J. J. : *Sexual Life in Ancient India*. 2 Vols. Routledge, London, 1930.
- Miller, H. A. : *Races, Nations and Classes*. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1924.
- Mitra, P. : *Prehistoric India; Its Place in World Cultures*. 1928.
- Moll, A. : *The Sexual Life of the Child*. Tr. by E. Paul. Allen & Unwin, London, 1923.
- Money-Kyrle, R. E. : *The Meaning of Sacrifice*. Hogarth Press, London, 1930.
- Monier-Williams, M. } : *Indian Wisdom*. 4th Ed. Luzac & Co., London, 1893.
- „ „ : *Brahmanism and Hinduism*. 3rd Ed. John Murray, London, 1887.
- Mookerji, } : *Aśoka* (Gaekwad Lects.). Macmillan, Radhakumud, } : London, 1928.
- „ „ : *Democracies of the East*. P. S. King., London, 1923.
- „ „ : *Nationalism in the Hindu Culture*. Theos. Pub. House, London, 1921.
- „ „ : *Harsha* (Cal. Uni. Lects.). Oxford Uni. Press., London, 1926.
- „ „ : *The Fundamental Unity of India*. Longmans, London, 1914.

- Mowrer, E. R. : *The Family*. Uni. of Chicago Press. 1932.
- Muir, J. : *Original Sanskrit Texts*. Vols. I-V. Second Ed. Trübner & Co., London, 1868-70.
- Mukerjee, Radha } : *Regional Sociology*. The Century Co.,
Kamal } : New York & London, 1926.
- Mukerjee, Radha } : *Intro. to Social Psychology*. D. C. Heath
Kamal, & N. N. } : & Co., London, 1928.
- Sengupta. }
- Müller-Lyre, F. : *History of Social Development*. Tr. by Lake and Lake. Allen & Unwin, London, 1923.
- „ „ : *The Evolution of Modern Marriage*. Tr. by I. C. Wigglesworth. Allen & Unwin, 1930.
- „ „ : *The Family*. Allen & Unwin, 1931.
- Münsterberg, H. : *Psychology, General and Applied*. D. Appleton-Century, London & New York, 1923.
- Murchison, C. : *Social Psychology*. Clark Uni. Press, Worcester, U. S. A., 1929.
- „ (Ed.) : *A Hand-Book of Social Psychology*. Clark. Uni. Press, & Ox. Uni. Press, London, 1935.
- Murphy, G. & L. B. : *Experimental Social Psychology*. Harper & Bros., New York, 1931.
- Myerson, A. : *Social Psychology*. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1934.
- Newmann, H. : *Education for Moral Growth*. D. Appleton, New York & London, 1923.
- North, C. C. : *Social Differentiation*. Chapel Hill, Uni. of North Carolina Press, U. S. A. 1926.
- „ : *Social Problems and Social Planning*. McGraw-Hill, New York & London, 1932.
- Notes and Queries on Anthropology*. Pub. by the British Association for the Advancement of Science. 5th Ed. 1929.
- Nunn, Sir T. P. : *Education; Its Data and First Principles*. Rev. Ed., Edward Arnold, London, 1935.
- O'Malley, L. S. S. : *India's Social Heritage*. 1934.
- „ „ : *Indian Caste Customs*. Camb. Uni. Pr., London, 1932.

- Oman, J. C. : *Indian Life, Religious and Social*. 1889.
 " " : *Cults, Customs and Superstitions of India*. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1908.
- O'Shea, M. V. : *Social Development and Education*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1909.
- Pai, D. A. : *Monograph on the Religious Sects in India among the Hindus*. Times of India Press, Bombay, 1928.
- Pargiter, F. E. : *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*. Ox. Uni. Press, London, 1922.
- Park, R. E. and E. W. Burgess, } : *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*.
 : Uni. of Chicago Press, Chicago, U. S. A. 1921.
- Parmelee, M. : *Oriental and Occidental Culture*. 1929.
- Paul, R. : *The Hindu Philosophy of Law in Vedic and Post-Vedic Times*. Bishvabhandar Press, Calcutta.
- Pearson, Karl. : *The Grammar of Science*. A. C. Black, London, 1911.
- " : *Nature and Nurture*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- " : *The Academic Aspects of the Science of National Eugenics*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- " : *The Groundwork of Eugenics*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- " : *Nature, Nurture and the Problem of Future*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- " : *The Problem of Practical Eugenics*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- " : *Darwinism, Medical Progress and Eugenics*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- " : *Social Problems; Their Treatment, Past, Present and Future*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.

- Pearson, Karl : *Eugenics and Public Health*. Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series. Camb. Uni. Pr. London, 1910.
- Peters, C. C. : *Foundations of Educational Sociology*. Rev. Ed., Macmillan, New York, 1930.
- Perry, W. J. : *The Primordial Ocean*. An Introductory Contribution to Social Psychology. Methuen, London, 1933.
- Phelps, H. A. : *Principles and Laws of Sociology*. Wiley & Sons, New York, 1936.
- Pittard, E. : *Race and History*.
- Porteus, S. D. : *The Psychology of a Primitive People*. Edward Arnold, London, 1931.
- Pound, Roscoe, : *Law and Morals*. Uni. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, U. S. A., 1924.
- „ „ : *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*. 4th Imp. Yale Uni. Press, New Haven, U. S. A., 1930.
- Pradhan, Sita Nath : *Chronology of Ancient India*. Calcutta University, 1927.
- Prasad, Beni. : *Theory of Government in Ancient India*. Indian Press, Allahabad, 1927.
- „ „ : *The State in Ancient India*. Indian Press, Allahabad, 1928.
- Prasad, I. : *History of Mediaeval India*. The Indian Press, Allahabad, 1923.
- Proceedings and Transactions of the All-India Oriental Conferences.*
- Puntambekar, S. V. : *An Introduction to Indian Citizenship and Civilization*. 2 Vols. Nand Kishore and Bros. Benares, 1928-29.
- Queen, S. A.,
Bodenhafer, W. B. } : *Social Organization and Disorganization*.
& Harper, E. B. } T. Y. Crowell, New York, 1935.
- Radhakrishnan, S. : *Indian Philosophy*. 2 Vols. Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *The Hindu View of Life*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *An Idealist View of Life*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1932.
- „ „ : *The Heart of Hindustān*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1932.

- Radhakrishnan, S. : *East and West in Religion*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1933.
- „ „ : *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*. Macmillan, London, 1920.
- Radin, P. : *Social Anthropology*. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1932.
- Ragozin, Z. A. : *Vedic India*. T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1899.
- Ranade, M. G. : *Religious and Social Reforms*. Collected and Compiled by M. B. Kolaskar. Gopal Narayan & Co., Bombay, 1902.
- Ranade, R. D. : *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1926.
- „ „ : *Mysticism in Mahārāshṭra*. Aryabhushan Press Office, Poona, 1933.
- Rapson, E. J. : *Ancient India, From the Earliest Times to the First Century A. D.* Cambridge Uni. Press, 1914.
- Recent Social Trends in U. S. A.* 2 vols. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1933.
- Reuter, E. B. & } : *The Family*. McGraw-Hill. New York, 1931.
- Runner, J. R. } :
- Ringbom, Lars. : *The Renewal of Culture*. Tr. by G. C. Wheeler. Allen & Unwin, London, 1929.
- Risley, H. H. : *The People of India*. 2nd Ed. Thacker, Bombay, Calcutta & London, 1915.
- Rivers, W. H. R. : *Social Organization*. Kegan Paul. London, 1932.
- „ „ : *Kinship and Social Organization*. Constable, London, 1914.
- „ „ : *Psychology and Politics*. Kegan Paul, London, 1923.
- „ „ : *Psychology and Ethnology*. Kegan Paul, London, 1926.
- Roback, A. A. : *Psychology of Character*. Kegan Paul, London, 1927.
- Robinson, E. S. : *Man as Psychology Sees Him*. Macmillan, New York, 1932.
- Robinson, J. H. : *The Mind in the Making*. 2nd Ed. With Intro. by H. G. Wells. Jonathan Cape, London, 1923.
- „ „ : *The Humanizing of Knowledge*. Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1924.

- Ross, E. A. : *Social Psychology*. 25th Imp. Macmillan, New York, 1929.
- „ „ : *Social Control*. 7th Imp. Macmillan, New York, 1915.
- „ „ : *Principles of Sociology*. 1st Revision, Appleton-Century, New York & London, 1930.
- Roy, S. : *Customs and Customary Law in British India*. Pub. by the Author. Calcutta, 1911.
- Russell, Bertrand, : *Principles of Social Reconstruction*. Allen & Unwin, 1917.
- „ „ : *The Conquest of Happiness*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1930.
- „ „ : *Education and Social Order*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1932.
- „ „ : *The Scientific Outlook*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1931.
- „ „ : *On Education, Especially in Early Childhood*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1926.
- „ „ : *Marriage and Morals*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1930.
- Russell, R. V. : *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*. 4 Vols. Introductory Essay on "Caste", in Vol. I. pp. 3-197, London, 1916.
- Samaddar, J. N. : *The Glories of Magadha*. 2nd Ed. Pub. by the Author, Patna, India, 1927.
- Sarkar, B. K. : *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*. Pāṇinī Office, Allahabad. 1914-1921.
- „ „ : *Sukranīti* (Tr.). Pāṇinī Office, Allahabad, 1914.
- „ „ : *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*. Leipzig. 1928.
- Sarkar, S. C. : *Some Aspects of the Earliest Social History of India*. Oxford University Press, London, 1928.
- Schwesinger, Gladys : *Heredity and Environment : Studies in the Genesis of Psychological Characteristics*. Macmillan, New York, 1933.
- Scott, C. C. : *Social Education*. Ginn & Co., Boston & London, 1908.

- Seal, B. N. : *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*. Longmans, London, Bombay & Calcutta, 1915.
- Sen, A. K. : *Studies in Hindu Political Thought*. Calcutta, 1926.
- Senart, É. : *Caste in India*. (Tr. by E. D. Ross). Methuen, London, 1930.
- Sen Gupta, N. C. : *Sources of Law and Society in Ancient India*. Art Press, Calcutta, 1914.
- Shah, K. T. : *The Splendour that was 'Ind*. Taraporevala, Bombay, 1930.
- Shama Sastry, R. : *Evolution of Indian Polity*. University of Calcutta, 1920.
- Shastri, Bhagat } : *The Bhakti Cult in Ancient India*. B.
Kumar } Banerjee & Co., Calcutta, 1922.
- Sidhanta, N. K. : *The Heroic Age of India*. Kegan Paul, London, 1929.
- Sircar M. N. : *The System of Vedantic Thought And Culture*. University of Calcutta, 1925.
- „ „ : *Hindu Mysticism*. Kegan Paul, London, 1934.
- Slater, G. : *The Dravidian Element in Indian Culture*.
- Small, A. : *General Sociology*. The University of Chicago Press, Illinois, U. S. A., 1920.
- Smith, G. Elliot : *Human History*. Rev. Ed., Jonathan Cape, London, 1934.
- Smith, W. R. : *Principles of Educational Sociology*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1928.
- Snedden, David : *Educational Sociology for Beginners*. Macmillan, New York, 1930.
- Sorokin, P. : *Social Mobility*. Harper & Bros., New York, 1927.
- „ „ : *Contemporary Sociological Theories*. Harper, New York, 1928.
- Speier, H. : Art. "Honour and Social Structure", *Social Research*, Vol. II (1935), pp. 74-97.
- Spencer, H. : *The Study of Sociology*. 22nd Ed. Kegan Paul, London.
- „ „ : *Principles of Sociology*. 3 Vols. 3rd Ed. D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1923.
- „ „ : *Herbert Spencer on Education*. Ed. by F. A. Cavenagh. Camb. Uni. Press, London, 1932.

- Sumner, W. G. : *Folkways*. Ginn & Co., London & New York, 1906.
- „ „ : *What Social Classes Owe to Each other*. Yale Uni. Press, 1925.
- Sumner, W. G. & A. G. Keller } : *The Science of Society*. 3 Vols. Yale Uni. Press, 1927.
- Tagore. R. : *Sādhanā*. Macmillan, London, 1926.
- „ „ : *The Religion of Man*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1931.
- „ „ : *Man*. (Andhra Uni. Lectr. Series, No. 16), Waltair, Madras, 1937.
- „ „ : *Creative Unity*. Macmillan, 1922.
- Tansley, A. G. : *The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life*. George Allen, London, 8th Imp. 1923.
- Tarde, G. : *The Laws of Imitation*. Tr. from French. Holt, New York, 1903.
- Tawney, R. H. : *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. John Murray, London, 1929.
- „ „ : *The Acquisitive Society*. G. Bell, London, 1930.
- „ „ : *Equality*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1931.
- Thomas, E. J. : *The Song of the Lord; Bhagawad-Gītā*. Tr. with Intro. and Notes. John Murray, London, 1931.
- Thomas, F. : *The Environmental Basis of Society*. The Century Co., 1925.
- Thomas, F. W. & A. R. Lang, } : *Principles of Modern Education*. Harrap, London & Bombay.
- Thomas, W. I. : *Sex and Society*. A study in the Social Psychology of Sex. Chicago, 1907.
- Thomson, G. H. : *A Modern Philosophy of Education*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1929.
- Thomson, J. Arthur, & P. Geddes. } : *Life: Outlines of General Biology*. 2 Vols. Williams Norgate, London, 1931.
- „ „ : *Sex*. Home University Library, London, 1927.
- Thoothi, N. A. : *The Vaishnavas of Gujarāt*. Longmans, London & Bombay, 1935.

- Thorndike, E. L. : *Educational Psychology*; Vol. I: "The Original Nature of Man". Teachers' College, Columbia University, New York, 1919.
- „ „ : *Education; A First Book*. Macmillan, New York, 1923.
- „ „ : *Individuality*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1911.
- Tilak, B. G. : *Bhagawad-Gītā-rahasya*. (Marāṭhī). Tilak Bros., Gayakawad Wada, Poona, 1923.
- „ „ : *The Arctic Home in the Vedas*. Tilak Bros., Gayakawad Wada, Poona, 1925.
- Tozzer, A. M. : *Social Origins and Social Continuities*. Macmillan, 1925.
- Trotter, W. : *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. 2nd Ed. Macmillan, 1919.
- Tuttle, H. S. : *A Social Basis of Education*. T. Y. Crowell Co., New York, 1935.
- Unwin, J. D. : *Sex and Culture*. Ox. Uni. Press, 1934.
- Urwick, E. J. : *The Social Good*. Methuen, London, 1927.
- „ „ : *A Philosophy of Social Progress*. 2nd Rev. Ed. Methuen, London, 1920.
- Vaidya, C. V. : *Epic India*. 1st Reprint. The Bombay Book Depot, Bombay, 1933.
- „ „ : *The Riddle of the Rāmāyana*. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1906.
- „ „ : *Mahābhārata: A Criticism*. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1905.
- „ „ : *History of Mediaeval India*. 3 Vols. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1921-26.
- Venkateswara, S. V. : *Indian Culture Through the Ages*. Vols. I and II. Longmans, London & Bombay, 1928.
- Wallace, A. R. : *Social Environment and Moral Progress*, Cassell & Co., London, 1913.
- Wallas, Graham. : *The Great Society*. Macmillan, London, 1928.
- „ „ : *Human Nature in Politics*. Constable, London, 1924.
- „ „ : *Our Social Heritage*. Allen & Unwin, 1921.
- „ „ : *Social Judgment*. Allen & Unwin, 1934.

- Waller, W. : *The Sociology of Teaching*. Wiley & Sons, New York, 1932.
- Ward, Lester, F. : *Psychic Factors of Civilization*. Ginn & Co., Boston, U. S. A. 1897.
- Warner, W. Lloyd, : Art. on "American Caste and Class", *Amer. Jour. Socio.* Vol. 42, pp. 234-38, Sept. 1936.
- Wesley, E. B. : Art. "A Socialized Education for a Socialized Age", in the *Annals of the American Academy of Pol. and Soci. Sc.*, Vol. 182, Nov. 1935.
- Westermarck, E. : *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. 2 Vols. Macmillan. 2nd Ed. 1924.
- " " : *History of Human Marriage*. 3 Vols. 5th Ed. Rewritten. Macmillan, London, 1921.
- " " : *A Short History of Human Marriage*. Macmillan, London, 1926.
- " " : *Three Essays on Sex and Marriage*. Macmillan, London, 1934.
- " " : *The Future of Marriage in Western Civilization*. Macmillan, London, 1936.
- " " : *Ethical Relativity*. Macmillan, London.
- Williams, J. M. : *The Foundations of Social Sciences. An Analysis of their Psychological Basis*. Knopf, New York, 1920.
- " " : *Principles of Social Psychology*, Knopf, New York, 1920.
- Wissler, Clark. : *Man and Culture*. Harrap. 1923.
- Woolner, A. C. : *Ashoka*. 2 Parts. Punjab University Publications, 1924.
- Wündt, W. : *Elements of Folk Psychology*. Tr. by E. L. Schaub. Macmillan, New York, 1916.
- Young, Kimball, : *Social Psychology*. F. S. Crofts. New York, 1931.
- " " : *An Introductory Sociology*. American Book Co., New York 1934.
- Znaniecki, F. : *The Laws of Social Psychology*. University of Chicago Press, 1925.
- " " : *The Method of Sociology*. Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1934.

3. JOURNALS, PERIODICALS, ETC.

(i) Oriental.

Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

Indian Art and Letters. India Society, London.

Indian Culture. A Quarterly Journal of the Indian Research Institute, Calcutta.

Journal of the American Oriental Society. Quarterly, Yale Uni. Pr., New Haven, Conn., U. S. A.

Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Old and New Series, Bombay.

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Quarterly, London.

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

Man in India. A Quarterly Record of Anthropological Science with special reference to India. Published by "Man in India" Office, Ranchi, B. N. I. Railway, India.

The Poona Orientalist. Quarterly. The Oriental Book Agency, Poona.

The Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society. Old and New Series, Bangalore.

Review of Philosophy and Religion. Journal of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, Poona.

Vividha-jñāna-vistāra. (Marāṭhi).

The Viśva-Bhārati Quarterly. Śānti-niketan, Bengal.

(ii) General.

The American Journal of Sociology. Bi-monthly. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.

American Sociological Review. Official Organ of the American Sociological Society, published bi-monthly.

- Character and Personality*. An International Psychological Quarterly. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Ethics*. An International Quarterly of Social, Political & Legal Philosophy. (Formerly published under the title "*The International Journal of Ethics*") The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.
- The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*. A Quarterly Publication of the American Psychological Association. The Psychological Review Co., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A.
- The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, London.
- The Journal of Social Philosophy*. A Quarterly Devoted to the Philosophic Synthesis of the Social Sciences. New York.
- The Journal of Social Psychology*. Quarterly. Provincetown, Massachusetts, U. S. A.
- Man*. A monthly Record of Anthropological Science, published by the Royal Anthropological Institute, London.
- Psychological Index*. Published by The Psychological Review Co., Princeton, U. S. A.
- The Sociological Review*. A Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Sociology. The LePlay House Press, London.
- Sociology and Social Research*. Bi-monthly. Los Angeles, California, U. S. A.
- The Eugenics Review*. Quarterly. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London.
- Eugenical News*. Bi-monthly. Published by The Eugenics Research Association, Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, N. Y., U. S. A.
- Scientific Monthly*. The Science Press, New York, U. S. A.

INDEX

INDEX

- Agni-parinayana*, 166-7
Ārsha marriage, 151, 152
 "Arthaśāstra", as a source of
 Hindu life and thought,
 xiv-xv
Āsmārohaṇa, a ceremony in
 marriage, 167
Āśrama, the first (*Brahma-*
 charya), 78, 218
 See also ch. iii.
 the second (*grihastha*), 78,
 218-9
 See also chs. iv, v.
 as specially valued, 82-6
 the third (*vānaprastha*), 78-9
 the fourth (*samnyāsa*), 79-81
Āśramas, originally three, 71-4
 the social psychology of the
 four, ch. ii
 as providing schooling, 63-6,
 89-91
 See also ch. ii
 the psycho-moral basis of,
 66-70
 in relation to the individual
 and the group, 89-91
 and the tradition of *yajna*
 (*yajna-paramparā*), 87-9
 and *varṇas*, as coordinating
 schemes, 63-4, 81-2, 281,
 337 ff.
Āsura marriage, 151, 152
 Beale, Howard, 132
 Bhandarkar, R. G., 36n, 47
Bhāratasāvitṛī verses, 344-5
 Bosanquet, H., 227
Brahmacharyāśrama, 78, 103-
 42, 218
Brāhma marriage, 151, 152
 Brown, L. G., 246
 Bühler, G., 19n
 Burgess, E. W., 207
 Calverton, V. F. & S. D.
 Schmalhausen (Ed.), 145n,
 185n
 "Cambridge History of India",
 xiin, xiiin
 Carver, T. N., vi, vii, 324n,
 325n
 Castes and *Varṇa*, 293-8
 Cattell, R. B., 125-6
 Colebrooke, H. T., 234n, 282
 Comte, A., 206
 Conception of human life and
 deeds,
 in the 'Brāhmaṇas', 5-6
 in the Epics, 9-17
 in the 'Gītā', 31-44, et seq.
 in the 'Nītiś', 23-5
 in the 'Smṛitiś', 17-23 et seq.
 in the 'Upanishads', 6-9
 in the 'Vedas', 5
 in the 'Yoga-Sūtras', 25-31
 Cooley, C., 205, 238, 321n,
 322, 340 ff.
Daiva marriage, 151, 152
 Das, S. K., 107-8
 Das Gupta, S. N., 27
 Daughter
 'appointed', 159, 247-8
 dowry in marriage forbidden,
 180-1, 250
 free to marry or not, 150,
 248-9, 269, 270-1
 position of, in the family,
 247-50

- Debts, individual and social, (*riṇas*), 75, 84
- Destiny (*daiva*) and *karma*, 15-7, 23, 25
- Deussen, P., 70
- Dewey, John, 96, 125
- Dharma*
and the home, 211-3
and *karma*, 11, 13-4, 17, 20-3, 34, 36-8, 56, 58-60, 65-6, 211, 212-3
in relation to *Artha* and *Kāma*, 66-70, 77, 212-3, 255
See also '*Purushārthas*'.
and social institutions, 58-60, 281
and time and place (*deśa-kāla*), 63
and *varṇa* and *āśrama*, 281
See also '*Dharma* and social institutions'.
Yājñavalkya's classification of, 22-3
- Dharma-śāstras* as sources of Hindu life and thought, xiii-xiv, 335-7
- Dunbar, G., xiin, xiiin
- Dutt, M. N., 11n, 109n
- Dutt, N. K., 282, 283, 284n-290n, 297
- Education,
age of initiation, 106-8
external control upon, 131ff.
female, 134-9, 272
free tuition and its effects upon, 118ff.
importance of celibacy in, 127ff.
and inequality of pupils' talents, 130ff.
and lessons in simple living, 108ff.
- Locke on place of punishment in, 129
moral training along with the intellectual in, 122ff.
personal attention of the teacher (*guru*) in, 113ff.
place of punishment in, 128ff.
Locke on, 129
compared with Europe and America, 129-30
the psychology of, ch. iii
and psychoanalysis, 133-4
pupil's duties to the teacher 117ff.
rites of initiation in, 103ff.
social implications of, 106
general socio-psychological implications of, 96-103
teacher's duties to the pupil, 116
as a *vrata* (vow), 139-41
- Eggeling, J., 108, 142
- Einstein, A., 132n
- Ellis, R. S., 323n
- Ellwood, C. A., 100, 203, 204, 206n, 207
- Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 147, 151
- Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 70
- Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 323, 324, 325
- Epics, as sources of Hindu life and thought, xi-xiii
- Eugenics, 158
and *varṇa*-organization, 329ff.
- Family
the continuity of the, 209-10, 211-2
interpersonal relations in the, 221ff.
husband and wife, 222-43, 259, 260-1, 264, 265, 268

- the joint Hindu, 214-15
and the *samskāras*, 215-21
for the woman 219-20,
271-2
for the Sūdra, 219-20
Socio-psychological bases of
203ff.
Structure and function of the
Hindu, 207ff.
See also Home.
Father, the position of, in the
family, *See* Parents.
Female education, 134-9, 272
Flügel, J. C., 206
Freud, S., 133, 263n
Galton, F., 339n
Gāndharva marriage, 151-2,
175, 176, 177, 178-81, 184
as specially recommended,
176, 177, 178-80
Gates, R. R., 339n
Ghosh, Dr., 182
Giddings, F. H., 324n—5n
Ginsberg, M., 324, 325
Gotra in marriage, 154-8
and *pravara* in marriage,
156-7
Griha-praveśa (entering the
home), 170-2
“*Grihyasūtras*” as sources of
domestic life, xiii
Guṇas as the bases of *varṇa*-
system, 314ff.
Hamilton G. V. & K. Mc-
Gowan, 185
Haug, M., 282-3
Heredity in marriage, 159-61
Hindu ideals, not contradictory
to the Western, ix-xi
Holmes, S. J., 339n
Home
and *Dharma*, 211-13
five great sacrifices in, 207-9,
211
rituals for building the,
209-10
See also Family.
Husband and wife, 222-43
permitted days of intimacy,
241-3
power over wife, 224-41
See also Family.
Jolly, J., 214
Judd, C., 101
‘*Kāmasāstra*’ as a source of
Hindu life and thought,
xiv-xv
Kāma-Sūkta (Hymn to God of
Love), 164-5
Kane, P. V., 66, 156n
Kanyā-dāna, 164-5
Karma
and its atonement, 6ff.
development of the theory of,
9ff.
and *Dharma*, *See* ‘*Dharma*’.
theory of, not fatalistic, 32ff.
Keith, A. B., 32n, 73, 74
Kirkpatrick, E. A., 205
Kreuger, E. T., & W. C.
Reckless, 204
Kroeber, A. L., 322-3
Lājā-homa, in marriage, 167-8
Linton, R., 321n
Locke on punishment to pupil,
129
Ludovici, A. M., 266n
Macdonell, A. A., xiii, 32, 46
& A. B. Keith, 71, 155,
156, 251
MacIver, R. M., 207, 321n,
322

- MacKenzie, J. S., 222
 'Mahābhārata', as a source of
 Hindu social thought and life,
 xii-xiii
 Malinowski, B., 146-7
 Mantegazza, P., 146
Mārgas (ways) of attaining the
 final aim of life, in the *Gītā*,
 38ff.
 Marriage, ch. iv
 age of, 181-7
 brahmacharya (celibacy) for
 some time after, 172, 182
 chastity of the bride and
 groom in, 152-4
 concealment of the defects of
 the bride or the groom,
 187-8
 concluding remarks on
 Hindu, 197-9
 as a *dharma*, 148-50
 dissolution when allowed,
 188-90, 224
 endogamy and exogamy in,
 154-8
 foetus-laying rites after, 173-
 4, 215
 forms of Hindu, 150-2, 175-8
 levirate (*niyoga*), 196-7
 polygamy, 193-6, 223-4
 and the *purushārthas*
 (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*),
 165, 166, 174
 qualifications for, 152-63
 remarriage of widows, 190-2
 rites and ceremonies in,
 163-72
 rites and ceremonies after,
 172-4
 as a social institution,
 147-50, 219
 some Western views of
 Hindu, criticized, 145-7
 wife as a gift by the gods in,
 169
 wife when allowed to re-
 marry, 188-90
 Masson-Oursel, P., and others,
 298
 MaxMüller, F., 282
 McDougall, W., 205
 Modi, P. M., 71, 72
 Moll, A., 262n
 Mother, the position of, in the
 family, *see* Parents.
 Muir, J., 282, 283

 "Nature", cited, 132
 Newlon, Professor, 132
 Newman, H. H., and others,
 339n
Niyoga (levirate), 196-7
 Nunn, T. P., 97, 99, 106, 126

 O'Shea, M. V., 97, 98, 129

Paiśāchu marriage, 152
Pancha-muhā-yañnas, 207-9, 211
Pāṇi-grahaṇa, 165-6, 174-5,
 176, 188, 207
Pāṇinī, grammarian, 155n
 Parents' position in the family,
 250-5
 Past,
 Carver on the value of, v, vii
 lessons of, useful for the
 present, iii-vii
 literature of Hindus giving
 basic social ideals and
 ideals, vii
 Pearson, K., 339n.
 Peterson, P., 161, 162, 163n,
 232, 235n
 Plato, 290n
Prājāpatya marriage, 151, 152
Pravara in marriage, 154-8

- Purushārthas* (*dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *moksha*), as the psycho-moral bases of the *āśrama* - system, 66 - 70, 86-87
and the home, 355
Purusha - *sūkta* interpreted, 282-4
- Radhakrishnan, S., 25n, 26, 45
Rākshasa marriage, 152
"Rāmāyaṇa", as a source of Hindu social life and thought, xi-xii
- Ranade, R. D., 7, 47n, 72n, 73n, 290n
- Rangachari, K., 156n
- Roback, A. A., 262n-263n
- Ross, E. A., 114, 118
- Sacraments (*samskāras*) sanctifying the body, 215-21
See also Family.
and the *varṇas* and *āśramas* 220-1
- Saṁdha* relationship and marriage, 155
- Sapta-padī*, 168-9, 174-5, 227, 236
- Sarkar, B. K., 23, 125
- Schwesinger, G., 339n
- Scriptures of the Hindus as sources of their basic social thought, vii-x
- Senart, É., 297-8
- Small, A., 322
- "*Smritis*" as sources of Hindu life and thought, xiii-xiv
- Social classes,
modern views on, 320ff.
varṇas as, See '*Varṇas*'.
- Social institutions, based on conception of the origin of life and its conduct, 1-2, et seq.
- 'Social Reformer' and 'Orthodox', 334ff.
- Social stratification, remedy against, 328ff.
- Son, the eldest, 244-6
the position of, in the family, 243-6
- Sources, original, of Hindu social psychology, xi-xv
- Sumner, G., 98, 133, 147, 153-4
- Tansley, A. G., 133n, 134
- Thoothi, N. A., 47n, 51, 52, 57n, 70n, 213n, 256
- Trivarga* (*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*), xiv, 68
- Upanayana* ceremony, 103ff., 218
- Urwick, E. J., 222
- Vaidya, C. V., 71, 156n
- Varṇa* and deeds, 303-5, 306-13
Varṇas,
duties of, 298ff.
in distress, 301-3 **APADA D**
the four, ch. vii
and the *guṇas*, See '*Guṇas*'.
and *jāti*, 293, 296-8
the mixture (*samkara*) of, 293-8
and Eugenics, 339ff.
without class-distinctions in Vedic literature, 284-6
in the "*Gītā*", 313ff.
in the "*Mahābhārata*", 291-5, 298ff.
in the "*Smritis*", 295-6, 301-3
the origin of, 281-96
in the "*Brahmaṇas*" and the "*Samhitās*", 288-90
in the "*Mahābhārata*", 291-5

- in Vedic literature, 282-6
 - in the "*Upanishads*", 290-1
- Vasu, S. C., 26
- Venkatesan, N. K., 45n-46n
- Venkatesvara, S. V., 137
- Vidyarnava, S. C., 234n
- Vivāha*, See Marriage.
- Ward, L. F., 321
- Westermarck, E., 147, 148
- Wife,
 - abandonment of, 240-41
 - and husband, See Family.
 - when allowed to re-marry, 188-90
- Williams, J. M., 101, 111, 115, 186-7
- Winternitz, M., xiin-xiiin
- Woman,
 - and the *āśramas*, 276-7
 - See also "Female education".
 - and education, See Female education.
 - in Hindu society, ch. vi
 - See also, Daughter, Mother, Wife.
 - the nature of, 261-2, 265-9, 272-4, 277-8
 - and the *samskāras*, 219-20, 271-2
- Yajna*,
 - and the *āśramas*, 87-9
 - and the home, 255-6
 - See also, 'Pancha-mahā-yajnas'
 - and *karma*, 39-41, 49-56
 - the tradition (*paramparā*) of, 49-55
- Young, K., 98, 101, 203, 204, 246
- Zimmer, H., 282

